quote:

Originally posted by RHINOWSO:
RIP Shipmates.

Yes. RIP. What young men take on as their duty is humbling.

It is partly why I wonder if some of the simplest things like putting more eyes outside, while maybe oversimplified, can't be done - at least in the interim.

If a ship constantly runs drills, why can't ship driving in busy traffic be drilled day in and day out on a simple computer?

quote:

Originally posted by Tubetone:

quote:

Originally posted by RHINOWSO:
RIP Shipmates.

Yes. RIP. What young men take on as their duty is humbling.

It is partly why I wonder if some of the simplest things like putting more eyes outside, while maybe oversimplified, can't be done.

We don't know how many eyes were outside.

The watch complement is adequate for all but the relatively rare, heretofore, incident. Standing watches takes away from other duties and requirements. Too few is a problem and so is too many.

For all we know Mark 1 Mod 0 eyeball users saw the ship and called it, as did radar and the bridge team mishandled it somehow. You're moving, several other ships are moving nearby, they are big and you don't know what their intentions are. They don't know yours. One guy makes an unanticipated change of course and speed and in the narrow confines if the passage, it turns into bumper boats before you know it.... at night. They ought to be able to handle it, and do nearly every time, but sometimes, things don't work out.

I wonder where the Captain was, if there was a steering problem as speculated elsewhere, did the lookouts do their job. Obviously someone did not, maybe several someones.

These things are hard to figure out. When I went to emergency ship handling school, we studied in great detail the collision of the Stockholm and the Andea Doria, the movements, commands, radar presentations. You would think it never should have happened, good equipment all working, experienced officers on the bridges, but it did. Some fog, too much speed, mistake interpreting radar, and smack! It was several minutes between the time they were in extremis, going to collide no matter what, and the collision.

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:

quote:

Originally posted by Tubetone:

quote:

Originally posted by RHINOWSO:
RIP Shipmates.

Yes. RIP. What young men take on as their duty is humbling.

It is partly why I wonder if some of the simplest things like putting more eyes outside, while maybe oversimplified, can't be done.

We don't know how many eyes were outside.

The watch complement is adequate for all but the relatively rare, heretofore, incident. Standing watches takes away from other duties and requirements. Too few is a problem and so is too many.

For all we know Mark 1 Mod 0 eyeball users saw the ship and called it, as did radar and the bridge team mishandled it somehow. You're moving, several other ships are moving nearby, they are big and you don't know what their intentions are. They don't know yours. One guy makes an unanticipated change of course and speed and in the narrow confines if the passage, it turns into bumper boats before you know it.... at night. They ought to be able to handle it, and do nearly every time, but sometimes, things don't work out.

I wonder where the Captain was, if there was a steering problem as speculated elsewhere, did the lookouts do their job. Obviously someone did not, maybe several someones.

These things are hard to figure out. When I went to emergency ship handling school, we studied in great detail the collision of the Stockholm and the Andea Doria, the movements, commands, radar presentations. You would think it never should have happened, good equipment all working, experienced officers on the bridges, but it did. Some fog, too much speed, mistake interpreting radar, and smack! It was several minutes between the time they were in extremis, going to collide no matter what, and the collision.

Being ignorant of such things, I thought there may be more to it.

I just didn't know if there was some military peril in having more eyes on deck. In that you have had training, more eyes may just add more confusion is what I take you to mean.

I guess everyone has had the experience of facing someone in a doorway and having a collision while misinterpreting the other's intention.

It is just that it has happened with two front-line nimble ships in such a short time that makes it seem as though some simple old fashioned approach should be available.

How hard would it be to run computer simulations for on board continuing training? Do they do that already?

Also, how far would a ship have to travel to detect a change of course from another's radar?

I guess there is a reason cars have turn signals.

quote:

Originally posted by Tubetone:

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:

quote:

Originally posted by Tubetone:

quote:

Originally posted by RHINOWSO:
RIP Shipmates.

