quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:
Further drift....

What are the requirements for these various master’s licenses?

A friend of mine in San Diego used to make two cruises to Dammam, Saudi Arabia a year, from the US, for really good money.

I believe he qualified solely based on his Navy officer experience and training. Maybe he took a test or several. My understanding is that he did not have to take courses. This was ~35 years ago, too.

A LOT of requirements have been added in the last 35 years.

A LOT of requirements were added in 2012 ish that went into effect last year, so that professional mariners had to take several weeks of classes to keep our licenses current. But we could also do 1 license upgrade under the old requirements prior to Jan 1st 2017, but still had to take several classes to keep our license current even if not upgrading. Also some classes that you took once and done, now need to be retaken at every single license renewal such as STCW basic safety training and fire fighting.

Here is the official USCG checklist for master over 500 GT under 3000GT

http://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portal..._fm_nmc5_205_web.pdf

I don't know about the Navy, but I do have several peers that are former USCG. They served 12 years and 20 years in the USCG and both left the USCG with USCG merchant mariner licenses. One held a USCG 1600 GRT/3000GT master. The other I think an unlimited master license. They took their courses from the USCG while in the USCG. One was the master of a USCG 378' buoy tender in the Bering Sea while in the USCG. They both do what I do, and reduced their license at renewal time to 500GRT/1600GT masters due to the very high expense of carrying/renewing the USCG license with the new regulations and classes required to keep that license level (continuing education).

If you're working in the commercial merchant mariner side of things, the company you work for will pay you your weekly pay plus all expenses (flights, hotel, food, etc.) to take the classes to upgrade.

Here is the upgrade package that lists all of the classes depending on your tonnage and seatime (but need to already have been a Captain for a number of years holding a 200GT master) starts at $15,999 and starting at 15 weeks of classes (for 500 gross ton master oceans, and more time and expense for classes for a 1600 or 3000 master which all need to be completed within 1 year. BUT, just the Celestial Navigation course that's required is a 14 day course and $1999, and is one of about 14 courses. These ALL have to be done in 1 year and license upgraded submitted or else you have to retake them as they're useless.

http://www.mptusa.com/program-...s-results.cfm?pid=13

This message has been edited. Last edited by: jimmy123x,

Most US unlimited deck license holders (75%+) are graduates of one of the seven four-year accredited maritime academies in the US.
Here is the curriculum for the USMMA'

https://www.usmma.edu/sites/us...Curriculum2017_1.pdf

So first a 4 year degree in Nautical Science, Engineering etc. Then you take a 3rd Mates exam. Do 360 days of time underway as a 3rd mate (minimum) and you can take the 2nd Mate exam, etc. These exams are not easy, most people will not pass unless they spend several months studying. it is usually about 10-13 hours of testing spread over 2 days for each exam.

Here is the USCG checklist for Unlimited Master:

http://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portal..._fm_nmc5_202_web.pdf

But before you get there you must do everything on the checklists for Chief Mate, Second Mate, Third Mate, with sufficient time in rate to sit for each upgrade. Also must qualify and hold an endorsement for Able Seaman Unlimited.
Everything is in the CFRs, Titles 46 and 35, primarily.
Here is the USCG licensing website if you are REALLY interested.
http://www.dco.uscg.mil/Our-Or...nal-Maritime-Center/
I came up the long way, through the hawsepipe. Not counting the sailing circumnavigation I did in the 70's I have been at sea professionally and almost continuously (250 to 320 days per year underway) since 1989.
So despite merely engaging the "leisurely hauling of dog shit", we are also navigational, ship-handling and ship management specialists, and most of us do a pretty fair job of safely hauling dog shit from A to B without incident. Most of us don't know anything about the capability of military SONAR, SAM systems, AEGIS, NIXIE (dating myself with that one), EM countermeasures, etc, etc. etc.

Naval officers (Line) are specialists as well, but they rarely (never) stay as focused on one job for 30 years. The USN needs to rededicate themselves to the core competencies of seafarers, not so much focus on being; technology experts, weapons systems specialists, social justice activists, etc. Just my $.02

Just staggering, mind boggling incompetence.

