quote:

Originally posted by BansheeOne:
As I posted on the Mike Johnson thread by mistake (only afterwards realized it wasn't one of the Ukraine ones; goes to show these debates look all the same), the new US aid package clearly shows that both candidates in the presidential race have decided Ukraine faltering before the election would be bad for their campaign. By next year, the country can probably satisfy most of its material needs from European production, including joint ventures in Ukraine itself.

Interestingly, the deputy head of Ukrainian military intelligence told British press last week that "peace talks could happen in late 2025, as he expects Russian arms production to plateau early the following year due to a shortage of engineers and supplies." This week I heard directly from a German source that Russian production was still ramping up to the degree they were starting to put equipment back into depots rather than taking it out, and were prepared to prosecute the war into 2026.

At first I thought that to be a contradiction, possibly based upon wishful thinking by the Ukrainian side. Reading the latter's statement over, it occurs to me it might not be, and both sources essentially agree that Russian production will increase until early 2026 - but if they haven't made a decisive breakthrough in Ukraine by then, they will hit a ceiling that mandates to open negotiations some time earlier while they're still in a position of relative strength, before the strategic situation deteriorates for them again.

Such a breakthrough remains possible of course due to the overextended Ukrainian defenses, lacking both men and materièl, and being vulnerable to an additional Russian push - if the latter can find the strength for that. You can sense the Western worry about that, particularly in the controversial statements by French president Emmanuel Macron that in such a case he might deploy troops to relieve Ukrainian forces from securing their border with Belarus, releasing them to counter the Russian thrust. When I first heard that, I thought it was just tough talk to distract from the fact that Ukraine might not have its current ammunition problems if Macron hadn't blocked the use of EU funds to buy from non-EU sources so long.

That might still be, but by now I'm coming around to the interpretation that he is successfully introducing an element of strategic ambiguity into the Western stance to counter the one Russia has employed from the start with its threats against NATO members for supporting Ukraine, possible nuclear use, etc.; a principle mirrored in French nuclear doctrine. He certainly managed to throw pro-Russian propaganda sources aimed at impressionable Western audiences out off their continuity, making them oscillate between their two standard modes of "Russia has already won in Ukraine, all that remains is to dictate terms to the West" when it's going well for them, and "if the West threatens Russia's existence by supporting Ukraine it will cause nuclear war" when it's not, on a daily basis.

There are other signs, like the slowly hardening attitudes in Europe on the 600,000-plus military-age males from Ukraine who have fled there, though tough action is unlikely anytime soon. Yet for now, while Russian propaganda touts continuing offensive successes, their overall extent remains negligible on a strategic scale as the below maps of the Institute for the Study of War show; light blue being territory taken by Ukraine during its summer offensive last year up to the continuous red line, the dashed red line marking Russian advances since December, and contested areas in yellow.

The never-ending war brought to you by the US Taxpayer!

quote:

Originally posted by BansheeOne:
Such a breakthrough remains possible of course due to the overextended Ukrainian defenses, lacking both men and materièl, and being vulnerable to an additional Russian push - if the latter can find the strength for that.

Well, they certainly found the strength for an economy-of-force operation, crossing the border from Russia proper near Kharkiv in three thrusts across a width of 15 miles last Saturday, either side of a salient around the Russian town of Sereda with an estimated three regiments/brigades each. While the center thrust either stalled quickly or was held back intentionally to not outrun those on the flanks, the latter made good initial gains against weak Ukrainian defenses, as deep as three miles towards the town of Lyptsi. Russian artillery and aviation also targeted bridges and other LOC nodes all the way to Artemivka on the Pechenizke Reservoir of the Donets River, almost 30 miles from the border.

It was notable how everyone but the Ukrainians appeared to downplay the move. Russian milbloggers initially talked of reconnaissance in force, noting the half-dozen villages taken on the first day were long deserted and destroyed in border skirmishes anyway, and most of the civilian population had already been evacuated by Ukraine. Official sources declared it an attempt at creating a buffer zone against the long-time Ukrainian shelling of, and raids by pro-Ukrainian "Russian volunteer groups" into, the Belgorod region. Even hardliners on pro-Russian propaganda sites noted that the push towards Kharkiv, 20 miles from the border, didn't have the strength to take a city of 1.5 million.

Given that the city of Belgorod is another 20 miles in the opposite direction on the Russian side, it would remain well within range of rockets and aviation munitions even if Russia advanced to the outskirts of Kharkiv, so the buffer zone argument is a little dubious. Even when they had the city almost surrounded in the first year of the war before they had to retreat behind the border during the Ukrainian counter-offensive of late 2022, Ukraine conducted airstrikes on Belgorod (not to talk of the Russian Su-34 which had an accidental release over it, luckily only blowing up a friendly parking lot at night).

Most likely this is simply aimed at overtaxing Ukrainian defensive strength overall by opening another front, hoping that their lines will eventually suffer a major break somewhere along the hundreds of miles of fighting. As it is, after the first two or three days Ukraine found sufficient troops down the back of the sofa to move towards Kharkiv and slow the Russian advance to the snail's pace usual for most offensive operations in this war - though likely at the price of weakening other sectors. Russia managed to move to the edge of Lyptsi in the western thrust, and break into the town of Vovchansk in the eastern, but has not managed to get much further in the last two days.

However, there are indications for a similar operation towards Sumy, further to the northwest opposite the Russian region of Kursk. And if the deployment maps at militaryland.net can be trusted in the fog of war, there is very little in operational units Ukraine has left to back up the two territorial defense brigades it currently has there. Which is why there's renewed talk of French and Baltic, possibly Polish troops relieving Ukrainians from routine tasks like training or demining in safer parts of the country itself; or taking over security on the border with Belarus, which is unlikely to become a frontline again, but can't be left unattended either.