Yes. RIP. What young men take on as their duty is humbling.

It is partly why I wonder if some of the simplest things like putting more eyes outside, while maybe oversimplified, can't be done.

We don't know how many eyes were outside.

The watch complement is adequate for all but the relatively rare, heretofore, incident. Standing watches takes away from other duties and requirements. Too few is a problem and so is too many.

For all we know Mark 1 Mod 0 eyeball users saw the ship and called it, as did radar and the bridge team mishandled it somehow. You're moving, several other ships are moving nearby, they are big and you don't know what their intentions are. They don't know yours. One guy makes an unanticipated change of course and speed and in the narrow confines if the passage, it turns into bumper boats before you know it.... at night. They ought to be able to handle it, and do nearly every time, but sometimes, things don't work out.

I wonder where the Captain was, if there was a steering problem as speculated elsewhere, did the lookouts do their job. Obviously someone did not, maybe several someones.

These things are hard to figure out. When I went to emergency ship handling school, we studied in great detail the collision of the Stockholm and the Andea Doria, the movements, commands, radar presentations. You would think it never should have happened, good equipment all working, experienced officers on the bridges, but it did. Some fog, too much speed, mistake interpreting radar, and smack! It was several minutes between the time they were in extremis, going to collide no matter what, and the collision.

Being ignorant of such things, I thought there may be more to it.

I just didn't know if there was some military peril in having more eyes on deck. In that you have had training, more eyes may just add more confusion is what I take you to mean.

I guess everyone has had the experience of facing someone in a doorway and having a collision while misinterpreting the other's intention.

It is just that it has happened with two front-line nimble ships in such a short time that makes it seem as though some simple old fashioned approach should be available.

How hard would it be to run computer simulations for on board continuing training? Do they do that already?

Also, how far would a ship have to travel to detect a change of course from another's radar?

I guess there is a reason cars have turn signals.

There is some computer simulation training, but I suspect it is not basic seamanship, etc. War gaming stuff more likely.

quote:

Originally posted by RHINOWSO:

quote:

I presume one of this type of Navy ship should be able to turn, stop and reverse much more quickly - if it only knew.

Correct, a DDG is much more maneuverable than a large freighter. And they typically have many more people on duty throughout the ship, although I don't know the exact specifics / numbers / etc.

But it seems that in the recent collisions, a loss of situational awareness (what is around my ship), possibly coupled with improper seamanship, made those performance characteristics unimportant. Because if you can't see something, you can't avoid it.

RIP Shipmates.

I also believe it was awareness lacking and training. My ship was bigger and slower and I knew it probably would have evaded if Right or Left flank speed was engaged.

I think we had on the bridge, 2 on watch,a radarman, helmsman and an OOD and possible one more and this was at night, more during the day.
I went to Damage Control School and there is nothing going to help with a gash that big. You can't DC a hole that big. Just contain it.

CHANGI NAVAL BASE, Republic of Singapore – U.S Navy and Marine Corps divers recovered and identified remains of 26-year-old USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) Sailor, Electronics Technician 3rd Class Dustin Louis Doyon, of Connecticut, on Thursday night.

More divers and equipment arrived overnight to continue search and recovery operations for eight missing Sailors inside flooded compartments of the ship.

Earlier Thursday, divers recovered the remains of 22-year-old Electronics Technician 3rd Class Kenneth Aaron Smith from New Jersey.

quote:

Originally posted by SeaCliff:


I think we had on the bridge, 2 on watch,a radarman, helmsman and an OOD and possible one more and this was at night, more during the day.
I went to Damage Control School and there is nothing going to help with a gash that big. You can't DC a hole that big. Just contain it.

