quote:

Originally posted by echidna:

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Originally posted by sse:

quote:

Originally posted by echidna:

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Originally posted by sse:
If "winning" the war against Russia remains the goal, then there will be no peace, because that will never happen.

Why not? They lost a war in 89 and ran home with their tail between their legs. Then they lost another one in 96. The rumours of Red Army invincibility are greatly exaggerated.

What scenario(s) do you perceive in which Russia will just wrap up and withdraw troops?

There are many scenarios, but this is exactly what they did both in 89 and 96. And if we are to go deeper in history, in 1905, 1917 and 1939.

Didn't answer the question.

Try this one: What scenario(s) do you perceive in which Russia will just wrap up and withdraw troops from Ukraine?

Sanctions? Blowing up Nord Stream again? seizing oligarchs' yachts?

The Average Ukrainian Soldier Is Now 43-Years-Old.

https://thenationalpulse.com/2...is-now-43-years-old/

The average Ukrainian soldier is now 43-years-old – a bizarre consequence of the rampant corruption in the army’s recruitment process, as well as the ever-increasing number of casualties suffered on the front lines of the nation’s conflict with Russia.

An aide close to President Zelensky even admitted the troops are “grown men now, and they aren’t that healthy to begin with.” He added, “This is Ukraine. Not Scandinavia.” Increasing numbers of fighting-age males have been avoiding service by either bribing recruitment officers or buying a medical exemption, a fact that came to the fore after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky fired dozens of recruitment officials over corruption concerns in August. However, the move failed to improve the situation on the ground, with recruitment having “nearly ground to a halt without leadership.”

Worse still, the armed forces have suffered casualties totaling in the hundreds of thousands, with U.S. estimates placing the number at around 70,000 killed and a further 100,000 to 120,000 wounded. The number of Ukrainian amputees is reportedly up to 50,000.

A second aide to Zelensky admitted the military’s greatest problem is no longer a shortage of ammunition, but rather the number of men capable of wielding weapons, despite hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian men volunteering to fight at the outbreak of the war last February. “Many people thought they could sign up for a quick tour and take part in a heroic victory,” stated another dejected Zelensky staffer.

It's only a matter of time. I give Ukraine a year or less before they relinquish control of the territory that Russia now occupies. Enough of this.

https://www.breitbart.com/poli...am-pipelines-report/

Senior Ukrainian Military Officer ‘Coordinated’ Sabotage of Nord Stream Pipelines: Report

One of the most significant economic attacks in the history of the European Union, the bombing of the Nord Stream natural gas pipelines, was orchestrated by a senior Ukrainian military officer with ties to Kyiv’s intelligence services, The Washington Post reported.

In a report published in conjunction with the German news magazine Der Speigel, The Washington Post, citing unnamed European and Ukrainian officials, claimed that Colonel Roman Chervinsky, 48, previously of Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces, served as the “coordinator” for the bombing of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines that transported natural gas from Russia into Germany.

According to the report, the former senior Ukrainian military officer managed the “logistics and support” for a six-man team which used false identities to rent a sailboat and used deep sea diving equipment to attach bombs to the two underwater pipelines and explode them last September. The Post went on to report that Chervinsky “took orders from more senior Ukrainian officials, who ultimately reported to Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s highest-ranking military officer.”

Chervinsky also reportedly had close ties to top military and security officials after having served in senior roles in Ukraine’s SBU Security Service.

“The officer’s role provides the most direct evidence to date tying Ukraine’s military and security leadership to a controversial act of sabotage that has spawned multiple criminal investigations and that U.S. and Western officials have called a dangerous attack on Europe’s energy infrastructure,” the American newspaper wrote.

The report flies in the face of attempts form the Biden administration figures such as Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm to blame Moscow for the attack, despite Russian state owned Gazprom being the majority shareholder of Nord Stream 1 and the sole owner of Nord Stream 2.

