quote:

Originally posted by Hound Dog:

quote:

Originally posted by 12131:
The USS McLame, of course.

John McCain *SR* (after whom the ship is named) was a great military leader. He was a legendary officer/leader in WWII. He rose to 4-star rank and was CinCPac during at least part of Vietnam.

His son, not so much.

McCain, Sr was a 4 star in WWII, died 4 days after the surrender ceremony in Coronado. His son, McCain, Jr., was CINCPAC in the 60's, and the father of the present Senator.

The ship is named for both Admirals, actually, not the Senator.

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:
McCain, Sr was a 4 star in WWII, died 4 days after the surrender ceremony in Coronado. His son, McCain, Jr., was CINCPAC in the 60's, and the father of the present Senator.

The ship is named for both Admirals, actually, not the Senator.

Perhaps we should change the name of the senator from Arizona instead.

I spent two weeks in the Navy, so can speak with some authority on this. Okay, so that's a joke, but I did spend two weeks on the USS Blueridge for an exercise as an "embarkee" USAF guy.
All those guys did was drill, drill, drill 24/7. Fire drills. Intruder drills. Flooding drills. All the damn time.
Has discipline changed that much? And I do understand what the BR is, even though the boss was not on it.

quote:

Originally posted by kimber1911:
North Korea has responded by parking a couple of big ass boats in the general vicinity of US Naval operations.

Lil Kim anticipates the entire US Naval fleet will be disabled by December.

For real.

Secret Strategy Revealed: Regular Marine Traffic Stumps US Navy!

quote:

Originally posted by Poacher:
I spent two weeks in the Navy, so can speak with some authority on this. Okay, so that's a joke, but I did spend two weeks on the USS Blueridge for an exercise as an "embarkee" USAF guy.
All those guys did was drill, drill, drill 24/7. Fire drills. Intruder drills. Flooding drills. All the damn time.
Has discipline changed that much? And I do understand what the BR is, even though the boss was not on it.

When it comes to fire and emergencies, Navy personnel are second to none in damage control. I don't think that has changed much.

The issue is experienced seamanship on the bridge. Naval officers simply don't have it compared to a professional US merchant mariner.

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:

McCain, Sr was a 4 star in WWII, died 4 days after the surrender ceremony in Coronado. His son, McCain, Jr., was CINCPAC in the 60's, and the father of the present Senator.

The ship is named for both Admirals, actually, not the Senator.

Ah. Thanks for the correction.

... God bless all who sail ...

If the Commanders cannot see a big ship nearby, how are they going to see a small boat loaded with Magnetic bombs Sailing by?

With this limited information, I am thinking the Navy has a serious command problem?

I also hope everyone is safe


I also don't get how this happens


I am admittedly, an army puke, but I went to sea on the Wasp (LHD-1) once upon a time...aside from learning I was damn glad I was in the Army, I also learned that the detection systems on those ships can see a fucking periscope poking out of the water

How do you miss a whole fucking merchant ship?

I didn't understand this the last time it happened either


I also don't understand why it's all of a sudden happening

Detection is better now than its ever been

If a dude standing in the crows nest a hundred years ago made sure this didn't happen, how in the hell can these ships that can basically see a 360 degree battlefield for hundreds of miles around....even over the horizon....collide with a big ass ship?

Has radar went out of fashion?

These 2 incidents really puzzle me on a U S Naval warship.

Here you go, just replace "Fitzgerald" with "McCain" etc.
My reply to the other collision thread...

Obviously, barring the revelation of some MAJOR equipment failure, in the final analysis, this collision is going to get chalked up to "Human Factors" as the cause. I guess I will bullet point my thoughts on this as a kind of list rather than an unreadable wall of text.
Just get a couple of things out of the way first.

1. It takes two to tango (COLREGS Rule 17) Rule 17 . Both vessels will be apportioned some measure of blame, even the obvious "Stand On" vessel. Admiralty courts usually assign percentages. Doubtful this will go to an admiralty court, the USN will almost certainly just pay actual damages to the box boat owners and call it a day.

