quote:

Originally posted by Fly-Sig:
While I place blame with Boeing for their system design weaknesses, the real blame lay with pilot training. The modern philosophy is minimal sim training time, and emphasize using the automation. Younger pilots seem anxious about turning off automation.

If I may be so bold (and some may call it "pompous"), I would venture to say if those two accident (MAX) aircraft were being flown by western-trained pilots in a FAR Part 121 U.S. Commercial Airline Operation, those planes would not have crashed. Fly-Sig...you are SPOT ON with your summation that automation is relied upon way too much in non Western-trained programs and operations.

I was taught FLY THE PLANE!!!!

B737 MAX-9 is back in service.

I have ZERO qualms about flying this or any other B737 variant in our fleet. Our maintenance team is among THE best in the industry and I have FULL faith they have inspected these planes/doors on both the -9 and -900ER to a greater degree than required.

See you in the skies!!

Yikes

quote:

...Two former senior Boeing staffers have said they wouldn't fly on the firm's killer 737 Max after its latest safety fiasco - and one said he urge his family not to set foot on one either.

'I would absolutely not fly a Max airplane,' said Ed Pierson, a former Boeing senior manager told the LA Times, following the January 5 incident which saw a door plug blow out of an Alaska Airlines 737 Max 9 in mid air.

'I've worked in the factory where they were built, and I saw the pressure employees were under to rush the planes out the door' he explained...

Multiple former senior Boeing staffers - one of whom also worked for FAA - say they would NOT fly on killer 737 Max planes and that they're urging their families to avoid them too

quote:

Originally posted by pedropcola:
My rudimentary understanding of this is that it stems from their purchase of McDonnell Douglas. Boeing had a superb record of quality and safety. After the purchase the McD guys kind of took over. The prior way of doing things went by the wayside and $$$$ took over.

pedropcola, I saw this article today and was immediately reminded of your comment here.

https://www.airguide.info/boei...-the-737-max-crisis/

Boeing’s Shift from Engineering Excellence to Profit-Driven Culture: Tracing the Impact of the McDonnell Douglas Merger on the 737 Max Crisis
By Aram Gesar| January 13th, 2024

Boeing’s journey, particularly with its 737 Max, reflects a dramatic shift in the company’s core values and operational philosophy, a change significantly influenced by its late-1990s merger with McDonnell Douglas. This pivotal event marked a departure from Boeing’s storied commitment to engineering superiority and a safety-first mindset, pivoting towards a business model heavily emphasizing cost efficiency and rapid production, often at the expense of product quality and safety.

Historically celebrated for its engineering-driven ethos, Boeing’s success was rooted in innovative design, meticulous attention to detail, and a culture deeply respectful of its engineers’ expertise and contributions. This approach not only built a strong reputation for quality and reliability but also ensured unwavering attention to safety in both design and manufacturing.

However, the merger introduced a starkly contrasting business philosophy. McDonnell Douglas, struggling with its commercial ventures, like the DC-10 and the MD-11, and focused on cost reduction and shareholder value, often sidelined the criticality of product excellence and engineering innovation. The company has a well-known approach of ‘good enough for government’, meaning mediocre engineering and production, and if problems arise, fix them later and charge for it. Consequently, McDonnell Douglas executives, upon assuming leadership roles in the merged entity, brought a less engineering-centric mindset, favoring financial metrics and market competitiveness.

The last Boeing aircraft untouched by this cultural shift was the 777, noted for its on-schedule, on-budget production and remarkable engineering and commercial success. As of July 2023, the 777 had become the most ordered and delivered wide-body airliner, with over 60 customers ordering 2,150 units across all variants, of which 1,713 have been delivered. The 777-300ER variant leads with 837 orders and 832 deliveries.

This change in focus was evident in Boeing’s subsequent business decisions and development strategies. The development of the Boeing 787 and 737 Max, pressured by competition with Airbus, underwent rushed timelines. Both aircraft faced delays, significant budget overruns, and were ultimately grounded due to safety concerns.

The rushed development of the 737 Max resulted in the implementation of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), a software adjustment necessitated by new, more fuel-efficient engines altering the plane’s aerodynamics. The MCAS, dependent on a single sensor, malfunctioned in two fatal crashes, starkly highlighting the dangers of compromising engineering integrity and safety for speed and cost reduction.

These incidents and the ensuing scrutiny revealed the extent of Boeing’s internal cultural shift. The company had moved away from its traditional, holistic engineering-first approach, resulting in fragmented communication, widespread outsourcing, and a reduced emphasis on safety and comprehensive engineering practices.

The current challenges Boeing faces trace back to the cultural and philosophical changes post-merger with McDonnell Douglas. This shift from an engineering and safety-centric approach to one driven by financial motives and market pressures has significantly impacted the company, undermining its legacy of product excellence and posing substantial challenges in upholding its reputation for quality and safety in the aerospace sector.