Even among German parlamentarians there are suggestions that NATO should establish an air defense zone to a depth of about 45 miles on Ukraine's western border. Which frankly is a no-brainer and should have been done at the outbreak of the war, or at the latest when some missiles of either party dropped on Polish and Romanian territory, killing some Poles in one incident. In my opinion it should extend to 125 miles or so, too, which is the range of a Meteor air-to-air-missile fired by an Eurofighter Typhoon or Rafale from the NATO side of the border.

At this point, it would establish a protected zone for bilateral missions training Ukrainian troops on their own soil rather than in Western Europe, simplifying logistics and releasing some of their personnel for immediate defense tasks; and/or securing the Belarus border for them. However, in Germany specifically, nothing is likely to move ahead of the EU elections on 9 June, when the Social Democrats of Chancellor Olaf Scholz are advertizing their old and tried buzzword of "peace" on campaign posters. So the best Ukraine can hope for right now is that their lines will hold as new ammo comes in from the US, and the first F-16s arrive from Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway; and that if they don't, France et al will follow through on their talk of bilateral support deployments.

China is declaring intentions to “reunify” with Taiwan and appears to be displaying the will to do it soon.

Linkasaurus rex

So the Russian offensive towards Kharkiv has been stuck for two weeks. Ukraine may even have taken some minimal terrain back, though it's still at the expense of having moved considerable troops from other fronts there. Yet while Russia continues making the same grinding advances elsewhere, those fronts haven't dramatically collapsed after being weakened like that. It seems that with American artillery ammunition coming in again, Ukraine can manage both the same defense of previous lines, and stopping the Kharkiv thrust completely. That casts an interesting light on the timing of the bi-partisan American decision to resume aid.

There's a suggestion that Russia launched the offensive prematurely to pre-empt just that, moving before they had really built up enough strength while the Ukrainians were still suffering from ammo shortages, under an attempted political cover of renewed nuclear threats aimed at impressionable Western audiences by announcing an unannounced exercise of their tactical nuclear forces. Thus trying to maintain the advantage that they would attack directly across their own border with their logistics safe from deep strikes by Western-supplied long-range weapons, which Ukraine has so far been barred from using against Russian territory proper for reasons of "non-escalation".

Of course Ukraine quickly demonstrated that those nuclear threats have long been devalued by gratuitous overuse when they struck two Russian ballistic missile early warning radars around a thousand miles behind the frontlines with their own long-range drones. Theoretically, attacks on their nuclear warfare infrastructure could be a case for nuclear counterstrikes under Russian doctrine, so it got everyone's attention. But we already know Russia is deterred from using nukes in Ukraine; because the one time they were actually building a case for it in the fall of 2022, when their situation in the south and east became untenable leading up to collapse of their frontlines, they got told by the US to stow that shit or else, and shut up overnight.

By the end of that year Ukraine also struck Russia's strategic bomber airbase at Engels, which had been used for long-range bombing raids against them, but is technically also nuclear warfare infrastructure. Back then Russia quietly relocated most of the bombers based there further east. In the present case, they haven't even officially acknowledged the strikes on their early warning radars; though the usual suspects like former Roskosmos space agency head, now Senator Dmitry "the American moon landings were faked" Rogozin demanded their usual nuclear response "if it wasn't a Ukrainian fake".

Anyway, any attempt to deter Ukraine's supporters from matching the escalation of the Kharkiv offensive clearly failed. Notably, the US, UK, France and Germany stated this week that Ukraine was allowed to use weapons supplied by them in accordance with international law in "areas adjacent to Kharkiv", the exact limits not made public for obvious reasons. Denmark also clarified that the F-16 fighters it is about to deliver could be used for strikes on Russian territory proper. It's frankly not a big deal if you take the Russians at their own words, since they also claim the occupied areas of Ukraine, and then some, as "their" territory, and have always accused NATO of being complicit in strikes on it.

There are other major aid packages carrying the label "biggest so far" from NATO countries, which may have been planned anyway or in reaction to recent developments. Particularly interesting is the Swedish, which includes two Saab Erieye AWACS besides leftovers like their entire fleet of old Pbv 302 armored personnel carriers, the Swedish M113 equivalent. Germany also announced a package worth half a billion Euro, mostly surface-to-air missiles, possibly major amounts of ammunition for the Skynex anti-air system and replacement barrels for the PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers which Rheinmetall just stated they got orders for, the new RCH 155 wheeled SPH, and three HIMARS launchers bought from the US. Another IRIS-T SAM battery was also delivered last week.

Another thing the Russian offensive seems to have triggered is France and some others following through with their statements that they would react to anything like that by bilaterally deploying some of their troops to relieve Ukrainian forces of rear-area tasks in the country itself. At least Ukraine's supreme commander General Oleksandr Syrsyi announced this week that he signed off on allowing French instructors into domestic training centers, though France said they were still in talks about specifics. I'd imagine such a mission to happen in the far southwest of Ukraine adjacent to Romania, where France already leads the forward-deployed NATO tripwire battlegroup including SAMP/T long-range SAMs, which could cover against air threats across the border.

In general, Russia seems currently more occupied with cleaning its own house. Putin used the recent elections to promote away defense minister Sergei Shoigu, long criticized for at best ineffective leadership, to become secretary of the national security council, replacing him with another long-time confidant, economist Andrey Belousov. Both before and after, some high-ranking defense officials were arrested on corruption charges, including Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov, the head of the ministry's personnel department, the deputy chief of the army's general staff, and the commander of 58th Army. In tandem with major tax hikes announced this week, it appears they realized they can't continue the war on the previous income/spending level.

quote:

Originally posted by BansheeOne:

...they got told by the US to stow that shit or else, and shut up overnight...

Are you sure about that? In the fall of 2022 they had been in Ukraine for over six months and all Biden could say to Putin was "Stop or I'll say stop again!"

I enjoy reading your posts, but I have a hard time believing Putin gave in to warnings from the US.