2. AIS. Automatic Identification System, it has been mentioned here in passing, but I think it almost certainly played a role in this collision. To the .mil folks, think of it as an advanced civilian TACAN or IFF. It is required on ALL merchant ships over 500 Tons and all passenger vessels over 100 tons. They are cheap, incredibly useful and even shrimp boats and small sailboats are carrying them now. Merchant sailors (over)rely on this system to a HUGE extent, most automatically assume that any vessel not transmitting AIS data* must be an insignificant dinghy. (*Lat/Lon, COG,HDG, SOG, ROT, vessel name, MMSI number, ship's particulars, you can even send ship to ship text messages over the thing.) EVERYBODY relies on these things, with one exception: The US Navy. If the Crystal's lookout was looking at the STBD quarter of the Fitz, all they would have seen is one 40 watt PERKO light bulb, that combined with a weak radar return from that aspect would have led the 3rd Mate to assume (if he was even aware of it) he was dealing with a small/slow target probably a small fishing vessel. The Fitzgerald was almost certainly receiving all this AIS data, along with the AIS data of approximately 50 other vessels within VHF range. They were not, however, TRANSMITTING any AIS data, which is why we don't know anything about their track. On most modern RADAR's the AIS data is automatically overlaid on the RADAR picture, to the extent that I have often rebuked Mates for selecting the AIS icon to track rather than the radar target return itself. Long story short, it would have been quite easy for the junior 3rd Mate standing the mid watch to not have ever acquired the Fitz on RADAR, because it wasn't broadcasting AIS.

3. Inexperience. It was the mid-watch, that means all the most junior personnel on both ships were on watch. The least experienced 3rd Mate almost always gets shafted with the balls to 4 on a merchant ship, ditto the lookout, who was probably the lowest OS (Ordinary Seaman) on the boat. That would have likely been the total number on watch (2) on the Crystal's bridge. It's a fairly crowded chunk of water so they would probably have actually been paying attention, though the ship would still have been on autopilot, and the captain would have been in the rack.

As for the Fitzgerald, this is a stickier wicket, and I might offend some former SWO's with my opinions here, but here is where things went way off the rails. "If It's Grey, Stay Away" is a long time merchant ship maxim, for good reason.
I already dogged on the poor Filipino 3rd Mate for barely knowing PORT from STBD, but he probably has 5 to 10 times the training and conning experience of the hapless JG or LT who had the Conn on the Fitzgerald. He possibly has more underway OICNW (Officer in Charge of a Navigational Watch) time than the CO and XO of the DDG combined. I had my 100 ton USCG license when I joined the navy back in the 80's. I worked for 2 CO's on a 700ft ship who were A-6 pilots. They had far less ship driving experience than I did then or any of the 3rd mates who work for me now, Senior full-bird Captains, one tour as XO on a surface combatant, that was IT. Correct me if I am wrong, but my guess is that the OOD (OICNW) on the Mid Watch on the Fitzgerald was most likely a LTJG who had recently got his water wings, or maybe a full LT, a distinction without a difference. Maybe he did an engineering rotation first and hasn't spent a lot of time on the bridge yet, Maybe he got hammered the day before, anyway, my point is that the Navy does a TERRIBLE job training people to drive ships. They spend most of their time learning all kinds of other important military shit, like the full specs on an AEGIS system, or the proper use of a Harpoon Missile, or how not to offend little Susie Rottencrotch's LGBGTXYZ snowflake sensibilities. There is a Naval training film called "Selected Collisions at Sea." Only the USN has enough collisions to have a "Best-of" collection, though the Coasties come in a close second. The Navy needs to work harder on training junior officers in the core competency of ship handling. Right now they spend far too much time on all the other stuff to ever really become good ship drivers. If they wind up with some specialists, vs the current attempt to cram everything into their little 22 yr old heads, so be it.

