quote:

Originally posted by sdy:
DDG 62 had a 21 million dollar upgrade in February 2017. Don't know the details

Maybe while is is in Japan.. they can have Subaru fit it with their Collision avoidance software..?

Obviously, barring the revelation of some MAJOR equipment failure, in the final analysis, this collision is going to get chalked up to "Human Factors" as the cause. I guess I will bullet point my thoughts on this as a kind of list rather than an unreadable wall of text.
Just get a couple of things out of the way first.

1. It takes two to tango (COLREGS Rule 17) Rule 17 . Both vessels will be apportioned some measure of blame, even the obvious "Stand On" vessel. Admiralty courts usually assign percentages. Doubtful this will go to an admiralty court, the USN will almost certainly just pay actual damages to the box boat owners and call it a day.

2. AIS. Automatic Identification System, it has been mentioned here in passing, but I think it almost certainly played a role in this collision. To the .mil folks, think of it as an advanced civilian TACAN or IFF. It is required on ALL merchant ships over 500 Tons and all passenger vessels over 100 tons. They are cheap, incredibly useful and even shrimp boats and small sailboats are carrying them now. Merchant sailors (over)rely on this system to a HUGE extent, most automatically assume that any vessel not transmitting AIS data* must be an insignificant dinghy. (*Lat/Lon, COG,HDG, SOG, ROT, vessel name, MMSI number, ship's particulars, you can even send ship to ship text messages over the thing.) EVERYBODY relies on these things, with one exception: The US Navy. If the Crystal's lookout was looking at the STBD quarter of the Fitz, all they would have seen is one 40 watt PERKO light bulb, that combined with a weak radar return from that aspect would have led the 3rd Mate to assume (if he was even aware of it) he was dealing with a small/slow target probably a small fishing vessel. The Fitzgerald was almost certainly receiving all this AIS data, along with the AIS data of approximately 50 other vessels within VHF range. They were not, however, TRANSMITTING any AIS data, which is why we don't know anything about their track. On most modern RADAR's the AIS data is automatically overlaid on the RADAR picture, to the extent that I have often rebuked Mates for selecting the AIS icon to track rather than the radar target return itself. Long story short, it would have been quite easy for the junior 3rd Mate standing the mid watch to not have ever acquired the Fitz on RADAR, because it wasn't broadcasting AIS.

3. Inexperience. It was the mid-watch, that means all the most junior personnel on both ships were on watch. The least experienced 3rd Mate almost always gets shafted with the balls to 4 on a merchant ship, ditto the lookout, who was probably the lowest OS (Ordinary Seaman) on the boat. That would have likely been the total number on watch (2) on the Crystal's bridge. It's a fairly crowded chunk of water so they would probably have actually been paying attention, though the ship would still have been on autopilot, and the captain would have been in the rack.

As for the Fitzgerald, this is a stickier wicket, and I might offend some former SWO's with my opinions here, but here is where things went way off the rails. "If It's Grey, Stay Away" is a long time merchant ship maxim, for good reason.
I already dogged on the poor Filipino 3rd Mate for barely knowing PORT from STBD, but he probably has 5 to 10 times the training and conning experience of the hapless JG or LT who had the Conn on the Fitzgerald. He possibly has more underway OICNW (Officer in Charge of a Navigational Watch) time than the CO and XO of the DDG combined. I had my 100 ton USCG license when I joined the navy back in the 80's. I worked for 2 CO's on a 700ft ship who were A-6 pilots. They had far less ship driving experience than I did then or any of the 3rd mates who work for me now, Senior full-bird Captains, one tour as XO on a surface combatant, that was IT. Correct me if I am wrong, but my guess is that the OOD (OICNW) on the Mid Watch on the Fitzgerald was most likely a LTJG who had recently got his water wings, or maybe a full LT, a distinction without a difference. Maybe he did an engineering rotation first and hasn't spent a lot of time on the bridge yet, Maybe he got hammered the day before, anyway, my point is that the Navy does a TERRIBLE job training people to drive ships. They spend most of their time learning all kinds of other important military shit, like the full specs on an AEGIS system, or the proper use of a Harpoon Missile, or how not to offend little Susie Rottencrotch's LGBGTXYZ snowflake sensibilities. There is a Naval training film called "Selected Collisions at Sea." Only the USN has enough collisions to have a "Best-of" collection, though the Coasties come in a close second. The Navy needs to work harder on training junior officers in the core competency of ship handling. Right now they spend far too much time on all the other stuff to ever really become good ship drivers. If they wind up with some specialists, vs the current attempt to cram everything into their little 22 yr old heads, so be it.

