quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:


1. Hull material is irrelevant in both of these accidents.

Of course it isn’t relevant, but you ignorantly claimed that the aluminum hulled destroyer stood no chance against the steel hulled freighter. The destoyer is steel hulled, of course.

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2. Excessive working hours can absolutely contribute to fatigue and lack of situational awareness and cause accidents and is the number 1 cause of human error in ship related accidents. So much so that the STCW stepped in, in commercial shipping on all vessels over 500 GT's and regulated it so that no crew member can work over 12 hours.

Perhaps it can, but the Navy is not required to follow those, anymore than any military unit is, the mission and manning of ships is completely different, and operational requirements have always taken precedence over civilian notions of these rules. The very thought that military missions would be run by union rules is hysterically funny to start with.

“Clang, clang, clang, clang, general quarters, general quarters, all hands man your battle stations.... ”

“Ahhh, pardon me, Captain, about half the crew is over the 12 hour limit right now, and the others are due for a 15 minute break in 10 minutes. What say we put this off another hour or so?”

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3. If they had the ECDIS system, required on all commercial vessels over 500 GT at the beginning of this year, it would show on their chartplotter the other vessels in the area AND their heading line for whatever it's set for (example: next 2 miles, next 30 minutes etc.), along with their speed, course over ground, and distance/time to collision, and alarm if another ship was on a collision course with them. So yes, having modern electronics like all of the commercial ships have most likely would've prevented these accidents as the noise is almost impossible to ignore.

Here again, your ignorance of Navy ships, manning, missions, operational practices, etc. appears to be total. For one thing, a ship captain cannot just pull up to a pier along side a West Marine, have his electronic warfare and nav gear replaced with whatever you recommend, and charge it to his Navy Mastercard, and sail away. Another of your hilarious cures for issues you misunderstand!

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The NAVY not knowing, training, and adhering to what the commercial vessels need to adhere to, is precisely what caused both of these accidents. Plain and simple.

There is little doubt that these disquieting incidents exposed some disturbing faults in training and experience. I’m not sure that replacing ship’s officers with licensed masters would result in any overall betterment, since the missions and capabilities are wildly different. Those ships aren’t just sailing around leisurely hauling dog shit from one place to another.

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Also, in both of these channels, the Captain wouldn't get any sleep at all if he is woken up by a ship passing within 3NM's because in these channels, if you look at the AIS, there are 3 ships all traveling 1/2 a mile from one another. In both of these places there is always a CPA of less than 3NM, it's a busy shipping channel. So in heavy traffic area's they would probably cut that radius to 1/2 mile or 1 mile. And, generally as long as a first officer is present (not sure what the Navy's official title for 1st officer is), you would never wake the captain for a situation as this, as the first officer holds all of the licensing and knowledge to run the entire ship as well, just hasn't been holding those licenses as long as the Captain has. But he is fully qualified to make these decisions (at least in the Merchant Marines he is).

BUT, you'd have to at least have enough training to know a vessel is passing or crossing within 1/2 mile, 1 mile or 3 miles, whichever the Captain specifies, in order to even wake up the Captain or alert the first officer, but these guys couldn't even figure that out in both cases it seems. The amount of complete and utter incompetency in both crews is almost completely unbelievable.

Nobody has ever said being a warship Captain is easy. In the Fitzgerald case, the OOD, for reasons unknown, was not notifying the Captain in violation of the Captain’s Standing Orders that he be notified of CPAs closer than 3 miles. Believe me, the Captain WANTS to know, and will be very unhappy if not notified, even if the incident is benign.

BTW, there is no First Officer on a Navy ship. The Captain’s representative on the bridge is the OOD. Also, the Captain can sleep whenever he wants, or can. Nobody can tell him to get out of his bunk!

Whether these two jokers forgot, decided it wasn’t necessary, thought the other had made the call or whatever, there is no excuse for it. It’s an order.

The JOOD brought the collision risk to the OOD’s attention a good ten minutes before it happened, they had visual contact with the other ship, and the radar repeater on the bridge as well. There is no mention, as I recall, for the role CIC played in this fiasco. I wonder about barreling through a confined high traffic area like this at 20 knots, too.

On the McCain, the Captain was on the bridge, got caught up in the drama of steering difficulties and nobody paid attention to what was going on around them, or bothered to make any signals of difficulties.

Neither ship had set special sea and anchor detail, additional manpower for entering and leaving ports, shallow water areas, etc.

For what you may know about Navy symantics you know nothing about what is normal in the operation or navigation of a ship. And, most of the time a destroyer is operating as a ship, not a warship.

It is pretty standard to do 10-20 knots in one of these shipping lanes. They're wide enough and the ships all traveling in the same direction in the traffic pattern, aside from the Fitzgerald that is. It's like driving down I 95.

If a crusty old POS $500k freighter can upgrade it's electronics to meet current standards, so can the Navy. There is no excuse for a ship to be using 2008 electronics. Especially one that's supposed to be the worlds state of the art war ship. It's not IGNORANCE, it's IGNORANCE on the Navy for not keeping their electronics updated like everyone else on the water has. It's completely and absolutely antiquated. It's like everyone is required to have an IPhone 7, and the navy is still using IPhone 2's. Or a 486 PC computer and everyone else is required to use Intel Celeron 5's or better.

