wanted to add a note about the 4 pictures above from the Vessel Finder video.

The part that is very confusing to me is "where was DDG 56 ?"

From comparing diff parts of the video where distance measurements can be made, I think the purple box is about 530 yards wide. That is a rough estimate but gives a scale to make some educated guesses.

Look at picture 4 and think about where DDG 56 had to be at the collision. Next go back and look at the path of TEAM OSLO. OSLO must also have come very close to DDG 56.

Did neither OSLO or ALNIC detect DDG 56 ?

Am assuming it was still dark. Collision time of 524am (local) with sunrise at 7am.

http://www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/...ilors-as-search-and/

CHANGI NAVAL BASE, Republic of Singapore – After more than 80 hours of multinational search efforts, the U.S. Navy suspended search and rescue efforts for missing USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) Sailors in an approximately 2,100-square mile area east of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

Ten Sailors went missing following a collision between the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer and the Liberian-flagged merchant vessel Alnic MC Aug. 21.

U.S. Navy and Marine Corps divers will continue search and recovery efforts inside flooded compartments in the ship for the missing Sailors.

The divers recovered the remains of one Sailor, confirmed as: Electronics Technician 3rd Class Kenneth Aaron Smith, 22, from Cherry Hill, New Jersey.

Still missing are:

Electronics Technician 1st Class Charles Nathan Findley, 31, from Amazonia, Missouri

Interior Communications Electrician 1st Class Abraham Lopez, 39, from El Paso, Texas

Electronics Technician 2nd Class Kevin Sayer Bushell, 26, from Gaithersburg, Maryland

Electronics Technician 2nd Class Jacob Daniel Drake, 21, from Cable, Ohio

Information Systems Technician 2nd Class Timothy Thomas Eckels Jr., 23, from Manchester, Maryland

Information Systems Technician 2nd Class Corey George Ingram, 28, from Poughkeepsie, New York

Electronics Technician 3rd Class Dustin Louis Doyon, 26, from Suffield, Connecticut

Electronics Technician 3rd Class John Henry Hoagland III, 20, from Killeen, Texas

Interior Communications Electrician 3rd Class Logan Stephen Palmer, 23, from Decatur, Illinois

Multinational search efforts included ships and aircraft from the Republic of Singapore Navy, Singapore Air Force, Singapore Maritime Port Authority, Singapore Police Coast Guard, Royal Malaysian Navy, Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, Indonesian Navy and Royal Australian Air Force.

***************

also:

CHANGI NAVAL BASE, Republic of Singapore - The remains found by the Royal Malaysian Navy are not those of a USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) Sailor. On Aug. 22, the RMN discovered the remains while searching the area where the guided-missile destroyer collided with a merchant vessel.

The determination was made following medical examinations of the remains, which will be returned to Malaysian authorities.

OE berthing.

Article in Naval Institute online points to lack of training for surface warfare officers over the last 15 years, since the closing of the year long Surface Warfare school. An entire generation of officers with minimal ship driving skills and a new generatiin of college grads with a shocking over reliance on and infallible trust in technical aids.

Https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/

Article is Collisions: Part I - What Are the Root Causes?

I wonder how much money the US Navy saved shutting down the school vs repairing these badly damaged ships. Maybe the green eye shade boys should start looking at both sides of the equation.

I mean seriously, think how much time and money we would save as a nation if we stopped teaching 16 year olds how to drive. Just toss them the keys and tell 'em to watch YouTube videos. They are the connected generation, right?

quote:

Originally posted by rekstrom:
Article in Naval Institute online points to lack of training for surface warfare officers over the last 15 years, since the closing of the year long Surface Warfare school. An entire generation of officers with minimal ship driving skills and a new generatiin of college grads with a shocking over reliance on and infallible trust in technical aids.

Https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/

Article is Collisions: Part I - What Are the Root Causes?

quote:

In 2003, SWOSDOC was shuttered, largely for financial reasons, but also in a mistaken attempt to create efficiencies. SWOSDOC was replaced by computer-based training (CBT). Instead of attending SWOS and associated billet specialty programs for upward of 12-14 months of rigorous training prior to reporting on board their first ships, new officers went directly from commissioning sources to their ships with only a packet of computer disks. Now it was incumbent on the ship’s CO to replace a year’s worth of intensive dawn-to-dusk training, in addition to his or her other considerable responsibilities.

As has been referenced previously... sigh...

This is all really quite shocking. I thought basic ship maneuvering in trafficked waters would be a 101 type of requirement.

I know nothing about navigating a ship on the seas but I always thought the two first principles were 1) don't run aground and 2) don't run into things.

I was informed that the Air Force prioritizes the need to fly the plane in its training.

A friend of mine who was an instructor pilot once told me that a key part of training is giving a pilot all kinds of problems to solve to distract him/her as well as the co-pilot while adding basic flying problems from wind, gauge clues and etc. to teach the pilots to keep their priorities straight.

