quote:

Originally posted by Cookster:
Not sure if it has been mentioned in this thread or not, but another factor that will most likely significantly impact the logistics of the dismantling and bridge rebuild efforts is the 240 kV power line that is seen in many of the photos just astern of the ship.

These lines carry power generated from the power plants located in Baltimore and provide power to the city of Baltimore, nearby communities and into the PJM market.

Any (tall) demolition / construction cranes cannot be operated near those lines as the risk of an arc would be too high and catastrophic.

A LOT of planning for matters across the board need to be well thought out and thoroughly vetted before those lines can be de-energized (if they are going to need to be).

I'm sure those lines have been de-energized by now. No point in sending power down a line without an adequate end point.

quote:

Originally posted by vthoky:
I've read the thread but may have missed this... what's the condition of the ship itself? Not leaking or sinking? If that's the case, can it be floated (tugged) to a proper place for unloading? (Yes, I know that relies on getting the bridge off it and getting a path in the water cleared.)

There's been no indication the MV Dali is taking on any water. In other footage there was heat/gas coming out of her stack so, she's go power, either main or, just generators.
Once the bridge and roadway material is removed off her bow, she'll be brought over to one of the terminals and her cargo off-loaded.

quote:

Originally posted by hrcjon:
I am confused in all this about the design situation. Its not like ships hitting bridge supports and causing a collapse is a new risk. Has happened a bunch of times. So exactly why is there not enough buffer riprap or whatever around these supports that a ship hitting them (not a completely unknown risk since this is a PORT!)
can't actually get to the support structure????

$$$

quote:

Originally posted by vthoky:
I've read the thread but may have missed this... what's the condition of the ship itself? Not leaking or sinking? If that's the case, can it be floated (tugged) to a proper place for unloading? (Yes, I know that relies on getting the bridge off it and getting a path in the water cleared.)
If it's damaged, is it damaged too badly to be tugged back to the port for unloading the cargo onto other ships? And how would a crew go about unloading it if it can't yet be moved? I'm thinking serious helicopters, but I imagine that would have to be seriously expensive.

I heard that the weight of the bridge that is on the ship has the bow of the ship sitting on the bottom of the bay.

quote:

Originally posted by hrcjon:
I looked at the overhead photos. There is NOT A CHANCE that the slight structure around the bridge supports was designed to stop a wayward ship. And that really to me is negligent even in the 1970's. That Florida bridge had already hit the deck I think by then. And the Ohio river bridge a decade earlier.

The previous Sunshine Skyway Bridge was struck in 1980.

The Francis Scott Key Bridge seemed to have survived being struck by a ship in 1980 as well:
“The previous Key bridge accident had eerie similarities to what happened on Tuesday. In August 1980, a Japanese container ship crossing the Baltimore harbor lost propulsion about 600 yards from the Key Bridge after its electrical control board shorted out in the early morning hours. The ship then crashed into the bridge, colliding with one of its piers, according to a National Research Council report on ship-bridge collisions.”

Link

quote:

Originally posted by hrcjon:

quote:

My understanding is the bridge was built in 1977 and ships this large were not imagined at that time.

That's clearly not true at least in terms of built ships, it might be true in terms of 'average' or 'mean'. But in any case even if the design point was a smaller ship it surely must have envisioned that the ship might actually be under power. This one was not. So this ship might have more mass but it didn't have more energy.

The big difference between the two allisions:
“One major difference between the two accidents was the size of the ship. Data from the maritime tracking website MarineTraffic suggests the ship that crashed into the bridge in 1980, then known as Blue Nagoya, was about a third of the length and a fraction of the weight of the Dali.”

Link

Up until 2016, the Panama Canal could handle ships 106’ wide with a 52,500 DWT. That was a hard limit, no “average” or “mean” needed. Vesselfinder.com says the Dali was built in 2015 and is 157’ wide with a DWT of 116,861. Amazingly enough, that fits within the New Panamax limits of 165’ and 120,000 DWT for 2016 forward.

Were they doing tall stacks of steel containers like this when the bridge was built. I'd imagine that structure is a rigid mass far above the water line and perhaps that is a significant factor in this accident? In other words, far forward of the waterline of the hull, and very high above the water, there is this rigid battering ram. Maybe even impacting the steel of the bridge instead of the concrete protection (dolphins, I take it) at the water line.