4. Information Overload. Another major issue on the bridge of a Navy ship is information overload. I'm sure CIC had a plot running on every surface target within 24 miles if not more, all the RF transmissions, CPA's Vessel types/speeds/nationalities, Probably updating all this info every 3 minutes, just a constant stream of numbers being barked out. The lookouts were calling in everything they could see, maybe as many as 20-30 visible targets judging from some of the AIS data I have looked at. Having transited the Straights of Gibraltar on a Navy bridge a dozen or more times, it was completely overwhelming from an informational standpoint, all the info coming up from CIC, all the lookout data, updates on track from the QMOW, lots of conversations, etc. The same transit on a Merchant vessel bridge is pretty easy, stay in the traffic scheme and don't run over anyone from behind. My point being that the bridge team on the Fitzgerald was probably out of their depth without realizing they were out of their depth.

5.
Anyway, it could have gone down a couple of ways. As for the Crystal, she makes her course change to port as planned and then 15 minutes later she's on top of the Fitzgerald. Oh Shit. Can't stop, All you can do is turn (NEVER TURN LEFT is one of the implied rules in COLREGS), so they turn right or are pushed to the right by the force of the collision. Maybe they saw the Fitz at the last minute, maybe they knew she was there the whole time, Maybe they didn't have a clue until the bang. We will find this out because the Crystal has a VDR (Voyage Data Recorder) It will have at the minimum, a full voice recording, any radio conversations, and any maneuvering information, possibly the RADAR plot as well.
As for the Fitzgerald there are a number of possibilities. They (OOD/JOOD/CIC) could have just lost track of the Crystal in all the informational gobbledygook. They could have been paying attention and misunderstood the information and then made some bad choices.
There could easily have been one or more other ships in the picture (it's quite common, though COLREGS
calls it a "Special Situation") Meaning that you have 2 or more ships with a risk of collision, Perhaps you are the "Stand On" vessel to contact #1 but the "Give Way" Vessel to ships #2 and #3 and they all require a different course to change your CPA to a safe distance. I ALWAYS have it in my standing orders to be called for any "Special Situation" Because this is where things can go wrong in a hurry if you do not have a really good grasp of a tactical plot. Personally I have a feeling that they were aware of the Crystal, but they waited too long and then did the wrong thing. (Probably sped up, a familiar Navy reaction) It's much harder to hit shit when you are stopped.
Last but not least is the hesitance of the USN to simply pick up the fucking VHF and say, "Vessel So and So, this is US Navy Warship off your port bow, can you alter course to Starboard?" They hardly ever do this.
Fucking OPSEC.

quote:

Originally posted by Balzé Halzé:

quote:

Originally posted by Poacher:
I spent two weeks in the Navy, so can speak with some authority on this. Okay, so that's a joke, but I did spend two weeks on the USS Blueridge for an exercise as an "embarkee" USAF guy.
All those guys did was drill, drill, drill 24/7. Fire drills. Intruder drills. Flooding drills. All the damn time.
Has discipline changed that much? And I do understand what the BR is, even though the boss was not on it.

When it comes to fire and emergencies, Navy personnel are second to none in damage control. I don't think that has changed much.

The issue is experienced seamanship on the bridge. Naval officers simply don't have it compared to a professional US merchant mariner.

So you would say the watch standers are not trained as well, or simply not doing their jobs?

Prayers to the crew of both ships. However, what is going on with our NAVY and all the collisions ???? God Bless

quote:

So you would say the watch standers are not trained as well, or simply not doing their jobs?

Well trained watchstanders do their jobs.

Poorly trained / disciplined watchstanders don't know what to do, so they have no idea when they aren't doing it.

quote:

Originally posted by Poacher:

quote:

Originally posted by Balzé Halzé:

quote:

Originally posted by Poacher:
I spent two weeks in the Navy, so can speak with some authority on this. Okay, so that's a joke, but I did spend two weeks on the USS Blueridge for an exercise as an "embarkee" USAF guy.
All those guys did was drill, drill, drill 24/7. Fire drills. Intruder drills. Flooding drills. All the damn time.
Has discipline changed that much? And I do understand what the BR is, even though the boss was not on it.