It does not matter if you fix the small hydraulic problem if you fly the plane apart.

I thought that kind of priority training was universal.

From a plain ole' citizen's point of view, what good is all that bristling weaponry if it is in dry dock or at the bottom for want of basic maneuvering skills?

I've seen unsubstantiated conjecture about maybe some cyber intrusion so I hope the Navy gets to solving the problem. It is not reassuring about our readiness.

quote:

Originally posted by Fenris:
I mean seriously, think how much time and money we would save as a nation if we stopped teaching 16 year olds how to drive. Just toss them the keys and tell 'em to watch YouTube videos. They are the connected generation, right?

Just think how much time and money we would save as a nation if we stopped ALLOWING 16 year olds to drive.

flashguy

http://www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/...-watch-standing-fun/

YOKOSUKA, Japan – Sailors assigned to U.S. 7th Fleet ships forward-deployed to Fleet Activities Yokosuka participated in the U.S. Navy’s operational pause Aug. 23.

The operational pause was directed by Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson Aug. 22 in response to recent operational incidents in the western Pacific. Adm. Scott Swift, commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, discussed the operational pause during a visit to Singapore this week.

“Each command will take a full work-day dedicated to this operational pause,” said Swift. “I expect this pause to be led by each of you with full participation by the chain of command. There can be no bystanders. Bystanders become weak links and need extra attention and leadership. During this pause, focus on fundamentals – both individual and team.”

In Yokosuka, commanding officers, officers, chiefs and watchstanders participated in the operational pause, led by instructors from Afloat Training Group Western Pacific. Topics included bridge resource management, communications, radar fundamentals, operational risk management and case studies of previous maritime incidents.

Rear Adm. Charles Williams, commander, Battle Force 7th Fleet, Task Force 70, Carrier Strike Group 5, stressed the importance of constantly refining technical proficiency and operational readiness.

“In the Pacific, every aspect of our training and operations support our preparedness for winning a challenging high end fight,” said Swift. “Per my Commander's Guidance, when called upon, our mission ultimately is to decisively prevail in all contingencies from war to peace. We cannot complete this mission without first mastering – and continually re-mastering – the basics of our profession.”

U.S. 7th Fleet is the largest of the U.S. Navy's forward ­deployed fleets. At any given time there are roughly 50-­70 ships and submarines, 140 aircraft, and approximately 20,000 Sailors in the region. Seventh Fleet’s area of operation spans more than 124 million square kilometers, stretching from the International Date Line to the India/Pakistan border; and from the Kuril Islands in the North to the Antarctic in the South.


*****************

diff topic - the US Naval Institute article referenced in above posts has the ring of truth to it. Definitely addresses "What Are the Root Causes?"

quote:

Originally posted by Tubetone:

I've seen unsubstantiated conjecture about maybe some cyber intrusion so I hope the Navy gets to solving the problem. It is not reassuring about our readiness.

I don't buy the 'cyber intrusion' thing. It smells like the Navy trying to cast blame ANYWHERE ELSE other than at themselves.

This sounds like a training deficiency problem, IMO.

Hound Dog,

I can see why cyber intrusion would be a preferable explanation to driver's ed.

Why nimble fighting ships keep getting run over by lumbering, plodding cargo ships obviously invites a question or two.

430 US navy vessels, and over 51,000 merchant marine vessels all plying the same water. If the navy runs into another navy vessel, now we got ourselves a party!

Does anyone know if putting out even a dozen constant deck watches with binoculars along all sides of a ship would somehow be dangerous or unworkable?

Why couldn't they do that if there is congested traffic and calm seas?

quote:

Originally posted by Stlhead:
430 US navy vessels, and over 51,000 merchant marine vessels all plying the same water. If the navy runs into another navy vessel, now we got ourselves a party!

If you had paid attention, you would know a professional mariner with decades of experience and training has assured us that there are a billion merchant ships out there.

quote:

Originally posted by Tubetone:
Hound Dog,

I can see why cyber intrusion would be a preferable explanation to driver's ed.

Why nimble fighting ships keep getting run over by lumbering, plodding cargo ships obviously invites a question or two.

Sure, it would be a *preferable* explanation for the Navy. If it's hacking or some other external interference, it's an external issue. If it's a training deficiency (replacing a year+ in-depth hands-on course for a handful of DVDs, for example), then the fault lies with Navy leadership.

I don't know enough about current or past Navy ops to be able to really make an informed or credible guess at this point, but I've seen the way the military has been trending over the past couple decades (emphasis on gender tolerance, sexual harassment Death By Powerpoint, political correctness run amok, etc), and I can easily believe it's a systemic training issue.

quote:

Originally posted by stoic-one:

quote:

Originally posted by rekstrom:
Article in Naval Institute online points to lack of training for surface warfare officers over the last 15 years, since the closing of the year long Surface Warfare school. An entire generation of officers with minimal ship driving skills and a new generatiin of college grads with a shocking over reliance on and infallible trust in technical aids.