STCW is NOT a union. It stands for Safety Training Certified Watchstanding and is endorsed and followed by almost all flag states (Countries) including the US. They regulate safety rules for the ENTIRE Merchant Marine industry and there is a reason you had 67 total ship accidents last year out of 50,000 ships and the Navy seems to have an accident every other week with under 500 ships. I'm going off the top of my head but, STCW specifies 12 hours off duty with 1 continuous 6 hour period, however you split up the remaining 6 hours is up to you. Did you ever think THIS is why the Navy is having so many accidents from ships they should be able to SEE, if they were awake while on watch????

Well the Navy ships can't seem to get out of the way of those freighters carrying dog shit around to even make it to be a warship WTF GOOD ARE THEY????? What are they going to hit next, a lighthouse?????? How good do you think their warship skills are if their basic navigation skills are so poor, they get taken out of duty and nearly sunk by a freighter???? You do realize you have a ship that's fast enough and maneuverable enough to literally run circles around a freighter doing it's cruise speed without getting hit by it if they wanted to? These idiots probably couldn't avoid a tug and barge coming at them at 3 mph loaded with explosives if they tried.

The Fitzgeralds had CPA's of under 3nm the ENTIRE NIGHT CONTINUOUSLY where it was located when the accident occurred, it was in a busy shipping channel for Christ's sake. So the orders had to have been changed by the Captain based on open ocean and busy shipping channels and protocols for each.

Based on the reports, every single aspect of the crew is incompetent. Navigation, training, watch standing, reporting, responsibility, shipboard operations. If the OOD cannot see on the dash that he transferred the steering to another station, wouldn't this be the very first thing you look at when you lose steering? The OOD has 10 MINUTES TO REACT TO A COLLISION SITUATION, and can't avoid a collision, what on earth does that tell you about HIS TRAINING???? You keep going around in circles about in the Navy it's done this way without accepting the fact that everything about the crew on both boats, is total incompetence and horrible training and promotion. There is nothing to defend, they're absolutely horrible sailors from the Captain down to the enlisted, so whatever the Navy has been doing as enlightened by these two accidents, is completely wrong.

And yes, absolutely without a doubt these incidents would not happen with a Merchant Marine crew. Navy ships, manning, missions, operational practices, etc. appears to be a total FAILURE. (fixed it for you). If their basic shipboard operations training and ability is so damn poor, do you really think their warship training and ability is any better???? seriously?

no sense arguing over some things that have been settled

Navy has said the surface ships will use AIS.

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson:

“We had, I think, a distorted perception of operational security that we kept that system secure – off – on our warships,” Richardson said. “One of the immediate actions following these incidents – particularly in heavily trafficked areas we’re just going to turn it on.”


Crew fatigue from working too many hours has also been identified as a problem by the Navy investigators.

And it must be painfully obvious something is totally hosed up in the training of routine shipboard operations.

Individuals made critical mistakes that cost lives, but the main culprit here is that the Navy has changed the way it trains and operates, and what training is emphasized.

Hey Jimmy123x - take a step back and put down the wide tar brush.

"There is nothing to defend, they're absolutely horrible sailors from the Captain down to the enlisted, so whatever the Navy has been doing as enlightened by these two accidents, is completely wrong.

And yes, absolutely without a doubt these incidents would not happen with a Merchant Marine crew. Navy ships, manning, missions, operational practices, etc. appears to be a total FAILURE. (fixed it for you). If their basic shipboard operations training and ability is so damn poor, do you really think their warship training and ability is any better???? seriously?"


If the Merchant Marine is so goddamn perfect, please explain the entire El Faro incident. With your logic, based on that one incident, that we should probably tie up every merchant vessel until complete inspections and retraining are completed. I read a lot about the common issue of unaddressed / unreported maintenance issues in the commercial fleet. If I recall, something about meeting schedules and inability to address management demands. So having a merchant vessel sink in an avoidable storm is not "a total FAILURE"?

The US Navy incidents are directly reflective of a change in 2003, when the the Navy cut SWO training in the mistaken belief that young officers could learn through OJT, and by reviewing a package of 21 CD-ROMs instead of a 6-month school in Newport. Couple that with the over-reliance on technology, and focus on passing inspections and PC-bullshit, and I agree there is a major training problem to address.

Beyond that, a fair amount of SWO junior officers have been deployed as "individual augmentees" and spent time in Iraq and Afghanistan, instead of driving ships. SWO training spends a lot of time on fighting the ship and damage control. These are not issues for professional merchant mariners, but are absolute issues for USN.

It's been a long time since I was in the USN, and things have changed. It seems the SWO world has changed, and needs serious changes. I believe those changes are happening, and hope they are happening fast.

In the meantime, try to be a bit more constructive. It might help if you better understood the entire picture of the differences between USN and Merchant Marine. Its different the way driving an 18-wheeler, and operating a M1 tank in combat, are different. The issue for USN is that most of the time they need to be acting like an 18-wheeler, but the requirements are that the are constantly training and preparing for fighting the ship, and simultaneously doing the equivalent of defending an IRS audit (e.g., INSURV, ORE, other inspections) and holding back the PC monitors.

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:

STCW.... It stands for Safety Training Certified Watchstanding and is endorsed and followed by almost all flag states (Countries) including the US.

No it does not. It stands for Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
(Or Standards of Training Certification on Watchkeeping, as it's written in my MMC). By the way, do you even have an STCW endorsement on your MMC? I'd be surprised if you did considering you likely don't need it for what you do. But never mind, you don't need to answer that.

