quote:

Originally posted by Hound Dog:
For any of our US Navy guys (current and former), based on the above timeline, was the crew as grossly incompetent as this makes them appear?

As I indicated above, this seems like a complete FUBAR of unimaginable proportions.

Nobody needs a zillion dollar bunch of radar and electronics to see “steady bearing, decreasing range”, realize the implications and DO SOMETHING.

The JOOD reported that visually 10 minutes before the collision. The OOD, of course, bears full responsibility including failure to comply with orders to notify the Captain of CPAs within 6,000 yards as we speculated.

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Nobody needs a zillion dollsr bunch of radar and electronics to see “steady bearing, decreasing range”, realize the implications and DO SOMETHING.

I took a class once on coastal navigation and this is one of only two things I remember. If you see another boat and you line up part of your boat, like a stanchion, and the other boat stays lined up with the part of your boat you choose for a period of time, then you are on a collision course. The other thing I remember was if you are the give way vessel and are on a collision course, aim for the stern of the other boat. Hopefully, by the time you get there, the other boat will be gone.

Of course, when I'm out on a boat it's just me identifying, deciding, and executing.

The Junior Officer of the Deck gave good advice at 0120 and 0122. DDG 62 was doing 20 knots (almost 700 yards per minute)

Slowing down would have helped as long as they also avoided Wan Hai. (although not clear in the Navy diagram, Wan Hai had turned to the NE at 0119)

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Originally posted by trapper189:
The other thing I remember was if you are the give way vessel and are on a collision course, aim for the stern of the other boat. Hopefully, by the time you get there, the other boat will be gone.

Of course, when I'm out on a boat it's just me identifying, deciding, and executing.

You don’t want to leave it to hope. You have to take action early enough, and adequate enough to assure safe passage, not merely miss.

These are summaries from the detailed report

DDG 56 John S McCain

I never imagined this level of mind boggling incompetence when trying to figure out how this happened. It's astounding and very concerning.

JALLEN, I would edit the subject line to indicate that a report is now out explaining the collision. Some may overlook this development.

You'd think John McCain himself was on the bridge steering.

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Originally posted by BamaJeepster:
JALLEN, I would edit the subject line to indicate that a report is now out explaining the collision. Some may overlook this development.

Excellent idea! Thanks!

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Originally posted by JALLEN:

quote:

Originally posted by BamaJeepster:
JALLEN, I would edit the subject line to indicate that a report is now out explaining the collision. Some may overlook this development.

Excellent idea! Thanks!

I'd love for some more of our Navy brothers to see this and chime in on the report.

Also, this may have been covered somewhere, but I'd be interested in the makeup of a typical watch - in pay grades. All the Navy terms mean nothing to me, a certified land lubber.

Like a full strength Army platoon (back in my day) would be an O-1 or O-2 with an E-7 and several E-6's and E-5's to give the young officer many years of experience to lean on.

It's hard to believe so many things went wrong and there didn't seem to be anyone with sufficient experience or training to sort any of it out. I can't imagine that crew in a combat situation - it's really scary to contemplate.

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Originally posted by BamaJeepster:

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:

quote:

Originally posted by BamaJeepster:
JALLEN, I would edit the subject line to indicate that a report is now out explaining the collision. Some may overlook this development.

Excellent idea! Thanks!

I'd love for some more of our Navy brothers to see this and chime in on the report.

Also, this may have been covered somewhere, but I'd be interested in the makeup of a typical watch - in pay grades. All the Navy terms mean nothing to me, a certified land lubber.

Like a full strength Army platoon (back in my day) would be an O-1 or O-2 with an E-7 and several E-6's and E-5's to give the young officer many years of experience to lean on.

It's hard to believe so many things went wrong and there didn't seem to be anyone with sufficient experience or training to sort any of it out. I can't imagine that crew in a combat situation - it's really scary to contemplate.

The OOD on a ship like this is likely either an O-3 or about to become one, maybe an O-4. The CO and XO on these ships were all O-5s. The JOOD is typically an O-1 or O-2. It varies from watch to watch as well. You make up the watch bill with qualified OODs that you have available. The Captain and XO don’t stand watches ordinarily. The OOD is the “Captain” temporarily, he approves or disapproves everything in the Captain’s place.

In my day, the helmsman and lee helmsman were non-rated, E-2 or 3. They take orders only from the officer who has the CONN. The quartermaster of the watch was a petty officer E-4 through E-6. Same for Boatswain’s Mate. A lot depends on who is available.