I'd put a newly licensed Pakistani 3rd Mate up against the CO's and XO's of the Fitz and McCain for straight up navigational knowledge. He's going to know exactly zip about 99% of what concerns the CO of a DDG, but he isn't going to have a collision or run aground. He's going to know the COLREGS backwards and forwards, and he certainly isn't going to run his ship across traffic entering/leaving a traffic separation scheme. Last but not least, despite his crappy English, if he has any doubts about what another vessel is doing, or if he has any problems with his vessel which may impact the vessels around him, he's going straight to VHF 16 to clarify and inform.

quote:

Originally posted by Zecpull:
So at What point does the Navy realize that Training is cheaper than rebuilding ships? I understand they are changing some things.. But I am not seeing that a Massive training of all people involved with maneuvering ships need much more training.
These guys have time they should be in class as much as possible. If needed bring in some retired old guys..

This is just one write up/report. There will be many reports, along with changes with how ships are certified and the type/level of instruction handed down by the Fleet Forces Command and Chief of Naval Personnel. As others have pointed out, there's a lot of care and oversight to how Navy aviation and submarine communities are looked after, and while the SWO community has for decades gutted-it-out on coffee and No Doze, clearly all the changes and compromises of the last decade and half has caught up and all the coffee in the world can't make up for that fact.

Moreover, the report reveals a level of nonchalance in obeying orders on the Fitzgerald which may be limited to that particular officer, or perhaps the command environment. The CO had been XO until a month or so before. There may be issues there, but that is not sufficient to justify the conclusion that all PacFleet officers are subpar.

It is true, too, that having elected the novel and imaginative approach to handle this on his own, the OOD did not distinguish himself in his seamanship or navigational prowess. He may be unique, though. The track, which we did not have before, is fairly damning. Some day we will learn the training and experience level of this poor fellow.

The details, where the devil often is, may be more revealing one way or the other.

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:
Moreover, the report reveals a level of nonchalance in obeying orders on the Fitzgerald which may be limited to that particular officer, or perhaps the command environment. The CO had been XO until a month or so before. There may be issues there, but that is not sufficient to justify the conclusion that all PacFleet officers are subpar.

It is true, too, that having elected the novel and imaginative approach to handle this on his own, the OOD did not distinguish himself in his seamanship or navigational prowess. He may be unique, though. The track, which we did not have before, is fairly damning. Some day we will learn the training and experience level of this poor fellow.

The details, where the devil often is, may be more revealing one way or the other.

Most of the issues seem to revolve around the Pacfleet. The Fitzgerald, Mccain, and the Antietam running aground in a harbor. My gut level feeling is the incompetence runs the gammet from the CO down there and they need to switch out CO's and XO's and retrain and re-evaluate them from top to bottom, as well as retrain or at least evaluate the entire crews. Well considering all 3 boats are in shipyards, now would be the time to retrain all of those sailors. It is not known if the incompetency is the same in other fleets and they've just gotten lucky, or it does not.

But it's sort of when someone buys a failed restaurant that was once on top, they clear out all of the personel and start from scratch.

The other issue is that everyone in the industry wants to give the least trained crew members the night shift, because none of the higher ranking or better experienced (more time in) officers want to do the night shift. And on ships, boats, yachts and murphys law, shit almost always happens at night. Night is also when you need to be extra vigalent navigating. The difference is though as Captain Mike pointed out, the lowest or newest crew navigating the vessel are still going to know their stuff inside and out when it comes to navigating the vessel.

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:
Moreover, the report reveals a level of nonchalance in obeying orders on the Fitzgerald which may be limited to that particular officer, or perhaps the command environment. The CO had been XO until a month or so before. There may be issues there, but that is not sufficient to justify the conclusion that all PacFleet officers are subpar.

It is true, too, that having elected the novel and imaginative approach to handle this on his own, the OOD did not distinguish himself in his seamanship or navigational prowess. He may be unique, though. The track, which we did not have before, is fairly damning. Some day we will learn the training and experience level of this poor fellow.

The details, where the devil often is, may be more revealing one way or the other.

Most of the issues seem to revolve around the Pacfleet. The Fitzgerald, Mccain, and the Antietam running aground in a harbor. My gut level feeling is the incompetence runs the gammet from the CO down there and they need to switch out CO's and XO's and retrain and re-evaluate them from top to bottom, as well as retrain or at least evaluate the entire crews. Well considering all 3 boats are in shipyards, now would be the time to retrain all of those sailors. It is not known if the incompetency is the same in other fleets and they've just gotten lucky, or it does not.