Although the two pipelines were not active at the time of the sabotage — with Russian President Vladimir Putin shutting them down amid Western sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine — their destruction severely impacted Russia’s ability to sell energy to Europe, which hitherto was a central component of the Russian economy.

The bombing of the pipelines also forced countries such as Germany to turn to more expensive natural gas shipped across the Atlantic from the United States to meet its needs, which not only negatively impacted Europe’s manufacturing hub economically, but also reduced Moscow’s leverage over Berlin and therefore disincentivised Germany from pushing for a peace settlement. Prior to the war in Ukraine, Germany received half of its natural gas through Nord Stream 1.

According to The Post, some of the officials who spoke of Chervinsky’s role in the pipeline attacks defended his actions as serving Ukraine’s national interests, arguing that it reduced Russia’s ability to fund its war and prevented Putin from using gas as political leverage over Europe.

It remains to be seen how Berlin will react to news of its supposed ally allegedly attacking its critical energy infrastructure and whether it will continue to send billions in aid and weapons to Kyiv.

quote:

In a report published in conjunction with the German news magazine Der Speigel, The Washington Post, citing unnamed European and Ukrainian officials, claimed...

Color me skeptical on this! At this point it's just as likely that this is intended to bolster the 'bunch of guys rented a sailboat' story in order to deflect from pointing the finger at NATO/US 'assets' being involved as it is to be true!

The Wall Street Journal ran an ‘essay’ yesterday piling on poor Ukraine and topped by a photo of a smirking Vladimir Putin, headlined “It’s Time to End Magical Thinking About Russia’s Defeat.” More like, it’s time to get real about Ukraine’s defeat.

The sub-headline revealed the shifting goalposts’ new position: “Putin has withstood the West’s best efforts to reverse his invasion of Ukraine, and his hold on power is firm. The U.S. and its allies need a new strategy: containment.”

Another new strategy!

For two years, the Journal has resolutely promised that Russia would crumble under Ukrainians’ fierce courage, dissolve under international sanctions, implode due to a lengthy list of allegedly-fatal Putin health problems (six different types of cancer, and counting), wither under a penetrating and glorious Ukrainian Spring Counteroffensive, and be wrestled to the bargaining table, where the former communist empire would be forced to cough up all its annexed territories and the Crimean peninsula to boot.

But um, nope. None of that happened. Not even close. It’s more like the reverse opposite.

Joining Time and NBC, the Wall Street Journal expressed plain pessimism over Ukraine’s plunging prospects:

Putin does not feel any pressure to end the war or worry about his ability to sustain it more or less indefinitely. As winter approaches, the Russian army has mounted a limited ground offensive of its own and surely will expand missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities, power plants, industrial sites and other critical infrastructure.

At the front line, there are no indications that Russia is losing what has become a war of attrition. The Russian economy has been buffeted, but it is not in tatters. Putin’s hold on power was, paradoxically, strengthened following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed rebellion in June. Popular support for the war remains solid, and elite backing for Putin has not fractured.
What Western leaders conspicuously haven’t done is level with their publics … They have indulged all too often in magical thinking—betting on sanctions, a successful Ukrainian counter-offensive or the transfer of new types of weapons to force the Kremlin to come to the negotiating table. Or they have hoped to see Putin overthrown in a palace coup.

Yikes. Like the Ukraine war itself, the Journal’s essay ultimately descended into an incomprehensible morass, a laundry list of lame suggestions about how, if Russia can’t be tamed in the short term, the U.S. should triple-down and punish Russia over the long term, invoking direct comparisons to the fifty-year Cold War (even while assuring readers they didn’t mean another Cold War, no, no, never), and waiting for Putin to eventually be replaced, assuming that whoever replaces him will see the wisdom of partnering with the West.

