quote:

Originally posted by BansheeOne:
After looking around for some time, by pure coincidence I finally got back into my real field of interest and competence and landed pretty much my dream job I always thought I could eventually end my professional career in; this month I’m gonna sign with the leading German-language publisher in security and defense for a double-hatted post, deputy editor-in-chief for one magazine geared towards deciders in security politics, and managing editor of another more technically orientated one for a broader audience. Everything’s done but the numbers, which can however only improve from my current gig.

That in turn means I’ll have a professional full-time outlet for my interests, so my private web presence isn’t exactly going to increase.

quote:

Originally posted by parabellum:
Well, he's not going to be impeached or removed from office. Two months until he's out, one way or another.

quote:

Ukrainian Kursk Offensive: 16th Week

In the Ukrainian Kursk Offensive and Russian counter-offensive, both sides were able to gain ground again last weekend after a week-long standstill before the fronts came to another halt. Ukrainian troops withdrew from the long-threatening pocket south of the town of Lyubimovka, which thus fell to Russia. Russian forces were also able to advance further south along the Snagost River and capture the town of Dar'ino. In contrast, the Ukrainian side was able to secure further ground northeast of Martinovka on the road to Kursk.

However, the focus of attention was less on the Kursk offensive itself than on the mutual missile attacks on targets in the hinterland, after Ukraine attacked a Russian ammunition depot in the neighboring Bryansk Oblast with ATACMS missiles for the first time on November 19, following the appropriate American authorization. On November 20, at least twelve Storm Shadow cruise missiles supplied by Britain also hit a target in Marjino, west of the combat zone. This was reportedly the Russian-North Korean command post for the counteroffensive.

Mutual missile fire

On November 21, Russia fired a ballistic missile at the industrial site of the Yuzhmash vehicle and space company in the southern Ukrainian city of Dnipro. According to Russian sources, this was a practical test of a new intermediate-range weapon called Oreshnik. According to video footage, the missile carried six independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), which appeared to be deployed without a warhead and achieved kinetic effect only due to the high impact speed.

Russian President Vladimir Putin combined his subsequent statement with a threat to attack military facilities of Western states that allow Ukraine to attack "real" Russian territory with missiles supplied by them. Nevertheless, from November 23, Ukraine carried out further missile attacks on targets in the Kursk Oblast, at least some of which used ATACMS. Among other things, a position of the S-400 air defense system and the Kursk-Vostochny airport were hit.

Impact on Kursk offensive unclear

Meanwhile, France has also announced that it has allowed Ukraine to use the French Storm Shadow variant SCALP against Russian territory. According to unconfirmed reports, there are also talks between France, Great Britain and Poland about the possibility of sending their own troops to Ukraine. At the beginning of the year, French President Emmanuel Macron had already brought this option into play in order to relieve Ukrainian armed forces of at least routine tasks such as training, mine clearance and border security against the Russian ally Belarus.

It is currently unclear to what extent the missile attacks on Russian territory will affect operations against the Kursk offensive. Although these seem to have stalled since then, Russia has been able to gain ground in the meantime, as recently at Lyubimovka and Dar'ino. To have a decisive impact, Russian command and supply facilities as well as air attack and defense bases would probably have to be neutralized on a large scale. It is currently unclear whether Ukraine or its supporters have the missile stocks necessary for this.

quote:

Arrow 3: Never more valuable than today

After the Russian attack with a new medium-range missile (IRBM) on the Ukrainian city of Dnipro this week, the German procurement decision for the Israeli missile defense system Arrow 3 suddenly looks better than critics wanted to believe. Those doubted that it would be suitable for dealing with potential threats. At the time, the latter were seen primarily in short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) such as the Iskander type, and cruise missiles. Since Arrow 3 is an exo-atmospheric interceptor missile, thus optimized for targets in largely airless space above an altitude of around 65 kilometers, according to this criticism it cannot combat such attacks at all.

This is certainly true with regard to low-flying cruise missiles, but was already doubtful with regard to Iskander. Given the distance between Russian and German territory, close to the assumed maximum range of the 9K723 missile, this would also have to reach an altitude of between 90 and 150 kilometers at the peak of its flight path. It was always clear that Arrow 3 would only cover the uppermost of the interception layers. Against cruise missiles and other low-flying threats - and also as a supplement to ballistic missile defense for point defense against missiles that break through - there are other systems: Patriot, and in the future IRIS-T SLM.

The return of intermediate-range missiles was foreseeable

There is of course room for discussion about additional systems that are specifically designed for short-range missiles in the Iskander class: Arrow 2, the American THAAD, or the Block 2 version of the French-Italian-British Aster 30 that is currently under development. But perhaps it is more important to first increase the number of systems introduced and selected in order to achieve better coverage over a wide area, particularly against low-flying threats. And what was already obvious at the time of the decision for Arrow 3: the Russian missiles back then would not remain the only ones.

With the termination of the INF Treaty banning land-based intermediate-range weapons by then- and future US President Donald Trump – and subsequently also by Russia – in 2019, a new arms race in this category officially began. In any case, Russian military officials were never happy with this treaty. Because it did not include China, it led to an arms gap with the eastern neighbor, competitor and potential enemy. To what extent the mutual accusations were true that the US missile defense systems in Romania and Poland on the one hand and the Iskander system on the other could also be used to launch land-based cruise missiles that violate the treaty: that no longer plays a role in retrospect.

Demonstration against NATO

The Russian attack on Dnipro has clearly demonstrated the return of these weapons. Vladimir Putin's subsequent threat of attacks on NATO countries that allow Ukraine to attack "real" Russian territory with missiles supplied by them shows that this was also the intention. The fact that this step remains unlikely as long as Russia does not even shoot down NATO drones in international airspace over the Black Sea, which it assumes - probably not without reason - to be providing Ukraine with targeting data; that it certainly does not (yet) have many internmediate-range missiles: granted. The potential is there.