When it comes to fire and emergencies, Navy personnel are second to none in damage control. I don't think that has changed much.

The issue is experienced seamanship on the bridge. Naval officers simply don't have it compared to a professional US merchant mariner.

So you would say the watch standers are not trained as well, or simply not doing their jobs?

They aren't doing the job. Whether that is due to ignorance or apathy or what I can't imagine.

There is just no way another ship ought to get within 1,000 yards without attracting the most intense attention. If it is getting attention getting close, you do something to get out of the way. It will cost the Captain his career, maybe the XO and the watchstanders too, likely.

Maybe the surface fleet ought to have a stand down for stupid study or something.

I pray the crew is safe and everyone is recovered alive.

I can't believe this...I spent 26 years in the Navy and never heard of anything like this so soon after another incident.

quote:

Originally posted by Balzé Halzé:

quote:

Originally posted by Poacher:
I spent two weeks in the Navy, so can speak with some authority on this. Okay, so that's a joke, but I did spend two weeks on the USS Blueridge for an exercise as an "embarkee" USAF guy.
All those guys did was drill, drill, drill 24/7. Fire drills. Intruder drills. Flooding drills. All the damn time.
Has discipline changed that much? And I do understand what the BR is, even though the boss was not on it.

When it comes to fire and emergencies, Navy personnel are second to none in damage control. I don't think that has changed much.

The issue is experienced seamanship on the bridge. Naval officers simply don't have it compared to a professional US merchant mariner.

As a professional mariner I agree whole heartedly. You cannot just promote people through the ranks to captain and all of them being a good captain. A person either has the ability to be a great captain or they don't. And no matter how much you train the ones that don't, they will never be a great captain. Most don't have what it takes, and most people cannot become what it takes.

All of these accidents, from navy ships that have more trained officers than the freighters have in total crew. That tanker is only going to have a crew of 24 or less, most likely and no more than 32 total crew. Here you have a destroyer with almost 400 crew. It's almost unfathomable. Not to mention they run freighters with only 2 or 3 total people on a watch. Captain or first officer, and 1 or 2 junior officers on watch. Yet the navy runs many times that and still manages to have this many accidents.

Seems like the time spent on diversity and inclusion over 8 years of the last administration was well spent.

No reason to think, now, that they should have been learning about and practicing anything else...

After reading Capt Mikes thoughts, it's makes more sense.

Newbies always ask why we need a rule for this or that, and the answer is always "because someone was killed or maimed or we broke a bunch of expensive stuff, so now we have that rule".

quote:

Originally posted by Poacher:

quote:

Originally posted by Balzé Halzé:

quote:

Originally posted by Poacher:
I spent two weeks in the Navy, so can speak with some authority on this. Okay, so that's a joke, but I did spend two weeks on the USS Blueridge for an exercise as an "embarkee" USAF guy.
All those guys did was drill, drill, drill 24/7. Fire drills. Intruder drills. Flooding drills. All the damn time.
Has discipline changed that much? And I do understand what the BR is, even though the boss was not on it.

When it comes to fire and emergencies, Navy personnel are second to none in damage control. I don't think that has changed much.

The issue is experienced seamanship on the bridge. Naval officers simply don't have it compared to a professional US merchant mariner.

So you would say the watch standers are not trained as well, or simply not doing their jobs?

I'm simply talking about experience. Training only gets you so far. For some situations, it's just hard to overstate how valuable raw knowledge and experience is.

Constant training for fire, flooding, etc over and over and over again works. It really does. People automatically jump into action at the sound of that general alarm and just know what to do. It's reaction after the fact.

Knowing what to do before that general alarm has to be pulled is where experience rules the day. Training is the foundation.