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Originally posted by BansheeOne:
After looking around for some time, by pure coincidence I finally got back into my real field of interest and competence and landed pretty much my dream job I always thought I could eventually end my professional career in; this month I’m gonna sign with the leading German-language publisher in security and defense for a double-hatted post, deputy editor-in-chief for one magazine geared towards deciders in security politics, and managing editor of another more technically orientated one for a broader audience. Everything’s done but the numbers, which can however only improve from my current gig.

That in turn means I’ll have a professional full-time outlet for my interests, so my private web presence isn’t exactly going to increase.

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Originally posted by parabellum:
Well, he's not going to be impeached or removed from office. Two months until he's out, one way or another.

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Ukrainian Kursk Offensive: 16th Week

In the Ukrainian Kursk Offensive and Russian counter-offensive, both sides were able to gain ground again last weekend after a week-long standstill before the fronts came to another halt. Ukrainian troops withdrew from the long-threatening pocket south of the town of Lyubimovka, which thus fell to Russia. Russian forces were also able to advance further south along the Snagost River and capture the town of Dar'ino. In contrast, the Ukrainian side was able to secure further ground northeast of Martinovka on the road to Kursk.

However, the focus of attention was less on the Kursk offensive itself than on the mutual missile attacks on targets in the hinterland, after Ukraine attacked a Russian ammunition depot in the neighboring Bryansk Oblast with ATACMS missiles for the first time on November 19, following the appropriate American authorization. On November 20, at least twelve Storm Shadow cruise missiles supplied by Britain also hit a target in Marjino, west of the combat zone. This was reportedly the Russian-North Korean command post for the counteroffensive.

Mutual missile fire

On November 21, Russia fired a ballistic missile at the industrial site of the Yuzhmash vehicle and space company in the southern Ukrainian city of Dnipro. According to Russian sources, this was a practical test of a new intermediate-range weapon called the 9M729 Oreshnik. According to video footage, the missile carried six independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), which appeared to be deployed without a warhead and achieved kinetic effect only due to the high impact speed.

Russian President Vladimir Putin combined his subsequent statement with a threat to attack military facilities of Western states that allow Ukraine to attack "real" Russian territory with missiles supplied by them. Nevertheless, from November 23, Ukraine carried out further missile attacks on targets in the Kursk Oblast, at least some of which used ATACMS. Among other things, a position of the S-400 air defense system and the Kursk-Vostochny airport were hit.

Impact on Kursk offensive unclear

Meanwhile, France has also announced that it has allowed Ukraine to use the French Storm Shadow variant SCALP against Russian territory. According to unconfirmed reports, there are also talks between France, Great Britain and Poland about the possibility of sending their own troops to Ukraine. At the beginning of the year, French President Emmanuel Macron had already brought this option into play in order to relieve Ukrainian armed forces of at least routine tasks such as training, mine clearance and border security against the Russian ally Belarus.

It is currently unclear to what extent the missile attacks on Russian territory will affect operations against the Kursk offensive. Although these seem to have stalled since then, Russia has been able to gain ground in the meantime, as recently at Lyubimovka and Dar'ino. To have a decisive impact, Russian command and supply facilities as well as air attack and defense bases would probably have to be neutralized on a large scale. It is currently unclear whether Ukraine or its supporters have the missile stocks necessary for this.

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Arrow 3: Never more valuable than today

After the Russian attack with a new medium-range missile (IRBM) on the Ukrainian city of Dnipro this week, the German procurement decision for the Israeli missile defense system Arrow 3 suddenly looks better than critics wanted to believe. Those doubted that it would be suitable for dealing with potential threats. At the time, the latter were seen primarily in short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) such as the Iskander type, and cruise missiles. Since Arrow 3 is an exo-atmospheric interceptor missile, thus optimized for targets in largely airless space above an altitude of around 65 kilometers, according to this criticism it cannot combat such attacks at all.

This is certainly true with regard to low-flying cruise missiles, but was already doubtful with regard to Iskander. Given the distance between Russian and German territory, close to the assumed maximum range of the 9K723 missile, this would also have to reach an altitude of between 90 and 150 kilometers at the peak of its flight path. It was always clear that Arrow 3 would only cover the uppermost of the interception layers. Against cruise missiles and other low-flying threats - and also as a supplement to ballistic missile defense for point defense against missiles that break through - there are other systems: Patriot, and in the future IRIS-T SLM.

