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Frangas non Flectes |
I keep seeing people draw parallels to WWII and Hitler, but specifically in regards to the above quote, there’s another and more direct historical parallel to be made that I feel is far more applicable. There was once a powerful nation that existed, which is the root of a good chunk of the culture we enjoy today. Much of our language, food, music, art, and more can be traced back to this nation. They were a super power, had spent centuries at war with their peer nations, had colonies and military bases around the world, and could project military might globally. There was a time when they were the premier military force in the world. Their culture was stratified into three main groups being the clergy (probably performing a role like our tech sector does today), the nobles, and then everyone else. The short version is that they spent and spent and spent until they were deep in debt and the people were suffering, and then they spent some more, and then they got themselves tangled up in a proxy war against their big rival, who they could, and probably should have allied with, but instead chose to antagonize on the other side of the globe because of enmities going back generations. They sent arms and artillery, they sent various and sundry war materiel and basic goods. This proxy war was long and ugly, and eventually, this powerful nation chose to get involved directly towards the end, so focused and invested were they on achieving what they set out to do. Their proxy war venture against their old enemy turned out to be a success. But while there was victory on the other side of the globe, there were long-reaching ramifications at home. Thirteen miserable, starvation-riddled years after the proxy war began, that class of “everyone else” decided that the nobles and the clergy had done enough adventuring at the cost of the people, and they threw a violent, armed insurrection. When it was over, they spent months publicly and brutally executed the ruling class. The clergy were also executed en mass, being seen as part of the problem due to the manipulation of public thought and opinion. Free thinking prevailed yet again, and when it did, blood quite literally ran in the streets. France is always and ever taught in our history classes as one of the good guys in the American Revolution. No doubt, we likely wouldn’t have succeeded without them, but it came at a terrible and violent cost to French society. Was the French Revolution a bad thing? I don’t know, but I do know that the factors that led to it were entirely avoidable. We seem to keep thinking of ourselves as reprising our WWII role as the heroes to Europe against a megalomaniacal force bent on destruction and expansion. The truth may be nearer to us being in a meddling and expeditionary role that we’re not financially and industrially capable of supporting, and the factors here at home read surprisingly more similar to pre-revolutionary imperial France than feels comfortable to me. Gentlemen, I wish Ukraine and Russia all the best in sorting out their border dispute, but we need to quietly back out of this one. It isn’t too late to turn this ship around, and make no mistake, we are ripe for disaster at home. Involvement in another European land war should be avoided. This notion that I keep seeing repeated that we’re buying the destruction of Russia for cheap and with no loss of life here is farcically short-sighted. It is dumb. There are ramifications to this that will take maybe another generation to bear fruit, and I am tired of men too old to actually fight desperately chasing wars that my son will get dragged into because they didn’t get to actually shoot their load after decades of waiting to get off on nuclear war with “the Ruskies.” ______________________________________________ “There are plenty of good reasons for fighting, but no good reason ever to hate without reservation, to imagine that God Almighty Himself hates with you, too.” | |||
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| Ammoholic |
But you left out the good part - all the kickbacks to Joey B. and other self serving scum working in DC. | |||
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| would not care to elaborate  |
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| His diet consists of black coffee, and sarcasm.  |
They are false parallels. We did not enter the war for a good two years after its start. During that time we did send aid to Britain, but we didn't just send them money willy-nilly with no accountability on either side. It took the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, followed by Germany's declaration of war on us before we on them, to bring us actively into the war. | |||
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You can view the article here: https://archive.ph/2dPIu _________________________ "Sometimes I wonder whether the world is being run by smart people who are putting us on or by imbeciles who really mean it." Mark Twain | |||
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| I swear I had something for this |