Um. The essay described magical thinking all right. Without naming names, it literally described the magical thinking of the U.S. State Department, the magical thinking of all the liberal war hawks, and by extension the magical thinking of the Corporate Media — which has obediently lapped up the official war propaganda like good little doggies. The article suggested a new narrative that, because Putin, we should expand the way we think about the war, to think far beyond victory in Ukraine. Let’s let the Russian dictator have his little victory — but then take a broad, long-term view of the situation and make Putin pay over time for every inch.

Oh. One more question. Since it’s now suddenly “magical thinking” to believe Ukraine can beat Russia, can we get our hundreds of billions of dollars back? Some of us knew it was magical thinking to start with and would like a refund.

https://www.coffeeandcovid.com...ack&utm_medium=email

Foreign Affairs Magazine

Redefining Success in Ukraine

https://www.foreignaffairs.com...ning-success-ukraine



Wall Street Journal

It’s Time to End Magical Thinking About Russia’s Defeat

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news...s-defeat/ar-AA1k28ij

quote:

The bombing of the pipelines also forced countries such as Germany to turn to more expensive natural gas shipped across the Atlantic from the United States to meet its needs, which not only negatively impacted Europe’s manufacturing hub economically, but also reduced Moscow’s leverage over Berlin and therefore disincentivised Germany from pushing for a peace settlement. Prior to the war in Ukraine, Germany received half of its natural gas through Nord Stream 1.

Well would you look at that, the Ukraine playing political football by interrupting a peace process, with Russia and cause instability in the region over fossil fuel supply....

Now who else just did this to cause instability in a region, upend a peace process and create problems in the energy sector and likely was a pawn of Russia.... anyone class, anyone, class, anyone?.

Well I’ve been away for some time. There was so much nonsense going on in the world at large and on the job that I couldn’t keep up cleaning out my bullshit filter. After looking around for some time, by pure coincidence I finally got back into my real field of interest and competence and landed pretty much my dream job I always thought I could eventually end my professional career in; this month I’m gonna sign with the leading German-language publisher in security and defense for a double-hatted post, deputy editor-in-chief for one magazine geared towards deciders in security politics, and managing editor of another more technically orientated one for a broader audience. Everything’s done but the numbers, which can however only improve from my current gig.

That in turn means I’ll have a professional full-time outlet for my interests, so my private web presence isn’t exactly going to increase. Before that happens though I thought I could do a general rundown on this topic at the two-year mark of the Russian 15-day operation to liberate Ukraine because it doesn’t exist, or something; somewhat prompted by an interesting leak Russian intelligence just dropped on their media, audio of the head of the German Air Force discussing in a video meeting how to brief defense minister Boris Pistorius on what it would take to enable successful use of Taurus cruise missiles by Ukraine. Actually very little has happened outside the scope of predictions we debated here at the start of the latter’s counter-offensive last summer, but it’s still worth looking at what that means where we are now.

*knucklecrack*

Strategic situation

That Ukrainian counter-offensive, aimed at cutting through Russian-occupied territory to the Sea of Azov in the south, failed to achieve any strategic gains. As suggested at the start, if it didn’t manage to break through the long-built-up Russian defensive lines within four weeks, it would eventually spend itself. What successes there were were too little, too late. Sure, they took back a couple hundred square kilometers of territory, a lot of that by turning the Vremivka salient in the southeast into the Vremivka bulge; at the high point they managed to break into, but not quite through, the Russian main defense line at Robotyne. However, they had to commit their last operational reserves to achieve that, originally meant to exploit any breakthrough.

In turn, the Russians had to commit their own last reserves to stop them. So the Ukrainians never even got to Tokmak about ten miles farther south, which would have cut an important road and the only railroad running the length of the occupied territory towards Crimea. That would have put Russian logistics in the southwest in trouble, and been a minimum strategic success to possibly build upon, but didn’t happen. Rather surprisingly, they did take the southern bank of the Dnipro River downstream from the drained former Kakhovka Reservoir, but couldn’t advance beyond the marshlands there either.

