quote:

Originally posted by BansheeOne:
After looking around for some time, by pure coincidence I finally got back into my real field of interest and competence and landed pretty much my dream job I always thought I could eventually end my professional career in; this month I’m gonna sign with the leading German-language publisher in security and defense for a double-hatted post, deputy editor-in-chief for one magazine geared towards deciders in security politics, and managing editor of another more technically orientated one for a broader audience. Everything’s done but the numbers, which can however only improve from my current gig.

That in turn means I’ll have a professional full-time outlet for my interests, so my private web presence isn’t exactly going to increase.

quote:

Originally posted by parabellum:
Well, he's not going to be impeached or removed from office. Two months until he's out, one way or another.

quote:

Ukrainian Kursk Offensive: 16th Week

In the Ukrainian Kursk Offensive and Russian counter-offensive, both sides were able to gain ground again last weekend after a week-long standstill before the fronts came to another halt. Ukrainian troops withdrew from the long-threatening pocket south of the town of Lyubimovka, which thus fell to Russia. Russian forces were also able to advance further south along the Snagost River and capture the town of Dar'ino. In contrast, the Ukrainian side was able to secure further ground northeast of Martinovka on the road to Kursk.

However, the focus of attention was less on the Kursk offensive itself than on the mutual missile attacks on targets in the hinterland, after Ukraine attacked a Russian ammunition depot in the neighboring Bryansk Oblast with ATACMS missiles for the first time on November 19, following the appropriate American authorization. On November 20, at least twelve Storm Shadow cruise missiles supplied by Britain also hit a target in Marjino, west of the combat zone. This was reportedly the Russian-North Korean command post for the counteroffensive.

Mutual missile fire

On November 21, Russia fired a ballistic missile at the industrial site of the Yuzhmash vehicle and space company in the southern Ukrainian city of Dnipro. According to Russian sources, this was a practical test of a new intermediate-range weapon called Oreshnik. According to video footage, the missile carried six independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), which appeared to be deployed without a warhead and achieved kinetic effect only due to the high impact speed.

Russian President Vladimir Putin combined his subsequent statement with a threat to attack military facilities of Western states that allow Ukraine to attack "real" Russian territory with missiles supplied by them. Nevertheless, from November 23, Ukraine carried out further missile attacks on targets in the Kursk Oblast, at least some of which used ATACMS. Among other things, a position of the S-400 air defense system and the Kursk-Vostochny airport were hit.

Impact on Kursk offensive unclear

Meanwhile, France has also announced that it has allowed Ukraine to use the French Storm Shadow variant SCALP against Russian territory. According to unconfirmed reports, there are also talks between France, Great Britain and Poland about the possibility of sending their own troops to Ukraine. At the beginning of the year, French President Emmanuel Macron had already brought this option into play in order to relieve Ukrainian armed forces of at least routine tasks such as training, mine clearance and border security against the Russian ally Belarus.

It is currently unclear to what extent the missile attacks on Russian territory will affect operations against the Kursk offensive. Although these seem to have stalled since then, Russia has been able to gain ground in the meantime, as recently at Lyubimovka and Dar'ino. To have a decisive impact, Russian command and supply facilities as well as air attack and defense bases would probably have to be neutralized on a large scale. It is currently unclear whether Ukraine or its supporters have the missile stocks necessary for this.

quote:

Arrow 3: Never more valuable than today

After the Russian attack with a new medium-range missile (IRBM) on the Ukrainian city of Dnipro this week, the German procurement decision for the Israeli missile defense system Arrow 3 suddenly looks better than critics wanted to believe. Those doubted that it would be suitable for dealing with potential threats. At the time, the latter were seen primarily in short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) such as the Iskander type, and cruise missiles. Since Arrow 3 is an exo-atmospheric interceptor missile, thus optimized for targets in largely airless space above an altitude of around 65 kilometers, according to this criticism it cannot combat such attacks at all.

This is certainly true with regard to low-flying cruise missiles, but was already doubtful with regard to Iskander. Given the distance between Russian and German territory, close to the assumed maximum range of the 9K723 missile, this would also have to reach an altitude of between 90 and 150 kilometers at the peak of its flight path. It was always clear that Arrow 3 would only cover the uppermost of the interception layers. Against cruise missiles and other low-flying threats - and also as a supplement to ballistic missile defense for point defense against missiles that break through - there are other systems: Patriot, and in the future IRIS-T SLM.

The return of intermediate-range missiles was foreseeable

There is of course room for discussion about additional systems that are specifically designed for short-range missiles in the Iskander class: Arrow 2, the American THAAD, or the Block 2 version of the French-Italian-British Aster 30 that is currently under development. But perhaps it is more important to first increase the number of systems introduced and selected in order to achieve better coverage over a wide area, particularly against low-flying threats. And what was already obvious at the time of the decision for Arrow 3: the Russian missiles back then would not remain the only ones.

With the termination of the INF Treaty banning land-based intermediate-range weapons by then- and future US President Donald Trump – and subsequently also by Russia – in 2019, a new arms race in this category officially began. In any case, Russian military officials were never happy with this treaty. Because it did not include China, it led to an arms gap with the eastern neighbor, competitor and potential enemy. To what extent the mutual accusations were true that the US missile defense systems in Romania and Poland on the one hand and the Iskander system on the other could also be used to launch land-based cruise missiles that violate the treaty: that no longer plays a role in retrospect.

Demonstration against NATO

The Russian attack on Dnipro has clearly demonstrated the return of these weapons. Vladimir Putin's subsequent threat of attacks on NATO countries that allow Ukraine to attack "real" Russian territory with missiles supplied by them shows that this was also the intention. The fact that this step remains unlikely as long as Russia does not even shoot down NATO drones in international airspace over the Black Sea, which it assumes - probably not without reason - to be providing Ukraine with targeting data; that it certainly does not (yet) have many internmediate-range missiles: granted. The potential is there.

Initially, there was speculation about the use of an RS-26 Rubesh intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). This is a derivative of the RS-24 Yars that has been reduced by one stage and was introduced in 2016 with only two systems. With a stated range of 5,800 kilometers, it remains just above the range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers defined by the INF Treaty for medium-range missiles. The first live use of an ICBM, which is commonly associated with nuclear doomsday scenarios, would probably have been even more spectacular. However, the American side quickly said that it was a new type they had been tracking for some time.

In the interception window of Arrow 3

Putin confirmed in his statement that it was a new weapon called Oreshnik, which is still in the test phase. It is possible that this was developed from the RS-26. Deriving an intermediate-range from an intercontinental missile is nothing new in Russian missile construction: the RSD-10 Pioner, with the NATO designation SS-20, which led to the NATO Double-Track Decision in the 1970s and ultimately to the INF Treaty, was essentially based on the RS-14 Temp-2S reduced by one stage. Little data is known about the Oreshnik so far. Images of the attack on Dnipro suggest that it can carry six independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). These were apparently used here without a warhead and achieved a kinetic effect only due to the high impact speed.

These can certainly be equipped with nuclear weapons in the future. But Oreshnik just as certainly also falls within the interception window of Arrow 3, which demonstrated its ability to combat intermediate-range missiles with a range of around 1,500 kilometers during the Iranian missile attacks on Israel this year. Coincidentally, that is also roughly the distance between Berlin and Moscow. One gets the impression that German decision-makers knew what they were doing when they initiated the introduction of Arrow 3 into the Bundeswehr by next year already. Although the matter certainly cannot be ticked off with that.

That was just the beginning

Unless developments lead to an arms control regime similar to the INF Treaty - complicated by the fact that this time it would also have to include China - we are only at the beginning of new threats. The much-used buzzword of hypersonic weapons has so far been applied largely incorrectly. After all, every ballistic missile with a range of more than a few hundred kilometers reaches hypersonic speeds of Mach 5 and more. The Russian systems touted with this term, such as Iskander and its air-launched variant Kinzhal, are of course capable of partially non-ballistic trajectories and are therefore difficult targets. However, they can very well be combated by existing interceptor missiles, as Patriot has already proven in Ukraine.

The real challenge comes from future hypersonic glide weapons and cruise missiles that can radically change course at these speeds. This will also require a new generation of interceptor missiles. Israel is already working on Arrow 4 as a successor to Arrow 3. In Europe, the HYDEF (Hypersonic Defence Interceptor Study) project is underway, which is to complete a study on a corresponding system by 2026 on behalf of the joint procurement authority OCCAR. Both are possible options for Germany as a successor and supplement to Arrow 3. Even if critics will then certainly doubt again whether they are suitable for defending against current threats.

quote:

Ukrainian Kursk Offensive – 17th Week

In the Ukrainian Kursk Offensive and the Russian counteroffensive, there have been no confirmed changes in the front line despite ongoing heavy fighting. Russian military bloggers reported that their own troops advanced towards Malaya Loknya in a forest area and into the village of Novoivanovka, but this has not yet been documented. In any case, the gain in ground would be minimal. This means that the front lines have remained largely at a standstill since Russian forces were able to advance from the north on Malaya Loknya three weeks ago, but were pushed back in the west.

It is unclear whether this is due to external circumstances such as winter weather conditions or possibly Ukrainian attacks on command and logistics facilities in the Russian hinterland since the use of Western precision weapons was authorized for this purpose. Interestingly, further south, Ukraine has also managed to regain some of the ground that Russia occupied in May during its own cross-border offensive from Belgorod Oblast towards Kharkiv.

False reports from Russian commanders

Meanwhile, Russian troops are slowly but steadily advancing in the Donbas. However, they have still not been able to capture the strategically important city of Pokrovsk and thus open a path to the open lowlands of the Donetsk region. In the Luhansk region, which is now completely controlled by Russia except for a few small sections, there was recently a scandal involving false reports from Russian commanders.

They had claimed to have taken villages near Siversk, which, when inspected by higher authorities, proved to still be held by Ukrainians. As a result, several officers were allegedly arrested and at least one brigade commander and the commander of the Southern Military District, Colonel General Gennady Anashkin, were replaced.

[...]

quote:

Ukrainian Kursk Offensive – 18th Week

There are currently conflicting reports on both sides regarding the Ukrainian Kursk offensive and the Russian counter-offensive. There are consistent reports that Russian forces were able to secure additional territory in the north-east of the combat zone and that they have taken the town of Plekhovo in the south-east, which they have had in a pincer for several weeks. However, official Ukrainian sources contradicted a Russian report that they had also advanced south of this into Ukrainian territory.

There are also contradictions about the situation in the northwest, where some Russian and Ukrainian sources report Russia's advance towards Malaya Loknya, while other Russian sources do not confirm this and even report that Russian forces have been pushed back north of the town. A Ukrainian source also shows a retreat of its own forces from Russian territory in the west, where they had launched a relief attack at the beginning of the Russian counteroffensive. This in turn is not confirmed by the Russian side.

Kursk Offensive coming to an end?

Overall, the initiative remains on the Russian side, as it has been since around mid-October, despite pauses and setbacks. If their systematic advance continues at the same pace as in the front sections in the Donbas, Ukraine would be completely displaced from the area occupied by the Kursk offensive in about another two months. The time frame is critical, as the momentum for negotiations on a ceasefire is now increasing following the re-election of Donald Trump as US president.

[...]

quote:

Trump-Macron 2025: The ticket for European peacekeeping troops in Ukraine?

Will the "Trump train" to the White House, which was much-invoked in the US election campaign, soon also be sending peacekeepers to Ukraine? Americans like to talk about the "ticket" with the names of a party's presidential candidate and his "running mate" for the vice-presidential post. For example, Trump-Vance 2024. Or Biden-Harris 2024, which then suddenly became Harris-Waltz 2024. But an unusual combination seems to be emerging for the coming year: Trump-Macron 2025. At least that is the impression one might have after Trump's visit to Paris at the end of last week, while confidential discussions have been taking place for several weeks, particularly between France and Great Britain, on the very subject of possible European peacekeepers for Ukraine.