The illustration on page 7 shows a CONN as a manned station. That’s a luxury I’m unfamiliar with. On the DDs and DEs, the CONN is whichever officer is giving the orders, most always the OOD, but he may hand off the CONN for whatever reason. That is always recorded. Whoever has the CONN will say, “Mr. Jones has the CONN.” Mr. Jones says, “I have the CONN.” And the quartermaster records that in the ship's log, with the time. The QM also logs steering and engine commands, the Captain on the bridge, leaving the bridge.

CIC is manned by a couple radar operators and a CIC officer, maybe a trainee or two. Some watches will have an appropriately rated Chief PO in an officer slot, as needed. I suppose a Chief with good experience etc might serve as OOD or JOOD, uncommon as far as I saw.

Lookouts should be posted fore and aft, and on each side, usually non-rated, or lower petty officers.

In my day, there were radio operators in the radio shack and signalmen on the signal bridge always manning their posts. They don’t have those anymore.

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Originally posted by JALLEN:
Even that somewhat sugar coated account exceeds my imagined level of incompetence.

A real FUBAR, both of them. Yikes!

Which is what I've been saying the ENTIRE TIME and getting ragged on for it. The crew was incompetent and horrible navigators on both destroyers. Which is the result of not the proper training and/or promoting people through the ranks far faster than their experience allows.

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Originally posted by jimmy123x:

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:
Even that somewhat sugar coated account exceeds my imagined level of incompetence.

A real FUBAR, both of them. Yikes!

Which is what I've been saying the ENTIRE TIME and getting ragged on for it. The crew was incompetent and horrible navigators on both destroyers. Which is the result of not the proper training and/or promoting people through the ranks far faster than their experience allows.

Well, maybe you were claiming it before the evidence came out? You could not have known what was in this report. Maybe the rest of us were giving them the benefit of the doubt, instead of immediately ragging the crew out before all the facts were in. . .

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Originally posted by BamaJeepster:


I'd love for some more of our Navy brothers to see this and chime in on the report...

It's worse than I'd imagined. I was hoping that the OODs had dropped the ball but that the bridge teams themselves were essentially sound. This wasn't the case; the report indicates that a person with a clue was a rarity, and was ignored when found. For God's sake, having the BMOW take over the helm because the helmsman can't follow rudder orders? Or not knowing how to transfer control from one station to another? Not knowing the course, speed, and CPA of the surrounding contacts? Unimaginable.

I've never been WestPac, but I've been through the Suez Canal and other joyfully tight locations, and the entry/exits to such spots were pretty busy (the memory is fuzzy, but I think being in the traffic separation lanes was less stressful than the funnels of chaos on either end). Every contact had a maneuvering board solution worked up on the bridge, with course, speed, and CPA of the contact. This was mirrored in CIC, and a lot of comparing notes took place. We burned through MoBoard paper at rate that made the Supply Officer cry. The CO got told of every required contact - except one that I thought the JOOD told him about, but he hadn't. The ass chewing I got for that calm, port-to-port passage at about a half-a-mile was memorable, and it was deserved, because the boss didn't know about the contact beforehand. We were many miles from the Suez lanes by that time, and the contacts were only coming 10 or 20 per hour then. The boss wasn't on the bridge, but he wasn't getting any peace, either.

Point is, we had a smaller ship, smaller crew, fewer watchstanders, and cruder technology, but still somehow made it all happen as it was supposed to. We were busy as bees, but it wasn't a goat rope, and nobody was fool enough to let anything distract them from their duties.

I think we did it that way because that's how the boss wanted it done... Sadly, I think both the Fitzgerald and McCain bridge teams were doing it how *their* bosses wanted it done, too. You cannot accumulate that many fuckups in one space at one time without setting it up well in advance.

quote:

Originally posted by BamaJeepster:
I never imagined this level of mind boggling incompetence when trying to figure out how this happened. It's astounding and very concerning.

Great observation. As I think back to theories about Russian hacking into the steering control, etc. I am reminded to never ascribe to malice what can be explicated by incompetence and the simplest explanation is usually correct.

The ships I was on had several helm stations...

At the helm was a switch that the helman had, to switch control to the lee helm or to an "open bridge", this switch turned on the little lamps above each dial to illuminate them. When switched, the main helm lights turned off....

It was not that hard to figure out that the (main)helm was no longer being run from that particular station.

The throttles were all ganged together, so that if you were at the open bridge you could watch the handles move as the throttles were adjusted inside the main bridge or if the throttles were being manipulated from the engine room.