Conversely, even during the offensive the Russians made some minor gains in the east, which they are now expanding upon after the usual mud period ended last year’s fighting season; though actually quite late and short. Their most notable success was taking the town of Avdiivka – or what’s left of it – two weeks ago after several months of siege. If they’re lucky, they might push the Ukrainians back another five miles or so to the Vovcha River there. They’re now also trying to roll back some of the gains Ukraine made in the south. Overall, what passes for initiative in this ground war has currently returned to Russia, and it’s their turn to win a couple square kilometers with heavy casualties.

One prominent Russian milblogger of the “the government isn’t doing this war seriously because they have only their own corrupt interests in mind” type, himself an active soldier, noted that taking Avdiivka alone cost them 16,000 “permanent” losses. After being criticized as unpatriotic, allegations of his commanders getting calls to rein him in or their troops wouldn’t get supplied etc., he committed suicide (apparently legit), which shook up the community somewhat bad. But generally, this kind of criticism seems well in hand for Putin after its most outspoken proponent, the previously-mentioned Igor “Strelkov” Girkin, was finally jailed on charges of “extremism” last year; though he keeps writing critical letters from prison.

Ironically, the field Ukraine has been most successful in is naval warfare, even though they don’t have a real navy left. But seaborne attack drones along with strikes on ships in port by British/French-delivered Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles have cost the Russian Black Sea Fleet heavily all the way since their flagship Moskva was sunk by shore-launched missiles early in the war. They have been pretty much chased out of the waters west of Crimea, and in fact withdrawn from the port of Sevastopol; which is even more ironic considering that control of the latter was a major justification for occupying Crimea in 2014.

That doesn’t help Ukraine much of course; except maybe keeping the city of Odessa and its area safe from amphibious operations aimed at completing the Russian land bridge towards the Moldavian breakaway region of Transnistria, which just petitioned Russia for protection again. More crucial is the air war, or maybe the lack of it. Both sides pretty much restrict themselves to launching guided ammunitions and long-range missiles from friendly airspace. Particularly Ukraine, which doesn’t have many aircraft left.

Russian pilots at least get close enough to the frontline to drop guided bombs, heavy use of which along with lack of Ukrainian artillery has contributed to the superiority in firepower enabling their ground troops to hold, and now advance somewhat. Still, their complacency of sticking to the same attack routes over and over again has permitted Ukraine to sometimes set up SAM traps and shoot down Russian high-value targets like several Su-34 tactical bombers. Though friendly fire by jittery air defenses seems to be the greater threat to Russian aviation; only last Friday they lost another A-50 AWACS, likely in such an incident. Both points to a lack of communication between air and ground units.

The wide absence of joint air-land battle on both sides has crucially shaped this conflict to become very unlike anything envisioned in either East and West for high-intensity warfare in the previous half-century. In fact this has largely become static trench warfare as seen in WW I, with a twist by the heavy use of drones for surveillance and attack purposes at all levels. A Russian poster on another board noted that rather than the continuously-manned trenches of yore, in some sectors a “line” in this war may mean two or three guys in a fortified position or the basement of a ruined house every now and there in a contested zone several kilometers wide.

Attacks typically are by squad-sized elements across the no-man’s land between both sides. If you’re wounded during the day, you’re SOL because you will have to wait for dark to be evacuated several kilometers to the rear on foot, or the drones will get you. Russian milbloggers also note that the entire Ukrainian-controlled left bank of the Dnipro is held by maybe 250 troops which are hard to dislodge, but equally hard to reinforce and supply, because boats crossing the river will be immediately spotted and engaged. Which is why even those boats have drone jammers now.

In many ways, this has become the transparent battlefield predicted since the 90s, where the concentration of troops for major operations becomes near-impossible through the omnipresence of sensors linked to decision and fires networks. The Russians in particular have shown quite a learning curve adapting their original ponderous decision cycles for quicker response. As it is now, both sides are largely locked in a technological stalemate.

