That arsonist (if truly arson) is F-U-C-Teed!!

This will be interesting...
Could only imagine the reason for....

Navy Charges Bonhomme Richard Sailor in Devastating 2020 Fire of Amphibious Assault Ship

quote:

The Navy has filed charges against a sailor for allegedly deliberately starting a fire last year that quickly spread and consumed much of the interior of his ship, amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6), the service announced Thursday.

“The sailor was a member of Bonhomme Richard’s crew at the time and is accused of starting the fire,” Cmdr. Sean Robertson, a U.S. 3rd Fleet spokesperson in San Diego, said in a statement.

The fire began in the morning of July 13, 2020, as the ship was berthed at Naval Base San Diego. It burned for nearly five days and later lead to the Navy’s decision to decommission and scrap the ship, which began commissioned service in 1998 and carried tens of thousands of Marines and sailors across the globe and to combat zones over the years.

Third Fleet officials didn’t specifically detail what specific charges were filed under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which Robertson said “were brought forth against a Navy sailor in response to evidence found during the criminal investigation into the fire started on USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) on July 12, 2020.”

Arson is covered under Article 126 of the UCMJ.

“Evidence collected during the investigation is sufficient to direct a preliminary hearing in accordance with due process under the military justice system,” Robertson said.

“Vice Adm. Steve Koehler, who commands 3rd Fleet, is considering court-martial charges and has directed a preliminary hearing at which an impartial hearing officer will make determinations and recommendations required by the UCMJ prior to any further trial proceedings – including whether or not there is probable cause to believe an offense has been committed and to offer a recommendation as to the disposition of the case,” he said.

Under military justice procedures, the preliminary hearing officer would make a recommendation to 3rd Fleet on whether the charges should be dropped or warrant prosecution at a court-martial.

The following si the complete statement from U.S. 3rd Fleet.

On July 29, charges under the Uniform Code of Military Justice were brought forth against a Navy Sailor in response to evidence found during the criminal investigation into the fire started on USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) on July 12, 2020. Evidence collected during the investigation is sufficient to direct a preliminary hearing in accordance with due process under the military justice system. The Sailor was a member of Bonhomme Richard’s crew at the time and is accused of starting the fire.

Vice Adm. Steve Koehler, commander, U.S. 3rd Fleet is considering court-martial charges and has directed a preliminary hearing at which an impartial hearing officer will make determinations and recommendations required by the UCMJ prior to any further trial proceedings – including whether or not there is probable cause to believe an offense has been committed and to offer a recommendation as to the disposition of the case.

Paying back Uncle Sam for destroying one of his spiffy rebuilt major warships, at the not unreasonable rate of $5000 per month, will take the miscreant just 16,666 years.

Hmmmmmmmmmmmm.

“In the end, the decommissioning decision had a number of factors, and one of which was, what would be the impact of the dollars spent and the actual effort to rebuild, what would be the impact on the industrial base? The dollars definitely would disrupt our strategy for investment. And then from an industrial base perspective, we had concerns that it would impact new construction or other repair work, and we knew that Gulf Coast would be the spot to get the building or the restoration done because of the capacity and their capabilities – but in the end made the decision for multiple factors, as I mentioned, that decommissioning would be the way to go,” Ver Hage told USNI News during the call."

Boy, what a typical 'corporate statement' which would come from the CEO after a meeting with the bean counters and the board of directors trying to figure out how to keep the share holders happy and not lose their end of the year bonuses...

Eisenhower did warn everyone many years ago about the 'Military Industrial Complex' which now seems to dominate much of what goes on not only in our country but the rest of the world.

I'm not really commenting on the decision to scrap the ship but just the obvious... the way the announcement was made and what I read into it. Why could they not just say it's going to cost too much to repair?

Do we not get to know which Navy sailor did this?

quote:

Originally posted by darthfuster:
Do we not get to know which Navy sailor did this?

