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| I am a leaf on the wind... |
It's a moot point, they didn't crash off the end of the runway. They got airborne and were flying, and then for some reason lost their lift. They had adequate thrust until just after liftoff. _____________________________________ "We must not allow a mine shaft gap." | |||
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Semper Fi - 1775 |
Captain Steve is my go to for all things aviation… ___________________________ All it takes...is all you got. ____________________________ For those who have fought for it, Freedom has a flavor the protected will never know ΜΟΛΩΝ ΛΑΒΕ | |||
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| I am a leaf on the wind... |
I think Capt Steve nailed it on this one. His thoughts and conclusions echo mine exactly. I have a hard time believing you could mistake the gear handle for the flap handle in a modern jet. The handles are designed very differently, they have weird and unique operating feel and are located on distinctly different parts of the control area. The gear handle is up forward on the firewall/instrument panel, and the flap handle is down on the center pedestal near the copilots knee. Both design and location are purposely designed to prevent mistaking one for the other. With all that said, and without further information, the only logical conclusion is that he raised the flaps instead of the gear, or he pulled the power back on the engines intentionally, but that would have been caught by the captain. Not saying he did it intentionally, but it's hard to 'see' the copilot raise the flaps instead of the gear, and easy to see him move the thrust levers. _____________________________________ "We must not allow a mine shaft gap." | |||
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אַרְיֵה |
Not jets, but the BeechCraft Bonanza / Baron family. 1985 was a transition year for gear and flap controls on these airplanes. Industry standard has the gear control on the pilot side, but prior to 1985, BeechCraft marched to their own drummer. Very early models had a row of "piano keys" in front of the co-pilot seat; these switches were side by side and very similar looking. Invitation to disaster. After a dozen years or so, Beech changed to more conventional switches, but for at least twenty years, the gear switch was on the copilot side and the flap control was in front of the pilot. 1985 was the year for major revisions, and the gear and flap controls were relocated to the standard positions. This was really critical for those pilots who regularly flew both pre and post 1985 models. One thing that I really insisted on, was "do NOT even think about retracting flaps during the post-landing rollout -- do NOT reach for the flap control until you are clear of the runway, have come to a full stop, and are paying 100% attention to the control switch that you are reaching for." As an instructor, I focused on the Bonanza / Baron family, almost to the exclusion of everything else. Clients had differently configured airplanes, no two exactly alike, and I always studied the cockpit layout carefully, before the first flight in any client's airplane. הרחפת שלי מלאה בצלופחים | |||
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| No More Mr. Nice Guy |
It's hard to imagine how a qualified pilot could mistakenly retract flaps rather than raise the gear. People make unexplainable errors sometimes, but if this is the case here it is a uniquely boneheaded move. I remember way back in my early private pilot days being told by an experienced corporate jet pilot, "If you do something and don't like the results, UN-DO IT!" For the flying pilot not to notice either? Also surprising. The gear handle is on the dashboard within normal range of vision for both pilots. It would be obvious nobody grabbed it and moved it to the UP position. Yet so far this seems like the simplest theory. I hope the FDR and CVR data are released quickly. | |||
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| I am a leaf on the wind... |
Not sure of the copilots experience level, but as a check airman I've seen them do some truly boneheaded things. And then I ask is that what you really wanted to do, and shit is going so sideways for them that they are inside the OODA loop, they have no idea what is wrong, what caused them to be wrong or how to fix what they just did. I can totally see them frozen with fear as everything they expected the airplane to be doing is going in the opposite direction, sitting there hopeless not knowing it was in their power to correct it. Again, hard to believe the capt wouldn't recognize this immediately, but here we are. I too am looking forward to the reports. _____________________________________ "We must not allow a mine shaft gap." | |||
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| Partial dichotomy |
I think I read ~1800 hours? SIGforum: For all your needs! Imagine our influence if every gun owner in America was an NRA member! Click the box>>>  | |||
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| I am a leaf on the wind... |
We need the breakdown, how much in that airplane, how much at that airline, how much in a crew operated jet etc. 1800 hours is right at that sweet spot where you should have decent amount of beginner experience, and know just enough to know that you know nothing. To be flying a 787 at that level is pretty inexperienced and is exactly the type of copilot I would expect to make this mistake and not know how to correct it. _____________________________________ "We must not allow a mine shaft gap." | |||
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| Partial dichotomy |
Correction. 1100 hours... Sorry SIGforum: For all your needs! Imagine our influence if every gun owner in America was an NRA member! Click the box>>> | |||
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| I am a leaf on the wind... |
Yikes, I literally cringed when I read that. _____________________________________ "We must not allow a mine shaft gap." | |||
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| Partial dichotomy |
https://timesofindia.indiatime...leshow/121813200.cms SIGforum: For all your needs! Imagine our influence if every gun owner in America was an NRA member! Click the box>>> | |||
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Member |
Humidity reduces air density. Year V | |||
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Member |
I think Sig2340 knows that; he was just saying the air was thick with water/humidity. We know H20 weighs less than O2. _________________________________________________________________________ “A man’s treatment of a dog is no indication of the man’s nature, but his treatment of a cat is. It is the crucial test. None but the humane treat a cat well.” -- Mark Twain, 1902 | |||
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| Savor the limelight |