A destroyer watch in my day, ~50 years ago, might have an OOD, a JOOD, a helmsman and lee helmsman, a quartermaster of the watch, a bosun mate of the watch, a sound powered phone talker or two, one talking to CIC, several lookouts around the ship, signalmen on the signal bridge behind the bridge, at least one radioman and probably 2, if available, plus a couple of non rated messenger/strikers, a couple of radarmen and another officer in CIC plus a status board/phone talker. More during the day, or in special situations, underway replenishment, GQ, special sea and anchor detail, etc.

if we ever hear the details of DDG 56 track and what the CIC/Bridge were dealing with, it may be that the ship TEAM OSLO will play a big part in the actions of DDG 56.

Looking at the collision point of DDG 56 and ALNIC, and looking back at the OSLO track, OSLO may have come within 200 yards of DDG 56 prior to the collision. That's close.

DDG 56 may have gotten trapped between OSLO on DDG 56 starboard side and ALNIC on DDG 56 port side.

This message has been edited. Last edited by: sdy,

quote:

Originally posted by Tubetone:

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:

quote:

Originally posted by Tubetone:

quote:

Originally posted by RHINOWSO:
RIP Shipmates.

Yes. RIP. What young men take on as their duty is humbling.

It is partly why I wonder if some of the simplest things like putting more eyes outside, while maybe oversimplified, can't be done.

We don't know how many eyes were outside.

The watch complement is adequate for all but the relatively rare, heretofore, incident. Standing watches takes away from other duties and requirements. Too few is a problem and so is too many.

For all we know Mark 1 Mod 0 eyeball users saw the ship and called it, as did radar and the bridge team mishandled it somehow. You're moving, several other ships are moving nearby, they are big and you don't know what their intentions are. They don't know yours. One guy makes an unanticipated change of course and speed and in the narrow confines if the passage, it turns into bumper boats before you know it.... at night. They ought to be able to handle it, and do nearly every time, but sometimes, things don't work out.

I wonder where the Captain was, if there was a steering problem as speculated elsewhere, did the lookouts do their job. Obviously someone did not, maybe several someones.

These things are hard to figure out. When I went to emergency ship handling school, we studied in great detail the collision of the Stockholm and the Andea Doria, the movements, commands, radar presentations. You would think it never should have happened, good equipment all working, experienced officers on the bridges, but it did. Some fog, too much speed, mistake interpreting radar, and smack! It was several minutes between the time they were in extremis, going to collide no matter what, and the collision.

Being ignorant of such things, I thought there may be more to it.

I just didn't know if there was some military peril in having more eyes on deck. In that you have had training, more eyes may just add more confusion is what I take you to mean.

I guess everyone has had the experience of facing someone in a doorway and having a collision while misinterpreting the other's intention.

It is just that it has happened with two front-line nimble ships in such a short time that makes it seem as though some simple old fashioned approach should be available.

How hard would it be to run computer simulations for on board continuing training? Do they do that already?

Also, how far would a ship have to travel to detect a change of course from another's radar?

I guess there is a reason cars have turn signals.

The radar observer on the destroyer should have been able to track all 3 ships simultaneously and with AIS it's relatively easy. As far as I know destroyers run a dedicated radar observer whose sole job is monitoring the radar the entire time they're underway. It displays each ships course over ground and speed along with it's heading line on it, right on most all radar displays on each target (ship showing on the radar). It also would show a ships change of course almost immediately. Even if a radar is tuned poorly (which it should not on a commercial ship or navy ship) it is almost impossible to not see a freighter on a radar screen, it creates a huge mark/target on the screen. All commercial ships over 500 GT are required to have and broadcast AIS data anytime they're underway. However, the radar user could turn these safety features off if they chose to do so. The only time I have ever done so, is in a VERY crowded harbor in daylight, when the headings and info creates a clusterfuk all over the screen.

You can also set up an EBL and VRM line on each target and determine if they're going to pass in front of or behind you, or if they're going away from you on each target/ship. This is also not very difficult to do.

NOW, if there truly was a steering issue, why wouldn't they alert the 3 ships to alter course to go around the destroyer, and turn on their AIS to alert other ships they're there, and turn on all of the deck lights so they could be seen. I just don't understand that if there truly was a steering issue, they didn't take any precaution measures to alert the other ships.