Yep. If Ukraine wasn't a corruption mecca and could be trusted with money, they would already be in NATO. | |||
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| Peace through superior firepower  |
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| SIGforum's Berlin Correspondent  |
Well Para asked me to copy the lengthy post I just made on the original Ukraine thread here. As noted there, this one is mostly about domestic American politics, which isn't really my business, and actually hasn't much to do with developments in Ukraine itself; I'd rather not be dragged into that. Anyway, and cutting the introduction about changes in my professional life that prompted me: Strategic situation That Ukrainian counter-offensive, aimed at cutting through Russian-occupied territory to the Sea of Azov in the south, failed to achieve any strategic gains. As suggested at the start, if it didn’t manage to break through the long-built-up Russian defensive lines within four weeks, it would eventually spend itself. What successes there were were too little, too late. Sure, they took back a couple hundred square kilometers of territory, a lot of that by turning the Vremivka salient in the southeast into the Vremivka bulge; at the high point they managed to break into, but not quite through, the Russian main defense line at Robotyne. However, they had to commit their last operational reserves to achieve that, originally meant to exploit any breakthrough. In turn, the Russians had to commit their own last reserves to stop them. So the Ukrainians never even got to Tokmak about ten miles farther south, which would have cut an important road and the only railroad running the length of the occupied territory towards Crimea. That would have put Russian logistics in the southwest in trouble, and been a minimum strategic success to possibly build upon, but didn’t happen. Rather surprisingly, they did take the southern bank of the Dnipro River downstream from the drained former Kakhovka Reservoir, but couldn’t advance beyond the marshlands there either. Conversely, even during the offensive the Russians made some minor gains in the east, which they are now expanding upon after the usual mud period ended last year’s fighting season; though actually quite late and short. Their most notable success was taking the town of Avdiivka – or what’s left of it – two weeks ago after several months of siege. If they’re lucky, they might push the Ukrainians back another five miles or so to the Vovcha River there. They’re now also trying to roll back some of the gains Ukraine made in the south. Overall, what passes for initiative in this ground war has currently returned to Russia, and it’s their turn to win a couple square kilometers with heavy casualties. One prominent Russian milblogger of the “the government isn’t doing this war seriously because they have only their own corrupt interests in mind” type, himself an active soldier, noted that taking Avdiivka alone cost them 16,000 “permanent” losses. After being criticized as unpatriotic, allegations of his commanders getting calls to rein him in or their troops wouldn’t get supplied etc., he committed suicide (apparently legit), which shook up the community somewhat bad. But generally, this kind of criticism seems well in hand for Putin after its most outspoken proponent, the previously-mentioned Igor “Strelkov” Girkin, was finally jailed on charges of “extremism” last year; though he keeps writing critical letters from prison. Ironically, the field Ukraine has been most successful in is naval warfare, even though they don’t have a real navy left. But seaborne attack drones along with strikes on ships in port by British/French-delivered Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles have cost the Russian Black Sea Fleet heavily all the way since their flagship Moskva was sunk by shore-launched missiles early in the war. They have been pretty much chased out of the waters west of Crimea, and in fact withdrawn from the port of Sevastopol; which is even more ironic considering that control of the latter was a major justification for occupying Crimea in 2014. That doesn’t help Ukraine much of course; except maybe keeping the city of Odessa and its area safe from amphibious operations aimed at completing the Russian land bridge towards the Moldavian breakaway region of Transnistria, which just petitioned Russia for protection again. More crucial is the air war, or maybe the lack of it. Both sides pretty much restrict themselves to launching guided ammunitions and long-range missiles from friendly airspace. Particularly Ukraine, which doesn’t have many aircraft left. Russian pilots at least get close enough to the frontline to drop guided bombs, heavy use of which along with lack of Ukrainian artillery has contributed to the superiority in firepower enabling their ground troops to hold, and now advance somewhat. Still, their complacency of sticking to the same attack routes over and over again has permitted Ukraine to sometimes set up SAM traps and shoot down Russian high-value targets like several Su-34 tactical bombers. Though friendly fire by jittery air defenses seems to be the greater threat to Russian aviation; only last Friday