Initially, there was speculation about the use of an RS-26 Rubesh intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). This is a derivative of the RS-24 Yars that has been reduced by one stage and was introduced in 2016 with only two systems. With a stated range of 5,800 kilometers, it remains just above the range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers defined by the INF Treaty for medium-range missiles. The first live use of an ICBM, which is commonly associated with nuclear doomsday scenarios, would probably have been even more spectacular. However, the American side quickly said that it was a new type they had been tracking for some time.

In the interception window of Arrow 3

Putin confirmed in his statement that it was a new weapon called Oreshnik, which is still in the test phase. It is possible that this was developed from the RS-26. Deriving an intermediate-range from an intercontinental missile is nothing new in Russian missile construction: the RSD-10 Pioner, with the NATO designation SS-20, which led to the NATO Double-Track Decision in the 1970s and ultimately to the INF Treaty, was essentially based on the RS-14 Temp-2S reduced by one stage. Little data is known about the Oreshnik so far. Images of the attack on Dnipro suggest that it can carry six independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). These were apparently used here without a warhead and achieved a kinetic effect only due to the high impact speed.

These can certainly be equipped with nuclear weapons in the future. But Oreshnik just as certainly also falls within the interception window of Arrow 3, which demonstrated its ability to combat intermediate-range missiles with a range of around 1,500 kilometers during the Iranian missile attacks on Israel this year. Coincidentally, that is also roughly the distance between Berlin and Moscow. One gets the impression that German decision-makers knew what they were doing when they initiated the introduction of Arrow 3 into the Bundeswehr by next year already. Although the matter certainly cannot be ticked off with that.

That was just the beginning

Unless developments lead to an arms control regime similar to the INF Treaty - complicated by the fact that this time it would also have to include China - we are only at the beginning of new threats. The much-used buzzword of hypersonic weapons has so far been applied largely incorrectly. After all, every ballistic missile with a range of more than a few hundred kilometers reaches hypersonic speeds of Mach 5 and more. The Russian systems touted with this term, such as Iskander and its air-launched variant Kinzhal, are of course capable of partially non-ballistic trajectories and are therefore difficult targets. However, they can very well be combated by existing interceptor missiles, as Patriot has already proven in Ukraine.

The real challenge comes from future hypersonic glide weapons and cruise missiles that can radically change course at these speeds. This will also require a new generation of interceptor missiles. Israel is already working on Arrow 4 as a successor to Arrow 3. In Europe, the HYDEF (Hypersonic Defence Interceptor Study) project is underway, which is to complete a study on a corresponding system by 2026 on behalf of the joint procurement authority OCCAR. Both are possible options for Germany as a successor and supplement to Arrow 3. Even if critics will then certainly doubt again whether they are suitable for defending against current threats.

quote:

Ukrainian Kursk Offensive – 17th Week

In the Ukrainian Kursk Offensive and the Russian counteroffensive, there have been no confirmed changes in the front line despite ongoing heavy fighting. Russian military bloggers reported that their own troops advanced towards Malaya Loknya in a forest area and into the village of Novoivanovka, but this has not yet been documented. In any case, the gain in ground would be minimal. This means that the front lines have remained largely at a standstill since Russian forces were able to advance from the north on Malaya Loknya three weeks ago, but were pushed back in the west.

It is unclear whether this is due to external circumstances such as winter weather conditions or possibly Ukrainian attacks on command and logistics facilities in the Russian hinterland since the use of Western precision weapons was authorized for this purpose. Interestingly, further south, Ukraine has also managed to regain some of the ground that Russia occupied in May during its own cross-border offensive from Belgorod Oblast towards Kharkiv.

False reports from Russian commanders

Meanwhile, Russian troops are slowly but steadily advancing in the Donbas. However, they have still not been able to capture the strategically important city of Pokrovsk and thus open a path to the open lowlands of the Donetsk region. In the Luhansk region, which is now completely controlled by Russia except for a few small sections, there was recently a scandal involving false reports from Russian commanders.

They had claimed to have taken villages near Siversk, which, when inspected by higher authorities, proved to still be held by Ukrainians. As a result, several officers were allegedly arrested and at least one brigade commander and the commander of the Southern Military District, Colonel General Gennady Anashkin, were replaced.

[...]

quote:

Ukrainian Kursk Offensive – 18th Week

There are currently conflicting reports on both sides regarding the Ukrainian Kursk offensive and the Russian counter-offensive. There are consistent reports that Russian forces were able to secure additional territory in the north-east of the combat zone and that they have taken the town of Plekhovo in the south-east, which they have had in a pincer for several weeks. However, official Ukrainian sources contradicted a Russian report that they had also advanced south of this into Ukrainian territory.

There are also contradictions about the situation in the northwest, where some Russian and Ukrainian sources report Russia's advance towards Malaya Loknya, while other Russian sources do not confirm this and even report that Russian forces have been pushed back north of the town. A Ukrainian source also shows a retreat of its own forces from Russian territory in the west, where they had launched a relief attack at the beginning of the Russian counteroffensive. This in turn is not confirmed by the Russian side.

Kursk Offensive coming to an end?

Overall, the initiative remains on the Russian side, as it has been since around mid-October, despite pauses and setbacks. If their systematic advance continues at the same pace as in the front sections in the Donbas, Ukraine would be completely displaced from the area occupied by the Kursk offensive in about another two months. The time frame is critical, as the momentum for negotiations on a ceasefire is now increasing following the re-election of Donald Trump as US president.

[...]

quote:

Trump-Macron 2025: The ticket for European peacekeeping troops in Ukraine?

Will the "Trump train" to the White House, which was much-invoked in the US election campaign, soon also be sending peacekeepers to Ukraine? Americans like to talk about the "ticket" with the names of a party's presidential candidate and his "running mate" for the vice-presidential post. For example, Trump-Vance 2024. Or Biden-Harris 2024, which then suddenly became Harris-Waltz 2024. But an unusual combination seems to be emerging for the coming year: Trump-Macron 2025. At least that is the impression one might have after Trump's visit to Paris at the end of last week, while confidential discussions have been taking place for several weeks, particularly between France and Great Britain, on the very subject of possible European peacekeepers for Ukraine.