When I'm running a yacht at night, I never pass a moving freighter in open water in less than a mile distance. I contact them at 3 NM's out or about 20 minutes out and confirm they see me, confirm their intentions etc. and ask them if they would like me to maintain course and speed or change my heading. At night I never travel faster than 12 knots, and usually more around 10 knots or less. In the daytime sure, I'll pass within 1/2 a mile or less of them (down the side or across their stern, NEVER the bow).

The freighter is at the disadvantage of detecting the destroyer. The destroyer is not broadcasting AIS, they are also purposefully designed so radar does not pick them up easily, and at night they usually run dark ship (no lights or only red lights which don't show very far at night) with only their navigational lights showing. The destroyers I've seen at night are very hard to see from the stern due to their single stern light and smoke from the engines or their stern flag sometimes partially obstructing your view of the stern light.

Here is a radar screen for example, but could put speed on each vessel in the settings
http://images.boats.com/resize...Channel-crossing.jpg

Here is the explanation of the differences in the targets you see on the radar, and how you can see when they turn etc.
http://www.furuno.com/img/prev...rpaz_ais_img_002.jpg

Jimmy, you are a real hoot.

You realize that the radar consoles on Navy warships are not items you can just saunter down to West Marine and plop your plastic on the counter to buy. There are many more functions and capabilities, plus they are tied in with fire control. A Navy warship generally will have several radarmen on watch in Combat Information Center, supervised by a senior enlisted rating and/or a commissioned officer 24/7 when underway. The rating name was changed to Operation Specialist. Each will have graduated from the "A" training school to start and more training as they move up"

Here is a description of their duties and capabilities. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wik..._(United_States_Navy)

What you do on privately owned yachts has almost no bearing on the operations on a Navy warship.

To be fair Jallen, they both float.

quote:

Originally posted by Fenris:
To be fair Jallen, they both float.

On good days, when everyone is at the top of their game.

A 777 and a TBM 900 both fly.

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:

quote:

Originally posted by Fenris:
To be fair Jallen, they both float.

On good days, when everyone is at the top of their game.

A 777 and a TBM 900 both fly.

See. You get my point.

None of us know what really happened, and I suspect we never will. Most bureaucracies are quite good at white washing over their problems. I doubt the Navy lacks in this particular department.

Thus each of us is bring our own experiences (and learning) to bear speculating on these events. Because speculating is fun.

Heck, I compared it to teaching a 16 year old how to drive. Which may be quite apt actually.

Something is definitely wrong. Four time in as many months is four times too often. My 16 year old doesn't get into that many accidents.

I pray they figure this out. Quickly.

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:
The destroyer is not broadcasting AIS, they are also purposefully designed so radar does not pick them up easily, and at night they usually run dark ship (no lights or only red lights which don't show very far at night) with only their navigational lights showing. The destroyers I've seen at night are very hard to see from the stern due to their single stern light and smoke from the engines or their stern flag sometimes partially obstructing your view of the stern light.

It will be interesting to read the MR and see if the McCain was running in a darken ship configuration in the Straits of Malacca at night. I'm not a boat driver by trade, but that would seem either incredibly unlikely or incredibly stupid.

This article was originally published in 2008 but is greatly relevant today considering the recent accidents with the Fitzgerald and the McCain.

Separate But Equal – A Look At Officer Training In The US Navy And Merchant Marine
August 22, 2017 by Editorial


USS-Fitzgerald-Unrep-MSC-Tanker
Sailors aboard the Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) pull in a fuel line on the ship’s forecastle during a fueling-at-sea with Military Sealift Command (MSC) fleet replenishment oiler USNS John Ericsson (T-AO 194). U.S. Navy photo taken in 2014 by Beverly J. Lesonik

This article originally appeared in the January 2008 publication of the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings and is republished now in the wake of the recent collisions involving the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain.