Https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/

Article is Collisions: Part I - What Are the Root Causes?

quote:

In 2003, SWOSDOC was shuttered, largely for financial reasons, but also in a mistaken attempt to create efficiencies. SWOSDOC was replaced by computer-based training (CBT). Instead of attending SWOS and associated billet specialty programs for upward of 12-14 months of rigorous training prior to reporting on board their first ships, new officers went directly from commissioning sources to their ships with only a packet of computer disks. Now it was incumbent on the ship’s CO to replace a year’s worth of intensive dawn-to-dusk training, in addition to his or her other considerable responsibilities.

As has been referenced previously... sigh...

This is a large part of it. But there is also no substitute for helm time and days at sea in a deck/officers position when it comes to experience. Most experienced merchant mariners can plot a new course on the fly, determine a ships bearing visually, and many other factors without using electronic aids to do so. On the merchant marine side of things, your license level is based on sea time (8 hour days or more at sea) and what tonnage you got that sea time on.

For the most basic of licenses you would need 360 days at sea. To be the master of one of these freighters you would have to have several thousand days at sea on similar sized vessels. In addition to a lot of class time. But basically you have to keep graduating license (tonnage) sizes and acquire so much sea time at each tonnage size. For example the largest license you could get to start would be 100 ton master (about a 70' yacht), then can jump to either 200 or 500 GT, then 1600 then unlimited master. It is not totally without fault though, I have seen chefs on mega yachts get captains licenses from time acquired standing in their galley.

quote:

Originally posted by Tubetone:
Does anyone know if putting out even a dozen constant deck watches with binoculars along all sides of a ship would somehow be dangerous or unworkable?

Why couldn't they do that if there is congested traffic and calm seas?

It is doable and possible. But really at night, they should be able to run 100% off of radar when it comes to seeing other ships and avoiding collision and this boils down to 1 person tuning and watching the radar. Another person at the helm to see visually. Many times by the time someone visually would see and confirm another ship bearing down on them at night, it's generally too late to react. Keep in mind many of these loaded freighters take 6-8 miles to come to a complete stop from cruise speed.

All of these giant freighters generally run a crew on watch of 2 for all navigational aspects at night. A captain OR first officer and a simple AB or ordinary seaman to watch /stand lookout They will have an engineer and possibly others on duty below deck, but for navigational operation purposes they'll generally only have 2 on duty. 3 at most. These giant freighters generally run with a crew of maximum 32 to run 24/7, and some with as little as 16 total crew, 1 or 2 of those being a cook.

To me it's obvious that the Navy (and other services) have sacrificed training and proficiency, for maintenance and other non-warfighting priorities, to include never saying "no" to the civilian leadership, ie that they cannot do something; not because they don't wish to carry out those orders, but that they don't have the proper resources to carry it out.

Maybe part of it is the "death by a million papercuts", where all these additional requirements (GMT, sensitivity training, other random collateral bullshit duties / tacks), coupled with 'optimal manning' schemes that have led to people being over-tasked and under-trained.

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:

quote:

Originally posted by Tubetone:
Does anyone know if putting out even a dozen constant deck watches with binoculars along all sides of a ship would somehow be dangerous or unworkable?

Why couldn't they do that if there is congested traffic and calm seas?

It is doable and possible. But really at night, they should be able to run 100% off of radar when it comes to seeing other ships and avoiding collision and this boils down to 1 person tuning and watching the radar. Another person at the helm to see visually. Many times by the time someone visually would see and confirm another ship bearing down on them at night, it's generally too late to react. Keep in mind many of these loaded freighters take 6-8 miles to come to a complete stop from cruise speed.

All of these giant freighters generally run a crew on watch of 2 for all navigational aspects at night. A captain OR first officer and a simple AB or ordinary seaman to watch /stand lookout They will have an engineer and possibly others on duty below deck, but for navigational operation purposes they'll generally only have 2 on duty. 3 at most. These giant freighters generally run with a crew of maximum 32 to run 24/7, and some with as little as 16 total crew, 1 or 2 of those being a cook.

Thanks for the info. I was looking at it more from a person who may know from a Navy ship's perspective, though.

I figured that big freighters took a lot of distance to stop. I presume one of this type of Navy ship should be able to turn, stop and reverse much more quickly - if it only knew.

quote:

I presume one of this type of Navy ship should be able to turn, stop and reverse much more quickly - if it only knew.

Correct, a DDG is much more maneuverable than a large freighter. And they typically have many more people on duty throughout the ship, although I don't know the exact specifics / numbers / etc.

But it seems that in the recent collisions, a loss of situational awareness (what is around my ship), possibly coupled with improper seamanship, made those performance characteristics unimportant. Because if you can't see something, you can't avoid it.

RIP Shipmates.