they lost another A-50 AWACS, likely in such an incident. Both points to a lack of communication between air and ground units. The wide absence of joint air-land battle on both sides has crucially shaped this conflict to become very unlike anything envisioned in either East and West for high-intensity warfare in the previous half-century. In fact this has largely become static trench warfare as seen in WW I, with a twist by the heavy use of drones for surveillance and attack purposes at all levels. A Russian poster on another board noted that rather than the continuously-manned trenches of yore, in some sectors a “line” in this war may mean two or three guys in a fortified position or the basement of a ruined house every now and there in a contested zone several kilometers wide. Attacks typically are by squad-sized elements across the no-man’s land between both sides. If you’re wounded during the day, you’re SOL because you will have to wait for dark to be evacuated several kilometers to the rear on foot, or the drones will get you. Russian milbloggers also note that the entire Ukrainian-controlled left bank of the Dnipro is held by maybe 250 troops which are hard to dislodge, but equally hard to reinforce and supply, because boats crossing the river will be immediately spotted and engaged. Which is why even those boats have drone jammers now. In many ways, this has become the transparent battlefield predicted since the 90s, where the concentration of troops for major operations becomes near-impossible through the omnipresence of sensors linked to decision and fires networks. The Russians in particular have shown quite a learning curve adapting their original ponderous decision cycles for quicker response. As it is now, both sides are largely locked in a technological stalemate. Performance of Western systems As the first high-intensity, near-peer, state-of-the-art international conflict since at least the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Ukraine has naturally served as a proving ground for both Russia and the West to test doctrines and equipment developed, but never tested to the limit since that time. Deliveries of Western weapons have of course influenced the course of the war, and indeed saved Ukraine’s bacon, since its very start; from the Javelin and NLAW anti-tank weapons which contributed to holding up the armored thrusts towards Kiev and Kharkiv, to the IRIS-T and Patriot SAMs protecting cities against missile attacks, to the HIMARS and Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles in turn permitting precise strikes against the Russian rear. The Ukrainian summer offensive put the spotlight on Western armored fighting vehicles, which were much-hyped by some “experts”; in part because of the pitched political debate about their delivery around the previous turn of the year, creating the impression that they would decide over victory or defeat. Under the particular conditions of warfare described above though, they didn’t make a particular impact, other than maybe having higher crew survival rates and thus better preserving manpower after loss. More than half a year on, we’re seeing attrition rates that could be expected for such a length of high-intensity combat that didn’t manage to implement the concept of mobile air-land warfare. While we know only of documented and published losses, we have a pretty good grasp on the numbers for AFVs because they’re used right on the frontlines with the abovenoted omnipresence of drones and other sensors, coupled with the desire of either side to make enemy losses public. Though the exact effects of attacks are frequently open to interpretation; Russian video of drone strikes often appear to show near-misses, possibly due to jamming by the target, or are cut to be inconclusive about the claimed hit. The Ukrainians are also very good with lifelike decoy targets. Naturally, pro-Russian and -Ukrainian sources vary in their judgement of whether a specific target was destroyed, damaged or not even hit directly; in the end, you might call a tank destroyed if the turret blows off, or repairable if you can still put a new turret on. Two notable websites keeping track of losses are Oryx, run by a couple Dutch guys with a more pro-Ukrainian bend; and Lost Armour, a Russian site counting only Ukrainian losses, and only listing vehicles they consider destroyed. Obviously, numbers are also dependent upon how and how long a particular type has been used: - Leopard 2 MBT: 73 supplied by Denmark, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Poland, Spain and Sweden (12 more pending); 35 lost, of which 14-23 destroyed. This reflects their heavy use since the start of the counter-offensive, where a lot of armored attacks ran into Russian minefields, then were targeted by artillery and anti-tank missiles. While quite a few of the damaged tanks were recovered, bringing them back into the fight is also hindered by insufficient training of local personnel who sometimes made it worse with “field fixes”, and a lack of spare parts even in the Western repair hubs. By a recent report, only five of the 21 Leopard 2A6, the most modern version delivered by Germany and