Its known that this individual is a Seaman Apprecentice (E-2) assigned to BHR. Somebody that new doing such a thing, must've been a real piece of work or, so dumb and stupid

In time, name and motives will be made public...in the meantime, i'll dream of how to do modern day keelhauling

Years ago, a sailor on an Ohio class missile sub (USS Alaska, maybe?) vandalized the boat, costing millions and taking a major strategic asset out of service for months.

He was having girlfriend problems, and wanted to delay sailing to work them out. . .

quote:

Originally posted by corsair:
...in the meantime, i'll dream of how to do modern day keelhauling

With a long rope?

quote:

Originally posted by Fenris:

quote:

Originally posted by corsair:
...in the meantime, i'll dream of how to do modern day keelhauling

With a long rope?

Attached to the ankles yeah, but, rope stretches so, cables attached...about 20-crewman on each end...gunwale-to-gunwale

quote:

Originally posted by ulsterman:
After the U.S. Navy's mismanagement of the USS Iowa investigation, I don't trust anything they say.

This is my opinion as well. This and the time they tried to railroad that Captan of one of the destroyers involved in a collision in the South China Sea.

First they cleared him. Then they decided to come back and press charges after the second collision.

Why am I not surprised, its an Undesignated as the primary suspect....

Sailor Who ‘Hated’ Navy Torched $1.2B Assault Ship: Warrant

quote:

A 20-year-old sailor with a grudge against the U.S. Navy and a failed attempt at becoming a Navy SEAL under his belt is accused of setting an amphibious assault ship ablaze and singlehandedly costing the Navy $30 million in damage.

According to an NCIS search warrant affidavit obtained by The Daily Beast, Ryan Sawyer Mays aroused the suspicions of investigators almost immediately after the 40,000-ton USS Bonhomme Richard went up in flames on July 12, 2020, burning for nearly five days and leaving dozens injured while extinguishing the ferocious blaze.

Mays, whose identity has not previously been revealed, now faces charges of arson within a special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, use of fire to damage federal property, and making a false statement, the warrant states. If the Navy instead proceeds with a court martial, Mays will be charged with aggravated arson and willful hazarding of a vessel, said a Navy spokesman. Mays does not have a lawyer listed in court records, and could not be reached for comment.

The fire raged through the 14-deck ship after beginning in a cargo hold, with the temperature onboard exceeding 1,000 degrees at times, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday told reporters last summer. The fire aboard the Bonhomme Richard, which was waiting on a $250 million upgrade at the time, was finally tamed by some 400 sailors from 16 vessels, helicopters dumping water on the flames, the Naval Base San Diego Fire Department, and numerous civilian fire departments from surrounding cities.

Every deck above the waterline was damaged, and although no deaths or serious injuries were reported, 71 people were hurt or treated for smoke inhalation. At least 18 firefighters filed workers’ compensation claims following the blaze, specifying they suffered, among other things, concussions, orthopedic issues, and dehydration.

Mays was identified by NCIS investigators after they interviewed some 177 sailors assigned to the Bonhomme Richard. One reported that he had seen a “light-skin male” in clean coveralls and a face mask carrying a metal bucket into the Lower V—the ship’s aft section—but didn’t recognize the person in question. But later, the sailor, named in the search warrant affidavit as Kenji Velasco, “did mention a sailor named Mays that ‘hates’ the U.S. Navy and the Fleet,” the filing states.

In further interviews, Velasco said he was “fairly sure” and “90 percent sure” he saw Mays descend into the Lower V before the fire broke out. He also noted that firefighting equipment in the area seemed to have been tampered with.

“Velasco further explained that in the hours and days after the fire, it had dawned on him that the individual who descended to the Lower V at 0805 on the day of the fire was Mays’s height and build, had fair hair that could be seen coming out from his cover, like Mays, sounded like Mays, and said, ‘I love deck,’ which is an expression Velasco knew Mays to say,” the affidavit states, adding that other sailors had also suggested to investigators that the person in question seemed to be Mays based on his clothing and language and that a command master chief “identified Mays as a person who showed disdain towards authority and the U.S. Navy.”

