Well, the Air Force is good at proning out dove hunters...

https://www.outdoorhub.com/new...rs-private-property/

I've got a good friend working at that base now.

Security at most military bases, in my experience, is pretty loose, but my experience was in Germany, post cold war and pre 9/11.

My sense is, that with many things in the military, there's an appearance of security, with guards at the gate and some patrol cars driving around, but that there really isn't a security mindset. It's a bit like the TSA; security theater, not the real thing.

I'm sure that at nuclear installations, facilities where highly secure equipment or intelligence is involved that the security is tight, but it seems to me that what is being protected is the equipment or information, not the people.

This is why the security at P-Cola was incapable of dealing with this threat. They aren't configured to deal with this kind of problem, as they aren't there to protect the people from this kind of random threat.

It's fundamentally a leadership failure; leadership does not properly appreciate the threat against their installation, is more afraid of their own people than they are external threats, and are unwilling to change "the way we do it here" to adapt to new realities.

Security on military installations at this point should focus on dual threat, in addition to security threats. Namely, the gates and perimeter should be guarded against assault, and internally, security should be deployed to protect the human and material assets of the installation. Whether that be through permitting the carriage of personal weapons, or through trained, armed, mobile security personnel.

USNORTHCOM dictates what the minimum force protection measures are for military bases in the continental U.S. Elevated force protection levels get elevated protection measures. FPCONS are A, B, C, D, with A being the lowest. Threat assessments are used to determine the levels. I think all bases have been at least in FPCON B continuously since 9/11. NCIS would have conducted the threat assessment at NAS Pensacola and obviously did not perceive a threat. I am sure NCIS is on the hot seat right now but they may or may not have been able to pick up on this threat.

Artie your example of the incident with the dove hunters at Goodfellow occurred in my opinion due to toxic leadership from civilian members in base police and local law enforcement. They did not have good interagency communication and something stupid was bound to happen as a result. Fortunately no one got hurt and some leaders had their asses handed to them.

I cannot speak for the other services but I can tell you that military Air Force Security Forces are well trained and equipped. They protect bases and priority resources all over the world including in combat zones and have learned many lessons in real combat. They are more than capable of responding to such an incident. It is why Security Forces is the largest career field in the Air Force. Air Force installation commanders can allow certain qualified individuals to carry concealed firearms on their installations.

Security is very resource intensive, and unless command believes their is a credible threat they are not going to spend the resources. I still think the Navy's total gun ban is stupid in view of Ft Hood, the Chattanooga Reserve Center shootings, the Washington Naval Yard shootings, and now this. Perhaps they will reassess now.

I hope so HayesGreener. but as I note, there's security, and then there's a security mindset.

In the civilian world, we have been conditioned post 9/11 and the Boston Marathon bombing that "If we see something, say something." I think that notwithstanding what you say about NCIS assessments, base security levels, and the capability of the Air Force Security Forces, there still exists a belief that "it couldn't happen here". I say that primarily because county deputies got to the scene, on base, before any base security personnel reacted. That may be because a 911 call went to county and therefore the SO was notified before base security, or it could be because base security sucks.

I respect your knowledge and appreciate your comments, and have learned from your post that things aren't as bad as I imagined them to be. I hope, as you note, that the Navy learns from this, and if they won't allow concealed carry generally on post, at least look into a program for officers and E-5 and above to be certified to carry on base, similar to the proposals surrounding armed teachers.

I've been out a long time, and I can tell you that in immediate post cold war Germany, US Army security was a joke.

I just think it's a shame that after Ft. Hood, Washington Navy Yard, Little Rock Recruiting, Chattanooga Recruiting, and now NAS Pensacola, there has been apparently so little done to address internal security and personnel protection in places that are mandated and know to be "gun free zones". To me, that indicates that higher command has not properly assessed the problem, and has not taken appropriate steps to ensure that their base personnel are secure and able to defend themselves.

We all are here because we have in interest in firearms and most of us carry daily. We adhere to a theory that "when seconds count, the police are minutes away". Many of our bases are huge, and a centralized security force, even if capably trained, armed, lead, and notified, can't be everywhere at all times. There will inevitably be delay and confusion. I hope higher command can come up with a better solution for our active duty personnel.