Look, Jimmy. Take my advice and pull back the throttles. You've said your peace and made some good points. You should now just quit talking. Trust me on this.

quote:

Originally posted by feersum dreadnaught:

If the Merchant Marine is so goddamn perfect, please explain the entire El Faro incident.

Not a comparable situation at all.

Yes, Jimmy is correct in that these recent accidents likely would not have happened with a crew of Professional Mariners. Basic seamanship on the bridge of Navy ships nowadays is less than to be desired which has not been a secret to those of us in the industry for quite awhile now.

However, in a wartime or battle situation, I'll take the Navy crew any day. Despite what was said above, Navy sailors are still great warriors.

quote:

For what you may know about Navy symantics you know nothing about what is normal in the operation or navigation of a ship. And, most of the time a destroyer is operating as a ship, not a warship.

You know the difference between a ship and a warship?

A warship is painted gray and has guns and missiles and lots of EW sensors. Such a ship is ALWAYS a warship whether it is in a running shore bombardment, screening for a carrier battle group, or merely driving around in circles practicing man over board drills, or even transiting from one port to another.

The rest of your rant is too silly and ignorant for reply. If you sincerely believe all that, and are confidant you are correct, you would do the nation a tremendous service by writing it all up in a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations. It would certsinly receive the attention it deserves.

There is no doubt there are deficiencies in training and operations that are going to be addressed. It may be that more sophisticated systems and equipment requires more training and experience to operate confidently. It may be that the culture has begun to treat Captain’s Standing Orders, which every OOD must read and sign upon taking the watch, as the Captain’s Wish List. We notice reduced levels of responsibility and discipline in other areas of our culture, and that relaxation may be affecting this aspect as well.

You guys just cannot help yourself's at times. I mean really. Back n forth, bank n forth. Trying show how superior your knowledge is over the next guy. Trying to belittle one another. It is really in not becoming, it really isn't. Gets very old.

On the topic, Not surprising that there seem's to be a systemic leadership issue that filters down through the ranks that allows something as egregious to happen on multiple occasions.

The damage and loss of property is horrible in and of its self. But the loss of life is completely unacceptable. It is hard to imagine that things would get this bad to allow things like this to happen in our Navy. Still the greatest on earth. I understand the human error aspect. But in this setting I just cannot except it. And now maybe the Naval leadership will adapt the same attitude. Our Navy has taken several hits in the last 25 years or so. Time to reestablish some leadership and accountability going forward.

I am very saddened by the crew lost in these situations. It did not need to happen and should never of. I don't feel these are the same as men and women lost in other training accidents such as helo or plane crash's. These are different.

JALLEN - there are some very troubling issues in the report (https://news.usni.org/2017/11/01/uss-fitzgerald-uss-john-s-mccain-collision-report).

The snowball of screw ups is unimaginable. From not setting special sea and anchor detail, to unqualified watchstanders that did not know how to shift helm control, and a bridge crew that did not understand what they were doing, it is not a good picture.

The fact that McCain took on-board crew from the Antietam (which was laid up being fixed from being run aground) and put them "on watch" as opposed to "under instruction" - when the bridge systems are not the same - is unforgivable. This incident is squarely on the Captain.

My question, which I've posed to classmates serving in the Pacific Fleet, is what are "we" doing to unscrew a material deficiency in training for mid- to senior-level officers - those that missed actually going to SWO school, while it was shut down from 2003 - 2012. We've got folks in command that I fear are missing some basics - well, based on the incidents, are proven to be missing some basics. And we know we've got a culture that can't say "nope, can't get underway, need to do training" - so they go off and seemingly wing it.

These incidents have taken out key elements of the ballistic missile defense system in PacFleet. USN needs to quickly excrete a solution. I'd suggest putting proven prior COs into command, and let them drive the process - might not play well to put O-6s into O-5 jobs, but at least they'd know what they were doing, and work on solving the immediate problem.

quote:

Originally posted by feersum dreadnaught:
JALLEN - there are some very troubling issues in the report (https://news.usni.org/2017/11/01/uss-fitzgerald-uss-john-s-mccain-collision-report).

The snowball of screw ups is unimaginable. From not setting special sea and anchor detail, to unqualified watchstanders that did not know how to shift helm control, and a bridge crew that did not understand what they were doing, it is not a good picture.

The fact that McCain took on-board crew from the Antietam (which was laid up being fixed from being run aground) and put them "on watch" as opposed to "under instruction" - when the bridge systems are not the same - is unforgivable. This incident is squarely on the Captain.

My question, which I've posed to classmates serving in the Pacific Fleet, is what are "we" doing to unscrew a material deficiency in training for mid- to senior-level officers - those that missed actually going to SWO school, while it was shut down from 2003 - 2012. We've got folks in command that I fear are missing some basics - well, based on the incidents, are proven to be missing some basics. And we know we've got a culture that can't say "nope, can't get underway, need to do training" - so they go off and seemingly wing it.

These incidents have taken out key elements of the ballistic missile defense system in PacFleet. USN needs to quickly excrete a solution. I'd suggest putting proven prior COs into command, and let them drive the process - might not play well to put O-6s into O-5 jobs, but at least they'd know what they were doing, and work on solving the immediate problem.

There are indeed.