4. Information Overload. Another major issue on the bridge of a Navy ship is information overload. I'm sure CIC had a plot running on every surface target within 24 miles if not more, all the RF transmissions, CPA's Vessel types/speeds/nationalities, Probably updating all this info every 3 minutes, just a constant stream of numbers being barked out. The lookouts were calling in everything they could see, maybe as many as 20-30 visible targets judging from some of the AIS data I have looked at. Having transited the Straights of Gibraltar on a Navy bridge a dozen or more times, it was completely overwhelming from an informational standpoint, all the info coming up from CIC, all the lookout data, updates on track from the QMOW, lots of conversations, etc. The same transit on a Merchant vessel bridge is pretty easy, stay in the traffic scheme and don't run over anyone from behind. My point being that the bridge team on the Fitzgerald was probably out of their depth without realizing they were out of their depth.

5.
Anyway, it could have gone down a couple of ways. As for the Crystal, she makes her course change to port as planned and then 15 minutes later she's on top of the Fitzgerald. Oh Shit. Can't stop, All you can do is turn (NEVER TURN LEFT is one of the implied rules in COLREGS), so they turn right or are pushed to the right by the force of the collision. Maybe they saw the Fitz at the last minute, maybe they knew she was there the whole time, Maybe they didn't have a clue until the bang. We will find this out because the Crystal has a VDR (Voyage Data Recorder) It will have at the minimum, a full voice recording, any radio conversations, and any maneuvering information, possibly the RADAR plot as well.
As for the Fitzgerald there are a number of possibilities. They (OOD/JOOD/CIC) could have just lost track of the Crystal in all the informational gobbledygook. They could have been paying attention and misunderstood the information and then made some bad choices.
There could easily have been one or more other ships in the picture (it's quite common, though COLREGS
calls it a "Special Situation") Meaning that you have 2 or more ships with a risk of collision, Perhaps you are the "Stand On" vessel to contact #1 but the "Give Way" Vessel to ships #2 and #3 and they all require a different course to change your CPA to a safe distance. I ALWAYS have it in my standing orders to be called for any "Special Situation" Because this is where things can go wrong in a hurry if you do not have a really good grasp of a tactical plot. Personally I have a feeling that they were aware of the Crystal, but they waited too long and then did the wrong thing. (Probably sped up, a familiar Navy reaction) It's much harder to hit shit when you are stopped.
Last but not least is the hesitance of the USN to simply pick up the fucking VHF and say, "Vessel So and So, this is US Navy Warship off your port bow, can you alter course to Starboard?" They hardly ever do this.
Fucking OPSEC.

I'd bet my parking pass on it



Seriously though Captain. Great insight and thought. Thank you

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Hobbs:
I'd bet my parking pass on it

Were you by any chance on the JFK when Fast Ed Fahy was Admiral? I had lunch with him on board in Mayport when I moored my little USNS research ship under the bow. (He was my CO on AOR6)

Thank you, CaptainMike, for such an informative post. It’s an extremely refreshing change from the flood of, “Everyone needs to be cashiered, if not sent to Leavenworth forever,” kneejerk comments by people whose total nautical experience evidently consisted of something to do with artificial ducks and bathtubs.

International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (Colregs)

quote:

Originally posted by CaptainMike:
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Hobbs:
I'd bet my parking pass on it

Were you by any chance on the JFK when Fast Ed Fahy was Admiral? I had lunch with him on board in Mayport when I moored my little USNS research ship under the bow. (He was my CO on AOR6)

2003-2006 My last tour before retiring. CS-5 CS-6 LCPO

You went into the admirals dining room from the port side. I worked on the same level but "hidden" over on the starboard side.

quote:

Originally posted by Hobbs:

quote:

Originally posted by CaptainMike:
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Hobbs:
I'd bet my parking pass on it

Were you by any chance on the JFK when Fast Ed Fahy was Admiral? I had lunch with him on board in Mayport when I moored my little USNS research ship under the bow. (He was my CO on AOR6)

2003-2006 My last tour before retiring. CS-5 CS-6 LCPO

Admiral Fahy retired around 2000 I think with a 2nd star, best CO I ever had. I did wind up running some old USNS junk out of Mayport again around 2006 I have an embarrassing photo here somewhere,...
My first "official" CO parking space. I never went in for the whole Khakis and shoulderboards thing.

I can only imagine what happened shortly after this incident. I bet the Navy blasted messages to ALL ships to pay attention and don't screw up. Don't they call that a safety stand down or something like that?

You look familiar Captain. WAY out of my league but familiar. It's a small world

quote:

Originally posted by Hobbs:
You look familiar Captain. WAY out of my league but familiar. It's a small world

It is indeed, good to meet you Chief!

