Very automated and integrated aircraft. Many things change with ‘WOW’(weight-on-wheels) logic.

The aircraft knows the difference between say flaps 1 in the air, or flaps one on the ground. Like with 1 selected on takeoff, you’d get configuration warnings, in the air, no.

There is also an ‘auto-gap’/ auto-slat feature at slower speeds with slats half out. The one side picture showed prominent leading edge slats clearly visible, minimal flaps on rear of the wing.

quote:

Originally posted by trapper189:
Is there a legitimate reason that a pilot would bring the flaps all the way up instead of retracting the landing gear at that point in the take off sequence?

Not with gear still down, unless there were an unusual operational reason to leave gear down for a few minutes. This is a very rare situation. Overheating brakes is one reason, where there'd be a caution or warning message posted on the screen. But in that case you have a maximum allowable airspeed with gear down, and minimum speeds for various flap configurations. It could be that with gear down you cannot also have flaps all the way up.

In the aircraft I flew (not the 787), the airspeed indication have several aspects to it. It is a vertical"tape" style, not a dial, with a pointer in the middle that points at the current airspeed. Higher speeds are above it, lower speeds below.

Then there is a trend bar right next to the tape that shows the speed the aircraft will be at in the very near future (e.g. 10 seconds). This is useful in being aware of what the energy state is doing. If you put gear down, the trend bar will show a lower speed is in your future. If you move the thrust levers, the trend bar will show a predicted speed that thrust will give you.

But the next indication is the red stall bar and the red overspeed bar. These are predictions of the airspeed where, assuming current configuration and load factor (g forces), the aircraft will stall or will overspeed.

These red bars adjust immediately when the flap handle is moved. They don't wait for the flaps to move. So if the flaps were reduced or retracted, the flying pilot would immediately see the red bars move towards his current airspeed.

You never want the red stall bar to rise up near to or above your present speed.

The red bars don't move with thrust changes, but your speed trend bar will move and if you pulled the power back it could move into the red stall bar.

So there are different indications right there where the flying pilot is spending a lot of his attention on the airspeed during early climb to inform him of impending stall and a good clue of which change is causing it, either flap retraction or thrust reduction.

Captain Steve updated his video…

Yeah, imagine that. Couldn't wait for more information. He had to be the first to get out his theory of events. And of course he was most likely wrong.

This is why I trust Mentour Pilot and blancolirio in these instances because they just give the facts as they come and not theories based on incomplete information.

quote:

Originally posted by V-Tail:
Not jets, but the BeechCraft Bonanza / Baron family. 1985 was a transition year for gear and flap controls on these airplanes.

Industry standard has the gear control on the pilot side, but prior to 1985, BeechCraft marched to their own drummer. Very early models had a row of "piano keys" in front of the co-pilot seat; these switches were side by side and very similar looking. Invitation to disaster. After a dozen years or so, Beech changed to more conventional switches, but for at least twenty years, the gear switch was on the copilot side and the flap control was in front of the pilot.

1985 was the year for major revisions, and the gear and flap controls were relocated to the standard positions. This was really critical for those pilots who regularly flew both pre and post 1985 models. One thing that I really insisted on, was "do NOT even think about retracting flaps during the post-landing rollout -- do NOT reach for the flap control until you are clear of the runway, have come to a full stop, and are paying 100% attention to the control switch that you are reaching for."

As an instructor, I focused on the Bonanza / Baron family, almost to the exclusion of everything else. Clients had differently configured airplanes, no two exactly alike, and I always studied the cockpit layout carefully, before the first flight in any client's airplane.

I had a G35 for a while with the piano key switches. I know that the gear switch had a spring loaded pin that you had to move to the side before moving the piano key (a safety on the gear switch if you will). I *think* that it had no such “safety” on the flap switch, but it has been so long I don’t remember for sure. I’m reminded of the “It looks like a flap switch, it feels like a flap switch, I’ll go ahead and raise the flap switch.” phrase, though my switches were all plain. On the way to OSH last year I saw an earlier one (D model maybe?) that had a tire molded into the gear switch and a flap into the flap switch.