It appears not:



The evolution of container ships and their sizes

The link is an interesting read about the evolution of container ships in general as well as their size.

Certainly seems plausible that height was a factor.




Source Link

^^^The images of the ships in that graphic are nowhere near the same scale.
This one shows an early 1970s ship compared to one like the Dali on the same scale, at least for length and height (oddly, the 10x9 and 19-20x16 container graphics are not the same scale):



Link

Interesting that Florida officials thought about implementing the then state of the art dolphins the Francis Scott Key Bridge had for the Sunshine Skyway Bridge before it was struck:

“The Key Bridge’s dolphins were once seen as the latest innovations in bridge design: After the Sunshine Skyway Bridge over Tampa Bay collapsed in 1980, killing 35 people, some observers noted the then-new Key bridge’s use of dolphins. Florida officials had considered duplicating them for the Sunshine Skyway but decided against it, according to an article in the Tampa Tribune that year.“

I’m also curious, but have not been able to find, what the Scott Key’s dolphins look like under water. I’d guess they are much more substantial that the part visible above the water.

From the NOAA chart for Baltimore Harbor:

"Huge Problem": Pentagon's Rapid Wartime Response Cargo Ships Trapped In Baltimore After Bridge Collapse

https://www.zerohedge.com/mili...ltimore-after-bridge

Two high-speed military cargo ships are stuck in the Port of Baltimore following Tuesday morning's collapse of the 1.6-mile-long Francis Scott Key Bridge. The major US East Coast port has been paralyzed for several days as the bridge collapse prevents inbound and outbound vessel traffic along the harbor's channel.

Using the automatic identification system, or AIS, data that tracks commercial vessels, three bulk carriers, two general cargo ships, one vehicle carrier, one tanker, and four Ready Reserve Force vessels (RRF), along with the container ship Dali that struck the bridge, are trapped in the harbor, according to the shipping blog gCaptain.

The three bulk carriers include:

The Liberian-flagged JY River, owned by JIADE INTERNATIONAL SHIP and managed by WAH KWONG SHIP MANAGEMENT HK of Hong Kong.

The Thailand-flagged Phatra Naree, owned by PRECIOUS STONES SHIPPING LTD and managed by PRECIOUS SHIPPING PCL of Thailand.

The Portuguese-flagged Klara Oldendorff, owned and managed OLDENDORFF CARRIERS GMBH & CO of Germany.

The vehicle carrier is:

The Swedish-flagged Carmen, owned by WALL RO/RO AB and managed by WALLENIUS MARINE AB of Sweden.

The general cargo ships include:

The French-flagged Saimaagracht, owned by REDERIJ SAIMAAGRACHT and managed by SPLIETHOFF'S BEVRACHTINGS BV of the Netherlands.

The Panama-flagged Balsa 94, owned by EASTERN CAPITAL MARINE INC and managed by HIONG GUAN NAVEGACION CO LTD of Hong Kong.

The tanker is:

The Marshall Islands-flagged Palanca Rio, owned by MINSHENG RUIYANG TIANJIN SHPG and managed by PUMA ENERGY SUPPLY & TRADING of Singapore.

The US Maritime Administration (MARAD) Ready Reserve Force vessels include:

The Cape Washington, a Cape W Class roll-on/roll-off vessel.

The Gary I. Gordon, a Gordon-class roll-on/roll-off vessel.

The SS Antares (T-AKR-294), a Algol-class fast sealift vehicle cargo ship.

The SS Denebola (T-AKR-294), another Algol-class fast sealift vehicle cargo ship.

According to the military blog The War Zone (TWZ), Algol class vessels are "some of the fastest cargo vessels of their general size anywhere in the world." These ships are part of the RRF, a subset of vessels within MARAD's National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) that provide surge sealift capability to the Pentagon for overseas conflicts.

TWZ noted the Algol class vessels have been called into action several times over the last three decades:

Algol class have been called upon multiple times since they entered US service. Just five of these ships were responsible for transporting 20 percent of US cargo sent from the United States to Saudi Arabia during the first phase of Operation Desert Shield in the immediate run-up to the First Gulf War. The ships would go on to deliver 13 percent of all cargo that arrived in Saudi Arabia from the United States in the full course of that conflict.

The US military subsequently used Algols to support operations in Somalia and the Balkans in the 1990s, as well as the opening phases of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s.