There has of course been some background rumbling of Russian nuclear threats to deter Western intervention from before the start of their invasion. Notably, four days into their attack, Putin put their nuclear forces on alert, and there were ongoing claims of Ukraine using or planning to use chemical and biological weapons (remember the whole "US biolabs" thing?), release radiological agents by shelling the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, etc.; just this week the head of the Russian NBC protection troops made his regular statement that Ukraine deploys choking agents and other chemical weapons. Something both sides have been accusing each other of, and is probably happening in some instances - though most of the claims are about CS and similar, still banned for military use, but not exactly a weapon of mass destruction.

The more serious debate started in September 2022 after Ukraine launched its counteroffensives towards Kherson in the south, and Kharkiv in the east. By 19 September, the US seemed to take it seriously enough that Biden warned of a "consequential reponse" to potential Russian nuclear use. On 21 September, Putin made implicit threats in reply to alleged "nuclear blackmail" by NATO while announcing a partial mobilization of conscripts, subsequently followed by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and the always-dependable ex-president Dmitry Medvedev. After Ukraine's Kharkiv offensive peaked by retaking the city of Lyman on 1/2 October, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov became the first major official to explicitely call for the use of tactical nukes.

The American response was wheeling out former officials like ex-CIA head David Petraeus with the time-tested approach of saying "well I haven't talked to anyone in the current administration, but if Russia did that, we would likely lead a NATO effort to, for example, destroy their troops in Ukraine as an effective fighting force, and sink their Black Sea Fleet, too" (that was when the latter was still a somewhat effective force). Things came to a head on 23 October, when Russia faced imminent collapse of its forces opposing the Ukrainian offensive towards Kherson. That day, Defense Minister Shoigu and other Russian defense officials directly called their US, UK, French and Turkish counterparts with claims that Ukraine was preparing to detonate a low-yield nuclear device or radiological "dirty bomb", and blame it on Russia in a false-flag operation.

Shoigu also announced that Russia was preparing its troops to work in conditions of radioactive contamination. This was seen as making the immediate case for nuclear use, and drew a joint American-British-French statement rejecting the allegations as a transparent pretext for further escalation. Whatever was communicated to the Russians non-publically - and there's a belief in the local security community that it included threatening a range of responses like those mentioned by Petraeus earlier - they shut up within 48 hours. Within the next three weeks, they withdrew from the Kherson area to the south bank of the Dniepro River.

I think our military is foolish to squander the defense budget on childish toys like helicopters, aircraft carriers and tanks.
For a fraction of the money they could simply send front men into hostile countries and buy up their television and radio stations, newspapers, entertainment companies and other information sources.
We could run their stock market, tell them which politicians to support, run their elections, omit any criticism of US policy, Tell them the US is their greatest ally and promote a host of bad ideas and lessons of subjugation.
We would have the power of social engineering. With that influence we could tell the men to be women, the women to be men
and the children to choose their gender.
Within a short time the majority would stop having children.
We could tell them their ancestors were mean and hateful and shame them into accepting millions of immigrants from the jungles of Africa and India and if any of them complain we could label them extremists and racists and trigger their guilt. Then we could offer them redemption from their guilt by suggesting they intermarry with the immigrants.
Eventually the people of that country would lose their national and ethnic pride and identity and they would be willing to negotiate with us rather than resist in the name of their ancestors.

quote:

Originally posted by BansheeOne:
https://www.timesofisrael.com/...athering-dust/[/url]

An Israeli poster on another board flagged this up before it hit the media. Apparently Israel had a total of eight Patriot batteries, which would triple the amount supplied to Ukraine by Germany, the US and Netherlands; a significant buildup of their depleted arsenal in the face of emboldened Russian air power.

Here we go. Interestingly, I just read an assessment in one of my new publisher's magazines that Ukraine currently has a capacity gap of seven Patriot batteries, forcing them to prioritize protection of their cities over that of their troops, further enabling Russian fire superiority. With Germany just having supplied its third battery, and the US having announced to provide its second, eight Israeli ones coming on top should significantly improve conditions for them. The question is of course how long it will take to refurbish and transfer those.

quote:

US discussing possibility of transferring Israeli Patriot missile defense systems to Ukraine

By Kylie Atwood and Oren Liebermann, CNN

Published 5:33 PM EDT, Thu June 27, 2024

CNN — The Biden administration is holding discussions with Israel and Ukraine about the possibility of transferring aging Patriot air defense systems currently in Israel to Ukraine as it continues to defend itself in the war with Russia, according to a senior administration official and a source familiar with the discussions, as the US urgently prioritizes air defenses for Kyiv.

No final agreement has been reached to transfer the crucial systems - and the countries are still working through specific logistics - but the administration official said they are hopeful the efforts might succeed, especially given the effectiveness of the Patriot batteries already operating in Ukraine.

The US and Germany have already sent Patriot systems to Ukraine, but the Biden administration has made it clear that Kyiv needs more as Russia continues to launch aerial attacks on the country.

It is unclear how long the process of finalizing details and transferring the systems to Ukraine would take. The systems would likely need to be transferred to the US first, where they would undergo refurbishment, before being sent to Ukraine.

If completed, the transfer would mark a significant shift in Israel’s position regarding the war in Ukraine. Israel has been careful not to overtly criticize Russia, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has tried to walk a fine line with President Vladimir Putin. Russia in 2022 warned that providing Israeli arms to Ukraine would “destroy all interstate relations between our countries.”

[...]

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/0...s-ukraine/index.html

Not much else happening. The Russians keep advancing a couple hundred meters per week in the East, but not always in the same place; it took them 20 weeks to cover those nine miles or so to almost reach the Vovcha River from Avdiivka, for example. They also reached the outskirts of Niu-York ... nothing to do with New York, but funny story. The Ukrainians are clearly falling back to preserve manpower in hope of a change to basic conditions, like that improvement of their air defense and attack capabilities. Except near Kharkiv, where they are actually pushing back that recent half-cocked Russian cross-border offensive somewhat with their local troop concentration at the expense of other sectors.