Investigators reviewed Mays’ now-private Instagram account, and found a post that stated, “I love the smell of napalm in the morning,” the affidavit explains. Mays’ service record showed that he joined the Navy in 2019 “with the intent on becoming trained in the Advanced Electronics Computer Fields,” then “changed his career goals to becoming a Navy SEAL.” But five days after beginning SEAL training, Mays dropped out and was reassigned to the Bonhomme Richard as an “undesignated Seaman.”

“According to Navy leadership, the morale and behavior of sailors who had aspired to become a SEAL, and then find themselves serving in a more traditional role on a Navy ship, are frequently very challenging,” the affidavit states.

Mays told investigators he was willing to take a polygraph exam, after which he was arrested. Mays is said to have then incriminated himself in the presence of two Master-at-Arms designated sailors, who “heard Mays say (unasked) that he was guilty, seemingly talking to himself,” according to the warrant. He later denied ever making the comments, and denied involvement in the arson, claiming he was being “set up.”

Investigators also dug into Mays’ personal life and discovered several red flags. After telling investigators during an initial 10-hour interview that he’d recently separated from a female sailor upon discovering that she was pregnant and he was not the father, investigators “later learned this was mostly contradicted by the female sailor” in question, the warrant said.

That sailor recounted to investigators that while Mays had gone around telling everyone she was pregnant and that he was “going to be a father,” she had never been pregnant and made that clear to him, even taking a pregnancy test to prove it.

It was not clear if that series of events was thought to have pushed Mays toward the alleged arson. NCIS investigators seized Mays’ iPhone, searched his car and apartment, and swabbed his cheek for a DNA sample. So far, Mays’ DNA has not been a match for DNA found at the scene.

Last November, the Navy said it would scrap the Bonhomme Richard in light of estimated repair costs of as much as $3.2 billion. The ship cost about $750 million when it was built in 1998, or about $1.2 billion by today’s standards. The investigation, according to the affidavit, is ongoing.

quote:

But five days after beginning SEAL training, Mays dropped out and was reassigned to the Bonhomme Richard as an “undesignated Seaman.”

“According to Navy leadership, the morale and behavior of sailors who had aspired to become a SEAL, and then find themselves serving in a more traditional role on a Navy ship, are frequently very challenging,” the affidavit states.

Yeah, that's not hard to imagine. There's probably a whole slew of young guys who enlisted in the Navy with heady dreams of acing BUD/S and becoming the next Chuck Norris, and after washing out, become problem children after finding themselves facing an enlistment contract that locks them into 4+ years of pushing a mop or stirring a bean pot.

quote:

Originally posted by RogueJSK:

quote:

But five days after beginning SEAL training, Mays dropped out and was reassigned to the Bonhomme Richard as an “undesignated Seaman.”

“According to Navy leadership, the morale and behavior of sailors who had aspired to become a SEAL, and then find themselves serving in a more traditional role on a Navy ship, are frequently very challenging,” the affidavit states.

Yeah, that's not hard to imagine. There's probably a whole slew of young guys who enlisted in the Navy with heady dreams of acing BUD/S and becoming the next Chuck Norris, and after washing out, become problem children after finding themselves facing an enlistment contract that locks them into 4+ years of pushing a mop or stirring a bean pot.

Lots of crushed dreams over the last 20-25 years, most figure out how to make the best of the situation and be an adult; then there's always a few who really should be separated from service. Sounds like this guy didn't even make it to BUDs and may have been dropped during prep-phase.