But it's sort of when someone buys a failed restaurant that was once on top, they clear out all of the personel and start from scratch.

The other issue is that everyone in the industry wants to give the least trained crew members the night shift, because none of the higher ranking or better experienced (more time in) officers want to do the night shift. And on ships, boats, yachts and murphys law, shit almost always happens at night. Night is also when you need to be extra vigalent navigating. The difference is though as Captain Mike pointed out, the lowest or newest crew navigating the vessel are still going to know their stuff inside and out when it comes to navigating the vessel.

The less you know, the easier it is to imagine all these horribles. Fashioning solutions based on gut feelings is not often regarded as sensible by those who know what they are doing.

With few exceptions, the watch bill on a ship is a rotation, designed so that watch standers have the duty at different times. The XO probably can make adjustments for good reason but in a multi day at sea period, the overnight duty revolves so that the same guys aren’t getting the midwatch all the time. Without the details of this officer and the CO, there are no conclusions to be drawn as to whether he alone was inexperienced and undertrained or that circumstance pervades the entire wardroom, or the entire fleet. All we know at this point, more than we knew a week ago, is that the traffic was observed and dealt with grossly improperly, and that this OOD had ignored orders to notify the Captain on several occasions. Whether this was his first watch as OOD (unlikely) or he was a seasoned veteran (less likely), we do not know.

You cannot conclude from these incidents that “the incompetence runs the gammet from the CO down there and they need to switch out CO's and XO's and retrain and re-evaluate them from top to bottom, as well as retrain or at least evaluate the entire crews.”. For one thing, the incidents appear to arise from different causes. Ignoring standing orders by the OOD is different from the CO not understanding the helm/engine throttles, and the effective action taken to alleviate those situations is different. Retraining everyone in the fleet is neither called for, nor likely.

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:
Moreover, the report reveals a level of nonchalance in obeying orders on the Fitzgerald which may be limited to that particular officer, or perhaps the command environment. The CO had been XO until a month or so before. There may be issues there, but that is not sufficient to justify the conclusion that all PacFleet officers are subpar.

It is true, too, that having elected the novel and imaginative approach to handle this on his own, the OOD did not distinguish himself in his seamanship or navigational prowess. He may be unique, though. The track, which we did not have before, is fairly damning. Some day we will learn the training and experience level of this poor fellow.

The details, where the devil often is, may be more revealing one way or the other.

Most of the issues seem to revolve around the Pacfleet. The Fitzgerald, Mccain, and the Antietam running aground in a harbor. My gut level feeling is the incompetence runs the gammet from the CO down there and they need to switch out CO's and XO's and retrain and re-evaluate them from top to bottom, as well as retrain or at least evaluate the entire crews. Well considering all 3 boats are in shipyards, now would be the time to retrain all of those sailors. It is not known if the incompetency is the same in other fleets and they've just gotten lucky, or it does not.

But it's sort of when someone buys a failed restaurant that was once on top, they clear out all of the personel and start from scratch.

The other issue is that everyone in the industry wants to give the least trained crew members the night shift, because none of the higher ranking or better experienced (more time in) officers want to do the night shift. And on ships, boats, yachts and murphys law, shit almost always happens at night. Night is also when you need to be extra vigalent navigating. The difference is though as Captain Mike pointed out, the lowest or newest crew navigating the vessel are still going to know their stuff inside and out when it comes to navigating the vessel.

The less you know, the easier it is to imagine all these horribles. Fashioning solutions based on gut feelings is not often regarded as sensible by those who know what they are doing.

With few exceptions, the watch bill on a ship is a rotation, designed so that watch standers have the duty at different times. The XO probably can make adjustments for good reason but in a multi day at sea period, the overnight duty revolves so that the same guys aren’t getting the midwatch all the time. Without the details of this officer and the CO, there are no conclusions to be drawn as to whether he alone was inexperienced and undertrained or that circumstance pervades the entire wardroom, or the entire fleet. All we know at this point, more than we knew a week ago, is that the traffic was observed and dealt with grossly improperly, and that this OOD had ignored orders to notify the Captain on several occasions. Whether this was his first watch as OOD (unlikely) or he was a seasoned veteran (less likely), we do not know.