The return of intermediate-range missiles was foreseeable

There is of course room for discussion about additional systems that are specifically designed for short-range missiles in the Iskander class: Arrow 2, the American THAAD, or the Block 2 version of the French-Italian-British Aster 30 that is currently under development. But perhaps it is more important to first increase the number of systems introduced and selected in order to achieve better coverage over a wide area, particularly against low-flying threats. And what was already obvious at the time of the decision for Arrow 3: the Russian missiles back then would not remain the only ones.

With the termination of the INF Treaty banning land-based intermediate-range weapons by then- and future US President Donald Trump – and subsequently also by Russia – in 2019, a new arms race in this category officially began. In any case, Russian military officials were never happy with this treaty. Because it did not include China, it led to an arms gap with the eastern neighbor, competitor and potential enemy. To what extent the mutual accusations were true that the US missile defense systems in Romania and Poland on the one hand and the Iskander system on the other could also be used to launch land-based cruise missiles that violate the treaty: that no longer plays a role in retrospect.

Demonstration against NATO

The Russian attack on Dnipro has clearly demonstrated the return of these weapons. Vladimir Putin's subsequent threat of attacks on NATO countries that allow Ukraine to attack "real" Russian territory with missiles supplied by them shows that this was also the intention. The fact that this step remains unlikely as long as Russia does not even shoot down NATO drones in international airspace over the Black Sea, which it assumes - probably not without reason - to be providing Ukraine with targeting data; that it certainly does not (yet) have many internmediate-range missiles: granted. The potential is there.

Initially, there was speculation about the use of an RS-26 Rubesh intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). This is a derivative of the RS-24 Yars that has been reduced by one stage and was introduced in 2016 with only two systems. With a stated range of 5,800 kilometers, it remains just above the range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers defined by the INF Treaty for medium-range missiles. The first live use of an ICBM, which is commonly associated with nuclear doomsday scenarios, would probably have been even more spectacular. However, the American side quickly said that it was a new type they had been tracking for some time.

In the interception window of Arrow 3

Putin confirmed in his statement that it was a new weapon called 9M729 Oreshnik, which is still in the test phase. It is possible that this was developed from the RS-26. Deriving an intermediate-range from an intercontinental missile is nothing new in Russian missile construction: the RSD-10 Pioner, with the NATO designation SS-20, which led to the NATO Double-Track Decision in the 1970s and ultimately to the INF Treaty, was essentially based on the RS-14 Temp-2S reduced by one stage. Little data is known about the Oreshnik so far. Images of the attack on Dnipro suggest that it can carry six independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). These were apparently used here without a warhead and achieved a kinetic effect only due to the high impact speed.

These can certainly be equipped with nuclear weapons in the future. But Oreshnik just as certainly also falls within the interception window of Arrow 3, which demonstrated its ability to combat intermediate-range missiles with a range of around 1,500 kilometers during the Iranian missile attacks on Israel this year. Coincidentally, that is also roughly the distance between Berlin and Moscow. One gets the impression that German decision-makers knew what they were doing when they initiated the introduction of Arrow 3 into the Bundeswehr by next year already. Although the matter certainly cannot be ticked off with that.

That was just the beginning

Unless developments lead to an arms control regime similar to the INF Treaty - complicated by the fact that this time it would also have to include China - we are only at the beginning of new threats. The much-used buzzword of hypersonic weapons has so far been applied largely incorrectly. After all, every ballistic missile with a range of more than a few hundred kilometers reaches hypersonic speeds of Mach 5 and more. The Russian systems touted with this term, such as Iskander and its air-launched variant Kinzhal, are of course capable of partially non-ballistic trajectories and are therefore difficult targets. However, they can very well be combated by existing interceptor missiles, as Patriot has already proven in Ukraine.

The real challenge comes from future hypersonic glide weapons and cruise missiles that can radically change course at these speeds. This will also require a new generation of interceptor missiles. Israel is already working on Arrow 4 as a successor to Arrow 3. In Europe, the HYDEF (Hypersonic Defence Interceptor Study) project is underway, which is to complete a study on a corresponding system by 2026 on behalf of the joint procurement authority OCCAR. Both are possible options for Germany as a successor and supplement to Arrow 3. Even if critics will then certainly doubt again whether they are suitable for defending against current threats.