His former and future French colleague Emmanuel Macron obviously still knows how to push the right buttons with Trump: an invitation to the reopening of Notre Dame Cathedral with a place of honor in the front row between Macron and his wife - while the acting American President Biden was probably not coincidentally represented by his own wife - and beforehand a one-on-one conversation in the Elysee Palace. During this, the Frenchman persuaded the American to invite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy directly instead of the planned further one-on-one conversation with him.

Russian concerns about Trump statements

Trump then announced on social media that the latter was ready to make a "deal" on a ceasefire in the war in Ukraine, and called on Russian President Vladimir Putin to come to the negotiating table. Russia's concern about this was immediately reflected in the reactions of pro-Russian media and propaganda sources. They spread the story that Zelenskyy's request for further American support had been rebuffed by Trump, who had in fact demanded a ceasefire from him. Zelenskyy had supposedly rejected this. Moreover, these sources focused on Trump's statement that Ukraine had already lost 400,000 soldiers, which was presented as the number of dead, deliberately ignoring the earlier sentence that Russia had as many as 600,000 dead and wounded.

As a basis for the alleged rejection by Zelenskyy, they cited a subsequent Telegram post in which he specified Ukrainian losses as 47,000 dead and 370,000 wounded of all categories, and pointed out the importance of security guarantees for Ukraine. While all of the figures mentioned are open to doubt, the wording of the statements in no way supports the Russian interpretation that makes Zelenskyy, rather than Putin, the addressee of Trump's negotiation demand. In view of the reported approach by the Trump team to force both sides to negotiate either by cutting or further increasing aid to Ukraine, the concern seems justified that Zelenskyy was able to successfully present himself in Paris as willing to compromise. And thus make Putin the main target of further pressure in this direction.

Outgoing and incoming president freed from public pressure

The same sources were all the more eager to pounce on an interview with Trump on NBC, which was essentially a throwback to the election campaign for the domestic audience. In response to respective lame questions, Trump replied just as lamely that of course aid to Ukraine would be completely cut off and that the US could withdraw from NATO. The same applies to an interview with Time Magazine this week, which has just named him "Person of the Year" again. There he criticized, among other things, the American permission for Ukraine to use US precision weapons against targets in the Russian hinterland - something he had previously been conspicuously silent about.

Trump is thus still prone to spontaneous outbursts of opinion, unless being guided by experienced tamers like Macron. Conversely, those like Putin or the North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un, who have led him to make the most hair-raising statements against American interests before, must be kept away from him. However, after the election, he is just as free from having to consider populist issues in domestic politics as Joe Biden - which explains the largely quietly-coordinated Ukraine policy between the two during the current transition phase. According to the US Constitution, Trump cannot run for president again. And he was elected primarily due to the economic concerns of American voters, for whom foreign policy traditionally plays little role.

Even then, according to polls, two-thirds of Republican voters are pro-Ukrainian. Trump's core supporters, who actually jumped on this issue during the election campaign, will continue to follow him regardless of his actual decisions and will ignore or explain away any different realpolitik as usual. He can make an additional name for himself only on the international stage anymore. For example, by mediating an armistice in Ukraine that will not make him personally or the US as a whole look weak by simply meeting Putin's demands. The choice of the "hawk" Keith Kellogg as his future Ukraine representative, who wants to resolve the conflict from a position of American strength, already points in this direction.

Same opinion, different motivation

Meanwhile, Emmanuel Macron arrived in Warsaw on Thursday of this week for talks with the Polish government. The discussion also focused on possible European peacekeeping troops to secure an armistice in Ukraine. The reported number of 40,000 men with five brigades, one of which Polish-led, does however not seem to be based on government sources but on wargames by French think tanks. Macron and Trump ultimately agree that the Europeans should shoulder more of the burden in international security policy, albeit for different reasons. As always, Macron certainly has greater European independence from the USA and a possible French leadership role in mind.

Trump, for his part, is not an American isolationist in the opinion of many observers, although he does cater to isolationist reflexes among his voters. Rather this would have him as merely the latest in a line of American presidents since Bill Clinton who believed that they could shift more of the defense burden onto their allies while maintaining the United States' leadership role with no change. In that regard, Joe Biden was a throwback to the Cold War generation that otherwise ended in the 1990s with George Bush Sr. as president. This is reflected in the alleged plans of Trump's team, according to which the United States would guarantee Ukraine's security after an armistice with further military aid, while the Europeans would monitor the armistice at their own expense with peacekeepers.

European Peacekeeping Forces: How it Will Not Work

This exact division of labor will of course not work. On the one hand, the Europeans - the EU plus Great Britain and Norway - had already provided 40 percent more aid to Ukraine than the USA in monetary terms at the end of October. After all the funds now approved by both sides have been exhausted, it will be more than double. This does not take into account that the US aid consists largely of stored weapons systems. Although these contributed more to the immediate rescue of Ukraine than the weak European material reserves, they are unlikely to be replaced at nominal price. Conversely, the development of production capacity in Europe has taken far too long. But its investments are now flowing not least into the production of European companies within Ukraine itself.

In this respect, Europe has nothing to make up for here and does not need to leave the field to focus solely on providing peacekeeping troops. These, in turn, would be doubtful in implementation and effectiveness without American reassurance. Macron may envisage such a commitment as a milestone in independent European security policy. But already in Warsaw it was heard that such "speculation" must be put to an end. Without recourse to NATO structures, a deployment of this magnitude is unlikely anyway. Especially since Great Britain, the second likely lead nation alongside France, is no longer integrated into the EU structures as the next best solution. At best, a hybrid solution would be conceivable - for example with leadership by the Eurocorps, which is available for both NATO and EU operations.

And Germany?

Recently, before the Paris meeting, Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock did not want to rule out Germany's participation in possible peacekeeping troops for Ukraine. This immediately attracted a lot of criticism in the freshly-started federal election campaign. In fact, she had first of all only avoided the German "exclusionitis" that has also often been criticized in the past, whereby government politicians, when asked about possible deployments, always first listed what would definitely not be done. However, observers of European security policy naturally suspect that the five peacekeeping brigades in the French wargames may include one each led by France, Britain and Poland, as well as one from another of Ukraine's larger neighbors - Romania, for example - and indeed a German one.

This is also difficult to imagine, given how the Bundeswehr is currently struggling to set up a new brigade for Lithuania. In fact, the German army is already more or less fully allocated to the sustainable defense of the Baltic states against Russia. A task that would remain even after an armistice in Ukraine. For immediate neighbors such as Poland (which however also has borders with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Belarus) and Romania, as well as allies committed to protecting NATO's southeast flank such as France, it would make sense to prevent Russia from advancing further into Ukraine. But Great Britain, which is the lead nation for the defense of Estonia, must already ask itself whether the peacekeeping troops deployed in one place would be missing in another.

Before peacekeepers, peace is needed

The German-led EU Battlegroup 2025 at least is still available and can be deployed quickly. For the first time, it also represents the EU's new Rapid Deployment Capability with possible reinforcements from air, naval and other forces to 5,000 men. At its core, however, this remains a reinforced light infantry battalion, which is primarily intended for scenarios such as peacekeeping and evacuation operations with a maximum duration of 120 days - not to deter the Russian army from violating an armistice. Better than nothing for the initial phase, perhaps, and just as suitable as a political "tripwire" as an armored division. But it is symptomatic of the practical problems that a credible implementation of all the ideas for European peacekeeping troops would entail.

Before all implementation problems, however, there is the question of whether an armistice in Ukraine can be achieved at all. As Russia is currently advancing further, this is not in its interest as long as its territorial and political demands on Ukraine are not met. Under no circumstances can it agree to a freezing of the fronts as long as Ukrainian forces are still on its own territory at Kursk. Otherwise it would have to enter into negotiations on an exchange of occupied territories. As long as Ukraine continues to signal its willingness to negotiate, it could then hope for an increase in US aid under Trump. It is very likely that the price for Putin will have to rise further before he accepts negotiations based on less than his maximum demands as a better alternative.

Squaring the Circle

This will probably not actually happen before Trump's target of January 20. But that would at least give Europeans and Americans time to agree on a realistic concept for maintaining a future armistice and to solve squaring the circle with other actors. Neither Russia nor many NATO members want to face each other directly in Ukraine. The actual "peacekeeping troops" on an armistice line would perhaps be better coming from neutral states. For example, from the circle of BRICS members who have already ostentatiously attempted peace initiatives. India, Brazil and South Africa, for example, could be considered. On the other hand, neither side would probably want to create the basis for a Chinese military presence on the European continent.

Any Western presence, whether called peacekeepers or otherwise, would serve as a deterrent. It would therefore necessarily have to be extremely robust, but not necessarily stationed directly on the line of contact. If it makes it easier for Russia, this could be nominally a European operation. But it would necessarily rely on NATO structures and include American involvement at least in a support role and contingency planning. This applies to command and control, reconnaissance, and air support and airlift capabilities, for example. Balancing all of this will be complex at best. But compared to the task of first achieving an armistice that does not simply hand Ukraine over to Russia, it is probably the smaller problem.

quote:

Originally posted by BansheeOne:

quote:

US discussing possibility of transferring Israeli Patriot missile defense systems to Ukraine

By Kylie Atwood and Oren Liebermann, CNN

Published 5:33 PM EDT, Thu June 27, 2024

CNN — The Biden administration is holding discussions with Israel and Ukraine about the possibility of transferring aging Patriot air defense systems currently in Israel to Ukraine as it continues to defend itself in the war with Russia, according to a senior administration official and a source familiar with the discussions, as the US urgently prioritizes air defenses for Kyiv.

No final agreement has been reached to transfer the crucial systems - and the countries are still working through specific logistics - but the administration official said they are hopeful the efforts might succeed, especially given the effectiveness of the Patriot batteries already operating in Ukraine.

The US and Germany have already sent Patriot systems to Ukraine, but the Biden administration has made it clear that Kyiv needs more as Russia continues to launch aerial attacks on the country.

It is unclear how long the process of finalizing details and transferring the systems to Ukraine would take. The systems would likely need to be transferred to the US first, where they would undergo refurbishment, before being sent to Ukraine.

If completed, the transfer would mark a significant shift in Israel’s position regarding the war in Ukraine. Israel has been careful not to overtly criticize Russia, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has tried to walk a fine line with President Vladimir Putin. Russia in 2022 warned that providing Israeli arms to Ukraine would “destroy all interstate relations between our countries.”

[...]

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/0...s-ukraine/index.html

quote:

Jan 28, 2025

Scoop: U.S. sending dozens of Patriot missiles from Israel to Ukraine

Barak Ravid

The U.S. military transferred around 90 Patriot air defense interceptors from storage in Israel to Poland this week in order to deliver them to Ukraine, three sources with knowledge of the operation tell Axios.

Why it matters: Getting more Patriot missiles to Ukraine has been a top priority for the Pentagon to help Kyiv defend against Russia's attacks on its critical infrastructure.

- This is also the most significant delivery of weapons from Israel to Ukraine since the Russian invasion almost three years ago.

Catch up quick: Last April, the Israeli Air Force officially decommissioned the Patriot air defense system, more than 30 years after it was first given to Israel during the first Gulf War.

- The system became less relevant as Israel developed its own air defense systems, and most Patriot batteries were used for training or left in storage.

Behind the scenes: The sources tell Axios that after the IDF announced the decommissioning, Ukrainian officials approached the U.S. and Israel with an idea: Israel would give those missiles back to the U.S. to be refurbished and sent on to Ukraine

- For several months, Israel dragged its feet out of concern Russia would retaliate, perhaps by supplying sophisticated weapons to Iran.

- A Ukrainian official tells Axios Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu refused to take his calls on that issue for weeks.

- But in late September, Netanyahu finally approved the idea, an Israeli official says.

Friction point: At the time, Netanyahu wanted to speak with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in order to get his approval for ultra-Orthodox Israelis to make an annual pilgrimage to the city of Uman in Ukraine, where a famous Rabbi is buried.