In August of 2023, an Air India 787 lost an engine on take off due to losing an improperly installed fan blade. The particular set of blades were replaced in Taiwan in 2018. The crew and plane completed the take off and subsequent landing safely with one engine. The report said the engine went through 2,287 cycles between the blade being improperly installed and the engine failure. I don't know what exactly what cycles means in this context, but I'm guessing that's a lot of hours of flying time between 2018 and 2023. India's DGCA (like our NTSB) report | |||
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| Member |
You may feel the air “thicker,” but the plane feels less density. Year V | |||
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| No More Mr. Nice Guy |
I've seen plenty of bonehead moves, too, during IOE. First day was pretty much single pilot ops for me! Once even after briefing the situation prior to engine start, then again in cruise, and a reminder approaching the airport, I ended up having to take the controls. His ego exceeded his airmanship, and it nearly got him fired. Before the days of ACARS it was especially anxiety inducing when, as PNF, I'd have to go off frequency to pick up ATIS. Sometimes in that minute the FNG would do something off-script. So I don't discount the chance of an 1100 hr FO pulling up the flaps. For the Captain not to notice? Seems like both would have to be mentally saturated. I don't want to impugn the crew's actions in this accident. I have seen training and attitudes of foreign carriers being against thoughtfulness. Do only what you're told, know only what we tell you. Cultural issues can compromise things, too. We have no idea if any of this might apply to this accident. | |||
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Tinker Sailor Soldier Pie |
I could easily see the Captain not noticing. He's concentrating on flying the plane and his instruments, and suddenly the plane performance starts lacking. Things are happening fast and confusion sets in quick. That said, I think it's irresponsible for these high profile YouTube pilot channels to be making these assumptions so soon in order to be the one who got it right first when we really don't know what happened. It's fine for us to speculate and have that discussion, but these guys need to be more careful. It sets a narrative and preconceived notion that is hard to break, even after all the information eventually comes out. We saw that with the 737 Max crashes. People were so quick to blame the pilots of the first crash that it may have set the stage that ultimately allowed the 2nd. ~Alan Acta Non Verba NRA Life Member (Patron) God, Family, Guns, Country Men will fight and die to protect women... because women protect everything else. ~Andrew Klavan | |||
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| I am a leaf on the wind... |
[QUOTE]Originally posted by trapper189: The report said the engine went through 2,287 cycles between the blade being improperly installed and the engine failure. I don't know what exactly what cycles means in this context, but I'm guessing that's a lot of hours of flying time between 2018 and A cycle is start the engine, advance to full power(take off power), reduce to idle and the. Shut down. Its basically a flight. But it doesnt count starting the engine and taxiing around then shutting down, or running the engine for maintenance or things like that, its counting the number of times it was started and run at full power. _____________________________________ "We must not allow a mine shaft gap." | |||
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| Just because you can, doesn't mean you should |
Another indication this could be correct, there is no reason to leave the gear down once the planes off the runway. Even if they knew a crash was imminent, the gear is of zero value at that point and adds drag that causes the plane to crash even sooner. Yesterday I saw another video in a 787 simulator that showed this exact scenario and the gear and flap controls were not far from each other on that model. The plane did just what this one did in real life. They are a different shape to give a different feel in the hand, but so far this is by far the most likely, in my non-professional opinion. Since they now have the data recorders and a lot of other information we don't, they probably know if this was the cause. If there was a different suspected cause, they would be taking some action by now to warn operators or even grounding. ___________________________ Avoid buying ChiCom/CCP products whenever possible. | |||
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| No More Mr. Nice Guy |
The flap handle is on the pedestal. According to a super fast google image search, it looks to be next to the FO's left knee, next to the thrust levers. It is wing shaped and has a mechanical gate which requires the handle be lifted and moved, which makes several audible metalic clicking sounds. The gear handle is on the instrument panel and has a wheel shaped handle. It does not make an audible metallic click. The nearest analogy I can come up with is this. You're driving your car with your wife in the front passenger seat. You ask her to adjust the air conditioning. She says "Done". You might not notice that she instead pressed her seatbelt release, but you would know she didn't put her hand onto the air conditioning controls which are well within your direct vision. Unless you were looking out the side window at that moment. Take-off under normal circumstances doesn't get a pilot anywhere near tunnel vision, just like driving on the highway doesn't put you near saturation under normal circumstances. One possibility which will be easily determined true or false with the flight data recorder is that one of the pilots pulled back the power below take-off setting. FADEC systems are fully electronic, so there is no mechanical connection from the power levers to the engines. At the beginning of take-off, the flying pilot will push the power levers up to the correct number of "clicks" and say something like "Set Thrust". The non-flying pilot verifies lever position and the engine gauges show thrust is properly set. Generally, at V1 decision speed the flying pilot removes his hand from the thrust levers, because you are committed to fly at V1. This means nobody has a hand on the thrust levers until Climb Power is set, which could be 400 feet or 1000 feet, or something in that ballpark depending on various factors. If the thrust was pulled back below climb thrust for whatever reason, the result could be what we saw. A rigid mentality of completely trusting the technology and assuming that thrust was set properly has caused other accidents. e.g. Washington DC where they went into the Potomac. The most likely scenarios do seem to involve some sort of gross human error. | |||
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SIGforum.com Main Page The Lounge London-bound Air India jet with 242 on board including 53 Brits crashes just seconds after take-off
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