Performance of Western systems

As the first high-intensity, near-peer, state-of-the-art international conflict since at least the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Ukraine has naturally served as a proving ground for both Russia and the West to test doctrines and equipment developed, but never tested to the limit since that time. Deliveries of Western weapons have of course influenced the course of the war, and indeed saved Ukraine’s bacon, since its very start; from the Javelin and NLAW anti-tank weapons which contributed to holding up the armored thrusts towards Kiev and Kharkiv, to the IRIS-T and Patriot SAMs protecting cities against missile attacks, to the HIMARS and Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles in turn permitting precise strikes against the Russian rear.

The Ukrainian summer offensive put the spotlight on Western armored fighting vehicles, which were much-hyped by some “experts”; in part because of the pitched political debate about their delivery around the previous turn of the year, creating the impression that they would decide over victory or defeat. Under the particular conditions of warfare described above though, they didn’t make a particular impact, other than maybe having higher crew survival rates and thus better preserving manpower after loss. More than half a year on, we’re seeing attrition rates that could be expected for such a length of high-intensity combat that didn’t manage to implement the concept of mobile air-land warfare.

While we know only of documented and published losses, we have a pretty good grasp on the numbers for AFVs because they’re used right on the frontlines with the abovenoted omnipresence of drones and other sensors, coupled with the desire of either side to make enemy losses public. Though the exact effects of attacks are frequently open to interpretation; Russian video of drone strikes often appear to show near-misses, possibly due to jamming by the target, or are cut to be inconclusive about the claimed hit. The Ukrainians are also very good with lifelike decoy targets.

Naturally, pro-Russian and -Ukrainian sources vary in their judgement of whether a specific target was destroyed, damaged or not even hit directly; in the end, you might call a tank destroyed if the turret blows off, or repairable if you can still put a new turret on. Two notable websites keeping track of losses are Oryx, run by a couple Dutch guys with a more pro-Ukrainian bend; and Lost Armour, a Russian site counting only Ukrainian losses, and only listing vehicles they consider destroyed. Obviously, numbers are also dependent upon how and how long a particular type has been used:

- Leopard 2 MBT: 73 supplied by Denmark, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Poland, Spain and Sweden (12 more pending); 35 lost, of which 14-23 destroyed. This reflects their heavy use since the start of the counter-offensive, where a lot of armored attacks ran into Russian minefields, then were targeted by artillery and anti-tank missiles. While quite a few of the damaged tanks were recovered, bringing them back into the fight is also hindered by insufficient training of local personnel who sometimes made it worse with “field fixes”, and a lack of spare parts even in the Western repair hubs. By a recent report, only five of the 21 Leopard 2A6, the most modern version delivered by Germany and Portugal, are currently ready for combat.

- M1 Abrams MBT: 31 supplied by the US; one destroyed this week, but then they have only been reported in combat since last Friday.

- Leopard 1 MBT: 30 supplied by Denmark and Germany (105 more pending; theoretically available maximum from stocks 195); one damaged. Though this older type is less capable, and particularly less protected, it has also only been delivered and used recently, and mostly for providing fire support for infantry rather than armored thrusts.

- Challenger 2 MBT: 14 supplied by the UK; one destroyed. After that initial action, the type seems to have been little used, probably because the small number requires a disproportionate logistics effort.

- M2 Bradley IFV: 186 supplied by the US; 69 lost, of which 33-44 destroyed and two captured. Like the Leopard 2, it was used heavily from the start of the counter-offensive with the associated losses, likely made worse by the lesser protection of an infantry fighting vehicle compared to a main battle tank.

- Marder IFV: 90 supplied by Germany (30 more pending); nine lost, of which four to five destroyed. This type was deployed with the operational reserves in the attempted breakthrough at Robotyne, so avoided the early heavy action, and might also have fared better due to heavier protection compared to the Bradley.

- CV 40 IFV: 50 supplied by Sweden (undisclosed number of more pending); five lost, of which three claimed destroyed by Lost Armour, and one captured. Story similar to the Marder’s.