I have been retired from the Army for a long time, but I believe one of the systemic problems all the armed forces has is the idea that the commander is responsible for everything that happens in an organization. It sounds oh-so-tough and tight when discussing it, but is it truly reasonable? If someone is trained and tested to a reasonable standard and to the degree reasonably possible, is it really the base or division’s commander’s fault if an E-6 or O-3 shoots himself (or even someone else) by accident? The great irony is that either might be expected to lead a combat mission involving the lives of many others without being micromanaged or crucified if things go wrong, but the only way we can be sure they won’t misuse a firearm is to prevent their even having it.

As has been mentioned here before, at one time military members were permitted to be armed, and if they screwed up, it was their fault, not some guy’s who never saw them except in a mass formation. Unfortunately, the paranoia about personal weapons in the military has grown in lockstep with the paranoia in society at large, and no commander at any level today is prepared to say, “Yes, he lost it [or he had an unintentional discharge]. That’s what sometimes happens when people are issued weapons. We’ll be looking into it, but there’s nothing about our general policies that needs to be changed.”

Unless we have a Mumbai type attack involving masses of attackers (and casualties) on one of our military bases, I strongly doubt that there will be a significant change to the current policies.

I go onto the local Navy base regularly. Contract civilian gate guards do the 100% hands on ID checks faithfully. After the Pensacola incident, the backup at the gate was longer than usual, the guards were wearing kevlar pots, and there was an extra armed guard behind some kind of ballistic shield. Sorry to say my immediate thought was that the horse was already out of the barn. I wonder how long the enhanced security will be in effect.

Send all those America-hating shitty flying sunsabitches from Saudi Arabia back from whence they came and we shouldn't have to worry about security on any NAS or post. Plain and simple. Unfortunately "plain and simple" is sometimes obfuscated by the forest in the trees...

quote:

Originally posted by Day_late:
I wonder how long the enhanced security will be in effect.

That is always the question, is it not?

quote:

Originally posted by sigfreund:

quote:

Originally posted by Day_late:
I wonder how long the enhanced security will be in effect.

That is always the question, is it not?

Today.
No Kevlar and the M4's are gone.

Lets be honest, those vests and M4s do nothing to prevent an attack like this. At most they would delay it.

Without solid internal security protocols and an armed populace, these attacks will always be possible.

quote:

Originally posted by RHINOWSO:
Lets be honest, those vests and M4s do nothing to prevent an attack like this. At most they would delay it.

Without solid internal security protocols and an armed populace, these attacks will always be possible.

Nails it.

A few unrelated (to the shooting) questions:

1- Do we train these pilots to the same skill level as our own? We do something like this already with aircraft we sell them - the aircraft might be a less equipped version. After all, it is conceivable that we might go up against them some day. We don't want them or their planes to be as good as or better than we.

2- Why is the training at a naval base, not Air Force? Saudi has very little navy, let alone an aircraft carrier to fly planes off of.

3- Other than picking up pretty girls and bombing unarmed or lightly armed civilians - including their own - what do these pilots do with their newfound skillz when they get home?

This message has been edited. Last edited by: egregore,

quote:

Do we train these pilots to the same skill level as our own? We do something like this already with aircraft we sell them - the aircraft might be a less equipped version. After all, it is conceivable that we might go up against them some day.

We will never have to worry about the Saudis flying anything no matter how well they are trained. Their Air Force is widely considered to be a joke.

Answers in red

quote:

Originally posted by egregore:
1- Do we train these pilots to the same skill level as our own? We do something like this already with aircraft we sell them - the aircraft might be a less equipped version. After all, it is conceivable that we might go up against them some day. We don't want them or their planes to be as good as or better than we. Training is approved at the State Department level but all the training I am aware of only goes to the "winging" stage - basically making someone a qualified pilot or flight officer (for the Saudis). Then they go to their own country and train there which may or may not have DOS contracted support. But we aren't giving them graduate level training in flying and tactics - just up to what the newbie pilot / flight officer would have.