His former and future French colleague Emmanuel Macron obviously still knows how to push the right buttons with Trump: an invitation to the reopening of Notre Dame Cathedral with a place of honor in the front row between Macron and his wife - while the acting American President Biden was probably not coincidentally represented by his own wife - and beforehand a one-on-one conversation in the Elysee Palace. During this, the Frenchman persuaded the American to invite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy directly instead of the planned further one-on-one conversation with him.

Russian concerns about Trump statements

Trump then announced on social media that the latter was ready to make a "deal" on a ceasefire in the war in Ukraine, and called on Russian President Vladimir Putin to come to the negotiating table. Russia's concern about this was immediately reflected in the reactions of pro-Russian media and propaganda sources. They spread the story that Zelenskyy's request for further American support had been rebuffed by Trump, who had in fact demanded a ceasefire from him. Zelenskyy had supposedly rejected this. Moreover, these sources focused on Trump's statement that Ukraine had already lost 400,000 soldiers, which was presented as the number of dead, deliberately ignoring the earlier sentence that Russia had as many as 600,000 dead and wounded.

As a basis for the alleged rejection by Zelenskyy, they cited a subsequent Telegram post in which he specified Ukrainian losses as 47,000 dead and 370,000 wounded of all categories, and pointed out the importance of security guarantees for Ukraine. While all of the figures mentioned are open to doubt, the wording of the statements in no way supports the Russian interpretation that makes Zelenskyy, rather than Putin, the addressee of Trump's negotiation demand. In view of the reported approach by the Trump team to force both sides to negotiate either by cutting or further increasing aid to Ukraine, the concern seems justified that Zelenskyy was able to successfully present himself in Paris as willing to compromise. And thus make Putin the main target of further pressure in this direction.

Outgoing and incoming president freed from public pressure

The same sources were all the more eager to pounce on an interview with Trump on NBC, which was essentially a throwback to the election campaign for the domestic audience. In response to respective lame questions, Trump replied just as lamely that of course aid to Ukraine would be completely cut off and that the US could withdraw from NATO. The same applies to an interview with Time Magazine this week, which has just named him "Person of the Year" again. There he criticized, among other things, the American permission for Ukraine to use US precision weapons against targets in the Russian hinterland - something he had previously been conspicuously silent about.

Trump is thus still prone to spontaneous outbursts of opinion, unless being guided by experienced tamers like Macron. Conversely, those like Putin or the North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un, who have led him to make the most hair-raising statements against American interests before, must be kept away from him. However, after the election, he is just as free from having to consider populist issues in domestic politics as Joe Biden - which explains the largely quietly-coordinated Ukraine policy between the two during the current transition phase. According to the US Constitution, Trump cannot run for president again. And he was elected primarily due to the economic concerns of American voters, for whom foreign policy traditionally plays little role.

Even then, according to polls, two-thirds of Republican voters are pro-Ukrainian. Trump's core supporters, who actually jumped on this issue during the election campaign, will continue to follow him regardless of his actual decisions and will ignore or explain away any different realpolitik as usual. He can make an additional name for himself only on the international stage anymore. For example, by mediating an armistice in Ukraine that will not make him personally or the US as a whole look weak by simply meeting Putin's demands. The choice of the "hawk" Keith Kellogg as his future Ukraine representative, who wants to resolve the conflict from a position of American strength, already points in this direction.

Same opinion, different motivation

Meanwhile, Emmanuel Macron arrived in Warsaw on Thursday of this week for talks with the Polish government. The discussion also focused on possible European peacekeeping troops to secure an armistice in Ukraine. The reported number of 40,000 men with five brigades, one of which Polish-led, does however not seem to be based on government sources but on wargames by French think tanks. Macron and Trump ultimately agree that the Europeans should shoulder more of the burden in international security policy, albeit for different reasons. As always, Macron certainly has greater European independence from the USA and a possible French leadership role in mind.

Trump, for his part, is not an American isolationist in the opinion of many observers, although he does cater to isolationist reflexes among his voters. Rather this would have him as merely the latest in a line of American presidents since Bill Clinton who believed that they could shift more of the defense burden onto their allies while maintaining the United States' leadership role with no change. In that regard, Joe Biden was a throwback to the Cold War generation that otherwise ended in the 1990s with George Bush Sr. as president. This is reflected in the alleged plans of Trump's team, according to which the United States would guarantee Ukraine's security after an armistice with further military aid, while the Europeans would monitor the armistice at their own expense with peacekeepers.

European Peacekeeping Forces: How it Will Not Work

This exact division of labor will of course not work. On the one hand, the Europeans - the EU plus Great Britain and Norway - had already provided 40 percent more aid to Ukraine than the USA in monetary terms at the end of October. After all the funds now approved by both sides have been exhausted, it will be more than double. This does not take into account that the US aid consists largely of stored weapons systems. Although these contributed more to the immediate rescue of Ukraine than the weak European material reserves, they are unlikely to be replaced at nominal price. Conversely, the development of production capacity in Europe has taken far too long. But its investments are now flowing not least into the production of European companies within Ukraine itself.

In this respect, Europe has nothing to make up for here and does not need to leave the field to focus solely on providing peacekeeping troops. These, in turn, would be doubtful in implementation and effectiveness without American reassurance. Macron may envisage such a commitment as a milestone in independent European security policy. But already in Warsaw it was heard that such "speculation" must be put to an end. Without recourse to NATO structures, a deployment of this magnitude is unlikely anyway. Especially since Great Britain, the second likely lead nation alongside France, is no longer integrated into the EU structures as the next best solution. At best, a hybrid solution would be conceivable - for example with leadership by the Eurocorps, which is available for both NATO and EU operations.

And Germany?

