Small point that I think your explanation might confuse guys who don’t fly Boeings.

If the FO was performing the takeoff (he was) he probably didn’t have his hands on the thrust levers. After takeoff thrust is set the FO doesn’t touch them for the rest of the takeoff. The Captain guards the thrust levers until decision speed (V1). After that nobody touches them until some point in the climb where the flying pilot may or may not be up on them.

While I agree that we (pilots) are faster than auto throttles, on the initial climb I don’t see a lot of guys, myself included, getting back on the thrust levers quickly because all I need/want is the max calculated thrust set. There is basically almost no scenario where on the initial climb segment I would ever need/want to reduce thrust. Certainly not in the sub 500 feet of altitude regime this event occurred in.

This is Air Egypt all over again. To this day the govt of Egypt tells a tale of hydraulic flight control failure. India seems to be taking the same path.

Don’t let that SAIB (some lesser form of AD that the FAA doesn’t think even rises to the point of being mandatory compliance) make you guys think these fuel cutoff switches fail and can move back and forth with vibration, let alone 2 at the same time. This is all clutter that the media is throwing around and non technical people are jumping on because the thought of murder is abhorrent.

“Why did you turn those off” is damning. The lack of releasing the rest of what the cvr picked up is also damning.

Don’t fly third tier airlines. Maintenance is bad, oversight is bad, pilots are bad. (Compared to what you expect as Americans). You can hate that comment all day but it’s true. What’s also true is any competent crews would not have crashed those 2 Max crashes. Don’t believe everything you saw in those documentaries. Anybody who could follow the runaway stab trim checklist or even just have the monkey skills to trim out control pressures would have not crashed. 2 US airlines flew the Max’s for years without incident. There even were MCAS activations without issue as there was at the accident airline the flight prior. And yet they signed it off maintenance wise and the next day they flew it straight into the ground.

Boeing has made plenty of mistakes but now they are being blamed for everything regardless of facts. If the NTSB was running this accident investigation they would have already called in the FBI.

Folks, this is going to end up being like another Egypt Air flight 990 incident from 1999. Suicide/murder.

Air India crash probe focuses on actions of plane's captain, WSJ reports

July 17 (Reuters) - A cockpit recording of dialogue between the two pilots of the Air India flight that crashed last month indicates the captain cut the flow of fuel to the plane's engines, the Wall Street Journal reported on Wednesday.

The newspaper cited people familiar with U.S. officials' early assessment of evidence uncovered in the investigation into the June 12 crash of a Boeing (BA.N), opens new tab 787 Dreamliner in Ahmedabad, India, that killed 260 people.

A preliminary report into the crash released by India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) on Saturday said one pilot was then heard on the cockpit voice recorder asking the other why he cut off the fuel and "the other pilot responded that he did not do so."
Investigators did not identify which remarks were made by Captain Sumeet Sabharwal and which by First Officer Clive Kunder, who had total flying experience of 15,638 hours and 3,403 hours, respectively.
Kunder, who was flying the plane, asked Sabharwal why he moved the fuel switches to the "cutoff" position seconds after lifting off the runway, the Wall Street Journal reported.

The Journal did not say if there was any evidence that Sabharwal did move the switches, beyond the verbal exchange it cited. But it quoted U.S. pilots who have read the Indian authorities’ report as saying that Kunder, the pilot actively flying, likely would have had his hands full pulling back on the Dreamliner’s controls at that stage of the flight.
India's AAIB, Directorate General of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Air India and two unions representing Indian pilots did not immediately respond to Reuters' requests for comment on the Wall Street Journal report. Boeing declined to comment.

More...

https://www.reuters.com/busine...-reports-2025-07-16/

quote:

Originally posted by pedropcola:
Small point that I think your explanation might confuse guys who don’t fly Boeings.

If the FO was performing the takeoff (he was) he probably didn’t have his hands on the thrust levers. After takeoff thrust is set the FO doesn’t touch them for the rest of the takeoff. The Captain guards the thrust levers until decision speed (V1). After that nobody touches them until some point in the climb where the flying pilot may or may not be up on them.