There's actually increasing talk of negotiations from various quarters, including Ukrainian, though some of it is clearly self-promotion. Putin's recent "just give us all the territory we annexed, even though we never controlled some of it and you pushed us out of some other parts, and there will be peace" is obviously not a serious basis, either. The ultimate sticking point remains security guarantees for Ukraine after an armistice. As I said before, this is the crucial year for them to survive; maybe then there can be negotiations the next.

quote:

Originally posted by BansheeOne:
In the end, weapon systems are designed with certain doctrines in mind, and can only exploit their full potential when conditions permit to use the latter. While Western supplies have allowed Ukraine to hold itself, the timing and extent of AFV deliveries didn’t enable a successful counter-offensive; though experience from this particular battlefield will doubtlessly influence modifications and future designs.

Then again, when things work, they work. Just when you think you got a handle on the direction of this war, and it will grind on with few surprises until both sides feel they stand to lose less through negotiations than continuing sometime in 2025/2026, the Ukrainians go and pull an Entebbe-level coup on the Russians. Though where that takes them remains to be seen.

Things hadn't been going well for them in the East where the Russians continued their slow, methodical advance; particularly from Avdiivka to the Vovcha River which I keep referencing as a yardstick. While they still haven't reached it over the entire length, they actually crossed the river with their northern northern thrust and pushed several kilometers beyond in a development that looks like it could turn into a strategic threat to the entire Ukrainian defense of that front. Obviously this was helped by the Ukrainians having to pull out considerable troops in May to stop the fresh Russian cross-border incursion toward Kharkiv in the Northeast, and prevent a possible second towards Sumy further north. Insofar, that incursion probably fulfilled the Russian intent.

Then this Tuesday the Ukrainians demonstrated that two can play the game of exploiting local weak defenses along a huge overextended frontline, invading Russian territory in the Kursk region from Sumy. It's not their first ground operation on actual Russian soil, but previously those had been mostly raids on border villages by "Russian exile volunteer formations" dashing in, taking some pictures of themselves for propaganda purposes, then pissing off again when serious Russian troops arrived. The current thrust OTOH was carried out by elements of as much as four seasoned regular Ukrainian brigades equipped with Western systems; like the 82nd Air Assault, a mechanized formation despite the legacy name, which got British Challenger tanks, German Marder IFVs and US Stryker wheeled APCs before last year's Ukrainian summer offensive in the South. Back then it was held in reserve for a breakthrough at Robotyne, which was however ultimately unsuccessful.

In the Sumy-Kursk incursion, the Ukrainians for the first time demonstrated a NATO-type mobile defense/counterattack, largely bypassing strongpoints of what resistance there was by border guards, Russian army reserves, and possibly "Akhmat Troops" of Chechen ruler Ramsan Kadyrow - now part of the Russian National Guard - taking at least one sub-unit prisoner wholesale. They quickly advanced to the town of Sudzha eight miles behind the border and occupied a dozen-plus villages within the first two days. Advance elements moved up to a depth of 20 miles down the roads towards Rylsk about 35 miles to the northwest, Lgow about 30 miles to the north, and Kursk about 55 miles to the northeast, but pulled back when meeting more serious resistance.



The Russians scrambled to bring in reinforcements, but took about three days, and lost some of them in a long-range rocket attack on a truck colummn. They also lost two attack helicopters on the first day, a notable difference to their defense in the South last years when Ukrainian armored formations ran into deep well-prepared Russian positions covered by extensive minefields and overwatched by long-range fires and attack choppers. By now, the situation seems to have consolidated somewhat. The Ukrainians are holding an area about 20 miles wide and up to ten deep, with the Russians counterattacking mainly from the east towards Sudzha, which is in the contested zone. This is the biggest territorial gain either side has made in three days since the late 2022 Ukrainian offensive in the East.



Reports point to some factors which enabled the Ukrainian surprise despite the conventional wisdom about the advent of the "transparent battlefield" with its omnipresence of surveillance by drones etc. and the rapid kill chains in this war. First, there was little in the way of built-up Russian defenses and troops to man them, which drives home the point that both sides are way overstretched along their huge frontline, and vulnerable to local enemy troop concentrations. In theory, on its own soil Russia can use ample conscripts, not just the volunteers and voluntolds of the "special military operation" in Ukraine. However, Putin probably cannot afford to feed large numbers of them into another attritional battle, lest the well-connected urban population becomes upset when it's no longer disproportionately the sons from rural areas with strong ethnic minorities being killed in this little colonial adventure.

Russian milbloggers are pointing out that the Ukrainian buildup was actually observed for months by local Russian troops, but higher echelons couldn't be bothered to respond. There are also reports they brought in ample electronic warfare assets running on intelligence collected in more active sectors of the fromt, working very well against local older Russian systems. The terrain is also more hilly and wooded than the open land further south, more conductive to concealed movement. And the Ukrainians seem to have run a more integrated combined-arms approach supported by precise artillery strikes and tactical air defense, covering their right flank by artillery-delivered minefields among other things.

What has everyone puzzled is what the aim of the whole operation is; many have criticized that the troops would have been better used defending against the continued Russian advance further south, though maybe it's all about reversing just that overall dynamic. At its most basic, this of course shows that the Ukrainians is still capable of offensive operations, and is a huge embarrassment for Putin showing that while he's trying to empire-build in Ukraine, he can't even defend Russia's own territory. Also it puts Russia in the same spot as Ukraine over the Kharkiv offensive, having to pull troops from somewhere else to counter the new threat; see the domestic policy implications noted above for just throwing conscripts at the problem.

Some suggest the original target may have been the Kursk nuclear power plant, which is actually closer to Lgow on the Seim River. Any Russian territory seized could also be a token for a swap of occupied areas in eventual negotiations, and maybe accelerate bringing them about. Russian milbloggers are worried that despite the momentary consolidation, this may not be the end of the Ukrainian initiative, pointing to further troop concentrations off the Russian border crossings near Tetkino and Krupets to the west of the current flashpoint, possibly to cross into the flank of Russian reinforcements. And the big question is of course: if the Ukrainians managed to pull off this, where else out of the eye of higher Russian echelons might they have moved troops to - like the drained Kakhovka Reservoir in the South, which is slowly turning into a temperate jungle of high grass, brush, and young trees?