Recently, before the Paris meeting, Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock did not want to rule out Germany's participation in possible peacekeeping troops for Ukraine. This immediately attracted a lot of criticism in the freshly-started federal election campaign. In fact, she had first of all only avoided the German "exclusionitis" that has also often been criticized in the past, whereby government politicians, when asked about possible deployments, always first listed what would definitely not be done. However, observers of European security policy naturally suspect that the five peacekeeping brigades in the French wargames may include one each led by France, Britain and Poland, as well as one from another of Ukraine's larger neighbors - Romania, for example - and indeed a German one.

This is also difficult to imagine, given how the Bundeswehr is currently struggling to set up a new brigade for Lithuania. In fact, the German army is already more or less fully allocated to the sustainable defense of the Baltic states against Russia. A task that would remain even after an armistice in Ukraine. For immediate neighbors such as Poland (which however also has borders with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Belarus) and Romania, as well as allies committed to protecting NATO's southeast flank such as France, it would make sense to prevent Russia from advancing further into Ukraine. But Great Britain, which is the lead nation for the defense of Estonia, must already ask itself whether the peacekeeping troops deployed in one place would be missing in another.

Before peacekeepers, peace is needed

The German-led EU Battlegroup 2025 at least is still available and can be deployed quickly. For the first time, it also represents the EU's new Rapid Deployment Capability with possible reinforcements from air, naval and other forces to 5,000 men. At its core, however, this remains a reinforced light infantry battalion, which is primarily intended for scenarios such as peacekeeping and evacuation operations with a maximum duration of 120 days - not to deter the Russian army from violating an armistice. Better than nothing for the initial phase, perhaps, and just as suitable as a political "tripwire" as an armored division. But it is symptomatic of the practical problems that a credible implementation of all the ideas for European peacekeeping troops would entail.

Before all implementation problems, however, there is the question of whether an armistice in Ukraine can be achieved at all. As Russia is currently advancing further, this is not in its interest as long as its territorial and political demands on Ukraine are not met. Under no circumstances can it agree to a freezing of the fronts as long as Ukrainian forces are still on its own territory at Kursk. Otherwise it would have to enter into negotiations on an exchange of occupied territories. As long as Ukraine continues to signal its willingness to negotiate, it could then hope for an increase in US aid under Trump. It is very likely that the price for Putin will have to rise further before he accepts negotiations based on less than his maximum demands as a better alternative.

Squaring the Circle

This will probably not actually happen before Trump's target of January 20. But that would at least give Europeans and Americans time to agree on a realistic concept for maintaining a future armistice and to solve squaring the circle with other actors. Neither Russia nor many NATO members want to face each other directly in Ukraine. The actual "peacekeeping troops" on an armistice line would perhaps be better coming from neutral states. For example, from the circle of BRICS members who have already ostentatiously attempted peace initiatives. India, Brazil and South Africa, for example, could be considered. On the other hand, neither side would probably want to create the basis for a Chinese military presence on the European continent.

Any Western presence, whether called peacekeepers or otherwise, would serve as a deterrent. It would therefore necessarily have to be extremely robust, but not necessarily stationed directly on the line of contact. If it makes it easier for Russia, this could be nominally a European operation. But it would necessarily rely on NATO structures and include American involvement at least in a support role and contingency planning. This applies to command and control, reconnaissance, and air support and airlift capabilities, for example. Balancing all of this will be complex at best. But compared to the task of first achieving an armistice that does not simply hand Ukraine over to Russia, it is probably the smaller problem.

quote:

Originally posted by BansheeOne:

quote:

US discussing possibility of transferring Israeli Patriot missile defense systems to Ukraine

By Kylie Atwood and Oren Liebermann, CNN

Published 5:33 PM EDT, Thu June 27, 2024

CNN — The Biden administration is holding discussions with Israel and Ukraine about the possibility of transferring aging Patriot air defense systems currently in Israel to Ukraine as it continues to defend itself in the war with Russia, according to a senior administration official and a source familiar with the discussions, as the US urgently prioritizes air defenses for Kyiv.

No final agreement has been reached to transfer the crucial systems - and the countries are still working through specific logistics - but the administration official said they are hopeful the efforts might succeed, especially given the effectiveness of the Patriot batteries already operating in Ukraine.

The US and Germany have already sent Patriot systems to Ukraine, but the Biden administration has made it clear that Kyiv needs more as Russia continues to launch aerial attacks on the country.

It is unclear how long the process of finalizing details and transferring the systems to Ukraine would take. The systems would likely need to be transferred to the US first, where they would undergo refurbishment, before being sent to Ukraine.

If completed, the transfer would mark a significant shift in Israel’s position regarding the war in Ukraine. Israel has been careful not to overtly criticize Russia, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has tried to walk a fine line with President Vladimir Putin. Russia in 2022 warned that providing Israeli arms to Ukraine would “destroy all interstate relations between our countries.”

[...]

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/0...s-ukraine/index.html

quote:

Jan 28, 2025

Scoop: U.S. sending dozens of Patriot missiles from Israel to Ukraine

Barak Ravid

The U.S. military transferred around 90 Patriot air defense interceptors from storage in Israel to Poland this week in order to deliver them to Ukraine, three sources with knowledge of the operation tell Axios.

Why it matters: Getting more Patriot missiles to Ukraine has been a top priority for the Pentagon to help Kyiv defend against Russia's attacks on its critical infrastructure.

- This is also the most significant delivery of weapons from Israel to Ukraine since the Russian invasion almost three years ago.

Catch up quick: Last April, the Israeli Air Force officially decommissioned the Patriot air defense system, more than 30 years after it was first given to Israel during the first Gulf War.

- The system became less relevant as Israel developed its own air defense systems, and most Patriot batteries were used for training or left in storage.

Behind the scenes: The sources tell Axios that after the IDF announced the decommissioning, Ukrainian officials approached the U.S. and Israel with an idea: Israel would give those missiles back to the U.S. to be refurbished and sent on to Ukraine

- For several months, Israel dragged its feet out of concern Russia would retaliate, perhaps by supplying sophisticated weapons to Iran.

- A Ukrainian official tells Axios Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu refused to take his calls on that issue for weeks.

- But in late September, Netanyahu finally approved the idea, an Israeli official says.