I could expand to APCs and self-propelled artillery, but the factors of length and intensity of use plus protection for overall losses, and distribution between damaged and destroyed, remain pretty much the same. In the end, weapon systems are designed with certain doctrines in mind, and can only exploit their full potential when conditions permit to use the latter. While Western supplies have allowed Ukraine to hold itself, the timing and extent of AFV deliveries didn’t enable a successful counter-offensive; though experience from this particular battlefield will doubtlessly influence modifications and future designs.

Outlook

Back in summer I suggested that Ukraine’s offensive would probably be the last major one of either side in this war, and set the stage for a negotiated settlement in 2024 or 2025; or else for another frozen conflict. With the indecisive outcome, it certainly doesn’t look like anyone feels pressure to negotiate in earnest this year though. There are reports that Russia is assembling reserves in the east for another possible offensive towards Kharkiv, and maybe also in the south towards Zaporizhzhia. Whether they even have the means for that is doubtful though.

To me it looks like Russia has found an op-tempo they can sustain indefinitely with the human and industrial capacity they have, plus buying ammunition from Iran, North Korea, etc. Any more still runs the danger of inconveniencing Russian society to the point domestic support for the war begins to erode noticeably. Their only hope for a successful major offensive then would be an at least partial collapse of the Ukrainian front, like it happened to Russia in the fall of 2022. That’s not impossible, particularly due to lack of artillery ammunition for Ukraine; both sides have been successful in either offense or defense where they could achieve local artillery superiority.

OTOH, Ukraine stands to receive the first 44 F-16 fighter aircraft from Denmark and the Netherlands from summer to replenish its air attack capabilities, with more possible as the type gets replaced by the F-35 in European air forces. While European arsenals don’t provide for more used weapons beyond what has already been pledged without compromising the donor countries’ own capabilities – though Denmark notably just announced to dump its entire artillery on Ukraine – and the US is currently stuck in domestic politics preventing more deliveries, new production capabilities are slowly building up both in NATO and within Ukraine itself, partnering with European enterprises.

German Rheinmetall intends to assemble its Fuchs APC there from spring, the new Lynx IFV from late summer, and subsequently the KF 51 Panther MBT which is currently finishing development for Hungary. There are also plans to build the aforementioned Swedish CV 90 in Ukraine, assemble the Czech Bren 2 assault rifle, and produce ammunition with Sellier & Bellot. There is ongoing production of the German IRIS-T SAM for both domestic/European and Ukrainian requirements, orders for the new wheeled RCH 155 self-propelled howitzer which will start delivering in 2026, etc.

That’s the equipment part; both sides however also have manpower constraints, Russia for the abovementioned reasons of preserving domestic popular support, Ukraine obviously because it has a smaller population to begin with. It’s not like the latter has no reserves left; so far university students remain exempt, and in fact there is debate whether to lower minimum draft age from 27 to 25. Indeed what’s causing public discontent is that some parts of society keep partying in the clubs while some soldiers have served continuously for two years. So they are currently trying to reform the notoriously arbitrary, corrupt and generally ineffective conscription system. Which is no different in Russia, but then this is not an existential war for Russia.

There is also the huge issue of military-age males who have fled the country, estimated at 600,000. Overall, when it comes to population base, the millions of Ukrainian refugees have a far more serious impact than any war losses, military or civilian. For comparison purposes, in 2021 Ukraine had almost exactly the same population as France in 1914. The latter lost 1.15 million KIA in WW I just on its own territory, never dislodging the Germans from it either. In this war both sides remain tight-lipped about casualty numbers, but even by the worst estimates, Ukraine's losses have been maybe ten percent of that so far, and more likely five to seven. However, between 15 and 20 percent of their entire population have fled the country.