Thank you Captain. Thank you for taking considered time to post.
My previous ships and stations of note
USS Bainbridge CGN-25 (Norfolk)
USS Callaghan DDG-994 (Everett)
USS Stephen W. Groves FFG-29 (Pascagoula)
FCTCPAC Point Loma
FCTCLANT Dam Neck

We refueled resupplied the Bainbridge a bunch during Desert Shield/Storm. I was on the USS Kalamazoo AOR6 known for our delicious Kzookies (Macadamia Fudge chunk cookies) The JFK always sent over pizza during UNREPS back then.
I also did a stint on the San Jacinto.
I left as an SM1(SW)(SAR) in 1993, I wanted to drive ships, not do paperwork for a living, but that is a LONG story.

quote:

Originally posted by f2:
Audio: Confusion reigned before destroyer's collision, 5-23-2013, USS PORTER (DDG-78) collision with supertanker in SOH

deja vu all over again...

I stand corrected, I would never have expected the bridge of a US Navy warship to be so chaotic. It seemed like the helmsman knew a lot more about the situation than the Captain did.

Well there you go Captain. I was on the Bainbridge at that time. When we outchopped, we dropped down to Kenya ... then up to the North Atlantic for NATO ops. Got shellback AND bluenose in the same month. In the North Atlantic a storm drove the battle group to port but Ike had to stay out and Bainbridge was the only ship that could hang with the Ike. All the others were too top heavy (Ticonderoga and others) ... and the fact we were Nuclear and didn't need "gas". We did a bunch of just about 45 degree rolls for a about a week. Cold cuts, tied into racks and worried the 49 was going to shear. Lost the whiptails and accommodation ladder from the main deck as well as a welded down ammo storage locker. Shipmates on the Ike were messaging us and freaking out because they were taking 18 degree rolls.

quote:

Originally posted by Rightwire:

quote:

Originally posted by f2:
Audio: Confusion reigned before destroyer's collision, 5-23-2013, USS PORTER (DDG-78) collision with supertanker in SOH

deja vu all over again...

I stand corrected, I would never have expected the bridge of a US Navy warship to be so chaotic. It seemed like the helmsman knew a lot more about the situation than the Captain did.

That's not the helmsman that is the OOD, he would have been the one in command if the CO had not been on the bridge, sounds brimming with confidence, doesn't he? Yet he had better situational awareness than the CO. Neither of them knew what was really going on until it was too late though. My advice is almost always to slow down and assess. In this case though they pulled in front of a supertanker and then slowed down and got run over. Bad spot to slow down. Never cross under a bigger ship's bow is one of those law of gross tonnage rules everyone knows but isn't written down anywhere.

Ok, so here is the cleaned up version of those things on the bridge wings. I spent some time with "friends" finding this.

Old press release and OPSEC friendly:
http://www.naval-technology.co...-naval-weapon-system

quote:

Originally posted by stoic-one:
Old press release and OPSEC friendly:

Thanks stoic-one!

Captain Mike,

Thank you sir for chiming in.

Finally I am seeing more than just DailyMail pick up on this story.

It would appear that one of the 7 deceased, Fire Controlman 1st Class Gary Rehm Jr had ample time to escape and save himself, instead he continued to go back for his shipmates and may have saved up to 20 before he was ultimately trapped when fellow sailors were forced to contain the water before he was able to return for the final time.

Assuming these reports turn out to be accurate, my God, what a courageous young man. I would hope that ultimately the Navy finds a way to permanently honor him in some way.

http://www.businessinsider.com...ss-fitzgerald-2017-6

One of the 7 sailors who died aboard the USS Fitzgerald saved more than a dozen of his fellow shipmates before he ultimately lost his own life, The Daily Beast reported.

The USS Fitzgerald collided with a Philippine-flagged merchant vessel about 56 miles off the coast of Japan on Saturday.

Seven sailors were later found dead in flooded compartments on the ship.

When the Fitzgerald collided with the merchant ship, 37-year-old Fire Controlman 1st Class Gary Leo Rehm Jr., "leapt into action," according to The Daily Beast.

The Fitzgerald was struck below the waterline, and Rehm Jr.'s family was told by the Navy that he went under and saved at least 20 sailors, according to WBNS-10TV in Columbus, Ohio.

But when he went back down to get the other six sailors, the ship began to take on too much water, and the hatch was closed, WBNS-10TV said.

"That was Gary to a T,” Rehm Jr.'s friend Christopher Garguilo, told NBC4i in Columbus, Ohio. “He never thought about himself.”