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Ukrainian Kursk Offensive – 17th Week

In the Ukrainian Kursk Offensive and the Russian counteroffensive, there have been no confirmed changes in the front line despite ongoing heavy fighting. Russian military bloggers reported that their own troops advanced towards Malaya Loknya in a forest area and into the village of Novoivanovka, but this has not yet been documented. In any case, the gain in ground would be minimal. This means that the front lines have remained largely at a standstill since Russian forces were able to advance from the north on Malaya Loknya three weeks ago, but were pushed back in the west.

It is unclear whether this is due to external circumstances such as winter weather conditions or possibly Ukrainian attacks on command and logistics facilities in the Russian hinterland since the use of Western precision weapons was authorized for this purpose. Interestingly, further south, Ukraine has also managed to regain some of the ground that Russia occupied in May during its own cross-border offensive from Belgorod Oblast towards Kharkiv.

False reports from Russian commanders

Meanwhile, Russian troops are slowly but steadily advancing in the Donbas. However, they have still not been able to capture the strategically important city of Pokrovsk and thus open a path to the open lowlands of the Donetsk region. In the Luhansk region, which is now completely controlled by Russia except for a few small sections, there was recently a scandal involving false reports from Russian commanders.

They had claimed to have taken villages near Siversk, which, when inspected by higher authorities, proved to still be held by Ukrainians. As a result, several officers were allegedly arrested and at least one brigade commander and the commander of the Southern Military District, Colonel General Gennady Anashkin, were replaced.

[...]

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Ukrainian Kursk Offensive – 18th Week

There are currently conflicting reports on both sides regarding the Ukrainian Kursk offensive and the Russian counter-offensive. There are consistent reports that Russian forces were able to secure additional territory in the north-east of the combat zone and that they have taken the town of Plekhovo in the south-east, which they have had in a pincer for several weeks. However, official Ukrainian sources contradicted a Russian report that they had also advanced south of this into Ukrainian territory.

There are also contradictions about the situation in the northwest, where some Russian and Ukrainian sources report Russia's advance towards Malaya Loknya, while other Russian sources do not confirm this and even report that Russian forces have been pushed back north of the town. A Ukrainian source also shows a retreat of its own forces from Russian territory in the west, where they had launched a relief attack at the beginning of the Russian counteroffensive. This in turn is not confirmed by the Russian side.

Kursk Offensive coming to an end?

Overall, the initiative remains on the Russian side, as it has been since around mid-October, despite pauses and setbacks. If their systematic advance continues at the same pace as in the front sections in the Donbas, Ukraine would be completely displaced from the area occupied by the Kursk offensive in about another two months. The time frame is critical, as the momentum for negotiations on a ceasefire is now increasing following the re-election of Donald Trump as US president.

[...]

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Trump-Macron 2025: The ticket for European peacekeeping troops in Ukraine?

Will the "Trump train" to the White House, which was much-invoked in the US election campaign, soon also be sending peacekeepers to Ukraine? Americans like to talk about the "ticket" with the names of a party's presidential candidate and his "running mate" for the vice-presidential post. For example, Trump-Vance 2024. Or Biden-Harris 2024, which then suddenly became Harris-Waltz 2024. But an unusual combination seems to be emerging for the coming year: Trump-Macron 2025. At least that is the impression one might have after Trump's visit to Paris at the end of last week, while confidential discussions have been taking place for several weeks, particularly between France and Great Britain, on the very subject of possible European peacekeepers for Ukraine.

His former and future French colleague Emmanuel Macron obviously still knows how to push the right buttons with Trump: an invitation to the reopening of Notre Dame Cathedral with a place of honor in the front row between Macron and his wife - while the American President-elect Biden was probably not coincidentally represented by his own wife - and beforehand a one-on-one conversation in the Elysee Palace. During this, the Frenchman persuaded the American to invite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy directly instead of the planned further one-on-one conversation with him.