You cannot conclude from these incidents that “the incompetence runs the gammet from the CO down there and they need to switch out CO's and XO's and retrain and re-evaluate them from top to bottom, as well as retrain or at least evaluate the entire crews.”. For one thing, the incidents appear to arise from different causes. Ignoring standing orders by the OOD is different from the CO not understanding the helm/engine throttles, and the effective action taken to alleviate those situations is different. Retraining everyone in the fleet is neither called for, nor likely.

It has been shown that both watch standing crews of the Mccain and Fitzgerald were completely incompetent. The Antithieum running aground IN Tokyo Harbor pretty much shows them to be incompetent as well. It ABSOLUTELY involves the CO, as that is the person who is responsible for EVERYTHING that happens on his ship.

As a Captain (CO) it is your duty to evaluate the ENTIRE crew underneath you. It is especially your job to evaluate the OOD who is going to be running the ship while you're sleeping. If you have an OOD that is not competent, you certainly don't put them on a midwatch and certainly not on midwatch through a busy shipping channel. You take the time yourself to train them on what they do not know and get them up to speed. AND, if you have to use them as OOD, you schedule them on shifts they're less likely to get into trouble and you pair them up with the best person underneath them that you have.

As a CO or Captain do you know what your #1 skill is????? Your Decision Making and Risk Mitigation skills.

I've done a lot of long deliveries with overnight running, in busy shipping lanes. If I have a Captain underneath me that is not at the level he should be, as sometimes we all get stuck with one of those. I will NEVER schedule him on the midwatch because I would never be able to sleep with him at the helm and it's by far the most dangerous watch. Most of the crew is sleeping, a lot of people on watch get bored and sleepy on it, and etc. etc. If you have a fire or flooding situation, it's the shift that takes any crew the longest to muster and start attacking. I will schedule the inexperienced or incompetent one for the easy (ie daytime) watches AND pair him up with the best First Mate I have so that I have someone on the bridge that is competent. I have several first mates I use, that are better than half of the Captains I've come across at navigating and I can trust them explicitly. I also schedule myself to be on watch in the sections that carry a higher amount of risk...ie busy shipping lanes, channels, etc. YOU DO NOT PUT SOMEONE ON THE BRIDGE THAT DOES NOT KNOW THE SYSTEMS. I think all of the other merchant mariners on here will chime in and do the same thing.

AND YES, the ENTIRE watch standing crews need to be evaluated from all 3 ships and most likely all need more training. You do realize an evaluation is a test right???? One that they should've taken to get to their position.

One thing I know from this thread is Jimmy123 knows Jimmy321 back and front, up and down.

THIS I KNOW.

quote:

Originally posted by RHINOWSO:
One thing I know from this thread is Jimmy123 knows Jimmy321 back and front, up and down.

THIS I KNOW.

???

As an addendum to what dreadnaught posted, writer Bryan McGrath will be the guest on the podcast Midrats, which is a Navy focused weekly discussion with bloggers Cdr Salamander and Eagle One Sun afternoon. Should post either late Sun or, Monday.

Episode 409: USS FITZGERALD & MCCAIN Collisions; Observations with Bryan McGrath

quote:

This week saw the release of the reports on the collision reports and Comprehensive Review of the incidents this summer between merchant ships in WESTPAC and the destroyers USS FITZGERALD and USS MCCAIN.

The totally avoidable collisions resulted in the death of 17 Sailors and removal from our most important theater two of our most critical assets.

Our guest for the full hour will be Bryan McGrath, CDR, USN (Ret.).

Cdr Salamander, one of the better blogs regarding the Navy, particularly his specialty the surface Navy has his thoughts on the latest report

quote:

The FITZGERALD and MCCAIN’s MEMO - The Problem is Us
There will be more to come from the ongoing investigations in to the collisions of the USS FITZGERALD (DDG 62) and USS MCCAIN (DDG 56) that took place earlier this year. At each release, we should take some time to look at what is being presented and not just focus on the unit level failures – which are legion – but use those data points to see where they point towards the larger factors that led them to their unnecessary but logical end.

One of the factors often at play in these incidents is the very strong incentive, even requirement, when given an order by a superior, is to salute, “Aye aye, sir,” and get moving to carry it out. This is expected whether you can do it or not.

The Captain of a ship takes command, and has the crew that is there. He or she these days, has very little, if any, say in who is on the ship, and may not know any, or many, of the officers and principal chiefs on which his performance will depend. Are they trained? Experienced? Sound judgment?