The Navy needs to focus on line officer specialization now more than ever.

By Captain John K. Hafner – It is a calm, cool evening in a remote stretch of the Mediterranean. Far from busy shipping lanes and scattered fleets of fishing boats, two ships prepare to rendezvous and conduct underway replenishment operations. One is a U.S. Navy destroyer, the other, a large Military Sealift Command (MSC) oiler. Both ships come into visual range, and soon the destroyer is in position on the starboard quarter of the oiler, awaiting the signal to come alongside.

The signal is given, and in short order the commanding officer of the destroyer brings his vessel alongside the oiler, matching her speed and maintaining a prescribed distance off abreast. The crews on both ships are well practiced in this drill and know the choreography required to make the evolution happen quickly and safely.

The decks of both ships are a flurry of activity, as crew members scramble in the glare of artificial light to rig lines and hoses between the two moving vessels. After a few tense minutes, the lines and hoses have been passed, connected, and the operation is under way.

This evolution is familiar to anyone who has gone to sea with the U.S. Navy or MSC, and an outside observer would not be faulted for assuming that these ships have much in common. Both are, after all, steaming side-by-side with a common goal, struggling to maintain the exact same course and speed, and both share a narrow, precarious gap between them. Between these two vessels, however, is a vast metaphorical gap, especially with regard to the organization, training, and experience levels of the officers who man them.

Managers or Specialists?

The destroyer, a powerful, complex warship of the latest design, is of course manned by Navy personnel, a large crew of officers and highly specialized petty officers and chief petty officers whose job it is to operate and maintain the myriad different systems found on board a modern warship. The MSC oiler, also a ship of the latest design, is manned by professional (civilian) mariners and is organized more along the lines of a merchant vessel, with designated deck and engineering officers.

Both vessels have deck and engineering departments that work closely together to keep the ship operating. They are, however, managed very differently from each other. On the destroyer the officers are not specialized seafarers, engineers, weaponeers, etc. and as such are rotated through various departments and jobs in the course of their careers. On the MSC ship there is only vertical movement between jobs, and although there are fewer departments, there is no lateral crossover between them. The officers who work on the bridge have been trained from the beginning of their careers to be deck officers, with the same being true for the engineers. This type of specialization within the officer ranks is typical on merchant vessels, as well as in many foreign navies, and allows the vessel to operate with much smaller officer complements.

The benefits of this type of system are obvious, with the captain generally regarded as the best seaman on the ship — literally a master mariner — and the chief engineer considered the most capable engineer on board and the expert on all things mechanical. This is no hollow boast, as merchant ships don’t have CPOs with expertise in specific areas. The officers on board the MSC oiler have separate career paths but are equal in rank and pay as they move up their respective ladders.


MSC-Chief-Engineer-USNS-Comfort
Specialized Career Path – Unlike their U.S. Navy counterparts, engineering officers in Military Sealift Command have been trained exclusively as engineers from their first days as Merchant Marine cadets. Here, Douglas puritis (left), chief engineer on board the Military Sealift Command hospital ship USNS Comfort (T-Ah-20), shows Admiral James Stavridis, commander of U.S. Southern Command, the ship’s engineering spaces while anchored off the coast of haiti in September 2007.

Officer Comparisons

The CO of our destroyer is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, holds the rank of commander, and has had a typical naval career. He spent his early years after graduation at various schools and at sea qualifying as a surface warfare officer. The ensuing years were spent rotating be- tween sea and shore assignments with the ultimate goal of screening for command. He spent the last six years before taking command of the destroyer in required staff and joint assignments ashore — three years as part of a destroyer/cruiser squadron staff, and three more working at the Pentagon.

Ironically, the demands placed on him to reach this point in his career left him ill-prepared to head directly back to sea or face the unforgiving, fluid decision-making environment into which he was thrust. Instead of relying on experience to guide him, initially, he was completely dependent on the expertise and training of his officers and crew.