Breitbart News' Kristina Wong reported on Thursday that "The Department of Transportation will not say how many National Defense Reserve Fleet Ships are Stuck" in the Baltimore harbor.

Wong quoted John Konrad, CEO of gCaptain, who warned the stuck RRF vessels are a "huge problem if a war starts [but] not much of a problem if the next few months are peaceful."

The current readiness of the RRF fleet is unknown. And just like that, part of America's RRF fleet was taken out not by a missile or suicide drone, but a container ship that allegedly suffered a catastrophic 'electric issue'. America's enemies are taking note.

^^^
A concern but, not a pressing or, a priority issue.

The Maritime Administration has issues with getting enough crew and the after the last surprise drill a number of Ready Reserve Fleet ships were unable to activate.

What fell:



Will they learn?

From The Great Courses©, Lesson 10130, “Epic Engineering Failures and the Lessons They Teach”, presented by Professor Stephen Ressler.

The Sunshine Skyway Collapse

In the Gulf of Mexico, at 6:20 am on May 9, 1980, harbor pilot John Lerro and his pilot trainee, Bruce Atkins, boarded the freighter Summit Venture to guide it into the Port of Tampa. Summit Venture was a 609-foot, 34,000-ton bulk carrier. Aided by the ship’s magnetic compass and radar, the men would steer the ship through Tampa Bay’s main shipping channel, making a series of turns marked by pairs of numbered buoys. They would pass between two barrier islands and then beneath the 864-foot main span of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge.

The Sunshine Skyway was a 15-mile-long multi-span steel truss bridge carrying Interstate 275 across Tampa Bay. It comprised two independent structures. The first was built in 1954 to carry two lanes of traffic—one in each direction. Its twin was added in 1971 when the highway was reconfigured to four lanes—two northbound on the eastern bridge and two southbound on the western bridge. Each parallel bridge consisted of a three-span through truss crossing the navigation channel, a pair of deck trusses on either end of the through truss, and a series of shorter girder spans connecting these trusses to the shorelines. In a through truss, the deck and roadway are positioned at the truss’s bottom chord, such that traffic passes through the bridge. The through trusses were used above the navigation channel to provide additional overhead clearance for the ships passing beneath. A deck truss has its deck and roadway at the top chord such that vehicles drive on top of the bridge.

Summit Venture proceeded into the shipping channel. The weather was cloudy with intermittent light rain, but visibility remained good. The National Weather Service had issued no storm warnings. However, at 7:21 am, the rainfall intensity increased significantly. Lerro ordered the engine speed reduced to “half ahead.” Minutes later, as Summit Venture was about one nautical mile from navigation buoys 1A and 2A—and the final 18-degree turn that would take the ship beneath the bridge—they were suddenly enveloped in a fierce squall. As an unexpected line of thunderstorms swept across Tampa Bay, 60-mph winds blasted the vessel from astern. Intense rain reduced visibility to zero, rendering the ship’s radar ineffective. Steaming at half speed directly toward the bridge, the pilots were completely blinded by the squall.
At this crucial moment, Lerro had three options:

• He could order the engine reversed and the anchors dropped in an effort to stop the vessel before it reached the bridge. But given the wind, the ship couldn’t be stopped in time.

• He could cut power, drop anchors, and steer the ship hard to starboard, out of the channel and parallel to the bridge. In retrospect, this probably would have worked—but only if Lerro had initiated the turn immediately upon the onset of the squall. However, by the time Lerro and Atkins realized they might never spot buoys 1A and 2A, the window of opportunity for a turnout had already passed. Even if Lerro could complete the turn successfully, the strong wind might still drive the vessel sideways into the bridge.

• The sole remaining option was to remain in the channel and attempt to navigate beneath the bridge. But at that moment no one could even see the bridge.

Moments later, a lookout sighted buoy 2A just off the starboard bow—meaning the ship was still in the channel and had reached the required turning point. Lerro immediately ordered a turn to port and a further reduction in speed. But the massive vessel was slow to come around. Both its inertia and the wind drove it out of the navigation channel to the south. One of the bridge piers finally came into view, dead ahead, less than one ship length away. Lerro immediately reversed the engine, steered hard to port, and dropped both anchors—but it was too late.

