quote:

Originally posted by PASig:
What in the hell is going on with Germany right now? Seems like we actually don't have a monopoly here in the US as far as idiots in charge:

This is definitely NOT the Germany I remember of the early 90's that had their shit together tight.

quote:

[...]

Gerhartz: Very good, very good. Well, I wanted us to briefly talk to each other beforehand ... well, not in the sense of who says what, but so we briefly coordinate, and that the two comrades Florstedt and Fenske in particular know how the whole thing emerged. Because when you hear that the Minister of Defense wants to get really deep into Taurus, where the meeting is half an hour from what I saw, so ... we won't be able to get the thing to fly, to put it like that. I don't see any triggering momentum behind it at the moment. So it's not like the Chancellor told him, "Hey, gen up on it again and then let's decide tomorrow." At least I didn't recognize that, but rather that he mer Pistorius again due to this whole discussion, which comes up again and again; and of course it comes up because no one really knows, why is the Chancellor blocking this? Of course the most bizarre rumors arise. I want to name one. Yesterday I got a call from a journalist who is extremely close to the Chancellor. Well, she had heard in Munich that Taurus doesn't work at all.

I just say, okay, who tells you shit like that? I thought she picked up on it politically somehow. Then she says: “Someone in uniform told me.” Of course she doesn’t reveal her source, of course, but of course she jumped on it and wanted to make a mega headline out of it, along the lines of: “Now we finally have it the reason why the Chancellor is not delivering. Because the thing doesn’t work at all.” Of course I talked her out of it, I say total nonsense. We're even running shooting campaigns all the time, the last one wasn't that long ago. Right? But you can see what kind of drivel is always in the room and, above all, what nonsense is being said. So, I just wanted to take a moment to coordinate with you so that this doesn't go in the wrong direction. So first of all my question would be to Florstedt and Fenske. Has anyone ever spoken to you directly, or did General Freuding get in touch with you somehow?

Florstedt: Negative from my side, no, I only heard from Frank.

Fenske: Negative for me too. I only communicated with General Gräfe.

Gerhartz: Ah yes, all clear. And... [inaudible]...

Fenske: I gave him both numbers on Sunday and he said that he would [inaudible].

Gerhartz: Well okay, then maybe that is yet to happen. No, that hasn't happened yet, so what I've seen is that it's half an hour ... and it could well be that I might not be there at all. Rather I may have to go before the budget committee because we still have a small issue with a price increase for the F-35 infrastructure in Büchel; which is super annoying because it's not really a price increase, but BAIUD simply estimated too low, and now the companies have just submitted their offers and they are way above what BAIUD estimated. And now, of course, there is great anger. And I told them now that they have to know that for themselves. Whether I should go with you or whether I should go to the budget committee. In the end, the minister has to decide, because it is almost simultaneous. So it could well be that you are alone then. And I would recommend, well I'm not going to get ... I'm not going to get too much into it ... I'm just going to say, here, these are our two experts. One in the unit, the other in the ZLO and then ... then you have it. And I would recommend, I already sent this to you through Frank, to have a few slides with you, right? Submittals, as they like to call it, so that you can visualize a little bit. Well, you just have to put yourself in his shoes, he had ... well, we showed him at a demo show, there was a Taurus there, it was also in the weapon ... on the carrier next to the Tornado, but for example what it looks like when installed on a Tornado or what a mission planning facility looks like, for example, he has very little idea.

?: Okay. Udo you have ... you have a bunch of slides, right?

Fenske: Yes. Yes, I have them available.

Gerhartz: But on the other hand, don't bombard him with a slide show with 30 slides. Just keep in mind that the meeting is half an hour. I would say make a quick serve, hopefully Freuding will get in touch again. Of course it's also a bit about how it works, what can Taurus do, how is it used? But of course there is still something in the back of his mind ... if we were to make a political decision to support Ukraine, how could the whole thing work out in the end? And I would be really grateful to you if we, well … the challenge, according to the motto: “What’s not easy about it?” But that we don’t just pose a problem, but that we also always give the solution to it.