Guys who washout during BUD/S, depending on how they're doing can get lateraled into SWCC training. This also speaks to a larger issue that SEALs are really the only field in the Navy where you're shooting bad guys in the face, an impression that many prospective hopefuls have dreams of. Compare that to the Army, you fail at Ranger or, Special Forces, you cycle back into a infantry unit, where you'll still get to shoot bad guys. For USAF PJ or, CCT, you fail you get cycled into one of the security fields. Fail BUD/S or, even prep-phase, you're likely going out to the fleet with a needle gun or, a potato peeler, doing galley work and laundry duty for the remaining 3-4 years of your contract. This guy is an undesignated, he's got no skills, so he's screwed, he's at the mercy of the Navy's needs, which usually means menial labor.

So an E-nothing had stated he/she hated the Navy; well, that just eliminated 50% of the E-nothings.

Fire fighting equipment tampered with while the ship was in re-work, well since the fire main is shut down, likely that station was undergoing PMS or some other maintenance action.

"Well, I think I saw him..." Yup, pretty definitive and damning witness right there.

Washed out of BUDS - well damn brother, you are our candidate for being a fire bug, let's see what else we got on you...

Heartbroken because he found his [ex] girlfriend is pregnant and its not his baby - Red Flag
Oh, and quoting a famous line a movie about Vietnam - "WE GOT OUR MAN - CHARGE HIM AND LET THE WORLD KNOW WHO HE IS!!"

The link has many photos and diagrams.

https://news.usni.org/2021/10/...-investigation-finds

Long Chain of Failures Left Sailors Unprepared to Fight USS Bonhomme Richard Fire, Investigation Finds

By: Sam LaGrone and Gidget Fuentes
October 19, 2021 1:25 PM • Updated: October 19, 2021 2:15 PM

A cascade of failures – from a junior enlisted sailor not recognizing a fire at the end of their duty watch to fundamental problems with how the U.S. Navy trains sailors to fight fires in shipyards – are responsible for the five-day blaze that cost the service an amphibious warship, according to an investigation into the July 2020 USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) fire reviewed by USNI News.

The investigation into the fire aboard Bonhomme Richard, overseen by former U.S. 3rd Fleet commander Vice Adm. Scott Conn, found that the two-year-long $249 million maintenance period rendered the ship’s crew unprepared to fight the fire the service says was set by a crew member.

“Although the fire was started by an act of arson, the ship was lost due to an inability to extinguish the fire,” Conn wrote in his investigation, which was completed in April and reviewed by USNI News this week.
“In the 19 months executing the ship’s maintenance availability, repeated failures allowed for the accumulation of significant risk and an inadequately prepared crew, which led to an ineffective fire response.”

Beyond the ship, Conn concluded that training and oversight failures throughout the fleet – from Naval Sea Systems Command, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Naval Surface Force Pacific Fleet and several other commands – contributed to the loss of the $2 billion warship. Conn singled out 36 individuals, including five admirals, who were responsible for the loss of the ship due to either their actions on July 12 or lack of oversight leading up to the alleged arson.

“The training and readiness of the ship’s crew were deficient. They were unprepared to respond. Integration between the ship and supporting shore-based firefighting organizations was inadequate,” wrote Pacific Fleet commander Adm. Samuel Paparo in his Aug. 3 endorsement of the investigation.
“There was an absence of effective oversight that should have identified the accumulated risk, and taken independent action to ensure readiness to fight a fire. Common to the failures evident in each of these broad categories was a lack of familiarity with requirements and procedural noncompliance at all levels of command.”

In his investigation, Vice Adm. Scott Conn identified 36 individuals who contributed to the loss of USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) on July 12, 2020. U.S. Pacific Command commander Adm. Sam Paparo will now determine further punishments and accountability actions for the loss of the ship.

Conn highlighted the lack of adherence to the Navy’s special procedures for fire safety, which the service put in place after a 2012 arsonist fire resulted in the loss of attack submarine USS Miami (SSN-755), as a major cause of the fire.

“The considerable similarities between the fire on USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) and the USS Miami (SSN-755) fire of eight years prior are not the result of the wrong lessons being identified in 2012, it is the result of failing to rigorously implement the policy changes designed to preclude recurrence,” Conn wrote in his report.