- Zelensky wouldn't take his call until Netanyahu approved the Patriot deal, the Ukrainian official says.

- A spokesperson for Netanyahu told Axios the prime minister didn't object to the decommissioning of the Patriot system and its return to the U.S. and denied any connection between this and the pilgrimage.

- The Pentagon declined to comment for this story, as did a spokesperson for U.S. European Command.

[...]

State of play: In recent days, U.S. Air Force C-17 planes arrived at an air base in southern Israel and departed for Rzeszów in Eastern Poland, a hub for moving weapons into Ukraine.

- The sources said the flight transferred roughly 90 patriot interceptors that can be used by Ukraine with its current patriot batteries.

- The flights carried around 90 interceptors, which Ukraine can use with its current batteries. Additional equipment, like radars and other gear, will first be transferred to the U.S. to be refurbished.

[...]

quote:

North Korean Troops No Longer Seen on Front Lines Fighting Ukraine

North Korea sent its best troops to aid Russia in its war against Ukraine. But after months of suffering severe losses, they have been taken off the front line.

By Michael Schwirtz and Julian E. Barnes

Jan. 30, 2025

North Korean soldiers who joined their Russian allies in battle against Ukrainian forces have been pulled off the front lines after suffering heavy casualties, according to Ukrainian and U.S. officials.

The North Korean troops, sent to bolster Russian forces trying to push back a Ukrainian offensive inside Russia’s borders, have not been seen at the front for about two weeks, the officials said after requesting anonymity to discuss sensitive military and intelligence matters.

The arrival of around 11,000 North Korean troops in Russia in November caused alarm in Ukraine and among its allies in the West, who feared their deployment signaled a significant escalation in the nearly three-year-old war. But in just three months, the North Korean ranks have diminished by half, according to Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, Ukraine’s top military commander.

Ukrainian troops who have fought against the North Koreans have described them as fierce warriors. But disorganization in their ranks and a lack of cohesion with Russian units have quickly driven up casualties, a Ukrainian official said. Since arriving on the battlefield, the North Korean soldiers have been left to fend for themselves, advancing with few armored vehicles and rarely pausing to regroup or fall back, according to Ukrainian officials and frontline troops.

[...]

Many of the soldiers are among North Korea’s best-trained special operations troops, but the Russians appear to have used them as foot soldiers, sending them forth in waves across fields studded with land mines to be mowed down by heavy Ukrainian fire.

The American officials said the decision to pull the North Korean troops off the front line may not be a permanent one. It is possible, they said, that the North Koreans could return after receiving additional training or after the Russians come up with new ways of deploying them to avoid such heavy casualties.

[...]

quote:

Ceasefire by Easter, Peace by May 9: Trump's 100-Day Ukraine Plan Discussed in Political Circles

12:15, 26 January 2025

In recent days, political and diplomatic circles in Ukraine have been actively discussing a plan-schedule for ending the war in 100 days, allegedly already drawn up by Donald Trump and his team.

It is alleged that it was handed over by the Americans to a number of European diplomats. And from them it went to Ukraine. It should be noted that at the moment we have no confirmation of the authenticity of this "plan". Perhaps this is indeed a plan drawn up by Trump's team, or perhaps it is some kind of "apocrypha" compiled on the basis of the "Kellogg plan" made public last year before the US presidential elections. There are signs that point to both the first and second options.

However, given the great public attention to the topic of peaceful settlement, we decided to publish it.

So, according to the "schedule," Trump is said to be planning a phone call with Putin in late January or early February. In early February, the plan is to be discussed with Ukrainian authorities.

Following the results of Washington’s communication with Moscow and Kiev, the negotiations may either be paused (if no common ground can be found) or continued (if such points are found).

In the second case, the following further schedule is provided.

Zelensky must cancel the decree prohibiting negotiations with Putin.

In February - the first half of March 2025, it is proposed to hold a meeting between Trump, Zelensky and Putin (a trilateral meeting or two bilateral meetings will be decided separately). The meeting should approve the main parameters of the peace plan, and then continue working on the agreement at the level of special representatives.

While negotiations are underway and hostilities continue, Trump does not block the sending of military aid to Ukraine.

From April 20, 2025 (Easter, which this year all Christian denominations celebrate on the same day) it is proposed to declare a truce along the entire front line. At the same time, all Ukrainian troops must be withdrawn from the Kursk region.

At the end of April 2025, the International Peace Conference should begin its work, which will record an agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on ending the war with the mediation of the United States, China, a number of countries in Europe and the Global South. At the end of April, the exchange of prisoners will begin according to the formula "all for all".

By May 9, the International Peace Conference is expected to issue a declaration on ending the war in Ukraine based on agreed parameters.

After May 9, Ukraine is offered not to extend the martial law regime and mobilization.

Presidential elections are held in Ukraine at the end of August, and parliamentary and local elections at the end of October.

The proposed parameters of the agreement to be concluded within the framework of the International Conference:

1. Ukraine will not be a member of NATO and declares neutrality. The decision to ban Ukraine from joining the Alliance must be approved at the NATO summit.

2. Ukraine will become a member of the EU by 2030. The EU undertakes obligations for the post-war reconstruction of the country.

3. Ukraine does not reduce the size of the army. The United States is committed to continuing support for the modernization of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

4. Ukraine refuses military and diplomatic attempts to return the occupied territories. But does not officially recognize the sovereignty of the Russian Federation over them.

5. Some sanctions against the Russian Federation will be lifted immediately after the conclusion of a peace agreement. Some - over the course of three years, depending on Russia's compliance with the parameters of the agreement. All restrictions on the import of Russian energy resources to the EU will be lifted. But for a certain period of time, it will be subject to a special duty by the Europeans, the proceeds of which will be used to restore Ukraine.

6. Parties that advocate for the Russian language and peaceful coexistence with Russia must be allowed to participate in elections in Ukraine. All actions against the UOC and the Russian language must be stopped at the state level.

7. The point about the European peacekeeping contingent after the end of military actions is highlighted as particularly problematic. On the one hand, Kyiv demands this as a guarantee of security. On the other hand, the Russian Federation is categorically against it. Separate consultations between all parties should be held on this point.

[...]

quote:

Lines for a negotiated solution to the Ukraine war in 2025/26

January 25, 2025

With the beginning of 2025, a new dynamic has emerged in efforts to end the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine through a negotiated solution. Since its largely unsuccessful counter-offensive in the summer of 2023, Ukraine has been on the strategic defensive due to ongoing material and, increasingly, personnel shortages. Russia is currently advancing slowly and with high losses, but persistently, on almost all fronts. At the same time, there were already predictions from the Ukrainian side last spring that the aggressor itself could reach personnel and material limits in war production at the beginning of 2026.

Both sides have tried to turn these medium-term trends in their favor over the past year. With its offensive against Russian territory in the Kursk Oblast, Ukraine has gained political leverage - even at the cost of the fact that the forces deployed there are not available for the defense of its own territory. After the long-established procurement of weapons and ammunition from friendly countries such as Iran and North Korea, Russia has now also brought North Korean troops into the country. These are being deployed in the Kursk region in particular, in order to limit the legally possible but domestically politically sensitive use, and major losses, of conscripts in the defense and reconquest of its own territory.

Time frame and interests

The Trump administration in the US, which has just taken office, continues to strive to end the war as quickly as possible. There is no longer any talk of "within 24 hours", as President Donald Trump claimed during the election campaign. Self-imposed deadlines of 100 days to six months are mentioned. Since the Paris meeting with his French and Ukrainian counterparts Emmanuel Macron and Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the end of last year, Trump has taken the stance that the latter is ready for a "deal", and that it is now up to Russian President Vladimir Putin to act. He has just called on Putin to do this in his usual drastic manner, and threatened to impose even stricter sanctions against Russia if he does not.

The interests of both sides are known. Ukraine is striving to regain its Russian-occupied territories if possible, but in any case to stop further losses and, in particular, to secure security guarantees against further Russian attacks, preferably through NATO membership. Russia is demanding recognition of its annexation of the Ukrainian oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, of which it now controls almost completely the first, but only about two-thirds of the other three. In addition, Ukraine must become neutral - so in no case a NATO member -, severely limit its military potential under the heading of "demilitarization", and carry out domestic political reforms in Russia's interests in order to achieve "denazification".

Option to continue the war of conquest

The Russian demands clearly leave open the option of a later continuation of the war, for example to complete the land bridge to the Russian-controlled region of Transnistria in the Republic of Moldova by conquering the Black Sea coast in the Odessa region. Putin must also cater to the hopes of more radical voices in Russia who are calling for the incorporation of the entire historical region of Novorossiya - that is, the areas east of the Dnipro that were settled by Russians in the 18th century, including the capital of Kiev - or even the entire Ukraine. Freezing the current front line would be a minimal compromise, but he cannot agree to it under any circumstances as long as it runs within Russia near Kursk.

After a five-month Russian counteroffensive, Ukraine currently still holds about 40 percent of the territory it originally occupied there. The exact extent is ultimately of little importance, since a ceasefire before it is fully recaptured would require Russia to make disproportionate concessions to regain it. This explains the dogged Ukrainian hold onto it while Russian forces take more territory elsewhere. It also urges a hurry to reach a negotiated settlement before this bargaining chip is lost on the battlefield. At current rates, the 100 days mentioned by Trump circles are probably the most before the window for this closes.

Currently no Russian interest in a negotiated solution

This is extremely ambitious, especially because Russia cannot be interested in a negotiated solution as long as it continues to advance on the battlefield. A possible slowdown in its offensive potential in the coming year is currently still up in the air, and could possibly be mitigated by increased supplies from allies. Hopeful voices claim that the Ukrainian campaign against logistical facilities and industrial targets in the Russian rear area - especially with drones of its own production, which are not subject to Western restrictions on use - is now having an impact on the enemy's supplies. However, Russia does not yet seem to be under pressure to setttle for what has been achieved so far.

Based on all previous experience, further sanctions alone will not change this. Trump seems to believe that lowering the price of oil in cooperation with Saudi Arabia will quickly end the war. He has also indicated that China could be part of the solution - probably by exerting pressure on Russia as part of a major balancing of interests with the USA on mutual trade relations and other issues. However, a possible drop in the price of oil is only likely to have an impact on the Russian war chest in the medium term. If the Trump administration really wants to bring about at least a ceasefire within 100 days, it would first have to enable Ukraine to stop further Russian advances within this period.

Ukraine urgently needs a perspective

This fits in with the reported approach of threatening a side unwilling to negotiate with either a reduction or an increase in American military aid to Ukraine. However, this cannot compensate for the country's increasing shortage of personnel. According to reports, Trump's team, too, is now demanding that Ukraine lower the draft age for conscripts from the current 25 to 18 years. The Ukrainian government has so far avoided this due to the country's already-difficult demographic situation. Since the 18-24 age group is one of the weakest, there are fears that major losses will have significant additional effects on future population development. As in all Eastern European countries, this has been characterized by emigration, low birth rates and an aging population since the end of the Cold War.

In addition to the direct war losses since the full Russian invasion, Ukraine has also suffered enormous population losses due to flight abroad. This poses an acute threat to the economic basis, but also to reconstruction, and even to the continued existence of the nation itself. It would therefore also have to have a perspective of ending the war quickly in order to resort to this literally last resort. Especially since the population is now showing noticeable war fatigue, and reports of refusal to be drafted and desertions in the armed forces are increasing. This could include the increased delivery of long-range precision weapons and the lifting of restrictions on use against Russian targets - including by Germany. All additional troops drafted would also have to be equipped and would require most of the 100-day window for training.

Negotiation items and fallback positions

In this respect, Trump at least has the advantage of a loyal political base. Although it has so far eagerly spread fears of Russian retaliation, including nuclear war with NATO, it will uncomplainingly support or even applaud a tough stance against Putin's threats. Stopping further Russian advances as long as Ukraine still controls areas near Kursk would open the way to a negotiated solution that is advantageous for Ukraine and would also bring Trump international recognition. Possible elements would be an exchange of occupied territories, security guarantees for Ukraine and other points for a post-war order - but not "demilitarization" and "denazification". According to Ukrainian statements, the latter played no role in the unsuccessful negotiations with Russia in the spring of 2022 anyway.