At 7:34 am, Summit Venture collided with the southernmost pier of the western three-span through truss. The pier had a protective crash wall extending 15 feet above the waterline—but the ship’s flared bow struck the pier 40 feet above the crash wall. This sheared off both of the pier’s reinforced-concrete columns and toppled 1,300 feet of the Sunshine Skyway into Tampa Bay. Several vehicles were on the falling spans, and several others drove over the edge. Thirty-five people died.
Cantilever Bridges

The Sunshine Skyway’s three main spans constitute a cantilever bridge. The structure consists of six concrete piers, three on either side of the navigation channel, and two inner deck trusses. These trusses are classified as simply supported spans because each is supported only at its outer ends. To bridge the three center spans, a single three-span truss extends continuously across the two intermediate piers. However, because this three-span continuous truss is supported at four points rather than two, it’s more challenging to analyze and design than simply supported spans would be. Fortunately, the designers of the Sunshine Skyway had a third alternative at their disposal—the cantilever configuration.

A typical cantilever bridge comprises two exterior spans, each consisting of an anchor arm and a cantilever arm. A cantilever is any structural element fixed at one end and unsupported at the other. In this type of bridge, the cantilever arm extends across the intermediate support and partway out across the center span. The final component of the structural system, the suspended span, is suspended from the two cantilever arms and connected with pins. Because of this continuity across the intermediate support, the cantilever configuration provides essentially the same structural efficiency as the three-span continuous alternative. But because it consists of three separate entities, each supported at only two points, it’s no more difficult to analyze than the simply supported alternative.

Nonetheless, in the 1950s, the cost of the reduced computational complexity was a significant increase in the structure’s vulnerability to the loss of a support. The loss of only one support triggered the progressive collapse of the Sunshine Skyway’s approach span, anchor arm, cantilever arm, and suspended span—and also severely damaged the remaining cantilever arm. If the three-span continuous configuration had been used instead, it’s possible that none of the spans would have fallen. This configuration would have been significantly more redundant than the cantilever.
The cantilever’s inherent lack of redundancy explains why engineers chose to build a new bridge using a different structural configuration. The new Sunshine Skyway Bridge was a cable-stayed bridge, and its configuration offers the following:

• a 40% longer center span, which provides a greater margin of safety against navigational errors.

• massive double piers, which are significantly more resistant to collisions than their predecessors.

• protective structures called dolphins, which are designed to withstand direct impact by a 90,000-ton vessel while protecting the main piers from impacts.

quote:

Originally posted by wcb6092:
"Huge Problem": Pentagon's Rapid Wartime Response Cargo Ships Trapped In Baltimore After Bridge Collapse

https://www.zerohedge.com/mili...ltimore-after-bridge

Two high-speed military cargo ships are stuck in the Port of Baltimore following Tuesday morning's collapse of the 1.6-mile-long Francis Scott Key Bridge. The major US East Coast port has been paralyzed for several days as the bridge collapse prevents inbound and outbound vessel traffic along the harbor's channel.

Using the automatic identification system, or AIS, data that tracks commercial vessels, three bulk carriers, two general cargo ships, one vehicle carrier, one tanker, and four Ready Reserve Force vessels (RRF), along with the container ship Dali that struck the bridge, are trapped in the harbor, according to the shipping blog gCaptain.

The three bulk carriers include:

The Liberian-flagged JY River, owned by JIADE INTERNATIONAL SHIP and managed by WAH KWONG SHIP MANAGEMENT HK of Hong Kong.

The Thailand-flagged Phatra Naree, owned by PRECIOUS STONES SHIPPING LTD and managed by PRECIOUS SHIPPING PCL of Thailand.

The Portuguese-flagged Klara Oldendorff, owned and managed OLDENDORFF CARRIERS GMBH & CO of Germany.

The vehicle carrier is:

The Swedish-flagged Carmen, owned by WALL RO/RO AB and managed by WALLENIUS MARINE AB of Sweden.

The general cargo ships include:

The French-flagged Saimaagracht, owned by REDERIJ SAIMAAGRACHT and managed by SPLIETHOFF'S BEVRACHTINGS BV of the Netherlands.

The Panama-flagged Balsa 94, owned by EASTERN CAPITAL MARINE INC and managed by HIONG GUAN NAVEGACION CO LTD of Hong Kong.

The tanker is:

The Marshall Islands-flagged Palanca Rio, owned by MINSHENG RUIYANG TIANJIN SHPG and managed by PUMA ENERGY SUPPLY & TRADING of Singapore.