2- Why is the training at a naval base, not Air Force? Saudi has very little navy, let alone an aircraft carrier to fly planes off of.I'm not sure what started a lot of the foreign training at NASP but it was likely due to the Navy / USAF having "Joint Flight Officer" training in the 90s. It was part of the "Jointness" after Desert Storm - when I went through all USN / USAF / Foreigner Flight Officers did the same training pipeline up until the very end. At some point the USAF went back to doing it their own way but still do it at NASP for some reason. The majority of pilots are trained by the USAF, but not all

3- Other than picking up pretty girls and bombing unarmed or lightly armed civilians - including their own - what do these pilots do with their newfound skillz when they get home? No idea. The Germans we used to train went back and became valuable portions of their AF. The Saudis in general sucked in training and suck in real life. They buy fancy places and weapons but still need LOTS of foreign help to be semi-competent - read, foreign MX, foreign training back in Saudi Arabian, ex-pats flying in their squadrons, etc, etc.

quote:

Answers in red

This is why I like to say there's no such thing as useless knowledge.

I will add a bit to Rhino's post. Sometimes foreign military pilots are trained beyond the basic level. I helped train a group of Polish pilots on night/NVG (night vision goggles) operations when I was an instructor at the C-130 schoolhouse at Little Rock. I know some other countries sent pilots to us for other training as well. We trained to the level that was approved by the State Dept and DOD and paid for by their gov. The only person I am aware of that was sent home without completing training was from an African country (don't remember which one) who absolutely was not qualified. Dude was not even at the skill level of a basic private pilot, I believe he was connected to their president/prime minster/dictator. Other than that one case everyone was trained until we could at least lie with a straight face and say they were ok. Even if it took three times as many flights as a US student would be given.

I was lucky enough (and very thankful) that I never had to train any Saudis. No one I knew who helped train those guys had anything good to say about them.

Thanks for the add-on Herkdriver - my posts was primarily aimed at the Saudi and other foreign flight officer training provided in Pensacola, which pretty much stopped after their basic qualifications - but yes depending on the ally we do provide additional training.

The Aussies sent a number of aircrew to the US to learn the FA-18F / EA-18Gs that they purchased, even though they do initial flight training locally. The USAF has some F-16 training units primarily focused on training foreign pilots / maintainers.

Sometimes these programs are temporary, just long enough until a nation gets enough internal experience to start doing the training themselves and sometimes (like the Saudis) it's a never ending train because they don't mind paying for it and would crash every plane they own if they didn't get some competent training.

For the outsiders looking in, realize that this is completely driven by the State Department & Politics as part of making and keeping allies - the US Military doesn't have much (if any) say in the matter. Orders are given, money / resources are allocated, and training is conducted.

And we dont just teach them to fly, we also teach them English.
I attended USAF Security Police School at Lackland AFB and I did a lot of drinking after classes. Like, a lot of drinking. As one does!
After a seriously drunk night on the town (thank you, San Antonio) I made it back to base. Things went wrong at that point. I woke up the next morning lying on a couch in a barracks day room. Standing over me and jabbering excitedly in a language I did not understand was a group of swarthy looking dudes. This scared the crap out of me and I actually began to think I had been kidnapped by terrorists!. I ran out of the barracks but did not recognize my surroundings. My terror only increased when I saw more foreign types on the street. I took off running and ran for about a half mile before I heard approaching sirens. I was delighted to see Security Police cars converging on me. They snatched me up and my hung over ass was soon in front of the SP School Commander. He chewed my ass for about a half hour with the highlights being about me being in a restricted area while shitfaced. He let me go with with half an ass but no documented punishment. I was also the laughing stock of the entire school.
Turns out I had managed to crash the one of the barracks of the Defense Language Institute. The swarthy dudes were Saudi G.I.s were we teaching English.
I still dont understand Arabic despite a crash course in it.

https://www.usni.org/magazines...concealed-carry-base

It's Past Time for Concealed Carry on Base

By Commander C. Randolph Whipps, U.S. Navy Reserve
December 2019 Proceedings Vol. 145/12/1,402

In the November 2017 Proceedings, I suggested the Secretary of the Navy implement Section 4 provisions of Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5210.56, “Arming and the Use of Force.” Those provisions allow for “carrying of privately owned firearms on DoD property by DoD personnel for personal protection purposes that are not associated with the performance of official duties.” Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SecNavInst) 5500.37 was released in May 2019, but as evidenced by the recent insider-threat terrorist attack at Naval Air Station (NAS) Pensacola, the Navy’s response can be characterized as “too little, too late.”