Russian concerns about Trump statements

Trump then announced on social media that the latter was ready to make a "deal" on a ceasefire in the war in Ukraine, and called on Russian President Vladimir Putin to come to the negotiating table. Russia's concern about this was immediately reflected in the reactions of pro-Russian media and propaganda sources. They spread the story that Zelenskyy's request for further American support had been rebuffed by Trump, who had in fact demanded a ceasefire from him. Zelenskyy had supposedly rejected this. Moreover, these sources focused on Trump's statement that Ukraine had already lost 400,000 soldiers, which was presented as the number of dead, deliberately ignoring the earlier sentence that Russia had as many as 600,000 dead and wounded.

As a basis for the alleged rejection by Zelenskyy, they cited a subsequent Telegram post in which he specified Ukrainian losses as 47,000 dead and 370,000 wounded of all categories, and pointed out the importance of security guarantees for Ukraine. While all of the figures mentioned are open to doubt, the wording of the statements in no way supports the Russian interpretation that makes Zelenskyy, rather than Putin, the addressee of Trump's negotiation demand. In view of the reported approach by the Trump team to force both sides to negotiate either by cutting or further increasing aid to Ukraine, the concern seems justified that Zelenskyy was able to successfully present himself in Paris as willing to compromise. And thus make Putin the main target of further pressure in this direction.

Outgoing and incoming president freed from public pressure

The same sources were all the more eager to pounce on an interview with Trump on NBC, which was essentially a throwback to the election campaign for the domestic audience. In response to respective lame questions, Trump replied just as lamely that of course aid to Ukraine would be completely cut off and that the US could withdraw from NATO. The same applies to an interview with Time Magazine this week, which has just named him "Person of the Year" again. There he criticized, among other things, the American permission for Ukraine to use US precision weapons against targets in the Russian hinterland - something he had previously been conspicuously silent about.

Trump is thus still prone to spontaneous outbursts of opinion, unless being guided by experienced tamers like Macron. Conversely, those like Putin or the North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un, who have led him to make the most hair-raising statements against American interests before, must be kept away from him. However, after the election, he is just as free from having to consider populist issues in domestic politics as Joe Biden - which explains the largely quietly-coordinated Ukraine policy between the two during the current transition phase. According to the US Constitution, Trump cannot run for president again. And he was elected primarily due to the economic concerns of American voters, for whom foreign policy traditionally plays little role.

Even then, according to polls, two-thirds of Republican voters are pro-Ukrainian. Trump's core supporters, who actually jumped on this issue during the election campaign, will continue to follow him regardless of his actual decisions and will ignore or explain away any different realpolitik as usual. He can make an additional name for himself only on the international stage anymore. For example, by mediating an armistice in Ukraine that will not make him personally or the US as a whole look weak by simply meeting Putin's demands. The choice of the "hawk" Keith Kellogg as his future Ukraine representative, who wants to resolve the conflict from a position of American strength, already points in this direction.

Same opinion, different motivation

Meanwhile, Emmanuel Macron arrived in Warsaw on Thursday of this week for talks with the Polish government. The discussion also focused on possible European peacekeeping troops to secure an armistice in Ukraine. The reported number of 40,000 men with five brigades, one of which Polish-led, does however not seem to be based on government sources but on wargames by French think tanks. Macron and Trump ultimately agree that the Europeans should shoulder more of the burden in international security policy, albeit for different reasons. As always, Macron certainly has greater European independence from the USA and a possible French leadership role in mind.

Trump, for his part, is not an American isolationist in the opinion of many observers, although he does cater to isolationist reflexes among his voters. Rather this would have him as merely the latest in a line of American presidents since Bill Clinton who believed that they could shift more of the defense burden onto their allies while maintaining the United States' leadership role with no change. In that regard, Joe Biden was a throwback to the Cold War generation that otherwise ended in the 1990s with George Bush Sr. as president. This is reflected in the alleged plans of Trump's team, according to which the United States would guarantee Ukraine's security after an armistice with further military aid, while the Europeans would monitor the armistice at their own expense with peacekeepers.

European Peacekeeping Forces: How it Will Not Work

This exact division of labor will of course not work. On the one hand, the Europeans - the EU plus Great Britain and Norway - had already provided 40 percent more aid to Ukraine than the USA in monetary terms at the end of October. After all the funds now approved by both sides have been exhausted, it will be more than double. This does not take into account that the US aid consists largely of stored weapons systems. Although these contributed more to the immediate rescue of Ukraine than the weak European material reserves, they are unlikely to be replaced at nominal price. Conversely, the development of production capacity in Europe has taken far too long. But its investments are now flowing not least into the production of European companies within Ukraine itself.