The other fun thing Beech did was swap the prop and throttle controls on the earlier twins versus the standard. When I got my multi engine rating in a potato (Apache), it was simple: On engine failure keep the airplane flying straight and go right to left everything forward. Gives you mixture rich, then props full increase, then full throttle. Then after Identifying (dead foot = dead engine) you work your way back left to right. Verify by pulling the throttle on the engine you’ve identified as failed (If nothing changes you got it right, continue. If the airplane yaws wildly you got it wrong, put it back and try again :-). Next, carefully ensure you have the correct prop lever (if you correctly pulled the left throttle back, you want to make sure you feather the left prop) and pull the prop back into feather. You’ll get to the mixture as part of cleanup after. (This glosses over gear and flaps being configured correctly, but the basic idea is right to left, then work your way back from the left to the right. Works great until you get to an early Beech twin (like the ‘68 Travelair we fly) where Beech put the throttles in the middle and the props on the left. You still need to do mixture, props, throttles, then identify, verify, feather (and get the checklist out and cleanup), it just isn’t a simple straight line process anymore.

At the end of the day, you have to think about what you’re doing and do it carefully. Probably not a bad approach in general in aviation…

I saw this video from The New York Post on YouTube.

From the description:

"A passenger who reportedly flew on the doomed Air India jet just two hours before it crashed, killing more than 200 people, posted shocking video in which he says “nothing” was working in the cabin — including lights, air conditioning and the seat-back display screens.

The eerie footage was purportedly taken inside the Boeing 787 Dreamliner on its second-to-last flight as it flew from Delhi to Ahmedabad, hours before it crashed shortly after takeoff en route to London’s Gatwick airport."

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1y_u1O-T6jw

quote:

Originally posted by Balzé Halzé:
Yeah, imagine that. Couldn't wait for more information. He had to be the first to get out his theory of events. And of course he was most likely wrong.

This is why I trust Mentour Pilot and blancolirio in these instances because they just give the facts as they come and not theories based on incomplete information.

100%! I've noticed this guy being WAY out beyond his skies before, while carrying a suitcase full of confidence trimmed out in arrogance.

quote:

Originally posted by slosig:

At the end of the day, you have to think about what you’re doing and do it carefully. Probably not a bad approach in general in aviation…

Also valid in the airlines!

The turboprops I flew all had memory items for an engine failure or a runaway prop. Identify, Verify, Feather, as applied to specific models. You have to get those big props feathered, but otherwise relax. There are too many ways to make things worse if you start flipping switches (* an exception noted below).

In the jets the engine failure procedure was "Continue, wind your watch, take a sip of coffee, call for the QRH checklist". Those checklists, though, eat up a lot of time. Too much time imho. Sometimes you just want to put it down on a runway without delay.

* We had an engine flame out at about 300 AGL landing at a one-way mountain airport during a microburst onset (improving performance), with full flaps out. No way to descend, so we went around single engine, left prop windmilling, gear down flaps 40. Per SOP no configuration change during a microburst, but SOP says gear up and retract flaps per schedule single engine, and for a windmilling prop get it feathered. I was PF, Captain PNF. He popped the electric feather switch after instantly recognizing that the autofeather had failed. It was completely non-SOP but kept us out of the dirt. We missed the hills but barely, thanks to him also pulling the flaps up to 15. The company lauded the creative solution, the FAA prosecuted for not following SOP, for which there was none for our situation.

quote:

Originally posted by Fly-Sig:

the FAA prosecuted for not following SOP, for which there was none for our situation.

FAA just LOVES to prosecute. It must give them a reason to justify the existence of the "enforcers."

Example (ColoradoHunter, an ex-FAA guy, gave me some good guidance dealing with this situation a few years ago): I trained a guy for Instrument Rating. This was a very responsible pilot, followed the rules and regulations religiously. He flew his Cessna 310 from Our Little Airport (just northwest of Orlando) to North Perry, in the Fort Lauderdale area. This flight was conducted under IFR rules, meaning that he was in radio contact, and radar tracked, every second of the trip, from take-off to engine shutdown. Every second! Constant radio contact.

A day or two later, he asked me for help. He had been notified that he was under investigation for allegedly entering the airport's Class D controlled airspace, and landing, with no clearance, no radio communication. He swore to me, as did his wife (who is also a pilot and was sitting in the copilot seat) that the tower controller had cleared him to land.

I contacted the tower supervisor. We had a lengthy discussion that seemed to go nowhere. A few days later, it turned out that a minute or so after he landed, a different Cessna 310 had landed at the same airport with no landing clearance, no radio communication. Tower was able to read the N-number which was nothing like my client's number, yet they accused and threatened to prosecute a guy who had followed all the rules.

quote:

Originally posted by Ronin1069:
Captain Steve updated his video…

[FLASH_VIDEO]<iframe frameborder="0" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/8XYO-mj1ugg?si=1ryf62KCTjHAM0d_" width="560"></iframe>[/FLASH_VIDEO]

Interesting. The video with sound was available shortly after the crash (the same day, within a short time after the crash), and was the first one I viewed. The RAT could clearly be heard.

quote:

Originally posted by Ronin1069:
Captain Steve updated his video…

If he is correct that the RAT deployed, and if it was for both engines out, this raises the specter of a MH370 situation. Everything is just speculation so far, but I'm getting a bad feeling on this one.

quote:

Originally posted by V-Tail:
FAA just LOVES to prosecute. It must give them a reason to justify the existence of the "enforcers."