Why did it take the Department of the Navy (DoN) two and a half years to translate a November 2016 DoD directive into department-level policy? Yes, the DoN had to add specific references to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service and maritime-specific use of force criteria, but the delay smacks of bureaucratic inertia at best, and deliberate slow-rolling at worst.

Likewise, six months after the release of SecNavInst 5500.37, no relevant implementing policy, supplemental guidance, or training materials have been issued by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).1 No Navy website articulates how a Sailor or Navy civilian can request to carry a private firearm on base. No standard form exists to make such a request. All these are either specified or implied tasks from the SecNavInst that should have been anticipated three years ago.

Navy arming authorities at the installation level are inconsistent in making decisions “on a case by case basis following deliberate consideration,” as required by the SecNavInst. When that does occur, installation commanders have applied entirely subjective ex nihilo criteria to disapprove Section 4 arming requests, while still conceding that an applicant meets or exceeds every qualification and eligibility criteria specified in both the DoD directive and the SecNavInst.

The required qualification and eligibility criteria are rigorous and exclude younger (under 21) personnel and anyone who has not demonstrated competence with a firearm. The most restrictive wicket is that one must possess either “a Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA) credential, or authorization by the State where the installation is located to carry a firearm.”

As an example, a hypothetical 29-year-old instructor pilot and Florida concealed-carry permit holder (let’s call her LT Parks), assigned to NAS Pensacola, can carry a concealed handgun throughout Florida, but loses her civil rights and ability to protect herself and others on base. Indeed, setting aside carrying a concealed firearm on the flight line or in the classroom, she can’t even leave her private firearm locked in her car on base without permission to “carry.”2 LT Parks is thus also burdened while commuting from her residence to work, picking up a child from daycare, or running errands on the way home. Contrast this with Florida law, which explicitly allows employees to possess and secure firearms in their vehicles while at work.

By instruction, Navy arming authorities should account for the diligence and judgment of civil authorities that issue state permits, as well as law enforcement agencies (to include the Navy itself) that issue LEOSA credentials. In practice, installation commanders discount them entirely “in the interests of security, good order, and discipline.”3 Tell that to the family of Ensign Joshua Watson, the former Naval Academy rifle team captain, who experienced firsthand the lethal results of such good order and discipline.

"This isn’t the first time this happened and if we don’t change something, then it won’t be the last,” said Adam Watson, Joshua’s brother. “My brother was an excellent marksman. If my brother had not had that right stripped from him, this would be a different conversation.”4

Tell that, too, to the instructor pilots whose recent requests for on-base concealed carry were reportedly rejected.5 By failing to accept the de minimis risk of letting highly qualified and vetted Navy personnel carry on base, installation commanders are effectively transferring risk (not just career risk, but death and grave bodily harm) to service members like Ensign Watson.6

Adam Watson is right—the status quo of inaction regarding concealed carry on Navy installations is untenable. Navy senior leaders, including Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Gilday, should exercise their authority to squash this administrative slow-rolling, which is costing innocent lives on their bases. So long as the discretion of base commanders (however well-intentioned) effectively nullifies the intent of Congress and explicit direction of civilian DoD and DoN leaders—and thereby deprives DoN personnel of their civil rights—heroic but unarmed sailors will continue to fill body bags.


Link has footnote references.

So, how much good is a firearm in an emergency situation, when the thing is locked in your car?

I find it less than smart to invoke such asinine restrictions. Yeah, a shooter situation arises in some building (on base, or not) and the shooter(s) know that nobody in the building has a gun with which to fight back.

I can see the bad guys calling a "time out" to allow the good guys to go to their cars and get their gun. (irony).

How many of these "bad guys" would attack a building/facility if they knew that some percentage of the occupants were armed?

Is it not a little asinine to trust a fighter pilot with a fully armed fighter plane but deny him/her their right to carry a handgun?

And how much of this BS is attributable to obummer? It has not been that long since he left the white house.

I believe this originated during Bubba bill’s administration...