As an initial position, Ukraine could offer a complete renunciation of NATO membership or the stationing of Western troops if both sides withdraw to the pre-2022 lines - in the certain knowledge that this is unacceptable for Russia. Gradual fallback positions would be, for example, a renunciation of NATO for 20 years, as suggested by Trump's team, with a mutual withdrawal to the pre-2023 lines - i.e. after the Ukrainian recovery of large areas in autumn 2022. Then a renunciation for ten years, which experience shows a candidate needs to join NATO anyway, with a withdrawal to the pre-2024 lines. That would still include the small Ukrainian territorial gains in summer 2023 and reverse the Russian gains since then.

Realistically possible results

More realistic outcomes after such opening moves would probably be a mutual retreat behind the lines of the respective cross-border offensives of the past year: the Russian invasion of Kharkiv, and the Ukrainian advance towards Kursk. A withdrawal of Russian troops from Kharkiv Oblast behind the border of the Luhansk region claimed by Russia and the return of territories captured further south last year - in particular from Avdiivka towards Pokrovsk and near Vuhledar in Donetsk Oblast - would have to be negotiated. As a concession, Ukraine could withdraw from the small parts of Luhansk Oblast it still holds without officially recognizing Russian rule over these and all other occupied territories. In many respects, this would correspond to solutions during the division of Germany.

From the Russian perspective, complete control over at least one of the four annexed territories would be a major political win. Together with two thirds of the other three, Putin's conclusion to his own population could then be: "Three out of four ain't bad." Whether those calling for even more extensive annexations will take this as an acceptable result of three years of war with heavy losses is of course questionable. In addition, this solution would necessarily have to be backed up by extensive Western guarantees, including the stationing of NATO troops in Ukraine, in order to deter Russia from resuming the war of aggression at a later date. Overall, this would still be a high price for Putin to pay to regain his own territory at Kursk.

Additional incentives

Other incentives, both positive and negative, would probably be needed. These could include a partial lifting of sanctions against Russia. One little-noticed issue is the use of coastal waters belonging to the occupied Ukrainian territories. Although without conventional naval forces, Ukraine has virtually completely pushed the Russian Black Sea Fleet out of the Black Sea by using long-range guided missiles and air and sea drones, and forced it to abandon the Sevastopol naval base. Ironic, since control of this port was cited as a reason for the occupation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014. Now the role of the Russian Navy is largely limited to launching cruise missiles from the Sea of ​​Azov east of Crimea, or even the Caspian Sea.

The fact that Ukraine has effective control of the Black Sea waters means that Russia would have to negotiate their use after a ceasefire again during the conflict settlement. Otherwise, the use of the territorial sea, which under international law belongs to Ukraine, by ships flying the Russian flag, and in any case warships and other vessels in government service, could be excluded in an agreement and monitored by international or Western naval forces. This would definitely affect the coastal waters of Crimea in the Black Sea, including Sevastopol, and possibly also in the Sea of ​​Azov, including the northern coast around Mariupol. It is doubtful how much Putin could sell the land gains there as a success if Russian ships were not allowed to call at the ports.

Time is essential

The same applies to air traffic over the occupied territories. In any case, within the framework of a ceasefire agreement, possible buffer zones would have to be negotiated in which the conflicting parties on both sides of the demarcation line would be subject to restrictions, and which could be monitored by international troops. Examples would be the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea, and the Sinai Peninsula since the Camp David Accords of 1978 between Israel and Egypt. Expansions from a few kilometers deep to distance-dependent regulations for the exclusion of various categories of weapons systems, such as rocket artillery with a range of up to 100 kilometers or more, would be conceivable. Such zones would also have to extend along the international border between Russia and Ukraine. Their design would have to be seen as part of an overall package of mutual demands.

A negotiated solution to Ukraine's relative advantage would be more difficult if it were forced to withdraw from Russian territory before a ceasefire. The likelihood of this is increasing as the conflict continues under current conditions. The war might then not end until next year, if not later. However, the additional incentives mentioned above would remain. Nevertheless, in the worst-case scenario, Ukraine would have to accept a mere freezing of the front line as it then runs - probably only on its own territory and even further west than now. A quick solution for which the US and Europe pull together, possibly with the involvement of other parties, is therefore essential.

quote:

Oreshnik and Arrow 3: A Second Look

January 11, 2025

Seven weeks after the live test firing of the new Russian Oreshnik intermediate-range missile (NATO designation SS-X-34) at the industrial site of the Yuzhmash vehicle and space company in the southern Ukrainian city of Dnipro, the physical and political dust has settled. Although the mission publicly demonstrated the return of this type of weapon to Europe, long banned by the INF Treaty, on sober inspection it did not demonstrate any new capabilities. This is especially true when compared to the claims subsequently made by Russian President Vladimir Putin and pro-Russian propagandists. According to them, Oreshnik was the brand new development of an uninterceptable precision hypersonic missile. It supposedly turns its target into dust through kinetic action "like a meteorite". This was to be exactly what happened with the Yuzhmash plant.

In contrast, publicly available satellite images after the attack show no damage to the site that was not already caused by earlier hits with previous short-range missiles. Some members of the international open source intelligence (OSINT) community, however, claim to have spotted impacts from reentry vehicles or submunitions in a residential area up to one kilometer north of the site. These findings at least do not contradict available video recordings and the described mechanism of action. According to those, six independently controllable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), each with six impactors, were used in the attack, which hit at ten to eleven times the speed of sound.

Oreshnik is not Tunguska

In his description, Putin referred to the Tunguska meteorite, which in 1908 presumably devastated a forest area of over 2,000 square kilometers in Siberia, with signs of an explosion being seen over 500 kilometers away. If this theory is correct, it was however probably the breakup of a small asteroid or comet at an altitude of several kilometers. In other words, an air detonation with a corresponding pressure wave, but without a crater. In the case of Oreshnik, on the other hand, various calculations suggest that the impactors had a mass of 30 to 250 kilograms each. It is unclear whether these were the intended impactors, dummies for the test shot, or simply debris from the MIRVs.

Their kinetic energy would be considerable at an impact speed of Mach 10 to 11. But these would essentially be KE projectiles, the effect of which on the ground would depend largely on the shape and material properties of the impactor and the target. Deep penetration with an opening diameter more or less the size of the caliber, bursting on impact and/or various shapes and sizes of craters would be conceivable. Depending on the resolution, no major damage would then be visible on satellite images. However, the apocalyptic descriptions of Oreshnik's effect on the target are clearly not accurate.

A question of precision

This would still be an effective weapon against hardened, high-value targets such as bunkers, as the effects after penetrating layers of earth and structural reinforcements would also have to be considered. This would require targeting accuracy within a few meters, as is achieved by GPS or laser guidance, or intelligent optronic or radar target recognition. If it is true that Oreshnik impacts during the attack on Dnipro occurred up to 1,000 meters from the target, this would obviously not be the case. Precision guidance during the final approach is also unlikely due to the high impact speed.

The ionization effect of the surrounding air caused by frictional heat alone - which regularly leads to the interruption of radio communication with spacecraft during reentry into Earth's atmosphere - would significantly interfere with both optronic and radar- or satellite-based guidance. At best, inertial navigation is conceivable here. The 50 percent targeting accuracy (Circular Error Probable, CEP) of MIRVs is therefore usually in the range of 100 to 500 meters after they have been aligned and sent onto individual re-entry trajectories outside the atmosphere by the "bus" carrying them. This is sufficient for the use of nuclear warheads, but not for precision attacks on point targets with exclusively kinetic effects.

Hypersound is everywhere

This shows the dilemma of missiles referred to with the buzzword "hypersonic weapons". In fact, every ballistic missile with a range of more than a few hundred kilometers reaches hypersonic speeds of Mach 5 and more. In a narrower sense, however, the term refers to weapons that can also make radical course changes at such speeds and are therefore almost impossible to intercept with current means. This only applies to a limited extent to the often-mentioned Russian Iskander system and its air-launched variant Kinzhal. Although these can use the available propulsion energy to steer partially non-ballistic trajectories at less than their maximum range, the final approach is not hypersonic in order to achieve a target accuracy of five to seven meters.

The American intermediate-range missile Pershing II had similar capabilities in the 1970s, achieving a CEP of 30 meters with an imaging radar seeker after deceleration during re-entry into the atmosphere. Oreshnik, on the other hand, has so far demonstrated neither maneuverability in the ballistic phase nor precision in the final approach. The flight duration and the steep impact angle of the missiles suggest that the relatively short distance of just under 800 kilometers from the presumed launch site at the Kapustin Yar test site was reached by a conventional ballistic trajectory with a high apex. Images of recovered debris show a typical "bus" with fuel tanks and maneuvering nozzles for aligning the MIRVs before re-entry.

Nothing about Oreshnik is really new

Components with serial numbers from 2017 suggest that Oreshnik is not a recent, completely new development either, but rather comes from the Russian Kedr (Cedar) program for a modular missile system from the last decade. The aim was to be able to flexibly combine different propulsion stages and payloads for different purposes. Ultimately, it is therefore conventional technology that essentially used a launch vehicle for nuclear warheads to fire a kind of suborbital shotgun blast at a major city as a political demonstration. Neither the effect on the target nor the ability to assert itself against interception measures is revolutionary.

Nor is Oreshnik in series production yet. Since the attack on Dnipro, Ukraine has fired several other precision weapons supplied by Western countries into Russian territory. This was the declared reason for the demonstration of the missile, which was intended to serve as a deterrent. However, there has not been a further deployment so far. Putin himself has said that Oreshnik will enter service with the Russian missile troops in the second half of 2025. Then, in its function as an intermediate-range missile aimed at Europe, it will primarily face the US land- and sea-based Standard SM-3 interceptor missiles and the Israeli Arrow 3 system, which will then arrive in Germany.

Future German defense learns from the Houthis

Both types demonstrated their ability to counter intermediate-range missiles during the two massive Iranian attacks on Israel last year. The Israeli missile defense system still has to regularly prove itself against attacks by the Houthis from Yemen, who use Iranian missiles with a range of 2,000 kilometers and more (for comparison: the distance between the Oreshnik launch site in Kapustin Yar and Berlin is 2,300 kilometers). There is a constant learning curve in this. For example, Arrow 3 missed two incoming warheads shortly before Christmas. According to Israeli suspicions, these were a type from the Iranian Fattah family. This is equipped with a maneuverable warhead with additional propulsion, and is also described by Iran as a hypersonic weapon.

In fact, like Iskander, the type is likely to be capable of only a limited non-ballistic trajectory and would be slowed down below hypersonic speeds for precision guidance on the final approach. In any case, according to Israeli reports, a rapid upgrade of Arrow 3 at the end of December led to the weapon being successfully intercepted again, with a second warhead being destroyed on final approach by the American THAAD defense system. Non-maneuverable intermediate-range missiles such as Oreshnik remain vulnerable in any case in the phase between the burnout of the ascent stages with separation of the "bus" and the release of the reentry bodies. In this sense, Arrow 3 also shows potential for growth against possible future developments that could combine the range of Oreshnik with the limited maneuverability of Iskander. However, itremains important to prepare for the appearance of real hypersonic weapons.

quote:

Originally posted by reloader-1:
Slosig, that’s a chatbot. Already reported, look at prior posts by it.

quote:

Ukraine: Russian successes at Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar

2 August 2025

In the Ukraine War, Russia reports success in capturing two cities in the Donetsk Oblast that have been contested for over a year. According to the report, Russian troops now control Chasiv Yar and have also advanced into the city of Pokrovsk, further south. Pokrovsk, in particular, is considered strategically important because it controls access to the open lowlands of the oblast, potentially paving the way for more mobile warfare in the conquest of the rest of the Donbass region. However, according to Russian reports, fighting continues in both cities.