It’s unlikely that Ukraine will win this war the way France did WW I, through an internal collapse of the enemy, and with considerable more direct aid by allies. Putin for one is clearly intending to hold out at least into next year, probably hoping that US elections will bring back a President Trump or at least a Republican majority in Congress who will deliver Ukraine on a platter to him. No further American aid would almost certainly put paid to any Ukrainian hopes to take back much more of their territory, but they could probably hold on with the support of the rest of NATO. After all, US aid currently has already stopped, while it’s still growing from Europe.

Per the latest update of IFW Kiel’s Ukraine support tracker with numbers through 15 January, the US remains the biggest individual donor nation by virtue of having run up a previous total of 67.7 billion Euro (if you accept the 42.2 in military aid, much of which is the book value of equipment from long-time storage which was paid for a long time ago and isn’t going to be replaced in kind). But they were exceeded in combined European commitments last summer, with 85 billion by the EU institutions now, plus bilateral aid by EU members, the UK and Norway.

Depending upon which cost you count, among individual nations Germany is now closing in on the US with 22 billion bilaterally plus 19 billion EU share, and another 21.4 billion in refugee cost, for a total of 62.4. Poland, the UK etc. following in an order determined by which of those parts exactly you include. Overall, the EU and its members now account for more than double the US aid at a total 144.1 billion, sans refugee cost. If you include non-EU members UK and Norway, the European total increases to 170.5; if you add Canada as a non-European NATO member, it becomes 176.3 billion.

By share of GDP, the small economies of the Baltic States, Denmark and Norway still lead the pack, the exact order again determined by which cost beyond bilateral aid you include. All in, little Estonia comes out at more than five percent. For Poland, upward of 2.2; Germany, upward of 1.6; the UK, 0.62; the US and Canada, 0.32 respectively. For everyone but the US, those commitments are not yet fulfilled and are slated to be disbursed through 2027, so can support procurement of the abovementioned new-production arms. The crucial part for Ukraine is thus to make it through 2024 while deliveries from old stocks dry up and new production is still building.

Of course the most sane solution would still be if both sides realized right now they’re locked in a stalemate and wasting blood and treasury for no likely major gain anytime soon, and would negotiate some sort of settlement. Neither government can sell this option to its populace yet though. Vocal Russian hardliners are still dreaming of that land bridge towards Transnistria, and seizing all of the districts they have formally annexed, but don’t even fully control so far. OTOH Ukrainians overall probably aren’t ready to just give up all of their occupied territory yet; even if they were, the Israel conundrum applies – if Russia stopped fighting, there would be no war, but if Ukraine did, fear is that there would be no Ukraine.

The only situation in which serious negotiations have a chance is if both sides came to the conclusion that they stand more to gain than to lose from a settlement. I. e., both must believe that no reasonable effort will get them more than they already have, but what they have will be safe. That will unfortunately need to see more additional losses than either public is willing to support, and major international commitments. There are various ideas how a solution might look – the “German”, “Israeli”, “Korean” or “Kosovo” model – but the conditions on the ground are not there yet.

BansheeOne, post it here, please:

https://sigforum.com/eve/forum...35/m/4580095894/p/41

Can do that, too. Though I'd note that the other thread is mostly about domestic American politics, which isn't really my business, and actually hasn't much to do with developments in Ukraine itself; I'd rather not be dragged into that. Anyway, will cross-post.

Usually, I discourage cross-posting. In this case, I want information such as that contained in your post, in my thread on the conflict.

Welcome back. For what it's worth to you, despite our differing opinions on these matters, I value your input, and your absence was noted and lamented.

BansheeOne
Thank you for the excellent analysis and reporting. I'll be reading this twice to digest it.

They are putting NATO troops on Taiwan. Maybe the third time will be a charm ?

quote:

Originally posted by BansheeOne:
Conversely, even during the offensive the Russians made some minor gains in the east, which they are now expanding upon after the usual mud period ended last year’s fighting season; though actually quite late and short. Their most notable success was taking the town of Avdiivka – or what’s left of it – two weeks ago after several months of siege. If they’re lucky, they might push the Ukrainians back another five miles or so to the Vovcha River there.