There is a series of qualifications that one must attain to become responsible for any type of job aboard a ship (even if you held that job on another ship-you had to prove it by re-qualifying) there is PQS for everything, like "Lookout", "Helmsman" "JOOD" "OOD" "Watchstander" and different jobs for engineers below decks....

I was a third class Gunner's Mate on one ship but there was only 16 crew, so I learned how to navigate and eventually was a helmsman, lookout, jood....It really isnt that freaking hard....

The skipper had very few standing orders and one of them was "Don't hit anything big" we were allowed to deviate course w/o his permission up to 15 degrees to avoid other ships or go check things out..

On that ship the watch consisted of 1 engineer, 1 OOD, 1 jood/nav, 1 lookout/bmow....we made it work.

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Originally posted by Hound Dog:

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:
Even that somewhat sugar coated account exceeds my imagined level of incompetence.

A real FUBAR, both of them. Yikes!

Which is what I've been saying the ENTIRE TIME and getting ragged on for it. The crew was incompetent and horrible navigators on both destroyers. Which is the result of not the proper training and/or promoting people through the ranks far faster than their experience allows.

Well, maybe you were claiming it before the evidence came out? You could not have known what was in this report. Maybe the rest of us were giving them the benefit of the doubt, instead of immediately ragging the crew out before all the facts were in. . .

As a Captain, I don't have to read the report to come up with a very good idea of what happened. You're talking about getting run over by a freighter that's a city block long. If anyone was simply looking out the windows on the ship, they would have visually seen it coming. You don't need any electronics or hardly any training to realize a huge ship is bearing down on you if you simply are watching out the windows or standing a watch on the exterior of the vessel. The problem is a few souls on here simply DID NOT want to hear that it could be the crew and the way the Navy is training their crew.

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Originally posted by jimmy123x:

quote:

Originally posted by Hound Dog:

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:
Even that somewhat sugar coated account exceeds my imagined level of incompetence.

A real FUBAR, both of them. Yikes!

Which is what I've been saying the ENTIRE TIME and getting ragged on for it. The crew was incompetent and horrible navigators on both destroyers. Which is the result of not the proper training and/or promoting people through the ranks far faster than their experience allows.

Well, maybe you were claiming it before the evidence came out? You could not have known what was in this report. Maybe the rest of us were giving them the benefit of the doubt, instead of immediately ragging the crew out before all the facts were in. . .

As a Captain, I don't have to read the report to come up with a very good idea of what happened. You're talking about getting run over by a freighter that's a city block long. If anyone was simply looking out the windows on the ship, they would have visually seen it coming. You don't need any electronics or hardly any training to realize a huge ship is bearing down on you if you simply are watching out the windows or standing a watch on the exterior of the vessel.

Now we know that in the case of the Fitzgerald, they did see it coming. The JOOD had it on a collision course 10 minutes before the collision. No telling how much before that the visual contact was made.

It is essentially impossible for this to happen without carelessness. If everyone is paying attention and doing their job, trained and capable, there is no problem. This is done in aviation after every crash, to determine, as best we can, what went wrong. You know that, having ridden in the back of your patron’s TBM.

What was most perplexing in the Fitzgerald case was the Captain in his stateroom. Now we know the OOD routinely failed to notify the Captain as ordered, any contact with CPA of less than 3 miles. That’s not careless, or incompetence. It is irresponsible, even worse. If you were ordered to do something, you damned well had better see to it. Not obeying orders used to carry a commensurate price, invariably unpleasant.

Has the Captain’s Night Orders become the Captain’s Wish List? Was that just this OOD, or does this reveal a lax attitude ship or fleet wide towards these details, or orders generally?

The McCain incident is alarming on a different score. The Captain was in the bridge during that fiasco with the steering and the engine control. The old engine order telegraph was hard to screw up and easy to use. While they scratched their collective heads on the bridge trying to figure out why their boat was broken, they lost track of other traffic, gave no warnings to others, careening aimlessly it seems. It is the same when the pilots start trying to figure out why a warning light is flickering in the cockpit and fly into the ground.

BTW, Jimbo, you weren’t being ragged on for claiming incompetence. You were getting grief for not knowing what you were talking about, in numerous particulars, like the aluminum hull claim, or the hilarious one about the Captain having excessive working hours and not getting enough rest contrary to maritime rules. That was a good one! The inferences with the Sperry nav gear is another.