In Chasiv Yar, which has been largely destroyed by prolonged shelling, this affects the western outskirts of the town. Fighting has been going on in the town area since last summer, after Russia launched a new offensive in early 2024 following a failed first attempt. Since July of that year, Russian forces have also been attempting to capture Pokrovsk, a key hub for Ukrainian supply routes along the front. These routes have already been largely cut off in recent months, as Russia gradually encircled the city from three sides.

Urban battles continue

Like Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk had been transformed into a fortified stronghold by Ukraine. According to recent reports, Russian troops have now managed to advance along a road through the southwestern suburbs into the city proper. However, based on previous experience from urban warfare in the Ukraine War, further months of fierce fighting are to be expected before one side gains substantial control over the remaining ruins. Whether and how quickly Russia will succeed in this, and what this means for the further course of the war, remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, fighting also continues unabated along the rest of the front. Along the international border between the Ukrainian Sumy Oblast and the Russian Kursk Oblast in the northeast, Russia has already completely expelled the enemy from the territory occupied during the Kursk Offensive last year and has advanced up to ten kilometers into the Ukrainian side. Recently, however, Ukraine launched a counterattack near the village of Andriivka.

Minor advances on both sides

Further west, Ukraine has also been attempting for several months to encircle the town of Tiotkino, located in a salient of Russian territory, and occupies a strip of land on the right bank of the Seym River. Russian forces had already withdrawn from this difficult-to-defend sector at the beginning of the Kursk Offensive, blowing up the bridges behind them. Further along the border, Ukraine claims to hold some small areas on the Russian side, while Russia is attempting to further expand the zone it occupied during its advance toward Kharkiv last year.

Russia also announced the complete conquest of the Luhansk Oblast, which it officially annexed some time ago, while according to Ukrainian sources, two small sections are still held by its own forces. In the southeast, Russian troops have penetrated shallowly into the Dnipro Oblast, which is not officially claimed by Russia, at several points. Russian troops are also attempting to advance further in the south along the Dnipro River, which has retreated to its former bed here after the destruction of the dam near Kakhovka two years ago.

Ukraine remains on the defensive

Overall, as has been the case since the height of the Ukrainian Kursk Offensive last fall, Russia continues to maintain the strategic initiative, despite spectacular actions such as Operation Spider Web against several of its bomber bases, as it remains superior to Ukraine in terms of personnel and material. After American efforts to bring about a swift end to the conflict since President Donald Trump took office fizzled out, there is no sign of such an end. Meanwhile, Trump also seems to have realized that his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, has no interest in this as long as his troops continue to advance on the battlefield.

His ultimatums, initially 50 days, then ten days, to end the war, backed up by threats of sanctions, have so far had no effect. Given Russia's past behavior under Western sanctions, they are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, Trump is limiting himself to supplying weapons to Ukraine paid for by his European partners. According to recent reports, Germany will hand over two more Patriot anti-aircraft batteries in exchange for timely, priority-based replacements from US production.

quote:

Ukraine: Excitement over Russian advance at Pokrovsk

16 August, 2025

Over the past week, there has been excitement over reports of a breakthrough through Ukrainian defense lines near the embattled town of Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast. According to some sources on both sides, Russian forces have advanced 11 kilometers or more to the northeast in their attempts to encircle the town. Some sources have already spoken of the imminent fall of the entire unoccupied territory of the oblast. Pokrovsk is considered the key to access to its open plains.

The Ukrainian leadership deployed its own forces to halt the Russian advance and attempted to downplay the reports. Other sources also placed the events in the context of the current frontline conditions. It has long been known that large sections of the front are not a continuously manned "line" due to personnel shortages, particularly on the Ukrainian side, and the extensive use of drones. Rather, it is a more or less tight chain of positions, where a small number of soldiers usually monitor the terrain, primarily with drones, with which they also engage enemy movements.

Parallels to Ukraine's Kursk Offensive

It is also known that the Russian side has adapted its approach by deploying small groups of sometimes only two soldiers, who, taking advantage of terrain cover and/or night, reconnoiter enemy positions on foot or in light vehicles, or otherwise infiltrate into the rear. According to some reports, gaps in the Ukrainian position system in the affected sector have now allowed for the consolidation of such troops, although their overall strength remains small relative to the "occupied" territory.

Even Russian sources do not portray this as being entirely under their own control. However, Ukrainian authorities ordered the evacuation of about a dozen villages in the municipalities of Dobropillya and Biloserske, about 30 kilometers north of Pokrovsk. There are similarities to the situation at the beginning of the Ukrainian offensive against the Russian Kursk Oblast last year, when, in the absence of an organized defense, small mobile units unexpectedly appeared in locations far ahead of the main body of their troops, causing panic.

Ukrainian situation remains serious

Nevertheless, the Russian presence behind the official "front" should be taken seriously and once again points to the shortage of personnel and material in the Ukrainian defense system. Furthermore, Russia made further territorial gains both at Pokrovsk and on other fronts, such as at the Shcherbynivka stronghold near Toretsk further east, which is also threatened with encirclement, and in the border area of ​​the Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv Oblasts north of Sloviansk. At the same time, Russian military bloggers are again warning of Ukrainian troop concentrations and a possible further cross-border attack on the Bryansk Oblast.

Meanwhile, the meeting between US and Russian Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Alaska ended yesterday, Friday, without any tangible results. What was discussed regarding the war in Ukraine and whether there will be a follow-up meeting, possibly with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, remains unclear for the time being. It can be assumed that Putin continued to insist on his maximum demands for the complete cession of the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. In any case, there was no further talk of a territorial swap, as previously suggested by Trump.

quote:

When I hear “historical”, I cock my peacekeeping force

23 August 2025

In situations that were already described as historic in their time, people tend to recite historical quotations. Many of them may never have been said in such a way — or at least not by the person to whom they are attributed. One such bon mot about France during absolutism is: "The most powerful man in the country is always the one who last spoke to the king." It referred to the susceptibility of the various royal Louises to the influence of their advisors. Anyone who could convince the king of their ideas could also hope for their implementation through absolutist power. Of course, only until the competitors had their own audience. If that isn't real, one would have to invent it specifically for the current US president, as recent summit meetings have shown again.

First, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin met in Alaska. After Trump slowly seemed to realize that the Kremlin ruler had no real interest in peace in Ukraine and threatened sanctions, the latter agreed to this summit, which the American had long desired. As is well known, Trump always believed he could end the war in no time with a deal reached in person. Since Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had convinced him of his willingness to negotiate in meetings that were sometimes more, sometimes less successful, Putin now ran the risk of attracting new American measures. No problem, he probably thought: I'll just talk to Trump, and he'll eat out of my hand again like he did in Helsinki in 2018.

Welcome is when bombers fly

At that time, the two had withdrawn from a bilateral summit for a one-on-one conversation, where only a Russian interpreter was otherwise present and no notes were taken. Afterward, Trump declared, among other things, that according to Putin, Russia had not interfered in the previous US election campaign, as it had been accused of, and why should it? So the Russian was able to fly to Alaska in good spirits – formerly Russian soil, as his domestic media carefully noted. Especially since the invitation itself put the man, previously isolated by the West and wanted with an international arrest warrant, on equal footing with the American president. His Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, went one step further and appeared in a USSR shirt. He might as well have written on it: the Soviet Union is back, Yankees.

Of course, Trump also waved the power-politics flagpole. He first had a B-2 stealth bomber fly over Putin's head, just as it had recently bombed Iranian nuclear facilities, much to Moscow's displeasure. Then the convoy of presidents drove past an endless line of F-22 stealth fighters. The military superiority of the US, should it ever intervene in the Ukraine war, was thus unmistakably on display. Only recently, Trump had shown himself unimpressed by the usual Russian nuclear threats when he threatened former President Dmitry Medvedev – now deputy head of the Russian Security Council, primarily responsible for the role of the internet troll of which you never quite know whether he's drunk-posting – right back with the deployment of nuclear submarines.

Generous is when you don't get it anyway

And yet, immediately after Russia's commitment to the summit, the US President suddenly started talking about a territorial swap to end the war. That would have been a good idea six months ago, when Ukraine, for its part, occupied part of the Russian Kursk Oblast. But that episode is now over. As it gradually emerged, Russia now offered to withdraw from the Ukrainian oblasts of Kharkiv and Sumy, which it did not officially claim, and other small areas totaling just under 2,000 square kilometers. In return, Ukraine would have to give up the rest of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. While it only holds a few hundred square kilometers in the latter anymore, it still defends almost 7,000 in Donetsk.

Russia would also generously cease its attacks in the Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts, which are already making little progress. Since it has nominally annexed these regions, like Donetsk and Luhansk, this actually represents movement on the Russian side. However, all other demands for neutrality, limitation of armed forces, and domestic policy changes under the slogans of "demilitarization" and "denazification" of Ukraine remained unchanged. Most worrying was that after the summit, Trump adopted the Russian position, which should be seen in the same context, of wanting to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement that "elimates the root causes of the war" without a prior ceasefire.

Peace is when Russia wins

In Moscow, this refers not only to the original intra-Ukrainian conflict between the more pro-Russian and Western-oriented segments of the population and the latter's aspirations for membership in NATO and the EU, but also to the expansion of NATO into the former Soviet sphere of influence and the American presence in Europe in general. As is well known, on the eve of the 2022 attack on Ukraine, Russia had made demands of the West whose unfulfillment was already factored in as justification for the subsequent invasion: among other things, the withdrawal of all foreign NATO troops from the territory of the Eastern European allies and all US nuclear weapons from non-American territory.

So, if one accepts this idea of ​​a peace agreement, negotiations will likely continue until Russia has achieved its military goals in Ukraine anyway. This sums up the entire Russian delaying tactic. Trump's threat of sanctions was, in any case, off the table for the time being. In that respect, the meeting in Alaska was a complete success for Putin. No wonder that Ukraine and its European allies immediately pushed for another summit to present their own side of the story to the king. After all, he has by now learned that he needs the Europeans, who have always been Ukraine's biggest – and now sole – supporters financially. And who, according to the US, should also take over peacekeeping there.

Success is when the king nods

In this respect, this second audience also had some success. While Trump insisted on the approach of a peace agreement without a prior ceasefire, he simultaneously embraced the European idea of ​​a peacekeeping force in the country itself as part of comprehensive security guarantees for Ukraine after the fighting had ended. He was either unaware or unconcerned that Russia had always rejected any presence of Western troops. In fact, for the first time, he showed himself open to American reassurance, something the Europeans had long demanded, for example in the form of air support. This, in turn, represented a significant shift on the US side. In this respect, these petitioners could subsequently return home not dissatisfied, too.

Whether and how quickly the next summits with Putin and Zelensky, as announced by Trump, will take place remains unclear. Moscow recently stated that the results must first be finalized. It also reiterated its rejection of any kind of Western military presence in Ukraine and demanded that Russia be included in any security guarantees. The Kremlin appears to be pursuing a construction it had already introduced into the peace negotiations at the beginning of the war: that Russia should be one of the guarantor powers, and that these powers could only take measures against an attack unanimously. Consequently, that the likely aggressor would have a right of veto. This is precisely why the 2022 talks ultimately failed (although pro-Russian propagandists still blame an intervention by Britain's Boris Johnson).

Historic is when it works

Regardless of this, agreements on the format and contributions to a potential peacekeeping force in Ukraine are now in full swing in alliance circles. The usual debate promptly ensued in Germany as to whether and how one should or could participate. From an objective view of the political circumstances, the question of whether or not to participate is less in question than the ability, given the capabilities of the Bundeswehr. The operational resources are largely allocated to the defense of the Baltic states—a mission that will not be fulfilled even with a possible end to the fighting in Ukraine. The EU's currently German-led rapid reaction force would, at best, be available as a relatively small contribution. However, it will not only involve ground combat troops, but also, for example, air defense forces.