So over the last two months, the Russians have covered about half of that five-mile distance to the Vovcha, which is indicative for the typical pace of both sides' offensives in the last 18 months of this war. Until recently, the gains were mostly in the southern part of this sector, but largely stalled ahead of hastily-built Ukraine defense works. Then over the last week, the Russians made some comparatively distinct advances in the northern part, which seemed precarious at first, but appear to have caused some tactical retreats by the Ukrainians. Maybe that indicates the latters' lack of ammunition, or maybe they're regrouping in anticipation of a coming infusion following the fresh US aid package.

What has definitely degraded is their air defense capabilities, with instances of Russian close air support operating directly over Ukrainian-held cities, and surveillance drones deep inside their territory; a notable point being images of a missile strike on a travelling Ukrainian Patriot battery some weeks ago. Yet while the Russians have pulled about even in their northern and southern advances in the Avdiivka sector, the Ukrainians are so far holding in the center; and in a map of the entire theater, the recent Russian gains don't really show up, and don't even compare to the territory taken by Ukraine in their unsuccessful summer offensive.

Rumors persist of a major Russian push towards Kharkiv in the northeast, but I remain doubtful they have the reserves for that. Meanwhile Ukraine finally enacted the new conscription law they debated for a year, though notably they deleted the part limiting front service to two years. Minimum draft age was also lowered from 27 to 25. Significantly, Ukrainian embassies abroad ceased consular services for their military-age male citizens this week, too, except facilitating their return home. On the materiél side, besides the new American aid package supposedly including more of the long-range variant of the ATACMS artillery missile already delivered up front in secret, they stand to get more significant support from other allies.

Among that is a third Patriot battery from Germany, probably to replace the one they lost recently; this means Germany has now supplied a quarter of its entire Patriot arsenal, though replacements have been ordered. Spain also pledged another 20 Leopard tanks, while the UK last week announced its biggest aid package so far. The first of up to 65 F-16 fighter jets from Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands are also due to arrive in the next months. Additionally, Russian political support for the Palestinian side in the Gaza war finally pissed off the Israeli government enough that they announced to help Ukraine build up a missile defense system, after being previously mindful of the Russian presence in Syria.

IFW Kiel's Ukraine Support Tracker updated on Friday, but only extended their database to 29 February, so includes none of those recent additions yet. They seem to have put most of their work lately into changing their main criteria from total committed to actually allocated aid, though the latter (like the 82 billion Euro pledged by EU institutions and members over the next five years) still shows up. They have also changed comparison between American and European aid to include non-EU members like the UK and Norway in the latter, giving a better view of effective support delivered.

Currently Europe remains ahead with ca. 90 vs. 67 billion Euro, though that is likely to change depending upon how much of the new 61 billion-dollar US package will actually benefit Ukraine rather than support US military operations, refill national arsenals, etc.; in the previous 113 billion, the ratio was about 65:35, and from what is known will probably be more geared towards the collateral American side this time. IFW will doubtlessly sort it out for their next update. For now, there is next to no change in precedence of supporters. The US remains biggest individual donor country, followed by Germany, the rest being determined by whether you include EU share and/or refugee cost.

By share of GDP, the small economies of the Baltic States and Denmark remain firmly in the lead with more than one percent excluding refugee cost; Poland 0.87, Germany 0.54, France 0.35, the US, UK and Canada all at 0.31. This order is unlikely to change through the crucial year of 2024, too. As I posted on the Mike Johnson thread by mistake (only afterwards realized it wasn't one of the Ukraine ones; goes to show these debates look all the same), the new US aid package clearly shows that both candidates in the presidential race have decided Ukraine faltering before the election would be bad for their campaign. By next year, the country can probably satisfy most of its material needs from European production, including joint ventures in Ukraine itself.