While I agree that we (pilots) are faster than auto throttles, on the initial climb I don’t see a lot of guys, myself included, getting back on the thrust levers quickly because all I need/want is the max calculated thrust set. There is basically almost no scenario where on the initial climb segment I would ever need/want to reduce thrust. Certainly not in the sub 500 feet of altitude regime this event occurred in.

Great post, but at my airline after rotate the FO (assuming FO flying) does put hands on thrust levers. Your point is valid.. why do that if we aren’t going to decrease thrust and already at max thrust? I don’t have a good answer other than we’re trained that way. Even if I want more thrust I select higher climb power in the box versus push the thrust up further. I’m curious now why we do this! When I think of times I’m actively controlling AT it’s always gusty landings, I’m not doing anything with my hand on it during climb out. Great question for the training department on my next recurrent

Well if you were at my airline the reasoning would probably be something like “well that’s what we did in the 200”. lol (I’m an old guy so I remember flying it that way too)

I hate these foreign investigations that clearly are more concerned with national pride than actual answers. Looking at you South Korea.

quote:

Originally posted by pedropcola:
Small point that I think your explanation might confuse guys who don’t fly Boeings.

If the FO was performing the takeoff (he was) he probably didn’t have his hands on the thrust levers. After takeoff thrust is set the FO doesn’t touch them for the rest of the takeoff. The Captain guards the thrust levers until decision speed (V1). After that nobody touches them until some point in the climb where the flying pilot may or may not be up on them.

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Don’t fly third tier airlines. Maintenance is bad, oversight is bad, pilots are bad. (Compared to what you expect as Americans). You can hate that comment all day but it’s true. What’s also true is any competent crews would not have crashed those 2 Max crashes. Don’t believe everything you saw in those documentaries. Anybody who could follow the runaway stab trim checklist or even just have the monkey skills to trim out control pressures would have not crashed. 2 US airlines flew the Max’s for years without incident. There even were MCAS activations without issue as there was at the accident airline the flight prior. And yet they signed it off maintenance wise and the next day they flew it straight into the ground.

Boeing has made plenty of mistakes but now they are being blamed for everything regardless of facts. If the NTSB was running this accident investigation they would have already called in the FBI.

We were the same on the EMB 175. The Captain has his hands on the thrust levers to V1, then removes his hand, whether PF or PM. With the FO flying, the Captain is going to need his right hand to bring the gear up shortly after V1 anyway. Only after flaps are up and starting the final climb segment will the Pilot Flying put his hand on the thrust levers to pull them back one click into the climb detent.

As to 3rd tier foreign airlines, I agree 100%.

As to the Max crashes, I agree. We were given a surprise stab trim runaway in the sim after those crashes without any pre-brief or knowledge it was going to be part of the profile. It was a major "WTF-just-happened?" moment, but there's that big red AP/Trim disconnect button under my left thumb that halts the progression. I admit that as it was happening and for the next few minutes until the instructor stopped the sim, I didn't know exactly what the failure was, but the corrective action is obvious.

Yup. On those two crashes one of the crews actually used the stab trim override switches. Which 100% takes MCAS out of the equation. For some ridiculous indefensible reason they elected to turn them back on and crashed. Everytime you trim electrically MCAS is blanked out for 5 seconds. Plenty of time to trim out control pressures, nope. I think the final figure was 90lbs of force, thrust levers at max takeoff power, accelerating madly straight into the dirt. Also just flying the plane back to the runway would have eventually had you drop some flaps, which also disables MCAS.