And it's probably still too early for an informed discussion. The US is already sending mixed signals about the potential extent of its own involvement. In light of Russia's reactions to the Western resolutions, Trump himself has stated that Putin might not even want to make a deal and again spoke of a two-week deadline and sanctions. It's possible that he will turn against the Kremlin ruler again — or withdraw from the Ukraine negotiations in disappointment, as he did after the failed American solo efforts of his first 100 days. Another historical quote, which, like so many with unclear authorship, is attributed to Winston Churchill, offers hope: "The Americans can always be trusted to do the right thing in the end, after they have exhausted every other avenue."

quote:

Ukraine war: Territorial gains, rocket strikes, drone alerts

13 September 2025

In the war in Ukraine, Russian troops have made further territorial gains on several fronts over the past ten days. Near the contested key city of Pokrovsk in southeastern Ukraine, they managed to advance towards the area into which their own forces had already infiltrated last month . They also made gains further north in the Donetsk Oblast near Lyman and Siversk, as well as near the city of Kupyansk in the Kharkiv Oblast.

Further west, they secured additional small sections of terrain along the border with the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, which, like Kharkiv, is not among the territories officially claimed by Russia. They also captured two villages in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, on the eastern edge of the marshland left behind by the former Kakhovka Reservoir after the dam's destruction two years ago, and advanced further north. This likely represents the most significant change to the southern sector of the front since the largely unsuccessful Ukrainian offensive in the summer of 2023.

Increased missile attacks on both sides

Both sides have since intensified their missile attacks. On August 30, Ukraine launched its recently unveiled FP-5 Flamingo heavy cruise missile for the first time against a Russian FSB border post in Crimea. Given the relatively insignificant target and the stated range of up to 3,000 kilometers, this may have been a live-fire test under favorable conditions for accuracy. Of the three missiles fired, two reached the target area, impacting between 15 and 200 meters from the presumed object.

Interestingly, Denmark announced on September 3rd that it would have the fuel for the Flamingo missile produced domestically. This would mark the first officially known production site for Ukrainian weapons systems abroad. According to media reports from September 5th, Ukraine will also receive up to 3,550 ERAM light cruise missiles with a range of up to 460 kilometers from the US, 840 of which are due by October 2026. It is noteworthy that, according to the reports, the delivery is being financed not only by several European countries but also by the US itself, even though the administration of President Donald Trump had actually suspended such aid.

Campaign against Russian oil industry is showing effects

This suggests that the US armed forces want to test the system under combat conditions for future procurements. ERAM should not be confused with the US Navy's RIM-174 (Standard Missile 6) multi-purpose guided missile, for which the same designation is used. Rather, it is a project for a cost-effective, air-launched cruise missile, within which two American startups each developed a design to operational readiness within 14 months. These missiles can be deployed by both the F-16 and the MiG-29, both of which are in service in Ukraine.

The war in Ukraine is spilling over into Polish airspace again

Conversely, Russia is also escalating its attacks. Last weekend, a drone allegedly struck the government building in Kyiv, where the Ukrainian cabinet meets, for the first time. On Tuesday night, Poland reported airspace violations by at least 19 combat drones during a heavy wave of attacks against western Ukraine , with at least three of these drones being shot down for the first time. Polish fighter jets and Dutch F-35s were also involved in the operation. Following consultations under Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, the alliance launched Operation Eastern Sentry to strengthen the protection of its eastern flank against such threats.

The two-week deadline for a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelenskyy, set by US President Trump after his separate summits with both leaders and leading European representatives, has now expired. There has been no progress on this issue, nor has there been any sign of Trump's threatened further sanctions against Russia. No concrete details have yet emerged regarding European plans for a peacekeeping force of several tens of thousands of troops to be deployed to Ukraine following a ceasefire.

quote:

Ukraine war: Russia gains ground, loses refineries

15 October 2025

In the war in Ukraine, Russian troops have made further territorial gains along the entire eastern front over the past four weeks. These gains were most significant in the area of ​​the cities of Lyman and Siversk, near the border between the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, and in the southeast along the border of the Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Conversely, Ukraine appears to have succeeded in clearing an area north of the besieged city of Pokrovsk of infiltrated enemy forces and also, for the time being, halting the Russian advance in that direction.

North of Siversk, Russian troops managed to bring a wooded area under their control, thereby straightening the front, while to the south, after capturing several villages, a local encirclement threatens. An area immediately north of the city is contested. Near Lyman, they succeeded some time ago in crossing the Sherebets River at the eastern village of Torske and advancing from the north. Fighting is already taking place in the suburbs of Kupyansk, further north.

Ukraine on the defensive on the ground, on the offensive in the air

In the border region of Dnipropetrovsk, which Russia does not officially claim, Ukraine evacuated numerous villages due to the Russian advance. However, it also managed to recapture one occupied village. Along the Russian-Ukrainian border in the northeast, there were also reciprocal local incursions. In the south, Russian forces were able to secure further territory on the edge of the former Kakhovka reservoir. In contrast, the situation around the town of Kostyantynivka, which is also threatened with encirclement in the central sector of the front, remains largely stable.

Ukraine continues to achieve its greatest successes in the "air war," if one includes the use of long-range drones and cruise missiles. Once again, the occupied Crimea, but also facilities of the Russian oil and gas industry up to 2,000 kilometers from the front line, were the primary targets of heavy attacks. After the loss of Russia's national refining capacity was estimated at 17 to 24 percent last month , figures of 21 to even 40 percent are now being reported.

Increased American support

While the resulting regional fuel shortages still appear to be primarily affecting the civilian sector, Russia has now imposed an export ban and is even considering importing gasoline, despite being one of the world's largest oil producers. This is likely to exacerbate its financial situation, primarily due to lost revenue and additional expenses. Reports also indicate that a shortage of spare parts resulting from Western sanctions, as well as increased American support for the Ukrainian campaign through detailed intelligence findings since the summer, are contributing to the increasingly critical situation.

For some time now, US President Donald Trump has even been publicly considering supplying Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine. While these would not increase the range of existing capabilities, they would certainly strengthen Ukraine's firepower. Above all, however, this mention is likely a political signal of American dissatisfaction with Russia's willingness to negotiate, especially after President Vladimir Putin had given his counterpart Trump hope on this matter during their meeting in Alaska in August .

New momentum towards ending the war in Ukraine?

The Kremlin has since declared that the "momentum" of this meeting has now dissipated. However, Russia itself has contributed to this situation by demonstrating a lack of interest in negotiations during its ground offensive, having further intensified its drone and missile attacks, particularly against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Furthermore, recent reports have indicated that the effectiveness of Western-supplied Patriot air defense systems against these missiles has decreased from approximately 40 percent to six percent due to changes in the guidance software of Russian Iskander and Kinzhal missiles.

Until the Patriot software is updated, this is likely to further reinforce Russia's stance. Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy are scheduled to meet in Washington this Friday to discuss the next steps. Zelenskyy is expected to try to capitalize on the momentum from Trump's successful brokering of an agreement to end the Gaza war, hoping to spur him to take more decisive action.

quote:

Budapest summit plans: déjà vu all over again

25 October 2025

Sometimes you could just pull out a commentary on a past event and republish it after changing only a few words. For example, "Anchorage" with "Budapest." In any case, there isn't much to say this week about the relationship between Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin that wasn't already written about their meeting in Alaska two months ago. After the hopes for progress toward a negotiated solution to the Ukraine conflict, which Putin had raised with Trump there, gradually evaporated, the American finally seemed to be slowly beginning to see through the Russian's game.

At least he increased the pressure on Russia by publicly declaring that Ukraine had a real chance of recapturing all its Russian-occupied territories. He even considered supplying the attacked country with Tomahawk cruise missiles. The implementation of such a plan was always questionable: Ukraine currently lacks the necessary platforms for their deployment, and the discussed double-digit number would not have significantly enhanced its capabilities. With various long-range drones and domestically produced cruise missiles, it can already strike Russian targets 2,000 to 3,000 kilometers from the front line. And, according to reports, it is doing so, not least thanks to American intelligence.

Where have we seen this before?

According to recent estimates, between 20 and 40 percent of Russia's refining capacity is currently out of operation due to the Ukrainian campaign against its oil and gas industry. This is also because Western sanctions are hindering the supply of spare parts for repairs – a situation that has so far manifested itself primarily as regional fuel shortages in the civilian sector. However, measures already taken and those being considered, such as an export ban and purchases abroad, could further strain the already increasingly depleted war chest of the oil superpower in the medium term. In this context, Trump's Tomahawk threat was primarily a political signal. Judging by the outcry from Russian government circles and their propaganda network, it was received.

Last week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy flew to Washington for a meeting with Trump, hoping that while he wouldn't actually return home with Tomahawks in his luggage, the pressure on Russia to enter into serious ceasefire negotiations would be increased even further. But shortly before, Putin and Trump spoke on the phone, and the latter once again groveled before the Kremlin leader. Instead of making statements about regaining the occupied territories, he apparently told Zelenskyy that he now absolutely had to meet Russia's conditions, otherwise Russia would "destroy Ukraine." As the Americans say: Déjà vu all over again.

What exactly was the progress?

What Putin promised the US president this time remained vague. According to media reports, American sources saw the following progress: In Alaska, he had offered to freeze the front lines in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts if Ukraine withdrew from the entire Donbas region. Now, he has reportedly agreed to relinquish the areas in those oblasts not controlled by Russia if Ukraine withdraws from the entire Donbas. Anyone who spots the difference can keep it. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also stated on Tuesday of this week that Russia's conditions had not changed.

Earlier, Lavrov had spoken by phone with his American counterpart Marco Rubio to explore the possibility of another meeting, apparently discussed between Trump and Putin, this time in Budapest. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a close friend of both presidents, had previously suggested his capital as a possible venue. One small problem: to get there, the Russian, wanted on an international arrest warrant for war crimes, would have to fly over at least one NATO country. From his perspective, this was likely a political advantage: either NATO could be blamed for a failure or embarrassed if, after Trump's invitation to meet on US soil, it also had to open European airspace to him.

Who even came up with the idea of ​​Budapest?

Hungary's neighbor Poland made it clear that it would force Putin to land and arrest him if he attempted to fly over the country. Bulgaria, on the other hand, declared itself willing to grant permission in the interest of a possible peace in Ukraine. It remained unclear who had even come up with the idea. When asked about it by the media, the White House press office responded like any civilized adult: "Your mother." At that point, the signs were already pointing against the meeting. Over the weekend, Trump had called for a freeze on the conflict along the current front lines. Lavrov categorically rejected this on Tuesday, offering the remarkably frank explanation that "a large part of Ukraine" would then remain under the control of a "Nazi regime".

From a Russian perspective, this was logical, since Trump had foolishly agreed in Alaska to Moscow's position that instead of a ceasefire, there needed to be a comprehensive agreement to address the root causes of the war. According to Russia, this includes not only the current Ukrainian government, but also NATO's presence in Eastern Europe and the storage of American nuclear weapons overseas. However, rarely has a government official expressed so clearly that Russia's claims to Ukraine do not end at the Donbas. This confirmed the position of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who apparently explained to Trump in Washington, quite loudly, why he could not simply relinquish the strategically important territory in this region.

And what will happen to China next?

At a meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on Wednesday, the US president announced that he had canceled the summit in Budapest because it "didn't feel right" and he didn't want a "pointless meeting." Instead, there would be new sanctions against the Russian oil companies Lukoil and Rosneft, as well as their subsidiaries. "Every time I talk to Vladimir," Trump complained, "I have good conversations, but they lead nowhere." At least this realization took less than a week, which surprised the Russian side considerably. This gives hope that the man often described as the most powerful in the world will eventually shake the impression of desperately seeking Putin's recognition as his equal.