Of course it remains to be seen whether this has any effect at all other than creating another meatgrinder; same as with some other recent positive news for Ukraine. They just took delivery of the first ten or so of a promised 80 F-16 fighter jets to be supplied by Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, which presents at least the chance to regenerate their air defense and attack capabilities; particularly in light of the persisting depletion of their ground-based AD capacity. They also keep winning the naval war, largely having chased Russian surface combatants from the Sea of Azov now in addition to the waters west of the Crimean Peninsula; but as noted before, while that's ironic given that control of the port of Sevastopol on Crimea was one stated reason for Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, it doesn't help them much other than keeping the Odessa region safe from amphibious operations, and reducing the seaborne cruise missile threat on their southern flank.

Otherwise not much new on Western support. IFW Kiel came out with the latest numbers up to 30 June this week, and the major change is that for military aid, the US and collective Europe are now almost exactly on par with 51.6 vs. 51.5 billion Euro. In overall aid, Europe remains ahead with 187.2 vs. 98.4 billion committed, and 110.2 vs. 75.1 allocated. In terms of share of 2021 GDP, Denmark has made it to the top with 2.08 percent (excluding refugee cost), ahead of the Baltic States, Finland (1.04), Sweden (0.98) and Poland (0.93). Major players: Germany 0.59, UK 0.45, France 0.44, Italy and Canada 0.39 each, Spain 0.36, US 0.35, Japan 0.20.

Maybe most notable is that the talk of possible negotiations is taking on a more serious tone. Zelenskyy's recent statement that Russia should participate in the next summit based upon his "peace formula" is actually not as sensational as it was reported; obviously at some point you need to talk to the other side to negotiate about peace, and the Ukrainian approach was always winning the largest possible support for that formula before eventually confronting Russia with it. But "you withdraw from all Ukrainian territory, pay reparations and put your leaders on trial" remains a no more likely basis than Putin's recent "you withdraw from all territory we have annexed even though we never controlled all of it and you pushed us out of some, and undertake to remain neutral".

The real change is Zelenskyy noting that per the Ukrainian constitution, he can't just give away territory, rather it would have to be agreed by the people in a popular referendum. Which is of course dodging the question somewhat, yet also shows movement on the issue while pointing out the obvious: as long as Ukraine as a nation remains willing to fight for their territory, not only can he afford to continue, but going against it would also be politically perilious. Ascertaining popular sentiment in a country at war is even more difficult than under the best of circumstances, though a survey tracking opinion on the issue since the start of the war recently found that readiness for territorial compromises has grown from eight percent in May 2022 to ten in May 2023, then 32 this May. Maybe by next year there will be a majority.

Of course as always the devil is in the details, and the first question of all would be how much and which territory to give up; Putin's current official stance is clearly a non-starter, and he too would need to come to the conclusion that he gets off better by negotiating than keeping on fighting. Equally important are the guarantees for the negotiated result; Ukraine already quit fairly far-developed negotiations once in 2022 for reasons including that the Russian proposals would have left them largely defenseless if Putin decided to come back a few years later and swallow the rest of the country. It would be to be hoped that the latest developments speed up the approach to a stable solution, but right now both sides aren't quite there yet.

Do you think there’s any stomach for NATO to force a settlement by threatening to commit ground troops to the conflict?

There’s been some murmuring about that and it seems to me Putin doesn’t change his stance unless faced with an escalation of the war by NATO.

^^ Uhhh, NATO members and the West, led by the US & the UK, have scuttled ALL peace talks/negotiations thus far during this conflict! This war could've been over more than two years ago were it not for meddling by NATO and Boris Johnson's visits to Ukraine in opposition to a negotiated peace, promising weapons & cash to convince Zelenskyy that this war ought to be fought to the last Ukrainian!

It's NOT Putin's stance that's prolonging the conflict here!

This message has been edited. Last edited by: nhracecraft,

Whether or not you agree with BansheeOne's perspectives, we should consider ourselves fortunate to have posts from a European-based pundit, such as the one above.

I too appreciate BansheeOnes posts. His maps help a great deal in understanding the actual situation on the ground.

Thank you BansheeOne, I enjoy reading your perspectives although I don't always agree. Thank you Para, I sometimes take a lot of the knowledge on this forum for granted.

quote:

Originally posted by Milliron:
Do you think there’s any stomach for NATO to force a settlement by threatening to commit ground troops to the conflict?

There’s been some murmuring about that and it seems to me Putin doesn’t change his stance unless faced with an escalation of the war by NATO.

What talk there has been to this effect was by individual NATO countries like France, Poland and the Baltic States, and extended to relieving Ukrainian troops for frontline duty from secondary tasks like training, demining and air defense; or at best securing the border with Belarus, which is unlikely to become an attack vector again, yet cannot be left unattended either with Alexander Lukashenko's balancing between Putin and his own power. Any sane figure in NATO has stated that avoiding direct confrontation with Russian troops is paramount. The only exception I can see would be in case of Russia using nuclear weapons against Ukraine, which would be bound to affect NATO territory via fallout, and has drawn US threats of serious measures like comprehensive airstrikes against Russian forces in Ukraine and the Black Sea.

Forcing a settlement remains a difficult prospect. There were recent reports about plans allegedly developed by people connected to the Trump campaign, but not endorsed by the latter, which are fundamentally logical: To make both sides get to the table, you threaten to cut off US aid to Ukraine if they don't play, and conversely to crank it up sky-high if Russia doesn't. The devil is of course again in the details. While cutting US aid completely would seriously hurt Ukraine, going forward it's only a third or so of the total they get. As I noted before, from next year they can probably hold with joint local-European equipment and ammo production.

So for the approach to work, you'd have to tell the Europeans to cut aid, too. Which first of all is a little awkward after over 20 years of telling them they should spend more on defense. There are certainly some who would be happy to oblige, but not most Eastern Europeans who feel they would be next after Ukraine, or the UK and Nordic countries. I'd consider Germany as the biggest single nation payer after the US shaky on the issue, except that the money it spends on Ukraine vastly benefits its own defense industry, similar to US aid for Israel. Companies from big corporations like Rheinmetall to small drone makers like Quantum Systems who are investing heavily in production for, and plants in, Ukraine would scream bloody murder.