Navy officials have said little publicly about the resulting investigations into the fire’s cause and the firefighting response by the ship’s watchstanders, the base’s federal Fire Department crews and the local San Diego Fire Department. The investigation describes the overall response on the first day as disjointed, poorly coordinated and confusing.

The revelation of the report comes after the Navy charged Bonhomme Richard sailor Seaman Apprentice Ryan Sawyer Mays with arson in July. Prosecutors say he set the fire on the ship, while his attorney says the Navy has little evidence to tie him to the crime. Mays’ Article 32 preliminary hearing is expected to be held this month in San Diego.

An arsonist couldn’t have picked a better time to cause maximum damage to the ship, according to the investigation.

Bonhomme Richard was a ship splayed open for the shipyard availability and, as the lead investigator noted, “was particularly vulnerable to fire: having systems tagged out for maintenance; scaffolding, temporary services, and other contractor equipment hung throughout; a significant amount of ship’s gear, equipment, flammables and combustible material recently loaded onto the ship and packed into various spaces; and, more than three-quarters of the ship’s firefighting equipment was in an unknown status.”

That Sunday morning featured a small crew aboard the ship and watch sections turning over. The senior-most officer aboard was standing watch as the command duty officer for the first time. The vehicle stowage areas, used by embarked Marines to store their combat vehicles and equipment, was crowded with gear.

The fire began in the Lower V space, which included dozens of tri-walls filled with equipment, including plywood pallets; wire spools; wood beams; CO2 bottles; hand dollies; chairs; ammunition carts and three fueled vehicles: a forklift, a man-lift and a cargo tractor.

The first hint of trouble on July 12, 2020, came just after morning colors. Just after 8:00 a.m., a junior sailor walked through the upper vehicle deck as she headed out to a vending machine after her watch. She noticed a “hazy, white fog” in the lower vehicle deck around 8:10 a.m. But she didn’t report it, the investigation found, noting that “because she did not smell smoke, (the sailor) continued to her berthing.” Around 115 of the 138 sailors swapping duty on the ship that morning were just a fraction of the 1,000-plus in the ship’s company.

Around that time, another sailor who stopped at a sideport door in the Upper V to chat with a sentry “observed white smoke rising from the Lower V ramp into Upper V,” according to the report. One of them ran up the ramp and through the hangar to reach the quarterdeck, telling the officer-of-the-deck about the smoke.

At about 8:15 a.m. the engineering duty officer ran into a civilian contractor who told him of smoke near the mess decks. The EDO went to investigate and met another crew member who was also investigating a report of smoke.

Crew members who spoke with investigators described some confusion in communication among the watch teams as they scrambled to sort out the reports of smoke and get a solid picture and location of the growing blaze so they could organize and attack the fire. Investigators found inconsistent statements from crew members about the actions to investigate the reports of smoke and fire alarms and why there was a delayed reporting of the fire over the ship’s intercom system – the 1MC.

“Numerous sources agree to having heard a rapid ringing of a bell but disagree on whether the casualty was announced as ‘white smoke’ ‘black smoke,’ or ‘fire,’ as well as the location of the casualty: ‘Lower V,’ ‘Upper V,’ or ‘Hangar bay,’” the investigation found. “At 0820, the Petty Officer of the Watch (POOW) noted in his log: ‘Fire reported in Lower V.’”

The duty fire marshal told investigators he received a report of smoke in the Upper V and went to investigate, then called the Damage Control Central watch supervisor to tell the ship’s company about the casualty after seeing “smoke pouring out of Lower V.”

“The OOD stated that the [Damage Control] Central watchstander informed him that they already made a 1MC announcement. Having not heard any announcement, at 0820, the OOD called away the casualty over the 1MC,” the report found. The officer told investigators “he delayed calling away the casualty due to the possibility of a benign reason for the smoke (such as starting an Emergency Diesel Generator).”

