That is just a patently false statement of how MCAS and 737's work. That statement is wildly inflammatory and factually incorrect.

Just sticking to the truth of what MCAS would do and how it was programmed is bad enough. Stating your incorrect statement is no better than the inaccurate reporting we are forced to wade through on most issues.

There are multiple ways the pilots could overcome the MCAS events. The easy to understand version is that a pilot can disconnect electronic trim via the trim override switches. That would remove any electric trim whatsoever. There was a checklist for that but the title was vague, "runaway trim". The second way was simpler in most ways. Just keep flying the aircraft. Every time the pilot would trim out the nosedown trim, MCAS would stop for 5 seconds after the last trim input from the pilot. IE, it trims nose down, the pilot pulls backstick and then trims out the nose down trim, this would return the plane to "normal" until the next cycle kicked in 5 seconds after last input from pilot.

If you read the reports, the planes stayed flying until one crew basically gave up flying and the other one kept flying but each cycle they trimmed less than MCAS had put in so eventually the nose down trim overcame the ability to overcome it without serious flying (this is in the KC135 manual a maneuver to unload the control surfaces and manually trim back into flying condition, not something anyone in a 737 is trained to do)

This was Boeing doing stupid shit. Boeing not putting it in the books. Airlines training to a bare bones minimum. It is easier to train pilots to "fly" the autopilot than to hand fly a 75 ton jet. It bit them here.

This was a horrible situation. Both planes could have been flown in this condition. Or the system could have been disconnected entirely. The system is wildly flawed but to say "with no way for the pilots to override as they plummeted into the ground" is patently false.

I was just trying to be helpful. If you have deeper knowledge please make corrections in a polite manner.

My point is, politely, if you don't know what you are talking about then posting it as fact isn't any better than the fake news we always complain about.

Your statement isn't even close to true. There are dozens of 737 drivers on this board. Just ask if you aren't sure. If I had an accustrut question I would ask you I wouldn't just guess and present it as fact. I mean no disrespect but it is that kind of misinformation that benefits no one and can hurt others in the industry.

Boeing needs to unfuck themselves right quick. Every story that comes out is making it worse. Just sticking to the facts is bad enough, adding misconceptions isn't helpful. Sorry if you thought I was rude, I have edited it to be softer.

Fine, then. For the record I did research the MCAS issue and was only trying to provide a simplified explanation.

Well, respectfully, you didn't research it enough if your summation is "there was no way for the pilots to overcome MCAS". Once again, there are plenty of 737 drivers on this board who have dissected these incidences to death since we have personally flown the aircraft in question many, many times. And if you know any pilots at all, if there is only one thing we like to talk about more than ourselves, it is our airplanes. lol

quote:

Originally posted by gpbst3:

I dont fly much but always complained about getting an old plane. Now, I hope to get the old planes.

Me too!

lol. Nope, nothing could go wrong with that 90 year old DC3, ha ha. Beautiful old birds.

Boeing is a shell of a once great company. They need to seriously reassess their process. The next clean sheet project they do had better be how they did it prior to the acquisition or everybody is going to be flying Airbus.

I'll just say this. What does it say about your build quality if you send not only inspectors, which I would say in aerospace is not that uncommon (CYA documentation), but also multiple teams for rework to your customers production facility.

That's what Spirit Aerosystems is doing.

Is part of this cost cutting on maintenance? Asking a question....

My rudimentary understanding of this is that it stems from their purchase of McDonnell Douglas. Boeing had a superb record of quality and safety. After the purchase the McD guys kind of took over. The prior way of doing things went by the wayside and $$$$ took over.

So no, not maintenance, but actually bad design and manufacturing mistakes. Boeing and the FAA had a pretty cozy relationship for a long time. It worked because Boeing was its own worst critic and didn’t need the oversight. Now it’s flipped and they need it. Bad.

^^^^^^^^^^^^
Thanks for the response. I see the Boeing CEO front and center trying damage control.

quote:

Boeing and the FAA had a pretty cozy relationship for a long time. It worked because Boeing was its own worst critic and didn’t need the oversight. Now it’s flipped and they need it. Bad.

So true, and this is by far the biggest indicator of where things are at for them.

I see the 737 Max-900 is back on the schedule this weekend. I have zero worries about the plane’s airworthiness.

quote:

Originally posted by hrcjon:
How does a complete door assembly separate from the airframe. Seriously.

If the airframe around the door isn't strong (reinforced) enough and flexes away from the door itself due to pressure/forces.

quote:

Originally posted by pedropcola:

Nope, nothing could go wrong with that 90 year old DC3, ha ha. Beautiful old birds.

Almost 90, not quite. They went into airline service with American in 1936, the year before I was born. By 1940, the DC-3 carried more than half of the airline passengers in this country.



One of my bucket list items was the ATP check ride combined with a DC-3 type rating, the only type rating that I really lusted for.

I was part way there (pulled a 98 on the ATP written exam, missed one question), but couldn't get my medical certificate reinstated in time. Not eligible for PIC without a medical, check ride was out of the question, so that bucket list item never got fulfilled.

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:

quote:

Originally posted by hrcjon:
How does a complete door assembly separate from the airframe. Seriously.

If the airframe around the door isn't strong (reinforced) enough and flexes away from the door itself due to pressure/forces.

Actually, what seems to have happened here is that without the 4 locking bolts in place the door migrated upwards about 2 inches into the release position. There seems to be no damage or failure of the airframe itself.

Although it is a type of plug door, it's only a plug when in the lower position and the stop fittings on the edge of the door are behind the stop pads on the frame threshold.


Door plug by kpkina, on Flickr

quote:

Originally posted by pedropcola:
If you read the reports, the planes stayed flying until one crew basically gave up flying and the other one kept flying but each cycle they trimmed less than MCAS had put in so eventually the nose down trim overcame the ability to overcome it without serious flying (this is in the KC135 manual a maneuver to unload the control surfaces and manually trim back into flying condition, not something anyone in a 737 is trained to do)

This was Boeing doing stupid shit. Boeing not putting it in the books. Airlines training to a bare bones minimum. It is easier to train pilots to "fly" the autopilot than to hand fly a 75 ton jet. It bit them here.

This was a horrible situation. Both planes could have been flown in this condition. Or the system could have been disconnected entirely. The system is wildly flawed but to say "with no way for the pilots to override as they plummeted into the ground" is patently false.

Lots of truth in your several posts on this!

After the MCAS problem was understood, they gave us a surprise stab trim runaway in the sim at the next AQP that mimicked the Boeing failure profile. The Embraer system is similar to the MCAS, as is any automatic trim system really, other than we have 3 AOA sensors. The onset and initial presentation was confusing the first time.

In the CRJ we were well trained in using the 2 stab/trim disconnect switches on the pedestal. The ERJ though is more computerized, and these scenarios were not well trained before the Boeing crashes.

While I place blame with Boeing for their system design weaknesses, the real blame lay with pilot training. The modern philosophy is minimal sim training time, and emphasize using the automation. Younger pilots seem anxious about turning off automation.

I've been flying the 737 for a year now. I do like the MAX, it flies great, but I wish Boeing had made a mini-787 instead of continuing with the 73 airframe. I think it's reached its limit.

You aren’t alone in that thought. There is only so much “innovation” any one airframe can take. It’s time for a clean sheet build going back to the old Boeing methodology.

quote:

Originally posted by pedropcola:
You aren’t alone in that thought. There is only so much “innovation” any one airframe can take. It’s time for a clean sheet build going back to the old Boeing methodology.

There's the rub, that would likely cost more than they want to spend.

But, with the beating their reputation is taking in the public sphere, who knows.