Friction point: At the time, Netanyahu wanted to speak with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in order to get his approval for ultra-Orthodox Israelis to make an annual pilgrimage to the city of Uman in Ukraine, where a famous Rabbi is buried.

- Zelensky wouldn't take his call until Netanyahu approved the Patriot deal, the Ukrainian official says.

- A spokesperson for Netanyahu told Axios the prime minister didn't object to the decommissioning of the Patriot system and its return to the U.S. and denied any connection between this and the pilgrimage.

- The Pentagon declined to comment for this story, as did a spokesperson for U.S. European Command.

[...]

State of play: In recent days, U.S. Air Force C-17 planes arrived at an air base in southern Israel and departed for Rzeszów in Eastern Poland, a hub for moving weapons into Ukraine.

- The sources said the flight transferred roughly 90 patriot interceptors that can be used by Ukraine with its current patriot batteries.

- The flights carried around 90 interceptors, which Ukraine can use with its current batteries. Additional equipment, like radars and other gear, will first be transferred to the U.S. to be refurbished.

[...]

quote:

North Korean Troops No Longer Seen on Front Lines Fighting Ukraine

North Korea sent its best troops to aid Russia in its war against Ukraine. But after months of suffering severe losses, they have been taken off the front line.

By Michael Schwirtz and Julian E. Barnes

Jan. 30, 2025

North Korean soldiers who joined their Russian allies in battle against Ukrainian forces have been pulled off the front lines after suffering heavy casualties, according to Ukrainian and U.S. officials.

The North Korean troops, sent to bolster Russian forces trying to push back a Ukrainian offensive inside Russia’s borders, have not been seen at the front for about two weeks, the officials said after requesting anonymity to discuss sensitive military and intelligence matters.

The arrival of around 11,000 North Korean troops in Russia in November caused alarm in Ukraine and among its allies in the West, who feared their deployment signaled a significant escalation in the nearly three-year-old war. But in just three months, the North Korean ranks have diminished by half, according to Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, Ukraine’s top military commander.

Ukrainian troops who have fought against the North Koreans have described them as fierce warriors. But disorganization in their ranks and a lack of cohesion with Russian units have quickly driven up casualties, a Ukrainian official said. Since arriving on the battlefield, the North Korean soldiers have been left to fend for themselves, advancing with few armored vehicles and rarely pausing to regroup or fall back, according to Ukrainian officials and frontline troops.

[...]

Many of the soldiers are among North Korea’s best-trained special operations troops, but the Russians appear to have used them as foot soldiers, sending them forth in waves across fields studded with land mines to be mowed down by heavy Ukrainian fire.

The American officials said the decision to pull the North Korean troops off the front line may not be a permanent one. It is possible, they said, that the North Koreans could return after receiving additional training or after the Russians come up with new ways of deploying them to avoid such heavy casualties.

[...]

quote:

Ceasefire by Easter, Peace by May 9: Trump's 100-Day Ukraine Plan Discussed in Political Circles

12:15, 26 January 2025

In recent days, political and diplomatic circles in Ukraine have been actively discussing a plan-schedule for ending the war in 100 days, allegedly already drawn up by Donald Trump and his team.

It is alleged that it was handed over by the Americans to a number of European diplomats. And from them it went to Ukraine. It should be noted that at the moment we have no confirmation of the authenticity of this "plan". Perhaps this is indeed a plan drawn up by Trump's team, or perhaps it is some kind of "apocrypha" compiled on the basis of the "Kellogg plan" made public last year before the US presidential elections. There are signs that point to both the first and second options.

However, given the great public attention to the topic of peaceful settlement, we decided to publish it.

So, according to the "schedule," Trump is said to be planning a phone call with Putin in late January or early February. In early February, the plan is to be discussed with Ukrainian authorities.

Following the results of Washington’s communication with Moscow and Kiev, the negotiations may either be paused (if no common ground can be found) or continued (if such points are found).

In the second case, the following further schedule is provided.

Zelensky must cancel the decree prohibiting negotiations with Putin.

In February - the first half of March 2025, it is proposed to hold a meeting between Trump, Zelensky and Putin (a trilateral meeting or two bilateral meetings will be decided separately). The meeting should approve the main parameters of the peace plan, and then continue working on the agreement at the level of special representatives.

While negotiations are underway and hostilities continue, Trump does not block the sending of military aid to Ukraine.

From April 20, 2025 (Easter, which this year all Christian denominations celebrate on the same day) it is proposed to declare a truce along the entire front line. At the same time, all Ukrainian troops must be withdrawn from the Kursk region.

At the end of April 2025, the International Peace Conference should begin its work, which will record an agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on ending the war with the mediation of the United States, China, a number of countries in Europe and the Global South. At the end of April, the exchange of prisoners will begin according to the formula "all for all".

By May 9, the International Peace Conference is expected to issue a declaration on ending the war in Ukraine based on agreed parameters.

After May 9, Ukraine is offered not to extend the martial law regime and mobilization.

Presidential elections are held in Ukraine at the end of August, and parliamentary and local elections at the end of October.

The proposed parameters of the agreement to be concluded within the framework of the International Conference:

1. Ukraine will not be a member of NATO and declares neutrality. The decision to ban Ukraine from joining the Alliance must be approved at the NATO summit.

2. Ukraine will become a member of the EU by 2030. The EU undertakes obligations for the post-war reconstruction of the country.

3. Ukraine does not reduce the size of the army. The United States is committed to continuing support for the modernization of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

4. Ukraine refuses military and diplomatic attempts to return the occupied territories. But does not officially recognize the sovereignty of the Russian Federation over them.

5. Some sanctions against the Russian Federation will be lifted immediately after the conclusion of a peace agreement. Some - over the course of three years, depending on Russia's compliance with the parameters of the agreement. All restrictions on the import of Russian energy resources to the EU will be lifted. But for a certain period of time, it will be subject to a special duty by the Europeans, the proceeds of which will be used to restore Ukraine.