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Originally posted by JALLEN:

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Originally posted by jimmy123x:

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Originally posted by Hound Dog:

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:
Even that somewhat sugar coated account exceeds my imagined level of incompetence.

A real FUBAR, both of them. Yikes!

Which is what I've been saying the ENTIRE TIME and getting ragged on for it. The crew was incompetent and horrible navigators on both destroyers. Which is the result of not the proper training and/or promoting people through the ranks far faster than their experience allows.

Well, maybe you were claiming it before the evidence came out? You could not have known what was in this report. Maybe the rest of us were giving them the benefit of the doubt, instead of immediately ragging the crew out before all the facts were in. . .

As a Captain, I don't have to read the report to come up with a very good idea of what happened. You're talking about getting run over by a freighter that's a city block long. If anyone was simply looking out the windows on the ship, they would have visually seen it coming. You don't need any electronics or hardly any training to realize a huge ship is bearing down on you if you simply are watching out the windows or standing a watch on the exterior of the vessel.

Now we know that in the case of the Fitzgerald, they did see it coming. The JOOD had it on a collision course 10 minutes before the collision. No telling how much before that the visual contact was made.

It is essentially impossible for this to happen without carelessness. If everyone is paying attention and doing their job, trained and capable, there is no problem. This is done in aviation after every crash, to determine, as best we can, what went wrong. You know that, having ridden in the back of your patron’s TBM.

What was most perplexing in the Fitzgerald case was the Captain in his stateroom. Now we know the OOD routinely failed to notify the Captain as ordered, any contact with CPA of less than 3 miles. That’s not careless, or incompetence. It is irresponsible, even worse. If you were ordered to do something, you damned well had better see to it. Not obeying orders used to carry a commensurate price, invariably unpleasant.

Has the Captain’s Night Orders become the Captain’s Wish List? Was that just this OOD, or does this reveal a lax attitude ship or fleet wide towards these details, or orders generally?

The McCain incident is alarming on a different score. The Captain was in the bridge during that fiasco with the steering and the engine control. The old engine order telegraph was hard to screw up and easy to use. While they scratched their collective heads on the bridge trying to figure out why their boat was broken, they lost track of other traffic, gave no warnings to others, careening aimlessly it seems. It is the same when the pilots start trying to figure out why a warning light is flickering in the cockpit and fly into the ground.

BTW, Jimbo, you weren’t being ragged on for claiming incompetence. You were getting grief for not knowing what you were talking about, in numerous particulars, like the aluminum hull claim, or the hilarious one about the Captain having excessive working hours and not getting enough rest contrary to maritime rules. That was a good one! The inferences with the Sperry nav gear is another.

1. Hull material is irrelevant in both of these accidents.

2. Excessive working hours can absolutely contribute to fatigue and lack of situational awareness and cause accidents and is the number 1 cause of human error in ship related accidents. So much so that the STCW stepped in, in commercial shipping on all vessels over 500 GT's and regulated it so that no crew member can work over 12 hours.

3. If they had the ECDIS system, required on all commercial vessels over 500 GT at the beginning of this year, it would show on their chartplotter the other vessels in the area AND their heading line for whatever it's set for (example: next 2 miles, next 30 minutes etc.), along with their speed, course over ground, and distance/time to collision, and alarm if another ship was on a collision course with them. So yes, having modern electronics like all of the commercial ships have most likely would've prevented these accidents as the noise is almost impossible to ignore.

The NAVY not knowing, training, and adhering to what the commercial vessels need to adhere to, is precisely what caused both of these accidents. Plain and simple.

Also, in both of these channels, the Captain wouldn't get any sleep at all if he is woken up by a ship passing within 3NM's because in these channels, if you look at the AIS, there are 3 ships all traveling 1/2 a mile from one another. In both of these places there is always a CPA of less than 3NM, it's a busy shipping channel. So in heavy traffic area's they would probably cut that radius to 1/2 mile or 1 mile. And, generally as long as a first officer is present (not sure what the Navy's official title for 1st officer is), you would never wake the captain for a situation as this, as the first officer holds all of the licensing and knowledge to run the entire ship as well, just hasn't been holding those licenses as long as the Captain has. But he is fully qualified to make these decisions (at least in the Merchant Marines he is).

BUT, you'd have to at least have enough training to know a vessel is passing or crossing within 1/2 mile, 1 mile or 3 miles, whichever the Captain specifies, in order to even wake up the Captain or alert the first officer, but these guys couldn't even figure that out in both cases it seems. The amount of complete and utter incompetency in both crews is almost completely unbelievable.