Those documentaries made those events sound like the crews were doomed from the start with no hope of survival. Completely untrue. Stab trim runaway has been a checklist forever. Trimming out control pressure is a basic day one skill set. If you turn off a system and the problem goes away then you better have a good fucking reason to turn it back on (don’t reengage stab trim cutout switches)

This next part is a mildly educated guess that I don’t know if it’s true but would explain a lot. In the US we get paid whether we get to the destination or not. In fact, something like this happens if you returned to the departure airport you probably would be pulled from the rest of the trip and paid. I have heard foreign third tier carriers won’t pay for non completions. If this is true it really is a horrible anti safety idea. A pressure to get to destination regardless. Don’t know if what I’ve heard is correct. The safety mentality over there is ass backwards.

quote:

Originally posted by pedropcola:
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Everytime you trim electrically MCAS is blanked out for 5 seconds. ... Also just flying the plane back to the runway would have eventually had you drop some flaps, which also disables MCAS.

That's the kind of knowledge which 3rd tier foreign operators don't seem to even want their crews to know. In the USA we are moving more and more in that direction compared to the old days of having to know every pressure, temperature, valve, etc, but at least the culture within the pilot corps is one of striving for excellence.

quote:

Originally posted by pedropcola:
This next part is a mildly educated guess that I don’t know if it’s true but would explain a lot. In the US we get paid whether we get to the destination or not. In fact, something like this happens if you returned to the departure airport you probably would be pulled from the rest of the trip and paid. I have heard foreign third tier carriers won’t pay for non completions. If this is true it really is a horrible anti safety idea. A pressure to get to destination regardless. Don’t know if what I’ve heard is correct. The safety mentality over there is ass backwards.

My first airline job back in '95 was for a regional where we only got paid scheduled time for completions, so no pay for delays or diverts or return-to-field. They've long since been shut down under pressure from the FAA. I got out as fast as I could due to the maintenance, and went to fly freight at night instead.

India as a culture has very little regard for safety.

In India you will see 5 people riding on one 250cc motorcycle. Literally, guy riding, kid on the tank, wife behind him holding two kids in her arms. Traffic is like fluid with no regard for lanes. Scooter and motorcycles filling every empty space between cars. Driving on embankments when there is a traffic jam.

Where I work in Indiana, there was a problem with Indians jaywalking across a road next to an office building, so they put up fences and dedicated crosswalks. The simple solutions of disciplining the jaywalkers wasn't pursued as far as I know.

Plants in India were caught falsifying safety records and underreporting recordable incidents. When I was told our oldest plant in India was the safest plant in the company due to zero recordables in the prior year, I asked the safety person if they really believed that.

Indian culture is relentless cheap, always demanding lowest possible cost, and then they cut corners on top of that. It's pathological.

quote:

India as a culture has very little regard for safety.

In India you will see 5 people riding on one 250cc motorcycle. Literally, guy riding, kid on the tank, wife behind him holding two kids in her arms. Traffic is like fluid with no regard for lanes. Scooter and motorcycles filling every empty space between cars. Driving on embankments when there is a traffic jam.

Look at their trains. There's no place to glue anyone else anywhere on them.

About a 1000 people a month die from electrocution in India. Mostly stealing power.

On level of importance, safety is right up there with sanitation in Delhi.

Back in the 60s a slogan was "Take a chance, fly Air France." Recent years flying a third-world airline look like a gamble.

quote:

Originally posted by abnmacv:
Back in the 60s a slogan was "Take a chance, fly Air France." Recent years flying a third-world airline look like a gamble.

And BOAC was Better On A Camel...

Too Soon?

quote:

Originally posted by abnmacv:

Back in the 60s a slogan was "Take a chance, fly Air France." Recent years flying a third-world airline look like a gamble.

A French guy who was the director of our project and regularly commuted between Chicago and Paris, called it "Air Chance."

Shutting down the wrong engine is such a needless error.

If getting on the ground immediately is imperative (e.g. fire spreading to the cabin or severe structural damage to the airframe), just fly the airplane and don't worry about shutting down any engines. Part of the emergency evac checklist (frequently a memory checklist) is shut down both engines with the fire T-handles, and blow both the extinguishers.

If there is no such immediate need to get on the ground, the checklist procedures are deliberate, and include multiple verifications from both pilots before shutting an engine down.