Presently, he is at the tail end of an 18-month assignment as CO afloat and is wrapping up a six-month deployment, which took him to the Persian Gulf and various Mediterranean ports in support of U.S. operations in the region. At this point he is becoming comfortable and confident with his position, his ship, and his crew, and with a little bit of luck the trip back to Norfolk will be uneventful. Shortly thereafter he will hand over command to his successor, and a new CO cycle will begin on this ship.

The master (CO) of the MSC oiler is a graduate of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, a Coast Guard-licensed master mariner (any gross tons) as well as a commander in the Navy Reserve, and she too has had a pretty typical career for someone in her position. As a cadet, she spent her sea year on board a number of different merchant vessels, as well as an MSC oiler, and went to sea shortly after graduation. Unlike her counterpart on the destroyer, however, who worked in various departments on board different ships and ashore, the master of the oiler has spent her entire career on tankers as a deck officer, with many of those years spent as chief mate (XO) on board the very ship she now commands. The chief engineer of the oiler has also spent his entire career with MSC working in the engine department and is a licensed chief engineer. He, too, has been trained exclusively as an engineer from his first days as a Merchant Marine cadet.

Careerist Focus

Much has been made lately of the perceived lack of basic seamanship and shiphandling skills within the U.S. Navy’s line officer communities. This is not so much a reflection of the quality of people the Navy is attracting as it is an indictment of our system of line officer organization that has been in place for more than a century. Lack of specialization within the Navy’s officer corps is at the root of this problem.

Historically, the Navy has strived to produce line officers who are well-rounded generalists whose ultimate goal is command at sea. This is done by rotating them through many different shipboard and shore assignments to expose them to all aspects of the job/vessel/Navy and, just as important, to get their “ticket punched” to be competitive for promotion. This system does in fact result in a well-rounded officer, albeit one whose primary focus is on career, not on becoming a competent seafarer. As vessels become more complex, though, the issue of officers lacking the requisite seagoing experience to command a vessel at sea becomes more acute.

The reason for this is due in no small measure to the fact that the U.S. Navy is different from the world’s seagoing organizations (military, governmental, or commercial) because we do not have separate, defined career paths for seagoing line officers. As such, instead of producing savvy, competent warfighting seafarers, engineers, or weaponeers, we often end up with the generalist/careerist who is concerned primarily with arriving at a 20-year retirement without any bumps in the road. Command at sea is not always viewed as the attainment of a worthy goal but rather a crapshoot to see if you can go 18 months without a career-ruining mishap.

Our warships are the most complicated vessels afloat, and we are trying to run them with officers brought up in a hopelessly outdated organizational paradigm. Not all engineers, however competent, aspire to command at sea, nor do all (afloat) COs need, or care, to know the minutiae of their propulsion plants. So why are we trying to mold these officers into something they’re not?

This concept of line officer specialization is not new; we need only to look at similar organizations to see how a system with separate career specialties for line officers can work. It works every day in Military Sealift Com- mand, on merchant ships, and in numerous other navies throughout the world.

Commander Hafner is a licensed master mariner, and has sailed with the Merchant Marine for 20 years, the last three as master of a trans- atlantic, liner-service and roll-on/roll-off vessel. He is currently Vice President, Seafarer Manning & Training at International Registries, in affiliation with the Marshall Islands Maritime and Corporate Registries

This article originally appeared in the January 2008 publication of the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings and has been republished with the permission of the author.

Link

As much as I have some sympathy for the views in that article, I hasten to remind that in none of the cases we are handwringing over has it been established that the fault was that of the ship Captain, or even of the ship, except to the extent the rules of the road impose a duty on both ships to do whatever they can to avoid a collision.

The problem may be one of having to trust officers you don't know well, very little chance to determine who is a clown and who is a cowboy in terms of experience, reliability, judgment, etc., the quality my flying instructor once defined as "the habitual exercise of sound judgment." Command at sea is an enormous responsibility, for everything that affects the ship.