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Originally posted by jimmy123x:


1. Hull material is irrelevant in both of these accidents.

Of course it isn’t relevant, but you ignorantly claimed that the aluminum hulled destroyer stood no chance against the steel hulled freighter. The destoyer is steel hulled, of course.

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2. Excessive working hours can absolutely contribute to fatigue and lack of situational awareness and cause accidents and is the number 1 cause of human error in ship related accidents. So much so that the STCW stepped in, in commercial shipping on all vessels over 500 GT's and regulated it so that no crew member can work over 12 hours.

Perhaps it can, but the Navy is not required to follow those, anymore than any military unit is, the mission and manning of ships is completely different, and operational requirements have always taken precedence over civilian notions of these rules. The very thought that military missions would be run by union rules is hysterically funny to start with.

“Clang, clang, clang, clang, general quarters, general quarters, all hands man your battle stations.... ”

“Ahhh, pardon me, Captain, about half the crew is over the 12 hour limit right now, and the others are due for a 15 minute break in 10 minutes. What say we put this off another hour or so?”

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3. If they had the ECDIS system, required on all commercial vessels over 500 GT at the beginning of this year, it would show on their chartplotter the other vessels in the area AND their heading line for whatever it's set for (example: next 2 miles, next 30 minutes etc.), along with their speed, course over ground, and distance/time to collision, and alarm if another ship was on a collision course with them. So yes, having modern electronics like all of the commercial ships have most likely would've prevented these accidents as the noise is almost impossible to ignore.

Here again, your ignorance of Navy ships, manning, missions, operational practices, etc. appears to be total. For one thing, a ship captain cannot just pull up to a pier along side a West Marine, have his electronic warfare and nav gear replaced with whatever you recommend, and charge it to his Navy Mastercard, and sail away. Another of your hilarious cures for issues you misunderstand!

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The NAVY not knowing, training, and adhering to what the commercial vessels need to adhere to, is precisely what caused both of these accidents. Plain and simple.

There is little doubt that these disquieting incidents exposed some disturbing faults in training and experience. I’m not sure that replacing ship’s officers with licensed masters would result in any overall betterment, since the missions and capabilities are wildly different. Those ships aren’t just sailing around leisurely hauling dog shit from one place to another.

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Also, in both of these channels, the Captain wouldn't get any sleep at all if he is woken up by a ship passing within 3NM's because in these channels, if you look at the AIS, there are 3 ships all traveling 1/2 a mile from one another. In both of these places there is always a CPA of less than 3NM, it's a busy shipping channel. So in heavy traffic area's they would probably cut that radius to 1/2 mile or 1 mile. And, generally as long as a first officer is present (not sure what the Navy's official title for 1st officer is), you would never wake the captain for a situation as this, as the first officer holds all of the licensing and knowledge to run the entire ship as well, just hasn't been holding those licenses as long as the Captain has. But he is fully qualified to make these decisions (at least in the Merchant Marines he is).

BUT, you'd have to at least have enough training to know a vessel is passing or crossing within 1/2 mile, 1 mile or 3 miles, whichever the Captain specifies, in order to even wake up the Captain or alert the first officer, but these guys couldn't even figure that out in both cases it seems. The amount of complete and utter incompetency in both crews is almost completely unbelievable.

Nobody has ever said being a warship Captain is easy. In the Fitzgerald case, the OOD, for reasons unknown, was not notifying the Captain in violation of the Captain’s Standing Orders that he be notified of CPAs closer than 3 miles. Believe me, the Captain WANTS to know, and will be very unhappy if not notified, even if the incident is benign.

BTW, there is no First Officer on a Navy ship. The Captain’s representative on the bridge is the OOD. Also, the Captain can sleep whenever he wants, or can. Nobody can tell him to get out of his bunk!

Whether these two jokers forgot, decided it wasn’t necessary, thought the other had made the call or whatever, there is no excuse for it. It’s an order.

The JOOD brought the collision risk to the OOD’s attention a good ten minutes before it happened, they had visual contact with the other ship, and the radar repeater on the bridge as well. There is no mention, as I recall, for the role CIC played in this fiasco. I wonder about barreling through a confined high traffic area like this at 20 knots, too.

On the McCain, the Captain was on the bridge, got caught up in the drama of steering difficulties and nobody paid attention to what was going on around them, or bothered to make any signals of difficulties.

Neither ship had set special sea and anchor detail, additional manpower for entering and leaving ports, shallow water areas, etc.