That 1MC call was the first time the ship’s command duty officer, who was in his stateroom, learned of the fire. He reached the hangar, where the crew was organizing an initial suppression effort, at 8:24 a.m. The CDO had texted the ship’s commander and executive officer, who were both at their residences, about the reports of smoke. Bonhomme Richard’s commander, Capt. Gregory Thoroman, received the text about the black smoke at 8:32 a.m., shortly before the senior enlisted sailor – the command master chief – called to tell him “that a few sailors suffered smoke inhalation.” Thoroman drove to the base, as did the XO, who was told of the fire by the CMC.

At 8:22 a.m. the sound of the ship’s bell could be heard from a nearby parking lot.

Minutes later, crews aboard destroyers USS Russell (DDG-59) and USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62), which were also berthed on Pier 1, reported black smoke coming from Bonhomme Richard. Both destroyers “assembled their duty sections and began equipping Rescue and Assistance (R&A) teams,” with a team of 11 from Russell and eight from Fitzgerald reaching BHR’s hangar. But neither team was directed to join in the fire attack, according to the investigation.

At 8:25 a.m. “a ‘ship fire’ was reported on the Anti-Terrorism Tactical Watch Officer (ATTWO) Harbor Defense Net radio channel.”

“In those early minutes, the sailors had no radios so they used their own cellphones to communicate,” the lead investigator found. And the 1MC “did not work in many areas of the ship to include DC Central; and there was a lack of urgency. When initial responders from Ship’s Force descended into Lower V, no one shared the same understanding of what firefighting capability was online, contributing to their failure to apply agent to the fire or set fire boundaries, which enabled smoke and heat to intensify.”

Attack teams had trouble finding serviceable fire stations. In fact, 187 of the ship’s 216 fire stations – 87.5 percent – were in Inoperable Equipment Status condition at the time of the fire, the report said.

Smoke and Confusion

Meanwhile, the small duty force aboard Bonhomme Richard scrambled to assemble firefighting teams and to investigate the fire’s location. Despite thick, choking smoke spreading through the ship – and amid dangers from searing heat and possible fire flashes – some sailors, including several chief petty officers, didn’t don the required firefighting equipment. They mistakenly believed they couldn’t do so while wearing the Type III Navy working uniform, rather than their coveralls.

The ship’s fire teams were haphazardly outfitted and equipped, some with self-contained breathing apparatuses and firefighting ensembles, but others without one or the other, the investigation found.

Several fire teams of sailors ventured to the Upper V and found hot spots but no fire. And as sailors began to lay hoses to attack the spreading fires, they encountered fire stations with missing fire hoses and broken hose fittings.

Moreover, there were no concerted direction nor any announcements from DC Central.

“The DC Central Watch Supervisor stated that neither he nor EDO had an idea of how bad the fire was until later events forced them to evacuate DC Central. At no point did either the DC Central Watch Supervisor or EDO attempt to start any additional equipment or activate Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) firefighting systems,” investigators wrote.

“Despite the lack of reports that any of announcements were received or acted upon, neither the EDO nor DC Central Watch Supervisor sought confirmation that their announcements were broadcast,” investigators found. “Though the senior EDO in the duty section (name redacted) did not hear any 1MC announcements from DC Central, he did not proceed to DC Central to determine whether the EDO was attempting to execute control of the firefighting effort.”

Worse, the ship’s installed AFFF systems weren’t put into action “in part because maintenance was not properly performed to keep it ready and in part because the crew lacked familiarity with capability and availability,” the lead investigator wrote. Many of the ship’s hatches and doors – a critical first line of defense to isolate a fire and slow the spread – couldn’t be shut without disconnecting temporary utilities in place for the maintenance availability work.

Two crew members told Naval Criminal Investigative Service investigators that “they stated it was not possible to set boundaries in Lower V, because it was such a large space. Additionally, they reported the fire spread too fast to set effective boundaries. However, most Duty Section 6 Sailors aboard at this time stated in interviews they neither knew how to set boundaries nor operate the quick-disconnects. Limited quick-disconnect training was conducted early in the availability, but was not repeated nor reemphasized.”