Right? So when it comes to doing mission planning, for example, I know how the English do it, they do it completely in reachback. They also have a few people on site, they do that, the French don't. So, they also QC the Ukrainians when loading the SCALP, right, because Storm Shadow and SCALPs are relatively similar from a technical point of view. They already told me, yes, in God's name, they would also be watching over the Ukrainians' shoulders while they were loading Taurus. The question would be, how do we solve that? Should we let them do the mission planning and give them MBDA on their hand in a reachback manner, and then bring one of our people to MBDA? Now I would like to ask again, maybe Frank again, how did we always position ourselves, and how we would do it, and then of course we say Fenske, Florstedt, if you both show how you see it from your perspective.

Fenske: I might start with: “What is the most sensitive or critical thing that can happen now?” With the whole discussion, it goes back and forth forever, and I think the two points which are the most sensitive, are, on the one hand, timing, according to the motto, “Now the Chancellor says we'll supply it after all,” and you come from the Bundeswehr: Yes, great, but in eight months we'll be ready to start the first mission. And the second thing is, of course, we can't shorten the time either if there's a mistargeting and the thing drops on a kindergarten and there are civilian casualties. That's why these are the two ... left and right, a border between which you have to weigh. If you break it down like this, one track is the delivery of the missiles. We actually have nothing to do with that, and the important point would then be in the conversation ... I have to point it out again ... without the company we can't do anything, and the aim would then be like with the missiles of IRIS-T, that the first missiles are equipped, converted and delivered relatively quickly. But then rudimentary things have to be done, like another small overhaul, taking down the German insignia, and so on. But that doesn't have to wait until you have twenty, because you could theoretically hand over the first five. So, that would be the first track, the first line, how long can they be delivered? But that is actually completely in the hands of the industry, and the question also arises who pays for it, because it involves cost.

The second question is then the question of the interface: How do you connect it to which weapon system? And that's another thing, which some tinkerer from Ukraine would actually have to do with the company because... right, Mr. Fenske ... we don't have any shares in it when it comes to the integration into Su [Sukhoi], for example, right?

Fenske: I don't think so, although TSG, the manufacturer, says that they can do that with a timeframe of around six months, so either Su [Sukhoi] or F-16.

Gräfe: Exactly, that was something, we don't actually have any shares in handovers, but if the message comes across: "Great, the Chancellor has decided," and then the other message "but it takes time", “six months for the interface alone,” well, then the positive news quickly turns into negative news.

And the third part is the one that could theoretically affect us, namely training. That means, as we once said, that we work in collaboration with the industry in a similar way to IRIS-T - the industry trains how to use the system and we second people who provide tactical support for the whole thing. And then we talked about the thinnest case scenario of three or four months. And that would be the part we do in Germany. And then of course you would now have to think about whether you should rely on the British for both the interface and the training, in order to quickly come to a quick solution with the first missiles, if they look with their know-how of how they got the Storm Shadow on - it can't be that big of a difference - and maybe they'll take part in the operation at the beginning, while the crews are trained by us in the meantime. So that it doesn't take so long. And then there are a few things: Can we supply a database? Can we provide satellite images? Can we supply a planning station? In addition to the pure missiles that we have, everything would have to go through the industry or through IABG.

Gerhartz: Well, we always have to keep in mind that they have aircraft from which they use Storm Shadow, like Taurus. Well, that means the British were there and wired up the planes, so they're not that far off from having the Taurus from those planes ... right? An F-16 we're not talking about right now. They have it on the MiG-23, and that's what it was all about ... I can only say the experience from Patriot - I still remember what timelines our own experts drew up at the beginning. And they mastered the thing in just a few weeks and are now using it to such an extent that our people say: “Oh, wow, we didn't expect that at all!” Well, some of them are currently engaged in warfare more high tech than our good old Luftwaffe. I always keep all of this in mind when it comes to all the timelines that we open up, so that you shouldn't make such a mistake. But now, of course, comrade Fenske, Florstedt, I just want to see and hear your picture from you, now also with a view to a possible delivery to the Ukraine.

Fenske: I would pick up the point about training again. We've already looked at that. If the appropriate personnel come and can be trained in parallel, then we will have around three weeks of industrial training and a training phase, which we, the Luftwaffe, can then do in around four weeks. That means we're well below the twelve weeks - assuming we have appropriately qualified staff, we can do it without interpreters and the like, so there's a few other data there.