6. Parties that advocate for the Russian language and peaceful coexistence with Russia must be allowed to participate in elections in Ukraine. All actions against the UOC and the Russian language must be stopped at the state level.

7. The point about the European peacekeeping contingent after the end of military actions is highlighted as particularly problematic. On the one hand, Kyiv demands this as a guarantee of security. On the other hand, the Russian Federation is categorically against it. Separate consultations between all parties should be held on this point.

[...]

quote:

Lines for a negotiated solution to the Ukraine war in 2025/26

January 25, 2025

With the beginning of 2025, a new dynamic has emerged in efforts to end the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine through a negotiated solution. Since its largely unsuccessful counter-offensive in the summer of 2023, Ukraine has been on the strategic defensive due to ongoing material and, increasingly, personnel shortages. Russia is currently advancing slowly and with high losses, but persistently, on almost all fronts. At the same time, there were already predictions from the Ukrainian side last spring that the aggressor itself could reach personnel and material limits in war production at the beginning of 2026.

Both sides have tried to turn these medium-term trends in their favor over the past year. With its offensive against Russian territory in the Kursk Oblast, Ukraine has gained political leverage - even at the cost of the fact that the forces deployed there are not available for the defense of its own territory. After the long-established procurement of weapons and ammunition from friendly countries such as Iran and North Korea, Russia has now also brought North Korean troops into the country. These are being deployed in the Kursk region in particular, in order to limit the legally possible but domestically politically sensitive use, and major losses, of conscripts in the defense and reconquest of its own territory.

Time frame and interests

The Trump administration in the US, which has just taken office, continues to strive to end the war as quickly as possible. There is no longer any talk of "within 24 hours", as President Donald Trump claimed during the election campaign. Self-imposed deadlines of 100 days to six months are mentioned. Since the Paris meeting with his French and Ukrainian counterparts Emmanuel Macron and Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the end of last year, Trump has taken the stance that the latter is ready for a "deal", and that it is now up to Russian President Vladimir Putin to act. He has just called on Putin to do this in his usual drastic manner, and threatened to impose even stricter sanctions against Russia if he does not.

The interests of both sides are known. Ukraine is striving to regain its Russian-occupied territories if possible, but in any case to stop further losses and, in particular, to secure security guarantees against further Russian attacks, preferably through NATO membership. Russia is demanding recognition of its annexation of the Ukrainian oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, of which it now controls almost completely the first, but only about two-thirds of the other three. In addition, Ukraine must become neutral - so in no case a NATO member -, severely limit its military potential under the heading of "demilitarization", and carry out domestic political reforms in Russia's interests in order to achieve "denazification".

Option to continue the war of conquest

The Russian demands clearly leave open the option of a later continuation of the war, for example to complete the land bridge to the Russian-controlled region of Transnistria in the Republic of Moldova by conquering the Black Sea coast in the Odessa region. Putin must also cater to the hopes of more radical voices in Russia who are calling for the incorporation of the entire historical region of Novorossiya - that is, the areas east of the Dnipro that were settled by Russians in the 18th century, including the capital of Kiev - or even the entire Ukraine. Freezing the current front line would be a minimal compromise, but he cannot agree to it under any circumstances as long as it runs within Russia near Kursk.

After a five-month Russian counteroffensive, Ukraine currently still holds about 40 percent of the territory it originally occupied there. The exact extent is ultimately of little importance, since a ceasefire before it is fully recaptured would require Russia to make disproportionate concessions to regain it. This explains the dogged Ukrainian hold onto it while Russian forces take more territory elsewhere. It also urges a hurry to reach a negotiated settlement before this bargaining chip is lost on the battlefield. At current rates, the 100 days mentioned by Trump circles are probably the most before the window for this closes.

Currently no Russian interest in a negotiated solution

This is extremely ambitious, especially because Russia cannot be interested in a negotiated solution as long as it continues to advance on the battlefield. A possible slowdown in its offensive potential in the coming year is currently still up in the air, and could possibly be mitigated by increased supplies from allies. Hopeful voices claim that the Ukrainian campaign against logistical facilities and industrial targets in the Russian rear area - especially with drones of its own production, which are not subject to Western restrictions on use - is now having an impact on the enemy's supplies. However, Russia does not yet seem to be under pressure to setttle for what has been achieved so far.

Based on all previous experience, further sanctions alone will not change this. Trump seems to believe that lowering the price of oil in cooperation with Saudi Arabia will quickly end the war. He has also indicated that China could be part of the solution - probably by exerting pressure on Russia as part of a major balancing of interests with the USA on mutual trade relations and other issues. However, a possible drop in the price of oil is only likely to have an impact on the Russian war chest in the medium term. If the Trump administration really wants to bring about at least a ceasefire within 100 days, it would first have to enable Ukraine to stop further Russian advances within this period.

Ukraine urgently needs a perspective

This fits in with the reported approach of threatening a side unwilling to negotiate with either a reduction or an increase in American military aid to Ukraine. However, this cannot compensate for the country's increasing shortage of personnel. According to reports, Trump's team, too, is now demanding that Ukraine lower the draft age for conscripts from the current 25 to 18 years. The Ukrainian government has so far avoided this due to the country's already-difficult demographic situation. Since the 18-24 age group is one of the weakest, there are fears that major losses will have significant additional effects on future population development. As in all Eastern European countries, this has been characterized by emigration, low birth rates and an aging population since the end of the Cold War.

In addition to the direct war losses since the full Russian invasion, Ukraine has also suffered enormous population losses due to flight abroad. This poses an acute threat to the economic basis, but also to reconstruction, and even to the continued existence of the nation itself. It would therefore also have to have a perspective of ending the war quickly in order to resort to this literally last resort. Especially since the population is now showing noticeable war fatigue, and reports of refusal to be drafted and desertions in the armed forces are increasing. This could include the increased delivery of long-range precision weapons and the lifting of restrictions on use against Russian targets - including by Germany. All additional troops drafted would also have to be equipped and would require most of the 100-day window for training.