In this respect, Europe has nothing to make up for here and does not need to leave the field to focus solely on providing peacekeeping troops. These, in turn, would be doubtful in implementation and effectiveness without American reassurance. Macron may envisage such a commitment as a milestone in independent European security policy. But already in Warsaw it was heard that such "speculation" must be put to an end. Without recourse to NATO structures, a deployment of this magnitude is unlikely anyway. Especially since Great Britain, the second likely lead nation alongside France, is no longer integrated into the EU structures as the next best solution. At best, a hybrid solution would be conceivable - for example with leadership by the Eurocorps, which is available for both NATO and EU operations.

And Germany?

Recently, before the Paris meeting, Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock did not want to rule out Germany's participation in possible peacekeeping troops for Ukraine. This immediately attracted a lot of criticism in the freshly-started federal election campaign. In fact, she had first of all only avoided the German "exclusionitis" that has also often been criticized in the past, whereby government politicians, when asked about possible deployments, always first listed what would definitely not be done. However, observers of European security policy naturally suspect that the five peacekeeping brigades in the French wargames may include one each led by France, Britain and Poland, as well as one from another of Ukraine's larger neighbors - Romania, for example - and indeed a German one.

This is also difficult to imagine, given how the the Bundeswehr is currently struggling to set up a new brigade for Lithuania. In fact, the German army is already more or less fully allocated to the sustainable defense of the Baltic states against Russia. A task that would remain even after an armistice in Ukraine. For immediate neighbors such as Poland (which however also has borders with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Belarus) and Romania, as well as allies committed to protecting NATO's southeast flank such as France, it would make sense to prevent Russia from advancing further into Ukraine. But Great Britain, which is the lead nation for the defense of Estonia, must already ask itself whether the peacekeeping troops deployed in one place would be missing in another.

Before peacekeepers, peace is needed

The German-led EU Battlegroup 2025 at least is still available and can be deployed quickly. For the first time, it also represents the EU's new Rapid Deployment Capability with possible reinforcements from air, naval and other forces to 5,000 men. At its core, however, this remains a reinforced light infantry battalion, which is primarily intended for scenarios such as peacekeeping and evacuation operations with a maximum duration of 120 days - not to deter the Russian army from violating an armistice. Better than nothing for the initial phase, perhaps, and just as suitable as a political "tripwire" as an armored division. But it is symptomatic of the practical problems that a credible implementation of all the ideas for European peacekeeping troops would entail.

Before all implementation problems, however, there is the question of whether an armistice in Ukraine can be achieved at all. As Russia is currently advancing further, this is not in its interest as long as its territorial and political demands on Ukraine are not met. Under no circumstances can it agree to a freezing of the fronts as long as Ukrainian forces are still on its own territory at Kursk. Otherwise it would have to enter into negotiations on an exchange of occupied territories. As long as Ukraine continues to signal its willingness to negotiate, it could then hope for an increase in US aid under Trump. It is very likely that the price for Putin will have to rise further before he accepts negotiations based on less than his maximum demands as a better alternative.

Squaring the Circle

This will probably not actually happen before Trump's target of January 20. But that would at least give Europeans and Americans time to agree on a realistic concept for maintaining a future armistice and to solve squaring the circle with other actors. Neither Russia nor many NATO members want to face each other directly in Ukraine. The actual "peacekeeping troops" on an armistice line would perhaps be better coming from neutral states. For example, from the circle of BRICS members who have already ostentatiously attempted peace initiatives. India, Brazil and South Africa, for example, could be considered. On the other hand, neither side would probably want to create the basis for a Chinese military presence on the European continent.

Any Western presence, whether called peacekeepers or otherwise, would serve as a deterrent. It would therefore necessarily have to be extremely robust, but not necessarily stationed directly on the line of contact. If it makes it easier for Russia, this could be nominally a European operation. But it would necessarily rely on NATO structures and include American involvement at least in a support role and contingency planning. This applies to command and control, reconnaissance, and air support and airlift capabilities, for example. Balancing all of this will be complex at best. But compared to the task of first achieving an armistice that does not simply hand Ukraine over to Russia, it is probably the smaller problem.