We had already spoken to Ms. Friedberger. When it comes to missions afterwards, the recommendation would actually be that at least the first mission support would be provided by us, as the planning is very complex. We need about a year to train our personnel. So to sort of push it to, how do I put it now, ten weeks, with the expectation that they can drive a Formula 1 racing car off-road and also on Formula 1 tracks. So a possible variant would be to provide planning support. Theoretically, you could even do this from Büchel with a secure line to Ukraine, transfer the data file, and then it would be available and you could plan it together.

So, that would be the worst-case scenario, the minimum being the industry supporting the whole thing with a user helpdesk that can provide support with software questions, just like we basically have in Germany.

Gerhartz: One second, I'll butt in there, Mr. Fenske. If one was now politically concerned that this line from Büchel directly to Ukraine is too direct a participation, basically anything can happen in politics, one could then say: Okay, the data file will be made at MBDA and we will send our one, two experts to Schrobenhausen. It's total nonsense, but if you look at it that way, politically it might be something different now, if the data file comes from the industry, it will ... it doesn't come from the unit on our side.

Fenske: Yes. The question will be where does the data come from. Now I'll take a step back. When it comes to the target data, ideally it comes with satellite images because this gives the highest precision, so we have an accuracy of less than three meters. We have to process them in the first set in Büchel. Regardless of this, I think something would be achieved in some way with a data transfer between Büchel and Schrobenhausen. Or, which is of course also possible, you might send the data file to Poland and you have the handover, takeover somewhere in Poland, and someone drives there by car. And I think you have to look into it in detail and there will also be possible solutions.

So, at the moment when we have support, in the worst case scenario I'll even have to commute back and forth by car. It's just that this infringes upon response time, so you don't respond within hours. We have to say that if you want to react very quickly, we are at the point where we are confident that we can actually do the - I'll say, from order to ... well, aircraft airborne within six hours ... whereas we then are ... and we only have precision ... which is unfortunately greater than three meters, which can be enough for an appropriate target. And if I want to have greater precision, so I have to work with satellite images and model the target, then of course the subsequent time is crucial, and I can quickly get to twelve hours. That depends on the target, so I've never looked at it in detail, but I think it will be possible. All you have to say is that we need a data line that can do that.

Gerhartz: And do you think ... well, you always have to build on what else the Ukrainians are doing now. We also know that there are a lot of people with American accents walking around in civilian clothes. You can say that they are able to do this relatively quickly because they all have satellite images. You have to assume that too.

Fenske: Now let's talk about it very briefly, the question will then be: In order to be able to penetrate skillfully, I have to penetrate air defense, which is there in large numbers ... We can do that very well, we assume, because we can of course work at low altitude and have data from IABG and NDK for this. You would definitely have to make these available to them so that I can underfly a 21, so that I can get the most out of planning here and not plan using waypoints like with Storm Shadow, but actually by flying around or below the respective systems.

If I provide that, then there will probably be quicker learning effects and I'll just get back into the area where I eventually get to the number of missiles. So, very quickly, if I'm talking about 50, then 50 missiles will be fired very quickly.

Gerhartz: Yeah, yeah, of course. Of course, it must be clear that this will not change the war. We don't have at all ... we wouldn't give them all away, we don't want to give them up, and not all of ours are the same. I don't have to tell you that. So, you could say 50 in the first tranche, and then if they were to choke us again, for the next 50, and that would be the end of it. Well, that's completely clear.

Well, that would be big politics again, and then we can get back into the swing of things ourselves at that point ... I suspect there could be some momentum behind it, because I know - from my British and French colleagues - that they're pretty much Winchester with their Storm Shadow and SCALPs. And then, of course, they will say, before we deliver the next ones here - and we have already delivered here again - Germany should now make an effort. But, that would be again, you can now imagine, I wanted to say it again clearly ...

Florstedt: I took a pragmatic approach today. I thought about what the unique point compared to the Storm Shadows ... like air defense, obus time, flight altitude, etc. - and then I realized that there are two interesting targets: one is a bridge in the east, and the other is ammo depots into which we can get. The bridge in the east is just difficult to reach, and the pillars are relatively small, and Taurus can image that, and the ammo depots - we can just penetrate those. And if I now take that into account and compare how many Storm Shadows and MALDs were fired, you have a pretty good unique point. I picked out three routes where I would say, is it about the bridge or is it about ammo depots? Is it reachable with the current caps that Red [inaudible] have, and the Patriot?