Negotiation items and fallback positions

In this respect, Trump at least has the advantage of a loyal political base. Although it has so far eagerly spread fears of Russian retaliation, including nuclear war with NATO, it will uncomplainingly support or even applaud a tough stance against Putin's threats. Stopping further Russian advances as long as Ukraine still controls areas near Kursk would open the way to a negotiated solution that is advantageous for Ukraine and would also bring Trump international recognition. Possible elements would be an exchange of occupied territories, security guarantees for Ukraine and other points for a post-war order - but not "demilitarization" and "denazification". According to Ukrainian statements, the latter played no role in the unsuccessful negotiations with Russia in the spring of 2022 anyway.

As an initial position, Ukraine could offer a complete renunciation of NATO membership or the stationing of Western troops if both sides withdraw to the pre-2022 lines - in the certain knowledge that this is unacceptable for Russia. Gradual fallback positions would be, for example, a renunciation of NATO for 20 years, as suggested by Trump's team, with a mutual withdrawal to the pre-2023 lines - i.e. after the Ukrainian recovery of large areas in autumn 2022. Then a renunciation for ten years, which experience shows a candidate needs to join NATO anyway, with a withdrawal to the pre-2024 lines. That would still include the small Ukrainian territorial gains in summer 2023 and reverse the Russian gains since then.

Realistically possible results

More realistic outcomes after such opening moves would probably be a mutual retreat behind the lines of the respective cross-border offensives of the past year: the Russian invasion of Kharkiv, and the Ukrainian advance towards Kursk. A withdrawal of Russian troops from Kharkiv Oblast behind the border of the Luhansk region claimed by Russia and the return of territories captured further south last year - in particular from Avdiivka towards Pokrovsk and near Vuhledar in Donetsk Oblast - would have to be negotiated. As a concession, Ukraine could withdraw from the small parts of Luhansk Oblast it still holds without officially recognizing Russian rule over these and all other occupied territories. In many respects, this would correspond to solutions during the division of Germany.

From the Russian perspective, complete control over at least one of the four annexed territories would be a major political win. Together with two thirds of the other three, Putin's conclusion to his own population could then be: "Three out of four ain't bad." Whether those calling for even more extensive annexations will take this as an acceptable result of three years of war with heavy losses is of course questionable. In addition, this solution would necessarily have to be backed up by extensive Western guarantees, including the stationing of NATO troops in Ukraine, in order to deter Russia from resuming the war of aggression at a later date. Overall, this would still be a high price for Putin to pay to regain his own territory at Kursk.

Additional incentives

Other incentives, both positive and negative, would probably be needed. These could include a partial lifting of sanctions against Russia. One little-noticed issue is the use of coastal waters belonging to the occupied Ukrainian territories. Although without conventional naval forces, Ukraine has virtually completely pushed the Russian Black Sea Fleet out of the Black Sea by using long-range guided missiles and air and sea drones, and forced it to abandon the Sevastopol naval base. Ironic, since control of this port was cited as a reason for the occupation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014. Now the role of the Russian Navy is largely limited to launching cruise missiles from the Sea of ​​Azov east of Crimea, or even the Caspian Sea.

The fact that Ukraine has effective control of the Black Sea waters means that Russia would have to negotiate their use after a ceasefire again during the conflict settlement. Otherwise, the use of the territorial sea, which under international law belongs to Ukraine, by ships flying the Russian flag, and in any case warships and other vessels in government service, could be excluded in an agreement and monitored by international or Western naval forces. This would definitely affect the coastal waters of Crimea in the Black Sea, including Sevastopol, and possibly also in the Sea of ​​Azov, including the northern coast around Mariupol. It is doubtful how much Putin could sell the land gains there as a success if Russian ships were not allowed to call at the ports.

Time is essential

The same applies to air traffic over the occupied territories. In any case, within the framework of a ceasefire agreement, possible buffer zones would have to be negotiated in which the conflicting parties on both sides of the demarcation line would be subject to restrictions, and which could be monitored by international troops. Examples would be the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea, and the Sinai Peninsula since the Camp David Accords of 1978 between Israel and Egypt. Expansions from a few kilometers deep to distance-dependent regulations for the exclusion of various categories of weapons systems, such as rocket artillery with a range of up to 100 kilometers or more, would be conceivable. Such zones would also have to extend along the international border between Russia and Ukraine. Their design would have to be seen as part of an overall package of mutual demands.

A negotiated solution to Ukraine's relative advantage would be more difficult if it were forced to withdraw from Russian territory before a ceasefire. The likelihood of this is increasing as the conflict continues under current conditions. The war might then not end until next year, if not later. However, the additional incentives mentioned above would remain. Nevertheless, in the worst-case scenario, Ukraine would have to accept a mere freezing of the front line as it then runs - probably only on its own territory and even further west than now. A quick solution for which the US and Europe pull together, possibly with the involvement of other parties, is therefore essential.

quote:

Oreshnik and Arrow 3: A Second Look

January 11, 2025

Seven weeks after the live test firing of the new Russian Oreshnik intermediate-range missile (NATO designation SS-X-34) at the industrial site of the Yuzhmash vehicle and space company in the southern Ukrainian city of Dnipro, the physical and political dust has settled. Although the mission publicly demonstrated the return of this type of weapon to Europe, long banned by the INF Treaty, on sober inspection it did not demonstrate any new capabilities. This is especially true when compared to the claims subsequently made by Russian President Vladimir Putin and pro-Russian propagandists. According to them, Oreshnik was the brand new development of an uninterceptable precision hypersonic missile. It supposedly turns its target into dust through kinetic action "like a meteorite". This was to be exactly what happened with the Yuzhmash plant.

In contrast, publicly available satellite images after the attack show no damage to the site that was not already caused by earlier hits with previous short-range missiles. Some members of the international open source intelligence (OSINT) community, however, claim to have spotted impacts from reentry vehicles or submunitions in a residential area up to one kilometer north of the site. These findings at least do not contradict available video recordings and the described mechanism of action. According to those, six independently controllable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), each with six impactors, were used in the attack, which hit at ten to eleven times the speed of sound.