My brother, who spent 3-4 years Regular Navy officer on destroyers in WestPac, and I were discussing this yesterday. On the Fitzgerald, not notifying the Captain was the chief among a panoply of sins. Of course, not taking action was unforgivable as well.

I didn’t realize McCain was using crew from another ship. I’ve seen officers riding a ship to meet their ship stand watches, if they were otherwise qualified, but 50 years ago, systems were more standardized.

The fiasco with the throttles is very troubling. The engine order telegraph was simple, easy, standard, and nearly foolproof. A non-rated E-2/3 could handle it reliably with minimal instruction. Aparently these more modern throttle arrangements are not.

There was no SWO program when I was in. You were a 1100/1105. That was just beginning as I was getting out. I went to OCS, and had OOD like experience on YPs in Narragansett Bay. My brother, an NROTC grad, told me yesterday when he reported to his first ship, he envied my experience at OCS. He had never “had the conn” at all, no experience whatever. We worked manuevering board problems until we could do them in our sleep, and out on the bay. He had never done it for real.

He told me about his first watch as OOD. No JOOD, 2000-2400, transiting from San Diego westbound. There was a contact ahead, coming right for them. He phoned the Captain, in the wardroom watching the movie. “Keep me informed.” The bogie kept on coming. Finally the Captain comes up, and despite being the stand on ship, they turn a bit. It turned out to be another destroyer on some Fleet Ex, running dark, no radio, no radar, no lights. The Captain sent a Captain to Captain flashing light message, “Pretty sloppy seamanship.”

If the conduct of these reports are common, those unreps must be really exciting!

It has been over 30 years since I was on the bridge of a ship so my knowledge of current operations (both Merchant and Navy are hopelessly outdated) but I have two questions for those who are more knowledgeable than I ...

1. With all the electronics aboard Navy vessels it would seem that as part of their basic equipment they should have the computer ability to track all vessels within a given range and automatically sound an alarm if other vessel(s) is/are projected to come within a given range.

2. Do all the Navy personnel responsible for driving the boat from the Helmsmen on up all go to the same school or do the ones in the 7th fleet go to one on the west coast and others go to a different one? I ask this because both of these incidents where from the same group and this hasn't happened ( as far as we know) in other areas of the world we operate in..

Would it make any sense to divide the ship's crew into ship drivers/seamen/whatever and warfare specialists?

One thing which keeps being mentioned is lack of training. Could it be the case that there is just not enough time, etc to train the crew to be both?

This way the people on the bridge can train, and become some of the best at navigation, ship handling, knowing rules of the road, etc while others become experts in handling the weapons systems.

Obviously there would be some cross training and such.

Just food for thought.

cc

quote:

Originally posted by Balzé Halzé:

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:

STCW.... It stands for Safety Training Certified Watchstanding and is endorsed and followed by almost all flag states (Countries) including the US.

No it does not. It stands for Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
(Or Standards of Training Certification on Watchkeeping, as it's written in my MMC). By the way, do you even have an STCW endorsement on your MMC? I'd be surprised if you did considering you likely don't need it for what you do. But never mind, you don't need to answer that.

.

Yes, I hold a 500 GT master and have taken all of the STCW classes last year to stay current (fire fighting, leadership and management, etc.) and have an international USCG license. You're right in the majority of the time I do not need the STCW. But I run yachts for manufacturers and do a lot of deliveries and trips in the Bahamas, Carribbean, and Central America (yet not one foreign country has ever asked if I even have a Captain's license, let alone ask to see anything).

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:

quote:

For what you may know about Navy symantics you know nothing about what is normal in the operation or navigation of a ship. And, most of the time a destroyer is operating as a ship, not a warship.

You know the difference between a ship and a warship?

A warship is painted gray and has guns and missiles and lots of EW sensors. Such a ship is ALWAYS a warship whether it is in a running shore bombardment, screening for a carrier battle group, or merely driving around in circles practicing man over board drills, or even transiting from one port to another.

The rest of your rant is too silly and ignorant for reply. If you sincerely believe all that, and are confidant you are correct, you would do the nation a tremendous service by writing it all up in a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations. It would certsinly receive the attention it deserves.

There is no doubt there are deficiencies in training and operations that are going to be addressed. It may be that more sophisticated systems and equipment requires more training and experience to operate confidently. It may be that the culture has begun to treat Captain’s Standing Orders, which every OOD must read and sign upon taking the watch, as the Captain’s Wish List. We notice reduced levels of responsibility and discipline in other areas of our culture, and that relaxation may be affecting this aspect as well.

Let me clarify for you:

If there's ineptness and incompetence on multiple boats, then the entire Navy has an issue of mismanagement, inadequate training and supervision, and placement of personnel in roles they aren't capable of fulfilling. And it stems from the very top down.

smlsig - it's been as long for me as you - I last had the conn of USS IOWA in 1989...

However, the issue is not lack of radar tracking, it is lack of training and control of the bridge crew. They were aware they were on constant bearing decreasing range. They failed to move out of the way due to a variety of problems, none of which are excusable or insurmountable.