Driving a ship isn't rocket science, but does require a thorough grounding in rules of the road, handling metrics of the ship, sea states, wind, etc.

quote:

Originally posted by Balzé Halzé:
This article was originally published in 2008 but is greatly relevant today considering the recent accidents with the Fitzgerald and the McCain.

Separate But Equal – A Look At Officer Training In The US Navy And Merchant Marine
August 22, 2017 by Editorial

Very interesting article and it makes good points. My only question would be that combat ships may very well take casualties. By having officers competent to take on other roles in the event of an emergency or casualties it would seem that it makes the ship more resilient. On the other hand, I see the point that having specialists makes for better seamanship.

The only civilian equivalent I can relate to this is back in the 90's a lot of large companies went thru a phase where the mantra was that if a manager can manage a department making widgets, they should be able to manage a department of accountants.

It was a total disaster. I was stuck for a few years working under a person in an IT department who had zero IT knowledge. She had been an 'assistant to' a high ranking VP and was sent to get her 'manager' ticket punched. It was a miserable failure that had to be endured for a couple of years until she could be kicked upstairs for another promotion.

Just because you are good at managing A does not mean you can manage B.

1. Lack of adequate seamanship/ship-handling training and experience.
2. Loss of situational awareness. (see item 1)

The end.

I've been up working 18 hours. Harvey has thrown quite a kink into my 28 day hitch. Please forgive my bluntness.

And this crap doesn't help:
http://dailycaller.com/2017/03...d-its-getting-worse/

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:
Jimmy, you are a real hoot.

You realize that the radar consoles on Navy warships are not items you can just saunter down to West Marine and plop your plastic on the counter to buy. There are many more functions and capabilities, plus they are tied in with fire control. A Navy warship generally will have several radarmen on watch in Combat Information Center, supervised by a senior enlisted rating and/or a commissioned officer 24/7 when underway. The rating name was changed to Operation Specialist. Each will have graduated from the "A" training school to start and more training as they move up"

Here is a description of their duties and capabilities. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wik..._(United_States_Navy)

What you do on privately owned yachts has almost no bearing on the operations on a Navy warship.

Yeah, and we DON'T get run over by freighters!!!!!!!!!! Can you imagine that??????

The radar observer is the nautical term for the actual person whose job is to run and observe the radar, whatever title in the Navy you want to give that same person is irrelevant

Well the Navy might as well have bought the radar at KMART and used one of the cashiers to watch it, because if these radarmen on watch in the informational control room cannot detect that a ship larger than 3-4 football fields long is going to hit them. That's about as good as they are.

Any normal laymen that's halfway trained on radar.....and I mean a 2 day class, would be able to detect that a freighter is on a collision course with them, and going to hit them, with a properly functioning radar that was built and installed in 1985. What I am trying to say in most normal of terms, is anyone that is half ass trained on radar with the most basic of marine radars, could detect that a freighter is on a collision course and going to hit them. So what is the navy's excuse with all this technology????

I can tell you this much. The Sperry Console someone posted that they installed in 2008 and are retrofitting these ships with for navigation in these ships....the chartplotter and everything else they use at the helm for navigation. It's obsolete garbage we long threw out in the yachting industry and the technology has been obsolete for about 7 years. You couldn't give that navigational console to a yacht owner for free. The ECDIS navigational system mandatory on that freighter is decades ahead of it in technology.

I don't run 30' boats around. I run multi million dollar yachts where it's very common to have $250,000 of the latest and greatest electronics installed.....FLIR nightvision, top of the line radars, satellite weather, satellite internet, chartplotters, sonars etc. Some of it is derived from the military. A lot of it is sold to us and tested in our field BEFORE it is used in the military. The problem with the military is it takes many years to get new items approved, and a lot of times in electronics there is a huge jump in technology in that time period.