The US Maritime Administration (MARAD) Ready Reserve Force vessels include:

The Cape Washington, a Cape W Class roll-on/roll-off vessel.

The Gary I. Gordon, a Gordon-class roll-on/roll-off vessel.

The SS Antares (T-AKR-294), a Algol-class fast sealift vehicle cargo ship.

The SS Denebola (T-AKR-294), another Algol-class fast sealift vehicle cargo ship.

According to the military blog The War Zone (TWZ), Algol class vessels are "some of the fastest cargo vessels of their general size anywhere in the world." These ships are part of the RRF, a subset of vessels within MARAD's National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) that provide surge sealift capability to the Pentagon for overseas conflicts.

TWZ noted the Algol class vessels have been called into action several times over the last three decades:

Algol class have been called upon multiple times since they entered US service. Just five of these ships were responsible for transporting 20 percent of US cargo sent from the United States to Saudi Arabia during the first phase of Operation Desert Shield in the immediate run-up to the First Gulf War. The ships would go on to deliver 13 percent of all cargo that arrived in Saudi Arabia from the United States in the full course of that conflict.

The US military subsequently used Algols to support operations in Somalia and the Balkans in the 1990s, as well as the opening phases of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s.

Breitbart News' Kristina Wong reported on Thursday that "The Department of Transportation will not say how many National Defense Reserve Fleet Ships are Stuck" in the Baltimore harbor.

Wong quoted John Konrad, CEO of gCaptain, who warned the stuck RRF vessels are a "huge problem if a war starts [but] not much of a problem if the next few months are peaceful."

Curtis Bay Coast Guard station in within the affected area. There are signicent assets stationed there.

Early in my career I boarded one of those ready reserve ships when in civilian service in a small shipyard near Rotterdam. Coincidentally one of my classmates was a 3rd asst engr. He gave me a great tour and I’ve gotta say, that is one impressive engine room. Those ships are fast mofos! Designated SL 7’s in those days.

quote:

Originally posted by Citadel:
Curtis Bay Coast Guard station in within the affected area. There are signicent assets stationed there.

Coast Guard's only shipyard

Both the ship and engine were built at Hyundai Heavy Industries in Ulsan, South Korea. I've been there a few times, toured the engine plant, and worked with some of the people from that plant on another project from 2012-2015.

To give people an idea - the biggest engines I saw there were inline 10 cylinder engines with 1 meter bore and 3 meter stroke, with a two-piece articulated connecting rod. Power was in the 100,000 HP range. I also saw one of these engines being lowered into a ship with the biggest sawhorse crane in the world. Hearing one being tested at ~100 RPM is funnny because you hear each firing as an individual event.

In 2014 HHI lost a ton of money (more than a billion in the red) and in 2015 they sacked 250-ish men from the upper management ranks and re-assessed all businesses. The project I was working on with them was shut down, and my last trip to South Korea was in early 2016.

I received an email with the segment enclosed. I thought it to be an Artificial Intelligence phony creation - because making the statement on air is so completely insane as not to be believed!

Frankly, his avowed purpose in life to make me (Texas White Guy) afraid, dooms him to disappointment - actually, the diametrically opposite! For what it is worth, coming from an 82 year old disabled man, he is on my list of people the world would be better without.

That stated, I will contribute to anyone who runs against him and eliminate him from the political spectrum!

“The fact that I don’t believe in their untruthful and wrong ideology and I am very proud of my heritage and who I am and where I come from scares them, because me being at my position means that their way of thinking, their way of life of being comfortable while everyone else suffers is going to be at risk and they should be afraid because that’s my purpose in life,” said Scott.”

And there you have it, in his own words.

Scott’s “purpose in life” is to make white people uncomfortable and afraid.

I'm confused... Who is Scott?
Does this have something to do with the bridge collapse?

Sal gives some perspective and provides some good links for those experts in their fields, below are a couple of them



How to start a marine engine, also a great channel showcasing day-to-day life aboard operating a global merchant ship


Perspective from a tug boat captain

Naval support ships trapped
A major American port paralyzed
Now this, are we sure this was just an accident?

https://x.com/johnkonrad/statu...883210520518870?s=46

quote:

Originally posted by PASig:
Naval support ships trapped
A major American port paralyzed
Now this, are we sure this was just an accident?

100% sure. But I'm speaking for myself.