Enlisted crew don't really go to school for "driving" - they qualify through on-board training. There was a failure in performing training, and they had some crew from another ship that were not competent on the McCain's systems.

the forward deployed unit that have been having issues have a higher "optempo" meaning more time steaming, less in port. Not sure how these ships have done on inspections and so forth....


ccmdfd - enlisted crew are divided by specialty. Officers end up shifting jobs about every year, because promotion and eventual command depends on being able to do it all. In order to command an aircraft carrier, the CO has be both a qualified pilot/BN, and then also qualify as a surface warfare officer - and as a nuclear propulsion officer. One reason why that is a fairly pointy pyramid - not a lot of folks can do it all.

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:

Yes, I hold a 500 GT master and have taken all of the STCW classes last year to stay current (fire fighting, leadership and management, etc.) and have an international USCG license. You're right in the majority of the time I do not need the STCW. But I run yachts for manufacturers and do a lot of deliveries and trips in the Bahamas, Carribbean, and Central America (yet not one foreign country has ever asked if I even have a Captain's license, let alone ask to see anything).

Did you happen to complete the STCW classes at the STAR Center in Dania Beach? If so, then our paths may have crossed.

Major pain in thé ass getting all that done. I imagine even more so if you're paying your own way.

quote:

Originally posted by ccmdfd:
Would it make any sense to divide the ship's crew into ship drivers/seamen/whatever and warfare specialists?

One thing which keeps being mentioned is lack of training. Could it be the case that there is just not enough time, etc to train the crew to be both?

This way the people on the bridge can train, and become some of the best at navigation, ship handling, knowing rules of the road, etc while others become experts in handling the weapons systems.

Obviously there would be some cross training and such.

Just food for thought.

cc

Those that handle running the vessel and those that handle the weapons systems are 2 different teams of people (for the most part).

In order for a warship to be effective it needs to have it's basic seamanship skills down to a science for many reasons, some of them include:

-needs to be able to hold a constant heading when a resupply ship is alongside so they can transfer food, goods, and any other items needed.

-need to be able to navigate in a convoy without hitting the other ships in that convoy.

-need to navigate to where they need to be (on a map) in order to provide firepower,defense, and support to other vessels. For example a destroyer protecting an aircraft carrier.

-Need to be able to navigate to anywhere in the world to provide offense or defense, even if the crew has not been there before (without running aground or hitting something).

-Needs to be able to hold a constant heading for various warfare activities like launching and retrieving aircraft, needs to hold a constant heading/speed for firing guns at targets.


My gut level feeling is that if the training is so poor throughout the ranks when it comes to the basic operation and navigation of the vessel, that it is also lacking on the warfare side, but I do not know one way or another. But, you cannot have serious flaws throughout the organization on one side of the equation without having flaws on the other side of the equation.

quote:

Originally posted by Balzé Halzé:

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:

Yes, I hold a 500 GT master and have taken all of the STCW classes last year to stay current (fire fighting, leadership and management, etc.) and have an international USCG license. You're right in the majority of the time I do not need the STCW. But I run yachts for manufacturers and do a lot of deliveries and trips in the Bahamas, Carribbean, and Central America (yet not one foreign country has ever asked if I even have a Captain's license, let alone ask to see anything).

Did you happen to complete the STCW classes at the STAR Center in Dania Beach? If so, then our paths may have crossed.

Major pain in thé ass getting all that done. I imagine even more so if you're paying your own way.

No, I have taken all of my classes at MPT in Fort Lauderdale. Yes, paying my own way for the 3 weeks of class was a pain in the ass, but also the loss of income for not working 3 weeks was even bigger.

That is the entire reason even though I have the seatime and experience to get a 1600GT master, I did not. Now after the licensing changes it would be even more classes, more time, and more money lost. Aside from the $13k in classes required for the 1600 GT license (last year). The loss of income of taking 3 months of classes within a year, which is far costlier than the $13k, did not even come close to justifying it. I had done the megayacht thing working on a few early on (as a deckhand or mate), and have no interest being a vagabond traveling the world constantly and never being home. I also have outstanding offers from the oil companies to run their vessels all of the time, but do not want to be away from home 28 days at a time, all of the time. Largest yacht I have run was a 148' Megayacht.

Further drift....

What are the requirements for these various master’s licenses?

A friend of mine in San Diego used to make two cruises to Dammam, Saudi Arabia a year, from the US, for really good money.

I believe he qualified solely based on his Navy officer experience and training. Maybe he took a test or several. My understanding is that he did not have to take courses. This was ~35 years ago, too.

What We Learned from the Navy’s Collision Inquiries

Bryan McGrath - November 2, 2017

In a remarkable news conference today, a group of Navy admirals led by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John Richardson briefed the public on the findings of three separate but related inquiries stemming from last summer’s collisions involving USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) and USS John S. McCain (DDG 56). Included were Navy-produced summaries of the legally- privileged investigations conducted in the aftermath of the two collisions, and a detailed “Comprehensive Review” of “surface fleet operations and incidents at sea” conducted by a panel led by U.S. Fleet Forces Commander Admiral Philip Davidson and directed by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William Moran. The reports are public and worth reading in their entirety. http://s3.amazonaws.com/CHINFO...ive+Review_Final.pdf

Seventeen sailors died in the two collisions, and costs to repair damage to the ships will likely exceed $500 million. In the aftermath of the accidents, almost ten once-sterling careers were summarily ended: The Pacific Fleet commander (a four-star admiral) will retire early, the Surface Force commander (a three-star admiral) will retire early, the Seventh Fleet commander (another three-star admiral) was relieved of command, the two-star Carrier Strike Group commander was relieved, and the captain in charge of the Japan-based destroyer squadron was fired. Both ship’s commanding officers and executive officers were also sacked. These accidents have raised questions of basic competence and readiness in what has traditionally been considered the Navy’s most competent and ready force, the Japan-based Seventh Fleet. These doubts have also not gone unnoticed (or unamplified) by the propaganda efforts of the Chinese government, who have opportunistically seized on the accidents to undercut confidence in American influence in the region.