And then I basically come to the decision – yes, well, it’s doable. The limiting factor is the Su-24, how many of them they have left. That would be in the single digits. And I picked out a few lead points and said, look, basically it's doable, and how do you teach the Ukrainians the TTPs to shoot this thing? I would say the pilot – under a week. And how do you plot it? Mission planning, and that's exactly what it comes down to: what do we actually do now? We have to think about this mission planning and centralized planning. And the mission planning - it's in our unit, the execution takes two weeks, and I think that if you don't focus on the ZV now, it'll go relatively quickly, and it'll be in the unit in three weeks. That being said.

But when I look at a bridge like this, what I wanted to get to is that the CEP of Taurus is not enough to simply target it - that means I need pictures of it, how Taurus can work, and we need the mission data. And I don't know whether we can train the Ukrainians in an adequate time - of course if we're talking in months, [inaudible] - but in an adequate time ... the mission data, what does a bridge pillar look like for Taurus, how do we teach them. That means, for me, from an operational perspective, it is not possible to assess how quickly you can teach Ukrainians this image planning, I would say, and how quickly the integration will take place. But otherwise targets [inaudible], namely the bridge and the ammunition depots, and I generally see scruples about teaching people that very quickly.

Fenske: I would like to quickly add something about the bridge, because we have looked at it intensively. And unfortunately – due to its size – the bridge is like an airfield. That means I may need ten or twenty missiles for this.

Florstedt: I estimated it through, namely where it opens, when you take the pillars.

Fenske: Yes, the pillar, under certain circumstances we might just make a hole in it. And then we'll have egg on our face ... In order to have data-valid statements, we would really have to ...

Florstedt: I didn't want to define the bridge for you at all, I just want to say that was the pragmatic approach, what do they actually want and how quickly can I train them for it? And in the end it becomes clear: What remains is that we have to give them the image-centralized mission planning data. We basically have to give them the Semobi if we have it ourselves. And the daily data, which we have, but we would have to make it available to them somehow. Because when it comes to such small targets, you have to plan them out a little more precisely than just on a satellite picture. When it comes to hardened targets, it's much easier and relatively quick to plan if we exploit the fact that it can fly at a double-digit height.

Gerhartz: You sum it up quite well: We all know that they want to take out the bridge. That's clear, we also know what it means in the end ... then you got, supplying it is so important - not only militarily, strategically important, but also a bit politically, the good island is their linchpin. Now it's not quite so ... quite so fatal, now that they have their land bridge more or less there, but ... and that's why people are scared when the direct link of the armed forces goes to Ukraine. And then the question would always be: Can we basically pull the trick of assigning our people to MBDA, so there's only a direct line between MBDA and Ukraine? Then it's less bad than if the direct line is from our Luftwaffe to them.

Gräfe: I don't think it makes any difference, Ingo. We just have to be careful that we don't formulate in the war criterion right from the start. If we now tell the minister, I'm exaggerating a bit, we'll plan the data and then drive them over from Poland by car so that no one notices - that's a war criterion. We won't be able to implement the whole thing with any kind of involvement from ourselves. So first of all, if it comes from the company, MBDA would first have to agree to whether they would do it. Yes, but then it makes no difference whether we let our people in Büchel plan it or in Schrobenhausen. Involved is involved, and I don't think we'll get over that hurdle.

Now again what we assume as a red line as a basis. I'll just go back to what I meant at the very beginning: Either we have to split the training up, saying we do a fast track and a long track. And the long track – then they are there for four months and learn it completely correctly, with “How do I do it with a bridge”. And in the Fast Track it's all about quick deployment, after two weeks, how do I know what to do with an ammunition depot. Or the other option: We ask whether in this phase, until they themselves are fully trained, we ask the British whether they will take over in this phase. But I think any kind of attempt at an interim solution - imagine that gets leaked to the press! We have our people in Schrobenhausen, or we somehow drive through Poland by car - I don't think either of these are acceptable solutions.