At 9 a.m., two fire teams – including one from Russell – were told to evacuate the hangar because of smoke, and they watched “numerous” BHR sailors evacuate the ship.

At about 9:15 a.m., deteriorating smoke conditions in the hangar led the CDO to order all personnel without SCBAs to evacuate the ship after he had consulted with the ship’s captain. But the investigation found “there are varying reports on whether this evacuation order was communicated over the 1MC.”

Sailors searched berthing areas to evacuate any strayed crew, including one sailor who collapsed in a passageway after spending 15 minutes searching while not wearing any emergency breathing equipment. Another sailor carried her to the hangar, where she “regained consciousness” and was evacuated for smoke inhalation.

Investigators found that none of the crew evacuating the ship used an emergency egress breathing device (EEBD), which is a metal bottle of compressed air. “There are conflicting accounts as to whether all berthings had EEBDs in place,” they wrote. One sailor they interviewed looked for an EEBD, but could not find one and most of the sailors “did not try to find an EEBD or were concerned that returning to find an EEBD might have led to them becoming trapped by the fire.”

Mixup and Explosion

Thoroman, the ship’s captain, reached the base at 9:05 a.m. and met with Federal Fire and San Diego Fire chiefs at the incident command post set up on Pier 2.

The fire response already was substantial, as subsequent fire alarms broadcast calls for additional help, and the call for mutual aid prompted local fire departments to send crews to the base. But an hour into the fire, no water or retardant had been laid onto the fire, even though FedFire crews had laid down their hose line toward Lower V. The fire had spread unabated for nearly two hours before the first firefighters – crews from the San Diego Fire Department – poured water onto the flames.

That happened at 9:51 a.m. on the upper vehicle deck, where the city firefighters on their own initiative attacked a fire along the space’s starboard side. While unfamiliar with the ship’s layout, they told investigators, they nevertheless reached one area of the fire and fought the blaze for at least another 30 minutes before conditions deteriorated with the fire’s continuing multi-fingered spread.

By then, the billowing smoke had turned heavy and black. One city firefighting official told his teams: “This compartment is about to blast.”

At 10:37 a.m., the on-scene command ordered all firefighting teams to evacuate the ship.

At 10:50 a.m., “approximately 90 seconds after the last firefighters had departed the ship, a massive explosion occurred” aboard, according to the report. The ensuing shock wave knocked down people on the pier and blew debris across to Fitzgerald, and massive smoke billowed high into the clear sky across San Diego Bay. The report said that if sailors and firefighters had been aboard, several would have been killed.

The delayed firefighting response in those initial crucial minutes and hours – despite the BHR crew’s initial search and the city firefighting team’s attack – further strengthened the fire’s unchallenged spread toward 11 of the big-deck amphib’s 14 levels. Flames ignited compressed air tanks. Gases and vapors ignited super-heated fires, while air flowing in from vents and through passageways fueled the fires’ spread up and down trunks and through damaged compartments.

“This explosion occurred after more than two hours of efforts where none of the ship’s installed firefighting systems were employed and no effective action was taken by any organization involved to limit the spread of the smoke and fires,” the lead investigator wrote in the executive summary. When the ship was evacuated, “without personnel onboard, available installed systems, or electrical power, the fires on Bonhomme Richard were unimpeded.”

“Subsequent attempts to regain a foothold aboard relied on ad hoc strategies, delivering too little firefighting agent to combat the pace of the fire’s spread. Throughout the first day of efforts, agent was never applied to the seat of the fire, and the opportunity to do so was lost once the fire spread beyond the perimeter of Lower V and across the entire ship.”

Bureaucratic Fires

Bureaucratic divisions hampered firefighting efforts, the investigation found.