Today’s news conference and the reports are the Navy’s attempt to do four things. They first aim to provide a detailed examination of the events onboard the ships that led to the collisions without contaminating ongoing admiralty investigations. Second, they hope to tell a straightforward story so that the reader can draw conclusions as to responsibility. Third, they seek to lay bare the deep and persistent readiness problems plaguing the Navy’s Forward Deployed Naval Force in Japan in the face of rising operational commitments. Fourth, they want to relate those persistent readiness problems to the circumstances that led to the collisions. The Navy’s effort successfully addresses the first three tasks, but is somewhat unsatisfying on the fourth.

The Collisions and the Issue of Responsibility

In the aftermath of the summer’s tragedies, the most often asked question was “How can something like this happen?” Given the size, maneuverability, and relatively slow speed at which seagoing traffic moves, it seemed incomprehensible to many that ships could collide. Yet they did, and the two public documents released by the Navy yesterday provide a detailed, meticulous understanding of those events. Some may wonder why the public is not provided with the actual investigations conducted by Rear Admiral Brian Fort (Fitzgerald) and Rear Admiral Richard Brown (John S. McCain), and conspiracy theorists are likely to suspect the Navy is hiding something. Yet a fair reading of the publicly-released reports leaves the reader with a clear understanding of events and more than sufficient information to understand what happened. Specific timelines are provided. Mistakes are clearly called out, and those mistakes are identified with the watch (or position) who made the mistake. Thought processes and motivations for actions are included. And clear and unambiguous assignment of responsibility is made. What readers are not privy to are the identities of the individuals involved and other information that might be considered prejudicial to ongoing legal cases. Irrespective of that level of detail, what we are provided with are two narratives of human failure with disastrous consequences.

As someone who commanded a ship very much like the two in question, I read these reports with great interest and profound regret. In the aftermath of the Fitzgerald collision, I wrote in these pages of past collisions that, “[i]n virtually every instance, decisions made by fallible human beings were contributing factors.” Reading the Navy’s report on the Fitzgerald, this conclusion is reinforced. The person in charge of the safe navigation of the ship (the officer of the deck — usually an officer in the rank of lieutenant, junior grade) failed on several critical occasions to make required reports to the commanding officer on ships that would pass close-by. The commanding officer was asleep following a busy day of operations, but his explicit orders to bridge watch-standers warranted his notification several times that night, orders that were not followed. One of the ships the captain was not notified about was the motor vessel ACX Crystal, the other ship involved in the collision, whose track that night required the FITZGERALD to give way. These failures were repeated, and obvious, and to the extent that blame can be discerned from this collision, this officer’s actions come under special scrutiny.

Those assisting the officer of the deck (the junior officer of the deck and the junior officer of the watch — usually both ensigns) failed also to do so, or to urge the officer of the deck to take proper action. While the ship was operating in the vicinity of heavy merchant vessel traffic, the situation that they were faced with was not in and of itself extraordinarily complex: Three ships were to the Fitzgerald’s starboard side (or right) proceeding left (across the Fitzgerald’s bow), and each one of them — by the nautical rules of the road — had the “right of way,” meaning that the Fitzgerald was required to take action to avoid collision, to include slowing, turning to the right, or both. The Fitzgerald did not do either and the collision was the result.

There were additional contributing factors to this collision other than the gross professional failures of the officer of the deck. There was a lack of communication between those on the bridge and those in the “combat information center” whose job it was to serve as support and forceful backup to the bridge. There were questions of equipment configuration (especially radars), the degree to which available technology was being used, and the level of utility of the information that was available. These other factors played a role, but had the officer of the deck done what he or she knew to be the right thing, there would have been no collision. The tragedy of the USS Fitzgerald will be remembered in the U.S. Navy as an abysmally low moment in professional competence.

The John S. McCain collision is no less a story of human failure. The facts associated are somewhat less egregious, but the outcome was even more tragic. Early in the morning of August 21, the John S. McCain collided with the Liberian Flagged ALNIC MC east of the Strait of Malacca on the way to a port visit later that day in Singapore. A series of events were put in motion the previous day by the commanding officer, who with the best of intent, showed questionable judgment at several key moments in this tragedy.

The collision can be traced back to the previous day, when the ship conducted a “navigation brief” for the next day’s transit into Singapore, as required by U.S. Navy Surface Force regulations. At this brief, the planned track is explained leg by leg, aids to navigation are discussed and described, and the listing of key personnel by position (“watch-bill”) is reviewed. Because of the special demands of navigating near land and major ports, it is customary to fill that watch-bill with the most experienced watch-standers. In the special case of entering or leaving port, the “sea and anchor detail” is that team of sailors and officers. One of the jobs on that team — the master helmsman — played a key role in what happened next. The master helmsman is someone whose expertise and experience in the physical act of steering the ship and operating its engines from a control console on the bridge is of the highest caliber. This person is required to be present at the navigation brief.