Portugal, are currently ready for combat. - M1 Abrams MBT: 31 supplied by the US; one destroyed this week, but then they have only been reported in combat since last Friday. - Leopard 1 MBT: 30 supplied by Denmark and Germany (105 more pending; theoretically available maximum from stocks 195); one damaged. Though this older type is less capable, and particularly less protected, it has also only been delivered and used recently, and mostly for providing fire support for infantry rather than armored thrusts. - Challenger 2 MBT: 14 supplied by the UK; one destroyed. After that initial action, the type seems to have been little used, probably because the small number requires a disproportionate logistics effort. - M2 Bradley IFV: 186 supplied by the US; 69 lost, of which 33-44 destroyed and two captured. Like the Leopard 2, it was used heavily from the start of the counter-offensive with the associated losses, likely made worse by the lesser protection of an infantry fighting vehicle compared to a main battle tank. - Marder IFV: 90 supplied by Germany (30 more pending); nine lost, of which four to five destroyed. This type was deployed with the operational reserves in the attempted breakthrough at Robotyne, so avoided the early heavy action, and might also have fared better due to heavier protection compared to the Bradley. - CV 40 IFV: 50 supplied by Sweden (undisclosed number of more pending); five lost, of which three claimed destroyed by Lost Armour, and one captured. Story similar to the Marder’s. I could expand to APCs and self-propelled artillery, but the factors of length and intensity of use plus protection for overall losses, and distribution between damaged and destroyed, remain pretty much the same. In the end, weapon systems are designed with certain doctrines in mind, and can only exploit their full potential when conditions permit to use the latter. While Western supplies have allowed Ukraine to hold itself, the timing and extent of AFV deliveries didn’t enable a successful counter-offensive; though experience from this particular battlefield will doubtlessly influence modifications and future designs. Outlook Back in summer I suggested that Ukraine’s offensive would probably be the last major one of either side in this war, and set the stage for a negotiated settlement in 2024 or 2025; or else for another frozen conflict. With the indecisive outcome, it certainly doesn’t look like anyone feels pressure to negotiate in earnest this year though. There are reports that Russia is assembling reserves in the east for another possible offensive towards Kharkiv, and maybe also in the south towards Zaporizhzhia. Whether they even have the means for that is doubtful though. To me it looks like Russia has found an op-tempo they can sustain indefinitely with the human and industrial capacity they have, plus buying ammunition from Iran, North Korea, etc. Any more still runs the danger of inconveniencing Russian society to the point domestic support for the war begins to erode noticeably. Their only hope for a successful major offensive then would be an at least partial collapse of the Ukrainian front, like it happened to Russia in the fall of 2022. That’s not impossible, particularly due to lack of artillery ammunition for Ukraine; both sides have been successful in either offense or defense where they could achieve local artillery superiority. OTOH, Ukraine stands to receive the first 44 F-16 fighter aircraft from Denmark and the Netherlands from summer to replenish its air attack capabilities, with more possible as the type gets replaced by the F-35 in European air forces. While European arsenals don’t provide for more used weapons beyond what has already been pledged without compromising the donor countries’ own capabilities – though Denmark notably just announced to dump its entire artillery on Ukraine – and the US is currently stuck in domestic politics preventing more deliveries, new production capabilities are slowly building up both in NATO and within Ukraine itself, partnering with European enterprises. German Rheinmetall intends to assemble its Fuchs APC there from spring, the new Lynx IFV from late summer, and subsequently the KF 51 Panther MBT which is currently finishing development for Hungary. There are also plans to build the aforementioned Swedish CV 90 in Ukraine, assemble the Czech Bren 2 assault rifle, and produce ammunition with Sellier & Bellot. There is ongoing production of the German IRIS-T SAM for both domestic/European and Ukrainian requirements, orders for the new wheeled RCH 155 self-propelled howitzer which will start delivering in 2026, etc. That’s the equipment part; both sides however also have manpower constraints, Russia for the abovementioned reasons of preserving domestic popular support, Ukraine obviously because it has a smaller population to begin with. It’s not like the latter has no reserves left; so far university students remain exempt, and in fact there is debate whether to lower minimum draft age from 27 to 25. Indeed what’s causing public discontent is that some parts of society keep partying in the clubs while some soldiers have served continuously for two years. So they