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:
As much as I have some sympathy for the views in that article, I hasten to remind that in none of the cases we are handwringing over has it been established that the fault was that of the ship Captain, or even of the ship, except to the extent the rules of the road impose a duty on both ships to do whatever they can to avoid a collision.

The problem may be one of having to trust officers you don't know well, very little chance to determine who is a clown and who is a cowboy in terms of experience, reliability, judgment, etc., the quality my flying instructor once defined as "the habitual exercise of sound judgment." Command at sea is an enormous responsibility, for everything that affects the ship.

Driving a ship isn't rocket science, but does require a thorough grounding in rules of the road, handling metrics of the ship, sea states, wind, etc.

Avoiding a collision is one of the MAIN duties of a ship Captain. As a ship Captain, you are responsible for the safety of your crew and the safety of your ship and passangers (if you have them). That is pretty much rule #1. Everything that happens on that ship and every ship, is the responsibility of the Captain.

The BOTTOM LINE is a NAVY destroyer, shouldn't let ANY ship or boat within a mile of it. It's a Navy destroyer after all and any ship within close proximity should be treated as a threat. They should be 100% aware of their surroundings and surrounding ships at ALL TIMES. They're a destroyer!!!!!!!!!
You're failing to estimate (in typical Navy fashion) how crucial and how dangerous navigating (driving) a ship really is. You could turn a destroyer into complete unrebuildable junk if you run it aground at cruise speed in a timeline of about 30 seconds flat.

There aren't Cowboys in the Merchant Marine side of things, because they get weeded out verrrrrrrrry quickly.

It has EVERYTHING to do with these accidents. Merchant Mariners do not spend years on shore duty then years on ship duty, then back to shore duty then back to ship duty. Think of a heart surgeon, would you trust a heart surgeon who took a 4 year leave on vacation and came back to work and you're his first patient. Or would you prefer a heart surgeon who has been doing heart surgery exclusively the past 16 years straight?

On a merchant marine ship. The Captain has started in the deck department, worked himself up to first officer and then became Captain. Once he has become Captain, he has been Captain of a ship year after year after year. He hasn't been lolly gagging at a base for 4 years and forgotten half of which he learned. He has been practicing his knowledge day after day, year after year, for decades. His decisions are almost second nature, because he has been making them day after day for years.

If driving a ship isn't rocket science, how has the Navy had 4 major accidents in 4 months. Obviously there is something seriously wrong in their training and methods. Schooling only teaches you so much. The problem with schooling is it teaches you the methods, but does not teach you how to react to those methods in the heat of the moment.

It's very similar to Scully. All of the FAA testers at first said he was at fault, they all landed the plane at the airport on the flight simulator, BUT, they knew the scenario BEFORE they got behind the flight simulator. They forgot to react or even figure in the human element. They didn't take the time to go through the engine restart checklist. They forgot to try to take the time to restart the airplane, go through the decision making process, once that was factored in, they then realized that getting the plane safely to the airport was impossible and he made the right decision. Why did they forget all of this, because they haven't flown an actual plane in years. BUT, Scully is a Captain that has been flying for decades, with no breaks in his career, not teaching in a classroom for the past 5 or so years.

I'm going to conclude this by saying, if you're in a smaller, much nimbler, much faster, much more maneuverable ship, with a heck of a lot more crew on watch, getting hit by a cargo freighter is going to be partially your fault in almost any collision.

If you look at the AIS, two ships overtook the ALNIC. I can guarantee that all 3 ships were in VHF radio contact and the 2 overtaking ships discussed their intentions with the ALNIC, both overtaking vessels executed their maneuvers without issues at a safe distance from the ALNIC and this is standard procedure on the Merchant Marine side of things.

Being a Captain of a ship, you cannot take a 4 year break off of the water and then go right back to running a ship. You forget a lot of things, you honestly really have to work at it to be proficient again. Some things are like second nature, but a lot of things you have to relearn, you have to have them become second nature.