OTOH, as frequently pointed out Ukraine doesn't just have an equipment, but also a manpower problem. All the military and financial aid in the world can offset that only so much; so Putin, faced with the possible repercussions of an unsatisfactory settlement for his own rule, could say "bring it", lean back and keep feeding superior Russian manpower ressources into the meatgrinder for the rest of his expected lifetime. To counter that we'd be back at propping up Ukraine with actual NATO troops. And noone wants that, least of all US voters. Or you give Ukraine weapons free for deep precision strikes with US-delivered systems against strategic targets all over Russia, which again carries the risk of serious escalation.

So there is no magic solution that would force an end to the war overnight without risk. I still maintain negotiations will start only when both sides feel like they can sell it to their respective people that they will be better off with it than continuing to fight. Maybe aforementioned changes in Ukrainian public opinion will permit Zelenskyy to do that next year; maybe Ukrainian troops on Russian territory, raising the spectre of conscripts being sent into this war en masse, will allow Putin to do the same. Though both would have to contend with hardliners on their own side holding them to earlier promises to win (back) it all, or at least all the territories lost since 2022 for Ukraine, and everything east of the Dnipro River plus the land bridge to Moldavia for Russia.

The more realistic approach would of course be based upon armistice lines, but with some tokens to play for changes. Besides the Russian territory it now occupies, Ukraine also holds a a strip on the southern bank of the Dnipro at Kherson which is of little use by itself, for example. Also, having chased the Russian Navy out of the waters both east and west of Crimea, they might ask what it's worth to Russia that they won't remain excluded from there in a settlement. And then we get to the all-important question of guarantees for the result. Particularly for Ukraine as the weaker party, which has already been burned by the failure of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum when they gave up their Soviet-era nuclear arsenal.

There could be the "German" solution, where unoccupied Ukraine becomes a NATO member, and swears off trying to regain its lost territories by force. It would probably be the most stable, but unacceptable to Russia which justified its invasion with the claim of trying to prevent just that, among other things. The "Korean" solution would see an internationally-controlled demilitarized zone and Ukraine backed up by some Western troops based in-country. The "Israeli" solution would encompass continued Western military aid and diplomatic top cover, but is probably too little for Ukraine; unless you include an extensive Sinai-style DMZ. At any rate it will be complex, and I could easily see negotiations drag on at least as long as the war before. Which would obviously still be an improvement if both sides don't continue killing each other in the meantime.

So ten days ago the Ukrainian incursion into the Russian Kursk Oblast entered another of several distinct phases so far. For the first few days, their small mobile units ran rampant in the absence of serious defenses, sowing panic and confusion more than actually occupying territory. In the second week, Russian reinforcements arrived, though still few and disparate, drawn from different armed formations all over the country. As a result, there were various meeting engagements between both sides with actual control of territory frequently unclear; while motorized Ukrainians advanced along roads and valleys in hilly terrain with up to 1,000 feet in elevation differences, Russian infantry might still occupy the hilltops in between.



From the third week, both sides had introduced more substantial forces, and the "transparent battlefield" with its omnipresent drones and other means of real-time surveillance and attack was being re-established. Overall Ukraine retained the initiative, but consolidated more than expanded territorial control. At the high point, they occupied about 500 square miles and 100 settlements, while the Russians had evacuated 200,000 civilians from the combat zone and adjacent areas. Things looked particularly dire for them in the west after Ukraine destroyed all bridges over the Seym River and kept the makeshift crossings under constant air and artillery attacks. When their troops pushed through to the river bend at Krasnooktyabrskoe, the Russian troops on the south bank looked all but bottled up.



Instead, the Russians finally launched a comprehensive counteroffensive from that direction, in turn bottling up the Ukrainian lead elements at the river bend, and pushing the rest back up to eight miles within three days, taking back several settlements and one of two paved roads leading into the battlezone from Ukraine. They also gained back some territory in the southeast of the zone, while the Ukrainians were still securing more terrain along the road to Lgov in the north.



However, they also started a new cross-border attack axis in the back of the advancing Russians in the west, progressing up to four miles towards the Seym. While that's not a spectacular depth, it made the Russians react to the threat of their rear; though they have since expanded their counteroffensive laterally somewhat, they haven't advanced beyond Liubimovka. In a way, this compunds Russian fears that Ukraine still has enough reserves left to strike at chosen points into Russian or Russian-occupied territory. How much so can be seen in the fact that they started mandatory evacuations in another two districts of the Kursk Oblast along the Ukrainian border north of the Seym.



For the last few days, there has been little change to the situation; it's possible it will develop into another qasi-stalemate. Ominously for Russia, the same seems true of their previous significant advances towards the key town of Pokrovsk down south in the Donbas. A couple weeks ago it looked like they would seize it within maybe ten days, cutting an important road for Ukrainian logistics all along that part of the front, and opening up the grasslands to the west for occupation of the rest of the Donetsk Oblast which they have officially annexed in full. But since Ukraine moved up a brigade from further south, they have been mostly stuck and even suffered some minor setbacks. Though that came at the expense of a weakened defense and some Russian gains in the brigade's former location, this seems less inmportant for Ukraine than keeping Pokrovsk.

So maybe everyone can now return to the question of how to enter into negotiations and get out of this meatgrinder. I keep hearing that Russia is prepared to continue the war into 2026, but will then face some unspecified dip of personnel and material ressources early in the year. For Ukraine of course the crucible remains to make it into 2025. Here's a recent thorough article from one of my publisher's English-language magazines making the same point. I don't know the author myself, but think it's a good analysis - with the caveat that it was clearly written before the Kursk offensive, so is overly pessimistic of Ukraine's capabilities and resolve. He's also putting more emphasis on US support, and seems to assume that Russia would be up for negotiations about a peace next year already. Which would have to simply amount to Ukrainian surrender, and I remain of the opinion that both sides will have to be convinced they will retain more in a settlement than through continuing to fight.

quote:

Is 2024 the decisive year for Ukraine?