are currently trying to reform the notoriously arbitrary, corrupt and generally ineffective conscription system. Which is no different in Russia, but then this is not an existential war for Russia. There is also the huge issue of military-age males who have fled the country, estimated at 600,000. Overall, when it comes to population base, the millions of Ukrainian refugees have a far more serious impact than any war losses, military or civilian. For comparison purposes, in 2021 Ukraine had almost exactly the same population as France in 1914. The latter lost 1.15 million KIA in WW I just on its own territory, never dislodging the Germans from it either. In this war both sides remain tight-lipped about casualty numbers, but even by the worst estimates, Ukraine's losses have been maybe ten percent of that so far, and more likely five to seven. However, between 15 and 20 percent of their entire population have fled the country. It’s unlikely that Ukraine will win this war the way France did WW I, through an internal collapse of the enemy, and with considerable more direct aid by allies. Putin for one is clearly intending to hold out at least into next year, probably hoping that US elections will bring back a President Trump or at least a Republican majority in Congress who will deliver Ukraine on a platter to him. No further American aid would almost certainly put paid to any Ukrainian hopes to take back much more of their territory, but they could probably hold on with the support of the rest of NATO. After all, US aid currently has already stopped, while it’s still growing from Europe. Per the latest update of IFW Kiel’s Ukraine support tracker with numbers through 15 January, the US remains the biggest individual donor nation by virtue of having run up a previous total of 67.7 billion Euro (if you accept the 42.2 in military aid, much of which is the book value of equipment from long-time storage which was paid for a long time ago and isn’t going to be replaced in kind). But they were exceeded in combined European commitments last summer, with 85 billion by the EU institutions now, plus bilateral aid by EU members, the UK and Norway. Depending upon which cost you count, among individual nations Germany is now closing in on the US with 22 billion bilaterally plus 19 billion EU share, and another 21.4 billion in refugee cost, for a total of 62.4. Poland, the UK etc. following in an order determined by which of those parts exactly you include. Overall, the EU and its members now account for more than double the US aid at a total 144.1 billion, sans refugee cost. If you include non-EU members UK and Norway, the European total increases to 170.5; if you add Canada as a non-European NATO member, it becomes 176.3 billion. By share of GDP, the small economies of the Baltic States, Denmark and Norway still lead the pack, the exact order again determined by which cost beyond bilateral aid you include. All in, little Estonia comes out at more than five percent. For Poland, upward of 2.2; Germany, upward of 1.6; the UK, 0.62; the US and Canada, 0.32 respectively. For everyone but the US, those commitments are not yet fulfilled and are slated to be disbursed through 2027, so can support procurement of the abovementioned new-production arms. The crucial part for Ukraine is thus to make it through 2024 while deliveries from old stocks dry up and new production is still building. Of course the most sane solution would still be if both sides realized right now they’re locked in a stalemate and wasting blood and treasury for no likely major gain anytime soon, and would negotiate some sort of settlement. Neither government can sell this option to its populace yet though. Vocal Russian hardliners are still dreaming of that land bridge towards Transnistria, and seizing all of the districts they have formally annexed, but don’t even fully control so far. OTOH Ukrainians overall probably aren’t ready to just give up all of their occupied territory yet; even if they were, the Israel conundrum applies – if Russia stopped fighting, there would be no war, but if Ukraine did, fear is that there would be no Ukraine. The only situation in which serious negotiations have a chance is if both sides came to the conclusion that they stand more to gain than to lose from a settlement. I. e., both must believe that no reasonable effort will get them more than they already have, but what they have will be safe. That will unfortunately need to see more additional losses than either public is willing to support, and major international commitments. There are various ideas how a solution might look – the “German”, “Israeli”, “Korean” or “Kosovo” model – but the conditions on the ground are not there yet. | |||
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| Member |
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Do you have a link to that article? _________________________ "Sometimes I wonder whether the world is being run by smart people who are putting us on or by imbeciles who really mean it." Mark Twain | |||
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| Lawyers, Guns and Money  |
Banshee, There is much good information here, but...