Gerhartz: Of course you can turn it around so that you say, if the political will is there now, then we first have to say: “Well, someone from Ukraine should come here.” And then we have to know political requirement – no more direct involvement in mission planning? Then it must be clear: the training takes a little longer. And the complexity and ultimately the success of the operation naturally decrease, but it is not impossible either. Because it's not like they haven't already gained a certain amount of experience in this, and we can see for ourselves what high-tech stuff we're currently using. And then you would have to see: If that is the requirement - there is no direct participation, we cannot do the mission planning in Büchel and send them over, I could almost imagine that that is a red line for Germany ... well, It just has to be clear - you have to train them a little longer, then it just takes a few months, and you can't do everything with them. But it's not like saying you can't do anything with it. You can then perhaps even assume that they will get a grip on it relatively quickly. Then we just have to make sure that the entire database, the mission data, that they can process it yourself, right? So I mean …

Gräfe: Then I would do it the way Seb just said, doing a quick track and a long track. The point is to achieve a quick effect. And if it's just about the ammunition depots with an initial effect and not the complexity of the bridge, then you could say that you get rid of this junk for a certain price so that you can achieve a quick effect. And I don't see these IABG data as critical, because they are not related to a specific position, they have to explore that themselves. But that would be the generic performance of the system. That would be a point that we have already discussed in the group, which I could certainly imagine handing over. At the moment it's just German Eyes Only.

Gerhartz: That will remain the pivotal point, because basically even with an ammunition depot, because there is no easy plan from those in Bavaria due to the massive number of air defense. That means you will have to go so deeply into it ... with our people, I believe that we will find a way, and it would also be good at the moment when we say "Let's try it" in order to be able to give better political advice. As I said, all we need is the GO and we have to get started. What will fail it for us is that the KSA does not have a clear picture of where all the air defense systems are located.

Gräfe: But the Ukrainians have that, you can assume that they ...

Gerhartz: Exactly. Hopefully they will have that. Because I see that with us - we only show the radar set all the time. But in order for us to have proper planning, we really have to look at where the radar sets are and where the launchers are. The more we slim down, the less precise our plan becomes and the more ... so we have a super tool, which means that when we have the data, we can say relatively precisely if we can implement it. Anything that I eliminate somewhere for reasons of enemy or complexity, or because I don't have enough training yet, always means a reduction in my ability to penetrate.

Gräfe: Yes, yes, of course. But there is no reason now where you say: “This is the show-stopper”, where you say: “You can’t do that.” There are different gradations, depending on where the political red line is, you will do it maybe ... oh, by the way, I really like this short track/long track, too. There are different timelines and different possibilities for complex use, which will become more manageable for Ukraine over time.

Gerhartz: Definitely, because they can do it every day – practice.

So I think that even if I'm not there now, the minister will, is a really cool guy to deal with anyway. So that’s why ... you are the experts. It was just important to me that we just appear sober and don't somehow throw in show-stoppers that are simply ... that are not credible when other nations deliver Storm Shadows and SCALP.

So, I'm not shouting “hooray” either. I mean, we've now handed over three Patriot radars of twelve. There were long faces in air defense. But at the moment they are shooting down the planes and missiles that won't hit us.

Gräfe: You have to say very clearly: the longer you wait to make a decision, the longer it will take to implement it. Either the gradation: first something simple, later something bigger. Or asking the British: “Can you support us at the beginning and take over this planning?” Could accelerate what is in our responsibility. As I said, the interface is not our responsibility at all, the Ukrainians would have to do it themselves with the company.

[...]

quote:

Moscow at war can always play long. Horrific though it seemed at the time, the mooted deal in spring 2022 to revert to some version – almost any version – of the pre-February 2022 border would have made sense. Instead Ukraine has come to seem ever more like a Nato mercenary for western generals wanting to boost their budgets and relive the cold-war games of their youth. The price is paid by their taxpayers and Ukraine’s young men.

quote:

And yet, none of this appears to have made a difference, given now the widespread acknowledgement that Kiev forces are losing ground...

quote:

Originally posted by chellim1:
Former Top Polish Army Chief Admits "Ukraine Is Losing The War"