Are the systems all working, adequately, properly maintained?

Does it ever happen that you get orders to be C.O. of the USS Squalid, and in the pre change of command reviews, say, “nope, I’m not taking this steaming pile.”

After reading the report on the 2 patrol boats captured by Iran, I am convinced that was an enormous part of the serious equipment, training and personnal deficiencies contributing to that fiasco. Nobody dared raise their hand and say, “ahhh, maybe this isn’t a good idea. The engines are not up to snuff, the radios don’t work, the nav gear is a mystery and the gunners have no experience.” Some commander up above wants it done, so his staff gets busy and dreams up a plan, orders it, the next guy salutes and gets busy tasking his guys, and down at the boat level, the poor slub sets out to sea unprepared, ill equipped, ill trained, and might not even realize it. What would happen if that Lieutenant had told his boss it ought not be done, the engines are not sound, the nav gear, the comm, the guns are all problems and no paper charts?

Nobody admits that “readiness,” the holy grail, is like the Emperor’s clothes. Everyone pretends to see it, but the Emperor ends up looking foolish.

quote:

Originally posted by RHINOWSO:
One thing I know from this thread is Jimmy123 knows Jimmy321 back and front, up and down.

THIS I KNOW.

Hey, it is one of the known known's.

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:


The Captain of a ship takes command, and has the crew that is there. He or she these days, has very little, if any, say in who is on the ship, and may not know any, or many, of the officers and principal chiefs on which his performance will depend. Are they trained? Experienced? Sound judgment?

At the majority of commands in the last 2 decades I was active duty, the CO was usually XO for 18 months or so prior to taking over. He ought to know who is who.

quote:

Originally posted by Sigolicious:

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:


The Captain of a ship takes command, and has the crew that is there. He or she these days, has very little, if any, say in who is on the ship, and may not know any, or many, of the officers and principal chiefs on which his performance will depend. Are they trained? Experienced? Sound judgment?

At the majority of commands in the last 2 decades I was active duty, the CO was usually XO for 18 months or so prior to taking over. He ought to know who is who.

In airdale commands yes. In the surface Navy not always. Every CG i was on had a Captain O6 as CO and a LCDR O4 as the XO

quote:

Originally posted by Sigolicious:

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:


The Captain of a ship takes command, and has the crew that is there. He or she these days, has very little, if any, say in who is on the ship, and may not know any, or many, of the officers and principal chiefs on which his performance will depend. Are they trained? Experienced? Sound judgment?

At the majority of commands in the last 2 decades I was active duty, the CO was usually XO for 18 months or so prior to taking over. He ought to know who is who.

How common is this nowadays? I got out in 1989, but the more common practice back then was to promote an XO to a NEW command/ship, usually very similar, but a different ship.

The logic expressed to me at the time was that the existing crew would have an easier time transitioning to new officer as XO or CO, especially during non-wartime footing. Why? Because the XO was traditionally seen as the bad cop in the top two hierarchy of the CO and XO. As a result, there was usually a fair amount of animus towards an XO, which required a transfer to a new command so he could start on a fresh footing. Prior to my discharge in 1989, I don't remember ever hearing of an XO assuming the position of CO at the same command that wasn't considered temporary until a suitable NEW officer could be appointed... Just asking when and if this was actually changed.

For DDG 62 Fitzgerald

From 2011 to 2017 there 5 DDG 62 XO's in a row who were then made CO of DDG62

CDR Mutty
CDR Schitz
LCDR England
CDR Shu
CDR Benson

quote:

Originally posted by sdy:
For DDG 62 Fitzgerald

From 2011 to 2017 there 5 DDG 62 XO's in a row who were then made CO of DDG62

CDR Mutty
CDR Schitz
LCDR England
CDR Shu
CDR Benson

I have to wonder how the second commander pronounced his name.

Here's a worth-reading piece by a serving officer on why “there seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today,” as Adm. Beatty once put it, about Jutland.

https://warontherocks.com/2017...racker=1736992x84899

quote:

Originally posted by MTJbyrd:
Here's a worth-reading piece by a serving officer on why “there seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today,” as Adm. Beatty once put it, about Jutland.

https://warontherocks.com/2017...racker=1736992x84899

It certainly is. Thanks a meg!

So the Chinese didn't have to fuck up our navy. We did it.