Seriously? "Some things are apparent. Where government moves in, community retreats, civil society disintegrates and our ability to control our own destiny atrophies. The result is: families under siege; war in the streets; unapologetic expropriation of property; the precipitous decline of the rule of law; the rapid rise of corruption; the loss of civility and the triumph of deceit. The result is a debased, debauched culture which finds moral depravity entertaining and virtue contemptible." -- Justice Janice Rogers Brown "The United States government is the largest criminal enterprise on earth." -rduckwor | |||
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| Frangas non Flectes |
I’ll read all of that when I have a chance, but my opinion to that last quote is “so what, let him have it.” I cannot explain to you, nor could you ever understand how little I care about Ukraine at this point.This message has been edited. Last edited by: P220 Smudge, ______________________________________________ “There are plenty of good reasons for fighting, but no good reason ever to hate without reservation, to imagine that God Almighty Himself hates with you, too.” | |||
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A Grateful American |
I believe, BansheeOne is, the source of that article. "the meaning of life, is to give life meaning" ✡ Ani Yehudi אני יהודי Le'olam lo shuv לעולם לא שוב! | |||
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| Savor the limelight |
Nice post BansheeOne! I’ve been curious what your insight’s were and you did not disappoint. Thank you. Best of luck in your new endeavor. | |||
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| Get my pies outta the oven!  |
SMDH, so Trump is going to deliver Ukraine on a platter to Putin? Trump would have never even let this war begin in the first place! It’s disappointing to read that you have given into this propaganda bullshit about Trump being some sort of Russian stooge.  | |||
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| Member |
chellim1, BansheOne stated in the opening paragraph "As noted there, this one is mostly about domestic American politics, which isn't really my business, ...". I'm not seeing anything derogatory in the statement you are quoting, it is Banshe's opinion. If you want to know my opinion (don't answer that  ) after having many discussions with a Ukraine born DBA I work with, I don't care if Ukraine is handed back to Russia. It wasn't really a place you would want live even before the war. It has no strategic importance to the US. My $0.02.Edit: Thanks for your post BansheeOne | |||
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| SIGforum's Berlin Correspondent |
I am. As noted, I left out the introduction from the other thread saying I'm currently transitioning between a job which pretty much sucked me dry, and another where I get to do this stuff full-time. So this is a bit of a window where I could get around to dumping a round-up of the situation after last summer's debate on the Ukrainian counter-offensive. On the "Trump will deliver Ukraine" thing, that has long been the clear hope of the pro-Russian camp; though actually as the probability of his return to power has increased, and also since the Gaza War blew up, some expectation management has set in among international anti-globalists. Because the consistent among them are just as much anti-Israel as they're anti-Ukraine, and just as pro-China, even pro-Iran, as they are pro-Russia. Which is why they don't know how to handle guys like Javier Milei of Argentina, who is the consistent opposite of all the above; and they hated Tucker Carlson trying to slag China in his interview of Putin. So there's a bit of an emerging trend in the scene outside the US cautioning "Trump won't be any better than Biden for anti-globalism". Part of that regarding Ukraine might be the realization that the latter will hold to some degree even though material American aid has currently already expired. Putin himself recently stated in a domestic interview that he would actually prefer Biden to Trump; though for American voters, that's probably a reverse endorsement. And that's as far as I'm willing to approach the tar baby of domestic US politics from an international perspective. | |||
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| Member |
New York Times article. Archived with no paywall Surprisingly Weak Ukrainian Defenses Help Russian Advance https://archive.ph/d9rg0 _________________________ "Sometimes I wonder whether the world is being run by smart people who are putting us on or by imbeciles who really mean it." Mark Twain | |||
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| Lawyers, Guns and Money |
Well, I appreciate the international perspective, but I just disagree with your assessment of Trump. I just left the Missouri caucus where I was elected as a Trump delegate to the next level and the State Party convention. The local Missouri caucus was 81% Trump, 19% Haley. So, I just left a room with 1,000 Trump supporters and I can report that they are all anti-globalists (except the Nikki Haley supporters). None are anti-Israel or anti-Ukraine, or pro-China, or pro-Iran or pro-Russia. We are nationalists and tired of open borders and funding the military industrial complex and the world's wars. "Some things are apparent. Where government moves in, community retreats, civil society disintegrates and our ability to control our own destiny atrophies. The result is: families under siege; war in the streets; unapologetic expropriation of property; the precipitous decline of the rule of law; the rapid rise of corruption; the loss of civility and the triumph of deceit. The result is a debased, debauched culture which finds moral depravity entertaining and virtue contemptible." -- Justice Janice Rogers Brown "The United States government is the largest criminal enterprise on earth." -rduckwor | |||
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| Member |
If you can watch this and still want the war to continue, please share your reasoning. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iF13Ls2LJjQ _________________________ "Sometimes I wonder whether the world is being run by smart people who are putting us on or by imbeciles who really mean it." Mark Twain | |||
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| Get my pies outta the oven! |
What in the hell is going on with Germany right now? Seems like we actually don't have a monopoly here in the US as far as idiots in charge: This is definitely NOT the Germany I remember of the early 90's that had their shit together tight. German Generals Discussed Secrets Of Ukraine War Using Off-The-Shelf Video Phone Tech, One Dialed In From Hotel Room
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