The navigator, the operations officer, and the executive officer agreed that the optimal time to set the sea and anchor detail would be 0500 the next morning, which would have put the more experienced team (including a master helmsman) on deck earlier during the demanding transit to Singapore. The cost of doing so would mean that the entire ship (including members of the sea and anchor detail) would have to wake earlier than normal so that the crew could be fed before what was projected to be a three-plus hour transit to Singapore. The benefit of setting the detail earlier was clear: the presence of more experienced team members during a busy transit. Concerned with ensuring his crew got the extra hour of sleep, the captain overruled his leadership team and ordered that the detail to be set at 0600. In addition to giving the crew that extra hour of sleep, he did not want to risk a possible man overboard in the darkness of the dawn hours as crewmembers proceeded to their stations. Finally, he explained that he would be present on the bridge (as he was in fact, for the four and a half hours leading up to the collision), a signal that he believed his presence there would be sufficient risk mitigation. As events transpired, this was not the case.

On the morning of the collision, about an hour before the sea and anchor detail would report on deck (around 0500), the captain noticed that the helmsman operating the ship control console was having difficulty responding to the numerous course and speed orders he was given. This sailor was not a master helmsman, as would be required were the ship at sea and anchor detail (which it would have been by this time if the captain had followed his leadership team’s advice). To remedy this, the captain ordered that the steering and engine control functions be split, which necessitated another sailor joining the helmsman; one would steer, and one would control the engines. For this split to occur, the ship control console must be reconfigured according to a validated procedure. As it turns out, neither sailor involved was proficient in that procedure (though their administrative files indicated that they were qualified).

Steaming ahead into an area of high traffic density, the botched equipment configuration led the bridge team to believe that they had “lost steering” and so the word was passed on the ship’s announcing system to “man after steering” (a secondary location from which steering can be accomplished). Steering had not been lost, but the watch-standers did not recognize their error, nor were they able to reconcile the physical movements of the ship with their understanding of what was happening with the ship’s rudders and engines. Then came the collision.

Two decisions by the commanding officer — both well-intentioned — contributed directly to the collision. The first was to delay setting the sea and anchor detail, which would have positioned a master helmsman on the ship control console. Remember, the Fitzgerald collision had occurred less than two months earlier. There were already stories in the press about the degree to which crew exhaustion might have contributed to that accident. Giving his crew an extra hour of sleep and delaying for additional daylight to promote top-side safety seemed like good ideas to him at the time, despite the recommendations of his leadership team. The second decision was that of splitting out the steering and engine control functions, something that was not discussed at the navigation brief the day before, and something in which it turns out the assigned helm operators were not proficient.

Like the Fitzgerald, there were myriad other contributing factors that led to this collision. But stripped to its essentials, the actions of fallible human beings were central to this accident. It is difficult to conceive of this accident happening if the commanding officer had set the sea and anchor detail when his leadership team advised, which would have meant the presence of a master helmsman on deck.

The Navy suffered two collisions, 17 dead sailors, over a half-billion dollars in damage, and two ships out of commission in an already thinly-stretched theater. These accidents, as well as a collision between a cruiser and a fishing boat earlier in the year, and the grounding of another cruiser off the coast of Japan, contributed to the rational conclusion that something was deeply amiss in the Western Pacific, and it was this sense that the CNO responded to in directing Admiral Davidson’s comprehensive inquiry into surface warfare operations. Ultimately, one of the questions facing that review would be the degree to which systemic issues — if they existed — helped bring about these avoidable tragedies.

The Comprehensive Review

The third document released yesterday was the Comprehensive Review of Surface Warfare compiled by a task force of naval officers, civilians, and members of the other armed services under the direction of Admiral Philip Davidson, the commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command. In this 60-day review, the panel was directed to conduct

a Comprehensive Review of surface fleet operations and incidents at sea that have occurred over the past decade with emphasis on Seventh Fleet operational employment to inform improvements Navy-wide.

The review is notable for its direct and unsparing assessment of the state of training, readiness, and operations in the Seventh Fleet, and it is replete with substantial and important recommendations to address the systemic issues it did find.

The “elevator speech” summary of the nearly 170 pages goes something like this: The requirements of monitoring the rise of China’s navy and North Korean aggression dramatically increased the demand for available naval forces in the Seventh Fleet. A finite number of ships were available to accomplish these missions. To ensure that the growing number of missions could be accomplished, operational commanders began to task ships for these operational requirements with decreasing regard for the level of proficiency of the ships as measured by its certification status. In other words, the mission began to crowd out training.

This “can-do” dedication to mission accomplishment created what was at best, a more casual approach to the importance of basic training and readiness of assigned ships and crews. At worst, it created a more resigned approach to the perception of a “new normal.” The report does not lay out the specific objections made by officers able to object to the imbalance between readiness and mission accomplishment. Based on conversations I have had with officers with recent service in the Seventh Fleet, those objections were made.

Over a period of three years (2014 to 2016), more than one third of the required mission area certifications for the 12 cruisers and destroyers in Japan had been “mitigated” with a waiver, as the average number of days underway for the ships increased by nearly 50 percent. These mission area certifications (about 20 on each ship) consist of administrative, material, and operational assessments in proficiency in the missions assigned to the ship. These include anti-air warfare, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, seamanship, and navigation. By the time of this summer’s accidents, ships in based in Japan that were not in a mandated maintenance or modernization period were virtually always considered available for a wide range of missions, including ballistic missile defense patrols, and freedom of navigation operations. Their level of training and proficiency (certification status) came to be viewed as a second order consideration.