Even Trump must be embarrassed by this by now. He held military parades for his birthday, sent troops into opposition-ruled cities, sued dissenting media outlets, and ousted them from the White House and the Pentagon—yet other autocrats apparently still don't take him seriously. Least of all Putin, even though Trump believed he could resolve the Ukraine conflict most quickly because of his good relationship with him. Perhaps things will work out with Chinese President Xi Jinping, whom he plans to meet next week, after his tariff offensive against China has been stalled for months. He has already declared that China has no intention of taking over Taiwan. After all, he has a great relationship with Xi, and surely no one wants to jeopardize that. Well, then.

quote:

Ukraine War: Battles for Pokrovsk, Kostyantyivka and Lyman

4 November 2025

In the war in Ukraine, Russian troops are making further progress in their attempts to capture fortified Ukrainian cities along the front line. In Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast, which has been contested for over a year, they managed to advance into the city from the west last week, and large parts of it are now contested. On the opposite side of the pocket, they advanced from the east on the outskirts of Myrnohrad.

In the northeast, where Russian troops had infiltrated Ukrainian-controlled territory behind the front lines in recent months, Ukraine recently managed to clear these areas and slightly push back the advance of the main Russian forces. Over the weekend, in an unusual operation, special forces from the Ukrainian military intelligence service GUR landed with a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter behind Russian lines west of Pokrovsk.

Pokrovsk contested but not cut off

According to Russian sources, these forces were quickly eliminated by drones, while reports regarding the helicopter itself were conflicting. Ukraine stated that the operation continued, but Russia described it as a PR stunt at the expense of the deployed forces. Claims by the Moscow government that the Ukrainian defenders of Pokrovsk were surrounded and about to surrender were not confirmed, even by Russian military bloggers.

Further northeast, in Konstyantynivka, Russian troops also managed to extend the fighting from the east to the city's outskirts. Both cities are part of the Ukrainian fortress belt that has so far blocked Russia's access to the open lowlands of the still unoccupied part of the Donetsk Oblast. While there is another chain of cities beyond this belt, which are also likely to be fiercely defended, the Ukrainian side has therefore recently downplayed the potential loss of Pokrovsk.

Greater dangers lie behind than at the front

However, capturing this point, the highest in the area, could significantly increase the operational range of Russian drones. Already, a zone approximately 30 kilometers deep on both sides of the front line – which itself is less a line and more of an area several kilometers wide between positions on both sides – is under constant drone threat. Therefore, losses are less likely in the fortified and camouflaged positions themselves, from which the frontline soldiers primarily monitor the surrounding terrain using drones.

The most dangerous aspect is the rotation of troops to and from positions, including the evacuation of the wounded. Just last week, a team from German daily newspaper Die Welt, accompanying Ukrainian troops 25 to 30 kilometers from the front, was targeted by a Russian drone attack. Therefore, territorial gains are achieved by tiny teams of two to three soldiers who try to avoid detection and scout out the scattered enemy positions so they can be eliminated by artillery and guided missiles.

Ukraine is likely focusing on further automation

In this way, Russian troops were recently able to advance towards the city of Lyman in northern Donetsk. In previously less contested sections of the front, however, mechanized advances of up to battalion strength are still occurring. This is the case along the border with the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, which Russia does not officially claim, where Russia recently captured a dozen villages at once. Meanwhile, both sides are continuing their strategic air campaign against the other's energy infrastructure. Most recently, Ukraine scored several drone hits on the Tuapse oil terminal on the Black Sea.

The increasing automation of combat is possibly one reason why Ukraine recently allowed young men aged 18 to 22 to leave the country again. This demographically weak age group, considered the future of the country, had already been largely spared from military service, as conscripts are only drafted from the age of 25 (originally 27). This latest decision therefore aligns with a statement by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that Ukraine is prepared to continue the war for another two to three years.

quote:

Miraculous wonder weapons: Burevestnik, Poseidon and Company

8 November 2025

Pro-Russian channels often mock the Western belief in its own "Wunderwaffen"—frequently using the original German term—whose delivery to Ukraine would supposedly bring about victory over Russia. This isn't entirely wrong: anyone who followed certain media reports in the spring of 2023 could have gotten the impression that Ukrainian troops would soon capture Moscow after receiving Abrams, Challenger, and Leopard main battle tanks. In reality, this delivery came too late and was too small to significantly alter the course of the war. The front lines had long since solidified into fortified positions, kilometers-deep minefields, and comprehensive drone surveillance. Without air superiority on one side, large-scale operations of the conventional kind had become virtually impossible.

A similar situation later arose with the delivery of F-16 fighter jets. Conversely, the debate surrounding German Taurus cruise missiles occasionally gave the impression that their mere absence prevented Ukraine from recapturing all Russian-occupied territories. However, modern Western weapons did indeed have a decisive influence on the course of the war from the very beginning. From the Javelin and NLAW anti-tank missiles, which contributed to the failure of the initial Russian advances on Kyiv, to long-range precision systems like HIMARS and SCALP/Storm Shadow, which could be used against Russia's staging areas and logistical hubs far behind the front lines, they not only ensured the survival of the attacked country. They also enabled the successful Ukrainian counter-offensive in the first year of the war, through which Moscow lost a third of the territory it had conquered.

The wonder weapons of this world

In the three bloody years since, Russia has only been able to regain control of a fraction of the territories it had to abandon. This is despite the fact that its supporters, particularly in the West, harbored their own wishful thinking about the superiority of Russian weapons: about air defense systems like the S-400, whose deployment in Syria was supposed to render Western air operations impossible, but failed to do so; about the "unstoppable" hypersonic systems Iskander, Kinzhal, and Zircon, which have also not yet decided the war in Ukraine; or about the super-tank Armata and the stealth fighter Su-57, which have not even been produced in significant numbers or used in combat at all. Instead, what we are witnessing is a protracted war of attrition in which the most important weapons systems are off-the-shelf drones from Chinese discount stores and their larger, domestically produced counterparts.

This is quite annoying for fans of advanced military technology on both sides. But it's especially frustrating for Russia, which is actually far superior to Ukraine in almost every respect and hasn't managed to fully occupy even the Ukrainian territories it officially annexed in four years. In that sense, the derision of Western "wonder weapon" thinking is probably, not least, projection: if the enemy's high-tech systems were truly as effective as claimed, there would at least be an excuse for the lack of victory. Indeed, even the slow, costly advance in the Donbas could then be considered a success. In any case, the notion is often invoked that one is fighting against the entire Western world in Ukraine. Even though there haven't been any claims of French Foreign Legionnaires or entire Polish brigades there for quite some time.

The power of faith

The Kremlin's carefully cultivated belief that Russia is already at war with NATO likely explains the hype surrounding its own wonder weapons. Take, for example, the Oreshnik medium-range missile, touted as an unstoppable system with apocalyptic potential which, according to Russian propaganda, was supposed to win this war—either through direct deployment in Ukraine or by prompting NATO to withdraw its support in fear. In reality, little has been heard of this weapon, whose serial production was announced in August and which should now be stationed in Belarus. Aside from the belated Ukrainian report that one of the launch vehicles was destroyed last year, and the recent statement by a Moscow parliamentarian that it could be supplied to Venezuela, which is threatened by the US, there has been little news of it.

However, the thought of losing its own power in the systemic competition with the West—be it indirectly, through a lost war, an externally orchestrated "color revolution," or a collapse for other reasons, as after the Cold War—is clearly troubling the Russian leadership. From the outset, it has attempted to secure its efforts to return to former Soviet or imperial grandeur by seizing Ukraine with nuclear threats. And alongside systems like Oreshnik, which, despite all the hype, are merely a further development of existing technology, it has invested considerable resources in those with such questionable benefits that corresponding reports in the West were initially hardly taken seriously. These include the nuclear "torpedo" Poseidon and its flying counterpart, the Burevestnik cruise missile.

The radiance of nuclear power

When initial information about the Poseidon project, then still designated "Status 6," emerged in 2015, it seemed like a typical pipe dream from the early days of the nuclear age: a nuclear-powered torpedo with virtually unlimited range, equipped with a nuclear warhead capable of destroying entire coastal cities or flooding them with a radioactive tsunami. In fact, the idea likely dates back to the 1950s, and the Soviet Union did introduce conventionally propelled, unguided torpedoes with nuclear warheads around 1970. Targets included port facilities as well as American aircraft carrier strike groups, which were to be destroyed with concentrated firepower. The original concept was apparently revived in Russia after the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2010.

At its official unveiling by President Vladimir Putin in 2018 as one of six nuclear-capable "superweapons," its feasibility was still questionable. Due to the requirements of its nuclear propulsion, it was more of an autonomous mini-submarine than a torpedo. A clip shown on Russian television in 2022, depicting the complete annihilation of the British Isles by the system, could safely be dismissed as pure fantasy. Even with a warhead boasting the never-achieved yield of 100 megatons, studies from the early 1960s showed that the resulting tidal wave would, at best, reach only a few kilometers inland. Current Western estimates suggest a yield of two megatons – packed into a weapon almost twice the size of a submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missile.

The principles of deterrence

By Western standards, the whole thing is relatively pointless, even if it does follow a certain logic. If nuclear deterrence is no longer guaranteed because missile systems appear vulnerable to preemptive strikes or defensive measures, Poseidon offers a previously unforeseen fallback option. If it can't sink Great Britain, it can at least devastate one or two port cities. Even after crossing an entire ocean, perhaps days after the initial strike. The opinion that it is neither as difficult to detect nor intercept as Russian propaganda claims, and that its effect isn't worth the price, doesn't seem to be shared in Moscow. Otherwise, they wouldn't be building a new class of submarines specifically as a delivery platform.

A similar situation exists with the nuclear-powered Burevestnik cruise missile. This concept is also not new: When nuclear power still promised a radiant future, the idea was to develop aircraft engines that would heat the airflow using nuclear energy rather than by burning fuel, and then use that heat for propulsion. In the late 1950s, the US had Project Pluto, a supersonic cruise missile based on this principle. The propulsion system was successfully tested, but disadvantages compared to the rapidly developing intercontinental ballistic missiles led to the project's cancellation. One such disadvantage was that directly heating the airflow through the reactor elements would leave a radioactive trail behind the missile.

The magic of money

For Burevestnik it is assumed that the propulsion system operates indirectly via a closed primary cooling circuit of the reactor and achieves high subsonic speeds. At least then the missile wouldn't radioactively contaminate everything in its path before reaching its actual target. However, since the shielding must necessarily be relatively light, it would likely appear as bright as a Christmas tree to surveillance systems, even from space – if not radioactive, then certainly due to heat radiation. Published images also suggest it doesn't look particularly stealthy against radar. And neither the reported speed nor the altitude above ground are impressive compared to other systems.

This largely negates the advantage for its survivability against Western defenses that, due to its range, it could attack from unexpected directions. As with Poseidon, however, Russia seems to consider it worth the investment to diversify its nuclear deterrent with unconventional second-strike weapons in light of advances in missile defense. At a minimum, this forces the West to invest more heavily in conventional defense systems against air and underwater targets. Conversely, from a Western perspective, its own deterrent capability is more likely to be threatened by the modernization of Russia's other "superweapons": Kinzhal, Zircon, the new Samat intercontinental ballistic missile, and the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle.

As potential first-strike weapons, these pose a greater threat. Certainly, Western democracies, which do not equate the survival of their own regime with that of the state, do not need to invest in counterparts to Poseidon and Burevestnik. Perhaps it should be viewed this way: Every ruble that flows into these two wonder weapons cannot be used to finance the more threatening nuclear systems. Or for conventional weapons that could be used against Ukraine and, eventually, perhaps against NATO. The Soviet Union, as is well known, already over-armed itself to death. In that respect, from a Western perspective, Russia's recourse to the radioactive fantasies of the 1950s would not only be peculiar, but possibly even wonderful.

quote:

Battlefield Ukraine: The Automation of War

14 November 2025

Recent reports from the fighting around the Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk highlight the changing nature of war within the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine. A fundamental shift has been observable for some time. While the first year of the war saw classic mobile operations during the Russian advances in the north, east, and south of the attacked country, as well as the subsequent Ukrainian counter-offensives, the front lines had largely solidified by the second year.