Sam Cranny-Evans

5. September 2024

It will be difficult to identify true turning points in the Ukraine war. Instead, we should look to understand the trajectory of the war from multiple perspectives. This piece examines the current situation in Ukraine, and what things may begin to look like going forward.

Social media-fuelled optimism

Viewed through the camera of a drone, or one of the social media accounts that claims to track Russian losses in the war, it appears as though Ukraine is on course to win the war. In multiple videos, defeated Russian soldiers seem to give up and beg the drone operator for mercy before they are dispatched. In others, small vehicles weighed down with entire sections of Russian soldiers are engaged with first person view (FPV) drones, leaving the viewer to imagine the consequences. The Russians rarely seem to have had any form of defence; occasionally they fight back using rifles, shotguns or by swinging at the drone as it approaches. Rarely, it seems, are they successful. These stories are personal, and for those that are willing, it is possible to watch the final moments of Russian soldiers every day and to witness the despair and resignation they feel as the outcome becomes clear.

At the other end of the scale, social media accounts claim to have tracked Russian losses – some days they note hundreds of destroyed vehicles in a single day’s combat. Prestige kills still attract applause, the loss of a T-90M, long-range strikes against Russian air bases, or the sinking of a Russian ship in the Black Sea. And yet, the fighting continues, day after day. Other accounts, such as the British MoD’s Defence Intelligence provide optimistic updates, often without the context that would make the updates valuable in so far as understanding the state of the war is concerned. For example, a 12 July 2024 update notes that Russian casualties had increased to a daily conflict high of 1,262 in May 2024 and 1,163 in June 2024.[1] The same update claimed there had been 70,000 Russian casualties in the two months leading to mid-July 2024. There was no analysis of what these figures mean for Russia, nor are there reliable data on Ukraine’s own losses, which makes them a poor proxy for analysing the current status of the war.[2]

Instead, there are three elements that should be considered in assessing the current state of the war: Russia’s recent successful strikes against Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure – in particular its energy generation and distribution network. A holistic view of the situation on the frontline arrived at through those sources that are mapping the changes in the frontline combined with reported conditions there. And finally, an analysis of both countries’ ability to continue the war. Together, these threads are shaping the trajectory of the war, and they must be considered in their totality to understand what has happened in 2024, and what might happen in the months ahead.

The bottom line up front is that Russia has succeeded in many of its likely aims for 2024. Ukrainians are already facing hours without power in the summer, with worse to come in the winter. Its armed forces have made steady gains on the frontline leading to extensive casualties on both sides. Sadly, those are losses that are harder for Ukraine to replace than for Russia. At the same time, Russia’s defence industry has been mobilised and this is beginning to show results in terms of vehicles produced and refurbished, as well as the amount of ammunition reaching the frontlines and Ukraine’s cities.

All of this together has created a trajectory that will be difficult for Ukraine and its Western partners to alter, on timelines that are challenging in the extreme. There is, of course, the US election and the possible return of a Trump administration to the White House where he has promised to “end the war quickly.”[3] Furthermore, a recent poll of Ukrainians found that 44% believed it was time to negotiate with Russia, against 35% who did not.[4] Most rejected Putin’s conditions for peace, but these figures nevertheless indicate that the war is fatiguing Ukraine’s populace. While wider Western support for Ukraine remains firm in the face of several elections that could have changed the situation for the worse, few are providing support at the scale required to change the war decisively. It is likely that many are nervously considering the point at which they will have to focus on their own defence needs, at the expense of Ukraine’s. This means that if the war continues on the current trajectory, Ukraine will likely be forced to negotiate a settlement.

[...]

The threads make a rope

All of these threads combine to reveal the trajectory of the war. At present, Ukraine’s forces are able to exact a high price from Russian units as they seize towns and territory. The price they can exact depends on the level of Western support they have access to. More support increases the price as they can hold Russian aircraft at risk and return fire. Less support provides Russia with the opportunity to employ massive firepower to destroy Ukrainian positions without risking its own infantry. However, in general Russian units are showing greater tactical proficiency combined with more effective levels of firepower, which compound Russia’s advantages and can counter some of Ukraine’s strengths. If this situation continues, Ukraine will lose more territory and its position in any future negotiations will be weaker.

Ukraine may be able to reverse this situation if it can counter some of Russia’s advantages and retake lost towns at a sufficiently low cost that it does not expose the frontline to further shocks such as the Kharkiv offensive. However, this is largely dependent upon continued US aid and an increase in available troops and training. The third thread is the power situation and the civilian population’s willingness to continue the war. The frontline situation contributes to the overall sense of the country’s ability to actually win the war and the likely outcome. However, it is likely that the severity of the coming winter and attendant suffering imposed without power will shape the number of Ukrainians who believe that it is time to negotiate. This means that the war is unlikely to end in 2024, either militarily or socially. However, if the prevailing conditions at the beginning of 2025 are sufficiently dire for Ukraine’s population and its armed forces, the likelihood of an end to the war in that year increases significantly. In that sense, 2024 is a decisive year.

https://euro-sd.com/2024/09/ar...ve-year-for-ukraine/

Here is another perspective from a Ukrainian news source.

Infantry war at Pokrovsk: why Ukraine's key eastern front started (and continues) to crumble

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/.../2024/09/17/7475408/

This is a long article, so I’ll keep the introduction brief.

This is the story of how within six months, the Russian army has advanced 30 km from Avdiivka towards one of the largest and most strategic cities in Donetsk Oblast, one that until recently was far removed from the war: Pokrovsk.

We’ll ask whether this advance could have been prevented and what role Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has played.

The names and positions of most of the sources cited in this article have been omitted at their request. Only a handful are rank-and-file soldiers; the majority are officers, battalion commanders, and deputy commanders.