Example (ColoradoHunter, an ex-FAA guy, gave me some good guidance dealing with this situation a few years ago): I trained a guy for Instrument Rating. This was a very responsible pilot, followed the rules and regulations religiously.

I've known of several ridiculous prosecutions. One thing I learned was that the government has limitless resources to prosecute, and the penalties can be severe. The pressures applied to the pilot to take a settlement are huge, but even then the career implications are enormous.

I also learned we have a legal system, not a justice system.

We had 2 crews I personally knew their situations where they were prosecuted. One was on radar vectors into a major airport, and were prosecuted for entering a restricted airspace. The senior guy took a plea deal and didn't have his certificate taken, so he could keep coming to work (i.e. getting paid). He wasn't planning on going on up to a major airline. The younger guy did want to go to a major, so he needed a clean record. He fought the violations and finally got the radar data which showed they were close to but never inside the restricted area. Another crew had a significant malfunction during arrival to a major airport. They went into holding to run checklists. Before they finished all the checklists they reached bingo fuel, which was really thin. Iirc they had enough for one visual approach to a missed approach, and then a tight visual pattern back to land. It was determined had they finished the checklists the malfunction would have resolved, so the FAA prosecuted for failing to follow SOP. That one dragged out for a couple of years but the pilots eventually won.

I knew a young CFI aiming for the airlines who was violated for insufficient supervision of a student. The student was a retired military pilot converting to a civilian PPL. On his long cross country he chose of his own volition, without consulting his CFI, to not refuel. He successfully landed on a rural road with no injuries or damage. He testified in court that the CFI instructed him to refuel, yet he chose not to. The violation ended that CFI's aviation career.

I know of several other such examples. And the FAA wonders why pilots were not forthcoming before the ASAP program.

quote:

Originally posted by Fly-Sig:

If he is correct that the RAT deployed, and if it was for both engines out, this raises the specter of a MH370 situation. Everything is just speculation so far, but I'm getting a bad feeling on this one.

That was a triple 7 airframe, correct? Does it share similarities with the 787 in regards to propulsion and electronics?

quote:

Originally posted by Balzé Halzé:

quote:

Originally posted by Fly-Sig:

If he is correct that the RAT deployed, and if it was for both engines out, this raises the specter of a MH370 situation. Everything is just speculation so far, but I'm getting a bad feeling on this one.

That was a triple 7 airframe, correct? Does it share similarities with the 787 in regards to propulsion and electronics?

Idk what the commonalities are. My feeling is this may have been intentional like MH370, if the RAT deployed for both engines off.

Ah ok. I see.

The Cockpit Voice Recorder and Black Box data will be known soon enough...And then we'll know! Until then it's all speculation.

Juan Browne posted this on when the RAT automatically deploys on a 787:

Dual engine failure

Low pressure in all 4 hydraulic systems

Loss of all electrical power to the captain's and FO's flight instruments

Loss of all 4 electric motor pumps AND flight control system faults during approach

Loss of all 4 electric motor pumps AND an engine failure on takeoff

---

ACCU-STRUT FOR MINI-14
"Pen & Sword as one."

quote:

Originally posted by lechiffre:
"A passenger who reportedly flew on the doomed Air India jet just two hours before it crashed, killing more than 200 people, posted shocking video in which he says “nothing” was working in the cabin — including lights, air conditioning and the seat-back display screens.

I've been to India a few times - the thought of having no A/C or airflow on plane in India is a smell you don't want to even imagine, let alone experience.

Any chance they raised the flaps instead of the gear? That would account for the loss of lift at slow speed and the mushing just before the crash

quote:

Originally posted by nhtagmember:
Any chance they raised the flaps instead of the gear? That would account for the loss of lift at slow speed and the mushing just before the crash

Yes, but it wouldn’t explain the Ram Air Turbine (RAT) deploying. Second post on this page has video of nothing working in the cabin.

Did they depart with an airplane that had known issues?

It is also possible that the Pilot Not Flying selected gear up, but there was no hydraulic power (or not enough) to raise the gear.

Many things are possible, but lest one end up looking like Captain Steve and having to walk back their guesses, it might be best to wait for the investigation.