One reason, even back then, was the omnipresence of drones, which led to a largely transparent battlefield. Any significant troop concentration or movement near the front was usually quickly detected and could be immediately countered with artillery, long-range guided missiles, and even the drones themselves. Strong air defenses and a lack of countermeasures against those on both sides also prevented any air superiority that might have broken the stalemate.

Second year of the war: back to the First World War

The fighting increasingly resembled that of the First World War: both sides entrenched themselves in trench systems behind minefields, while propeller-driven aircraft dominated the sky, proving difficult to counter with contemporary air defenses. It was in this context that the Ukrainian counter-offensive in the summer of 2023, which once again relied on mechanized operations using armored fighting vehicles largely supplied by Western backers, ultimately failed.

Particularly on the Ukrainian side, drones increasingly took over the role of conventional artillery and fighter jets due to a lack of these weapons. Advances were now only carried out in small groups on foot or in light vehicles, utilizing any available cover. For a time, the Russian tactic consisted of sending assault troops forward to draw enemy fire. The Ukrainian positions thus identified could then be eliminated with long-range heavy weapons such as glide bombs, at the cost of heavy losses.

Third year of the war: Drone warfare from the underground

In the third year of the war, the trend toward dispersal and drone warfare continued in both attack and defense. The "front" now consisted increasingly of scattered positions underground or set up in building basements, from which small squads, primarily using drones, monitored the surrounding terrain and engaged identified enemies. The "no man's land" between the two sides could easily stretch for several kilometers.

The danger lay less in the service at the positions than in the trip to and from them. While night initially offered some protection, this largely disappeared with the increasing prevalence of night vision technology in drones. Other innovations included the introduction of fiber optic cable control and artificial intelligence, as well as the use of mother and relay drones to counter the massive use of electronic jamming against radio communications.

Fourth year of the war: Logistics on foot and old front-line diseases

This extended the danger zone to up to 30 kilometers behind friendly positions. Drone attacks must now be expected at any time within this zone. Accordingly, the rules for advancing towards the enemy now also apply to the rotation of troops in forward positions, their logistical support, and the evacuation of the wounded. All of this now also takes place on foot, in light vehicles – sometimes bicycles or motorcycles – or with unmanned systems.

One side effect: Fuel consumption at the front has decreased significantly compared to the logistics of mechanized operations. Another: Without a reliable means of rapid casualty evacuation, antiquated consequences of inadequate wound care, such as gas gangrene, are resurfacing. Overall, the front reportedly now appears largely deserted, but is teeming with countless drones.

Change in Russian attack tactics

Russia's immediate combat objective remains the reconnaissance of Ukrainian positions in order to destroy them – due to their underground fortifications, this is usually done with guided bombs weighing up to 1,500 kilograms, dropped from a distance of up to 50 kilometers. Infantry attacks are preferably carried out in poor weather conditions, which still offer some protection against drones.

These "attacks" are now often carried out by only two-man teams. If they don't find any enemy positions, they infiltrate the Ukrainian hinterland. In this way, enough Russian soldiers concentrated northeast of the contested city of Pokrovsk in August, up to ten kilometers behind the front line, to become a problem for Ukraine. Ukraine had to redeploy its own troops to clear an area around several villages of enemy forces roughly the size of a company.

Increasingly automated urban and house-to-house fighting

Even urban and house-to-house fighting is now characterized by relatively small troop numbers. During the Battle of Bakhmut in 2022/23, the Ukrainian side deployed approximately 30,000 soldiers, while the Russian side, including mercenaries from the Wagner Group, deployed roughly twice as many. During the nine-month battle in the largely destroyed city, Russia reported, according to its own figures, 20,000 to 30,000 dead and up to 80,000 wounded (some multiple times).

In Pokrovsk, both sides are apparently keeping their main forces about ten kilometers outside the city. According to recent Ukrainian figures, only about 300 Russian soldiers were within the city limits themselves. Russian sources indicate that it is now common practice for two men, supported by drones, to hold an entire street or a section of forest. A recent video showing Russian soldiers on motorcycles or in apparently locally acquired scrap cars entering Pokrovsk under the cover of dense fog caused a stir.

The future of war is revealed in Ukraine

A positive consequence of increasingly automated warfare is a reduction in human losses compared to earlier bloody battles like the one around Bakhmut. This is particularly advantageous for Ukraine, which has far fewer personnel resources than Russia. Most recently, it even allowed men aged 18 to 22 to leave the country again. Apparently, there is hope that the defense can be maintained for another two to three years with the conscripts currently being drafted from the age of 25.

Nevertheless, drone warfare across the broad front lines naturally claims numerous victims. And ultimately, it remains true that drones alone cannot occupy or hold territory: human soldiers are still required to exercise direct control over an area. However, with the increasing use of artificial intelligence, further automation of warfare is foreseeable, something armed forces worldwide must prepare for.

quote:

Ukraine War: Front in eastern Zaporizhzhia in motion

19 November 2025

Although attention in the Ukraine war is currently focused primarily on the fighting around the strategically important city of Pokrovsk in the Donetsk Oblast, Russia has made its greatest territorial gains in recent weeks further southwest, in the eastern part of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. This flank of the southern front had previously been relatively quiet, although fighting did of course still occur there daily.

However, after Russian troops advanced several months ago into the territory of the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts – an area not officially claimed by Russia – the Ukrainian flank defense, apparently less resourced due to its focus on other sectors, was in danger of collapsing. On Monday of this week, the Russian side at least managed to advance westward along a broad front of approximately 30 kilometers .

Intensified fighting in southern Ukraine

The Ukrainian weakness had already been evident in the Russians' use of mechanized attacks in this area—unusual in this war due to the constant drone threat—with armored vehicles ranging from company to battalion strength, sometimes capturing several villages at once. However, Ukrainian counterattacks on Tuesday managed to stabilize the situation in the region for the time being.

Should the advance of Russian forces continue here, they could theoretically roll up the southern front from east to west as far as the former Kakhovka reservoir. They already managed a minor northward advance at the beginning of September on the eastern edge of the marshland left behind after the dam's destruction two years ago.

Weather conditions restrict drone use

Meanwhile, the fighting around Pokrovsk and other fortified towns in the Donbas continues unabated. The city of Pokrovsk is now largely under Russian control, but pockets of Ukrainian resistance persist due to the fighting being primarily conducted with drones and minimal personnel. East of the city, a Ukrainian-controlled area around the neighboring town of Myrnohrad remains, but is threatened with encirclement by Russian advances north of both towns.

Further along the front line to the east and north, the situation near Kostyantynivka, Lyman, and Kupyansk also remains threatening for the Ukrainian defenders. Even along the Ukrainian-Russian border in the Kharkiv Oblast, Russia recently managed to gain ground again after a long period and secure the remaining area around the city of Vovchansk. Its attacks were often aided by poor weather conditions, such as fog, which limited the use of drones.

quote:

Ukraine War: Russia reports capture of Pokrovsk

3 December 2025

In the war in Ukraine, Russian sources are announcing the complete capture of the strategically important city of Pokrovsk. Similar reports surfaced last week, as well as following a report from Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov to President Vladimir Putin on Sunday. According to those, in addition to the city in the Donetsk region, which has been contested for over a year, the city of Vovchansk near the Russian-Ukrainian border has also now been completely occupied. Ukraine contradicted the report, stating that fighting in Pokrovsk is ongoing.

The actual situation is difficult to assess objectively due to the fighting, which is primarily conducted with drones and limited personnel. In recent weeks, Russian sources have repeatedly reported ongoing Ukrainian activity within the occupied city. The perceived "control" of a sector is largely based on drone footage of one's own soldiers waving their respective national flags. Both sides also disagree on whether Ukrainian forces in an area east of the city have now been encircled and defeated.

Conflicting accounts ahead of Moscow talks

The conflicting accounts, beyond the usual discrepancies between the warring parties' narratives, can likely be explained by the arrival of a US delegation in Moscow on Tuesday evening for further negotiations on a peace agreement. While Russia had previously apparently sought to create the impression that it was already victorious on the battlefield and therefore needed no agreement, Ukraine just as obviously wanted to counter this. According to subsequent statements, the talks were indeed "constructive," but without any tangible results.

The original 28-point draft agreement, which became public two weeks ago, strongly accommodated Russian demands by stipulating the complete withdrawal of Ukraine from its officially Russian-annexed Donetsk Oblast, the limitation of its armed forces to 600,000 troops, a ban on certain categories of weapons, NATO membership, and the stationing of Western troops. In return, the front line in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts was to be frozen, and Russia was to withdraw from territories not officially claimed by it.

Ukraine remains on the defensive

Based on various reports from the American and Russian sides, it is suspected that it was essentially a Russian list of demands, which was slightly revised after Putin's August meeting with US President Donald Trump in Alaska and later based on information from the American special envoy Steve Witkoff, and then leaked by the Russian side, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was under additional pressure due to a corruption scandal in his circle.

After its publication, Trump, in his usual manner, appropriated the plan, initially demanding the approval of all parties by the US Thanksgiving holiday last Thursday. He later backed away from it due to opposition from the excluded allies. Following negotiations with Ukrainian and European representatives, a modified 19-point version has emerged and was the subject of recent talks in Moscow.

Regardless of the situation in Pokrovsk, Russian troops continued their advance to the northeast and southwest. In the east of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, where the situation had initially stabilized after a broad Russian advance two weeks earlier, the fighting had now reached the Haychul River and the outskirts of the town of Hulyaipole. The battles around the towns of Kostyantynivka, Siversk, and Lyman in the Donetsk Oblast, as well as Kupyansk in the Kharkiv Oblast, were also ongoing.

quote:

Ukraine war at year's end: Fighting continues for frontline cities

17 December 2025

With two weeks remaining before the end of the fourth year of the war, several fortified cities in Ukraine are still contested. As previously reported, the exact front line is not always objectively ascertainable in individual cases due to the naturally differing accounts from both sides and the fact that the fighting is conducted heavily with drones and comparatively little with troop presence.

Ukraine continues to report fighting in the city of Pokrovsk, in an area eest of the city held by its own troops, and in the neighboring town of Myrnohrad. The Russian side, however, has repeatedly declared the capture of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, and for some time now, the encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the area between them . While resistance still exists, it is described as sporadic and ineffective.

Russian success in Siversk, embarrassment in Kupyansk

Further east, near Konstyantinyvka, the situation appears to have remained largely stable for some time following a Russian advance to the southeastern outskirts of the city. In contrast, to the north, Russia reports the complete capture of the long-contested city of Siversk and, further along the front, an advance to the edge of Lyman. However, premature reports of the capture of Kupyansk further north led to an embarrassment after Ukraine released film footage of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visiting the front at the city's entrance.

This, along with the ineffective response in the information space, was also criticized by Russian military bloggers. While official media outlets made unsubstantiated claims that everything in Kupyansk was proceeding according to plan, pro-Russian propaganda sources either questioned the timeliness or authenticity of the Zelenskyy footage or claimed that Ukrainian troops had used 500 civilians in the relevant district as human shields to prevent Russian attacks.

Talks on a Ukraine peace plan in Berlin

Along the Russian-Ukrainian border in the Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, as well as in the eastern part of the southern Ukrainian Zaporizhzhia oblast, Russia reported further territorial gains. In the latter, its troops reportedly managed to cross the Haychuhl River at its confluence with the Vovcha River and advance south of it to the outskirts of Hulyaipole. Due to seasonal weather conditions that hampered the use of drones, both sides also resumed mechanized operations with direct fire support.

Meanwhile, talks in Berlin between Ukrainian, European, and American representatives on a joint peace plan have concluded. The discussions reportedly include the transformation of the contested Donbas region into a "free economic zone," allegedly proposed by US President Donald Trump; Western security guarantees for Ukraine in accordance with Article 5 of the NATO Treaty; and the deployment of a European peacekeeping force in the event of a ceasefire. However, Russian approval appears unlikely.