Oreshnik is not Tunguska

In his description, Putin referred to the Tunguska meteorite, which in 1908 presumably devastated a forest area of over 2,000 square kilometers in Siberia, with signs of an explosion being seen over 500 kilometers away. If this theory is correct, it was however probably the breakup of a small asteroid or comet at an altitude of several kilometers. In other words, an air detonation with a corresponding pressure wave, but without a crater. In the case of Oreshnik, on the other hand, various calculations suggest that the impactors had a mass of 30 to 250 kilograms each. It is unclear whether these were the intended impactors, dummies for the test shot, or simply debris from the MIRVs.

Their kinetic energy would be considerable at an impact speed of Mach 10 to 11. But these would essentially be KE projectiles, the effect of which on the ground would depend largely on the shape and material properties of the impactor and the target. Deep penetration with an opening diameter more or less the size of the caliber, bursting on impact and/or various shapes and sizes of craters would be conceivable. Depending on the resolution, no major damage would then be visible on satellite images. However, the apocalyptic descriptions of Oreshnik's effect on the target are clearly not accurate.

A question of precision

This would still be an effective weapon against hardened, high-value targets such as bunkers, as the effects after penetrating layers of earth and structural reinforcements would also have to be considered. This would require targeting accuracy within a few meters, as is achieved by GPS or laser guidance, or intelligent optronic or radar target recognition. If it is true that Oreshnik impacts during the attack on Dnipro occurred up to 1,000 meters from the target, this would obviously not be the case. Precision guidance during the final approach is also unlikely due to the high impact speed.

The ionization effect of the surrounding air caused by frictional heat alone - which regularly leads to the interruption of radio communication with spacecraft during reentry into Earth's atmosphere - would significantly interfere with both optronic and radar- or satellite-based guidance. At best, inertial navigation is conceivable here. The 50 percent targeting accuracy (Circular Error Probable, CEP) of MIRVs is therefore usually in the range of 100 to 500 meters after they have been aligned and sent onto individual re-entry trajectories outside the atmosphere by the "bus" carrying them. This is sufficient for the use of nuclear warheads, but not for precision attacks on point targets with exclusively kinetic effects.

Hypersound is everywhere

This shows the dilemma of missiles referred to with the buzzword "hypersonic weapons". In fact, every ballistic missile with a range of more than a few hundred kilometers reaches hypersonic speeds of Mach 5 and more. In a narrower sense, however, the term refers to weapons that can also make radical course changes at such speeds and are therefore almost impossible to intercept with current means. This only applies to a limited extent to the often-mentioned Russian Iskander system and its air-launched variant Kinzhal. Although these can use the available propulsion energy to steer partially non-ballistic trajectories at less than their maximum range, the final approach is not hypersonic in order to achieve a target accuracy of five to seven meters.

The American intermediate-range missile Pershing II had similar capabilities in the 1970s, achieving a CEP of 30 meters with an imaging radar seeker after deceleration during re-entry into the atmosphere. Oreshnik, on the other hand, has so far demonstrated neither maneuverability in the ballistic phase nor precision in the final approach. The flight duration and the steep impact angle of the missiles suggest that the relatively short distance of just under 800 kilometers from the presumed launch site at the Kapustin Yar test site was reached by a conventional ballistic trajectory with a high apex. Images of recovered debris show a typical "bus" with fuel tanks and maneuvering nozzles for aligning the MIRVs before re-entry.

Nothing about Oreshnik is really new

Components with serial numbers from 2017 suggest that Oreshnik is not a recent, completely new development either, but rather comes from the Russian Kedr (Cedar) program for a modular missile system from the last decade. The aim was to be able to flexibly combine different propulsion stages and payloads for different purposes. Ultimately, it is therefore conventional technology that essentially used a launch vehicle for nuclear warheads to fire a kind of suborbital shotgun blast at a major city as a political demonstration. Neither the effect on the target nor the ability to assert itself against interception measures is revolutionary.

Nor is Oreshnik in series production yet. Since the attack on Dnipro, Ukraine has fired several other precision weapons supplied by Western countries into Russian territory. This was the declared reason for the demonstration of the missile, which was intended to serve as a deterrent. However, there has not been a further deployment so far. Putin himself has said that Oreshnik will enter service with the Russian missile troops in the second half of 2025. Then, in its function as an intermediate-range missile aimed at Europe, it will primarily face the US land- and sea-based Standard SM-3 interceptor missiles and the Israeli Arrow 3 system, which will then arrive in Germany.

Future German defense learns from the Houthis

Both types demonstrated their ability to counter intermediate-range missiles during the two massive Iranian attacks on Israel last year. The Israeli missile defense system still has to regularly prove itself against attacks by the Houthis from Yemen, who use Iranian missiles with a range of 2,000 kilometers and more (for comparison: the distance between the Oreshnik launch site in Kapustin Yar and Berlin is 2,300 kilometers). There is a constant learning curve in this. For example, Arrow 3 missed two incoming warheads shortly before Christmas. According to Israeli suspicions, these were a type from the Iranian Fattah family. This is equipped with a maneuverable warhead with additional propulsion, and is also described by Iran as a hypersonic weapon.

In fact, like Iskander, the type is likely to be capable of only a limited non-ballistic trajectory and would be slowed down below hypersonic speeds for precision guidance on the final approach. In any case, according to Israeli reports, a rapid upgrade of Arrow 3 at the end of December led to the weapon being successfully intercepted again, with a second warhead being destroyed on final approach by the American THAAD defense system. Non-maneuverable intermediate-range missiles such as Oreshnik remain vulnerable in any case in the phase between the burnout of the ascent stages with separation of the "bus" and the release of the reentry bodies. In this sense, Arrow 3 also shows potential for growth against possible future developments that could combine the range of Oreshnik with the limited maneuverability of Iskander. However, itremains important to prepare for the appearance of real hypersonic weapons.

quote:

Originally posted by reloader-1:
Slosig, that’s a chatbot. Already reported, look at prior posts by it.