The review also dug deeply into the four 2017 incidents (three collisions and a grounding) in the Western Pacific with the aim of assessing the state of individual, team, and unit level proficiency, with an eye to how that proficiency and readiness is supported (or not, as the case may be) by the larger system of training, manning, and maintenance. To its credit, the report pulls no punches. This includes acknowledging the fact that the effort to bring readiness and schedule regularity to U.S.-based forces may have come at the cost of readiness of the forces in Japan.

A final area where the report is dead-on and unsparing, is in its criticism of the technical and material support of the surface force. Specifically, the report states that the bridge equipment — surface search radars, displays, automated identification system (a system of identification that is mandated in the commercial world and which provides real-time location information), has not kept up with the technology found on even an average commercial ship. The Navy spends its money on combat systems and weapons. Bridge and ship control technology received short shrift. The bridge watch-standers on the two Navy ships that were involved in collisions were not suffering from a lack of information generated by electronic means. Rather, they suffered from unintegrated and unreliable information, and the humans onboard were not well-served by the technology available.

Most important of all in the Comprehensive Review is an exhaustive series of recommendations that will serve as a “work-list” for the Navy, each of which is designed to address a training, manning, maintenance, or technical deficiency. It would be useful for the Navy to provide an estimated cost to implement these recommendations, some of which are straightforward and some of which (such as altering the readiness production model for forces based in Japan) have expensive force structure implications. The Navy has done a good job of identifying its own deficiencies and providing itself with a path forward. That said, there were three areas I would like to have seen better evaluated in the Comprehensive Review.

Shortcomings in Self-Critique

First, it is not clear from the comprehensive review the extent to which the deficiencies noted in the Navy’s surface fleet are confined to ships based in Japan or are applicable across the entire fleet. If what was found in the Western Pacific exists to any degree elsewhere, the Navy’s readiness problem may be deeper than suspected.

Second, there is precious little discussion in this report given the degree to which the operational requirements had increased and, crucially, who it was that was driving the operational requirements. As the military is fond of saying, “shit rolls downhill,” and the operational requirements that are so thinly stretching the Navy in the Western Pacific are the purview of the secretary of defense and the commander of the Pacific Command. It is not enough for Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and Admiral Harry Harris to create military requirements. It is also their responsibility to ensure the forces filling those requirements are sufficient and ready, and the report does not touch on the degree to which either this or the previous secretary of defense or the commander of Pacific Command were aware of the strain on the force or efforts that they took to remedy it.

My final point may not be a criticism per se, but an observation. America’s readiness issues in the Pacific are deep and critical. They existed before these collisions, and had the collisions never occurred, would still be worthy of the attention they are now receiving. But that is not how any of this happened. Two collisions and 17 deaths shined a spotlight on a dark area of naval readiness, but those who look to associate the larger readiness problems with the actual circumstances leading to the collisions are likely to be disappointed. There is no smoking gun here. The ships that collided were fully qualified for the activities they were undertaking when they collided, irrespective of the degree to which other mission areas were not fully certified. Connecting the dots backward from an officer of the deck who knowingly violated the commanding officer’s standing orders on when to call him, to an increase in Seventh Fleet operational tasking, is a tall order, and this report does not make that case.

While experienced naval officers may feel in their bones that the readiness issues in the Pacific are closely related to these accidents, the explicit case is not made in the Comprehensive Review, and is to some extent undercut by the reports supplied by the Navy on the collisions. What is apparent is that on these two ships, basic human errors led to catastrophic outcomes. And it is also apparent that the Japan-based surface force is insufficiently supported. A systemic approach demands that both issues be addressed, and it appears that the Navy is poised to do so.

https://warontherocks.com/2017...collision-inquiries/

So at What point does the Navy realize that Training is cheaper than rebuilding ships? I understand they are changing some things.. But I am not seeing that a Massive training of all people involved with maneuvering ships need much more training.
These guys have time they should be in class as much as possible. If needed bring in some retired old guys..

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Originally posted by JALLEN:

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For what you may know about Navy symantics you know nothing about what is normal in the operation or navigation of a ship. And, most of the time a destroyer is operating as a ship, not a warship.

You know the difference between a ship and a warship?

A warship is painted gray and has guns and missiles and lots of EW sensors. Such a ship is ALWAYS a warship whether it is in a running shore bombardment, screening for a carrier battle group, or merely driving around in circles practicing man over board drills, or even transiting from one port to another.

The rest of your rant is too silly and ignorant for reply. If you sincerely believe all that, and are confidant you are correct, you would do the nation a tremendous service by writing it all up in a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations. It would certsinly receive the attention it deserves.

There is no doubt there are deficiencies in training and operations that are going to be addressed. It may be that more sophisticated systems and equipment requires more training and experience to operate confidently. It may be that the culture has begun to treat Captain’s Standing Orders, which every OOD must read and sign upon taking the watch, as the Captain’s Wish List. We notice reduced levels of responsibility and discipline in other areas of our culture, and that relaxation may be affecting this aspect as well.

If a warship is always a warship, how do you explain how several warships have allowed a slow not very maneuverable freighter to run into them and nearly sink them? Much less get within 1/2 a mile of them??????????????