The merger between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas in the late 1990s signaled a critical turning point, leading to the gradual erosion of Boeing’s engineering-driven culture. Influenced by McDonnell Douglas’s more commercially oriented and profit-driven approach, this shift precipitated notable changes in Boeing’s priorities and practices, culminating in the 737 Max crisis and a tarnished reputation for a company once synonymous with engineering excellence.

Initially established in 1916, Boeing was renowned for its engineering-led approach, highly valuing the insights and expertise of its engineers. This culture played a pivotal role in Boeing’s ascension as a leading aircraft manufacturer, characterized by a strong focus on safety, innovation, and quality.

The merger with financially struggling McDonnell Douglas, however, brought about a culture clash. Known for prioritizing cost-cutting and shareholder value, McDonnell Douglas influenced a significant shift in Boeing’s priorities. This shift was reflected in post-merger management styles and business decisions. Notably, several McDonnell Douglas executives, including former CEO Harry Stonecipher, assumed senior roles, introducing a more commercially driven approach at odds with Boeing’s historic focus on engineering excellence.

Boeing’s business practices, especially in developing new aircraft models like the 737 Max, increasingly mirrored this cultural shift. Challenged by Airbus’s A320neo, Boeing faced immense pressure, leading to an “extremely compressed” development timeline for the 737 Max. This haste led to the addition of the MCAS, designed to address aerodynamic changes from new, more fuel-efficient engines. However, the system’s reliance on a single sensor was its undoing, as evidenced by the tragic Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes. These events underscored the severe consequences of prioritizing cost and speed over engineering rigor and safety.

The aftermath of these tragedies laid bare deeper issues in Boeing’s approach to aircraft design and safety. The company’s focus had shifted from its collaborative, engineering-first culture to a fragmented and financially driven model.

This shift resulted in communication breakdowns, extensive outsourcing, and a diminished commitment to safety and thorough engineering practices. The 737 Max crashes served as a grim reminder of the potential consequences when financial objectives overshadow engineering excellence and safety considerations in the aerospace industry.

Boeing’s current struggles are directly linked to the cultural and philosophical changes following its merger with McDonnell Douglas. The move away from an engineering and safety-centric approach to a model driven by financial considerations and market pressures has profoundly affected Boeing. It has undermined the company’s longstanding legacy of product excellence and poses significant challenges in maintaining its reputation for quality and safety in the competitive aerospace sector.

The late 1990s merger between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas was a watershed moment, leading to a gradual erosion of Boeing’s engineering-driven culture. Influenced by McDonnell Douglas’s commercially oriented, profit-driven approach, this shift led to significant changes in Boeing’s priorities and practices, ultimately culminating in the 737 Max crisis and damaging what was once an emblem of engineering excellence.

Boeing’s transformation from an engineering-led powerhouse to a company grappling with the consequences of a culture shift underscores the importance of balancing commercial objectives with unwavering commitments to innovation, quality, and safety in the highly competitive and dynamic field of aerospace manufacturing.

Yep. That sounds about right.

I must comment on the former employees comments. They are bullshit. If they were going on vacation there is absolutely ZERO chance they wouldn’t board a MAX. ZERO.

Those are comments meant for publication. Boeing absolutely has an issue and they need to get back to basics. That being said, MAX’s aren’t unsafe. They are flying constantly. The MAX that went down on Lion Air and Ethiopian Air (?) have been back flying for years with no issues. Meanwhile Airbus is having engine issues. Nothing in aviation is guaranteed but it is still pretty safe overall.

This plug issue is an oversight issue. It is not an actual airframe or aircraft issue. The design is 100% safe. Unless you don’t install the bolts or bugger up the install. That is a QA (quality assurance) and oversight issue. Once those other airframes in question were inspected and the appropriate hardware was verified in place and properly secured there is basically no issue anymore.

I know that sounds blasé but that’s because it is. This type of door/plug assembly are widely used and pretty generic. It’s not cutting edge tech or thinking outside the box stuff. It’s putting a broom handle in your sliding glass door technology to the aviation world. It only works though if you put the broom handle in the track though. lol

quote:

Originally posted by PASig:

...Friday: 737 rolls off runway in Houston...

The pilot made a turn at the end of the runway going too fast on wet pavement. How is this Boeing's fault???

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Woms1sBqUdo

quote:

Originally posted by Sigmund:
The pilot made a turn at the end of the runway going too fast on wet pavement. How is this Boeing's fault???

None of them are Boings fault. They don't make the engines, maintain the tires, etc. It's maintenance and pilot error as are almost all of aviation accidents.

Me, when the subject is brought up......

This is the proverbial jumping on the bandwagon, piling on, etc.