Rest of article at link

If Biden wants a World War,this should do it.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told reporters in Kyiv on Sept. 20 that the “victory plan” he intends to present to the United States and other allies in the coming days involves “quick decisions” from Ukraine’s partners—and getting permission to use Western-supplied missiles to strike targets deep inside Russia.

Zelenskyy made the remarks at a press conference in Kyiv on Friday during a visit by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and additionally in a briefing to the Observer, per The Guardian.
The Ukrainian president said at the presser alongside von der Leyen that he plans to meet with President Joe Biden in Washington on Sept. 26 and lay out his “victory plan,” details of which remain scant.

“All the details [of the plan] I will discuss first of all with the president of the United States,“ Zelenskyy said. ”Most of the decisions from the plan depend specifically on him. On other allies too, but there are certain points which depend on the goodwill and support of the United States. I hope he supports this plan.”

Zelenskyy added that success of the plan is “predicated upon quick decisions from our partners,” adding that key decisions on which the plan rests should be taken between October and December.

“We really want to see this, and we would then consider that the plan has worked,” he said.
this should do it!
Zelenskyy Says Ukraine ‘Victory Plan’ Includes Deep Strikes Into Russia With Western Missiles
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that part of his plan includes permission to use Western-supplied missiles to strike Russia.

In a separate briefing with the Observer in Kyiv on Friday, Zelenskyy said that the plan involved carrying out deep strikes inside Russia with the use of Western-supplied missiles, which the United States and the United Kingdom have so far refused to allow.

By allowing the use of U.S.-supplied missiles to carry out long-range strikes inside Russia, Biden would “earn a place in history,” Zelenskyy said.

“Biden can strengthen Ukraine and make important decisions for Ukraine to become stronger and to protect its independence while he is U.S. president,” he said. “I think it is a historical mission.”

In a statement on social media on Friday, the Ukrainian president said that he and his team are preparing for negotiations in the United States, where he intends to also meet with former President Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris.
“We are ready to present a concrete plan—not just for Ukraine to endure, not just to maintain our resistance at the current level, but to strengthen ourselves right now. To strengthen in such a way that brings a just peace closer, that brings victory closer,” Zelenskyy said.

The Ukrainian president said on Sept. 16 that the plan was nearly complete and that it rests on four pillars: military, political, diplomatic, and economic.
Zelenskyy elaborated somewhat on the four parts of the plan in an interview with CNN several days ago.
“It’s about security. It’s about geopolitical place for Ukraine. It’s about very strong military support available to us, and that we have to be free in how to use one or another item. It’s about economical support, decisions, which I think will be interesting,” he said.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

Russia has warned that allowing strikes deep inside its territory with the use of Western-supplied missiles would amount to a declaration of war.

Several days ago, Vyacheslav Volodin, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, warned Western governments that a nuclear war would break out if they gave Ukraine permission to use long-range Western weapons to strike targets inside Russia.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said Friday that the West should stop supplying weapons to Ukraine and sponsoring “terrorist activity” if it wanted to send a signal that it is serious about putting an end to the war.

“As soon as they stop supplying arms to the Kyiv regime and sponsoring the terrorist activities of Bankova, then it can be perceived as a signal for political and diplomatic settlement,” she said.

“Everything else is either strengthening of anti-Russian ties with the West, or an attempt to attract other members of the international community to their reckless schemes, or elements of the current White House’s electoral program, so to speak, or manoeuvring,” she said. “In fact, this has nothing to do with peace.”

Michael Carpenter, senior director for Europe at the National Security Council, told Voice of America (VOA) on Friday that discussions between Zelenskyy’s team and members of the Biden administration could include Ukraine’s need for long-range capabilities, with “very active discussions” on this topic already underway.
“We will be having the broad conversation on all the range of capabilities that we think are most important for Ukraine right now, to put it in a position of strength,” he said.

Biden considers Ukraine’s sovereignty and success a key part of his legacy, Carpenter said.

https://www.theepochtimes.com/...eyMeAHspy%2BR6sGI%3D

How do you think the new strikes on the Russian ammunition depots will change the math on both sides to possibly agree to seek any negotiations? Stated in earlier posts, negotiation timeframes were being pushed based on ammunition supplies being chewed up and not replenished easily. But, you have counter reports of Russia ramping up ammunition production/buying enough to not only supply ongoing ops, but replenish stocks.

I have heard reports of 2 additional strikes on Russian depots. So in total for all 3 depots hit, claims are up to 40,000 tons of ammunition destroyed. I know there are many other depots in Russia, but this should be difficult to recover from quickly. Have heard this much tonnage could equal 800,000+ 152mm shells. But depth and width of actual types of munitions destroyed is not known. And to add, I’m definitely not an expert or knowledgeable by any measure on this subject, just my observations. Russia now knows Ukraine can and will hit more depots as the opportunity arises. So will this mean hardening existing depots, or moving and spreading stocks which both takes up manpower and money. The ability of Ukraine to strike deep into Russian territory has been impressive in my mind. They can pretty much hit infrastructure in most of SW Russian territory at will as long as munitions are available. The Russian defense against such incursions (in my view) has been non existent. Only thing really holding Ukraine back is restricting use of western munitions on Russian territory.

Russia has always to me, been a “Hunger Games” relationship to its people and outer territories. The “whole” of the Federation is there only to serve the few in Moscow. What and how much pain and suffering would it take to make the many turn on the few. To me the best scenario would be an internal rebellion leading to the fall of the federation by the Russian people and territories that are supplying all of the meat for the grinder. Hopefully this would take the threat of escalation of using nuclear weapons in this conflict to near zero. Because if you are a leader so desperate to possibly nuke your own territory, you have reached the “FUCK IT” stage. So you just go scorched earth, take everyone with you on your way out. Is Putin that type of person? That’s the billion dollar question of the day.

Just my ramblings on this situation sitting here reading the posts and drinking my coffee. What a downer, going outside to enjoy the beautiful day, and thank God I was lucky to have been born in the USA when I was. Gen X has it’s privileges.