As was stated above and bears repeating. Boeing doesn't make engines, tires falling off is a maintenance issue, and a pilot landing long and exiting at too high taxi speed to make the turn how in the hell does that have anything to do with Boeing? Those don't.

If you want to look into spoiler wiring discrepancies that is Boeing. That stuff of above is just aviation stuff.

Alaska Airlines has had problems with improper maintenance causing a fatal crash in the past. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...ht_261#Investigation

https://www.msn.com/en-us/mone...016f41a00b5bb3&ei=13

former Boeing employee known for raising concerns about the firm's production standards has been found dead in the US.

John Barnett had worked for Boeing for 32 years, until his retirement in 2017.

In the days before his death, he had been giving evidence in a whistleblower lawsuit against the company.

Boeing said it was saddened to hear of Mr Barnett's passing. The Charleston County coroner confirmed his death to the BBC on Monday.

It said the 62-year-old had died from a "self-inflicted gunshot wound" on 9 March and police were investigating.

Mr Barnett had worked for the US plane giant for 32 years, until his retirement in 2017 on health grounds.

From 2010, he worked as a quality manager at the North Charleston plant making the 787 Dreamliner, a state-of-the-art airliner used mainly on long-haul routes.

In 2019, Mr Barnett told the BBC that under-pressure workers had been deliberately fitting sub-standard parts to aircraft on the production line.

He also said he had uncovered serious problems with oxygen systems, which could mean one in four breathing masks would not work in an emergency.

He said soon after starting work in South Carolina he had become concerned that the push to get new aircraft built meant the assembly process was rushed and safety was compromised, something the company denied.

He later told the BBC that workers had failed to follow procedures intended to track components through the factory, allowing defective components to go missing.

He said in some cases, sub-standard parts had even been removed from scrap bins and fitted to planes that were being built to prevent delays on the production line.

He also claimed that tests on emergency oxygen systems due to be fitted to the 787 showed a failure rate of 25%, meaning that one in four could fail to deploy in a real-life emergency.

Mr Barnett said he had alerted managers to his concerns, but no action had been taken.

Boeing denied his assertions. However, a 2017 review by the US regulator, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), did uphold some of Mr Barnett's concerns.

It established that the location of at least 53 "non-conforming" parts in the factory was unknown, and that they were considered lost. Boeing was ordered to take remedial action.

On the oxygen cylinders issue, the company said that in 2017 it had "identified some oxygen bottles received from the supplier that were not deploying properly". But it denied that any of them were actually fitted on aircraft.

After retiring, he embarked on a long-running legal action against the company.

He accused it of denigrating his character and hampering his career because of the issues he pointed out - charges rejected by Boeing.

At the time of his death, Mr Barnett had been in Charleston for legal interviews linked to that case.

Last week, he gave a formal deposition in which he was questioned by Boeing's lawyers, before being cross-examined by his own counsel.

He had been due to undergo further questioning on Saturday. When he did not appear, enquiries were made at his hotel.

He was subsequently found dead in his truck in the hotel car park.

Speaking to the BBC, his lawyer described his death as "tragic".

In a statement Boeing said: "We are saddened by Mr. Barnett's passing, and our thoughts are with his family and friends."

is death comes at a time when production standards at both Boeing and its key supplier Spirit Aerosystems are under intense scrutiny.

This follows an incident in early January when an unused emergency exit door blew off a brand-new Boeing 737 Max shortly after take-off from Portland International Airport.

US launches Boeing investigation after blowout
Boeing review finds 'disconnect' on safety

A preliminary report from the US National Transportation Safety Board suggested that four key bolts, designed to hold the door securely in place, were not fitted.

Last week, the FAA said a six-week audit of the company had found "multiple instances where the company allegedly failed to comply with manufacturing quality control requirements".

Yep

https://x.com/gatewaypundit/st.../1833542212690260335

"The two aircraft, similar to Boeing type aircraft..." (sarcasm)

quote:

Originally posted by sigmonkey:
"The two aircraft, similar to Boeing type aircraft..." (sarcasm)

Well, they do have wings and engines and stuff.

Delta: “We’re learning to fly and it shows.”

some packing tape and a tie down strap and it will be ready to go

Don’t
Even
Leave
The
Airport

As someone who used to drive a bus at Hartsfield. SIDA badge with driving privileges. I saw as many accidents on the tarmac as I did around the airport. Atlanta has some of the worst driving I have seen. So two planes hitting each, not the first time and won't be the last.

Every person with an IQ above 75 knows that there have been aircraft accidents for as long as there have been aircraft.

The increased frequency of these events is the issue, due to the hiring practices of the FAA, with their stupid fucking DEI bullshit. Incidents and accidents of all sorts involving commercial aircraft will become far more commonplace because the FAA feels it's important to put unqualified pilots in the air, incompetent air traffic controllers in the tower, and lazy and deceitful maintenance personnel in the hangers.