On that first day, BHR’s fire teams of sailors didn’t integrate with FedFire crews. Ships around the waterfront began sending teams of sailors to help fight the fire, but the effort “was unorganized” initially before a coordinated watchbill was established. For five days, the ship and FedFire worked from separate command posts on Pier 2, without clear indications to others as to who was in charge of the firefighting mission.

After San Diego Fire’s initial response and fire attack, fire crews did not reenter the ship after it was evacuated. SDFD officials said they would support from the pier but not reenter the ship, citing their manual that reads: “‘[a]ctivities that pose a significant risk to firefighters shall only be taken when there is potential to save lives.'”

But it prompted frustration and disagreements with FedFire and the Navy over the city department’s safety policies, investigators noted. After discussing it with the Expeditionary Strike Group 3 commander, the FedFire chief said he told the SDFD chiefs to leave “if they were not going to provide meaningful assistance to fight the fire.”

The noticeable departure of SDFD crews and vehicles was followed by that of other localities who had responded to the mutual aid call in the large-scale, regional fire response, further dampening the mood on the waterfront amid the growing emergency in front of them.

“Uncertainty over whether SDFD was specifically released or left on their own led to confusion and disappointment among Bonhomme Richard leadership when municipal firefighting units began departing,” the investigator wrote.

With the afternoon arrival of other ships’ fire teams to assist, more sailors joined FedFire in chasing down the fire as it spread that afternoon. At 6:30 p.m., the fire “was burning throughout the entire length of the ship with approximately three decks on fire to include equipment on the Flight Deck and the ship’s superstructure,” according to the report.

At 6:55 p.m. a second explosion jolted the ship, caused “multiple minor concussive and blast-type injuries,” and prompted a second evacuation that halted firefighting efforts for several hours, the investigation states.

It “originated from an 8-inch Fuel, Jet Propulsion (JP-5) fuel pipe located in an auxiliaries division compartment underneath the Upper V ramp on the port side of the ship, Valve Grinding Area (3-81-2-Q),” investigators found. “This explosion blew a watertight door from an adjacent compartment, Engine Test Area (3-82-2-Q), across to the starboard side of Upper V and resulted in a large fireball.”

With the fire’s continuous spread, the Navy’s top concerns were the failing integrity of the ship’s superstructure, a warping flight deck and collapse of the cavernous hangar bay. That evening, in an agreement between the Navy Southwest Regional commander and the San Diego mayor, SDFD helicopters flew a mission to assess the fire’s impacts, and thermal imaging showed 1,200-degree fires burning on the superstructure. A few hours later, the first two Seahawks began dropping saltwater onto the ship in an aerial fire attack that totaled 1,649 water drops over four days.

By day two, the fire remained out of control in the ship’s interior spaces as firefighting efforts expanded, with a drone equipped with thermal imaging helping to identify hot spots. By the third day, holes were cut into those spaces to enable the deployment of AFFF, and high-intensity fire pumping equipment shot seawater onto the flight deck and superstructure.

Communication problems between BHR and FedFire continued to hamper the firefighting response, the report found, as crews battled stubborn fires in the disbursing office, high heat delayed teams reaching the joint intelligence center, and fire in a debris-filled troop washroom kept reigniting.

Meanwhile, all that water pouring into the ship required a massive dewatering effort to offset the shift and list of the ship driven by compartments filled with water.

But at 10:30 p.m. on July 15, firefighting waters that accumulated in the O1- and O2 levels shifted so significantly that the ship “experienced a rapid shift from 2.1-degree starboard list to a 4.9-degree port list,” according to the report. That happened over a 90-second period. Firefighting teams aboard at the time were evacuated and firefighting efforts were halted for nearly two hours.

The next afternoon, on July 16, the ESG-3 commander declared the fire was finally out.

“The overall command and control for the fire response was initially chaotic, but it improved over time through ad hoc decisions and assignments,” the investigator wrote.

“Although the CO, XO, CMC, [Chief Engineer], and DCA were all present on the pier prior to the explosion,” the investigator continued, “they failed to establish command and control of the situation and did not lead action to integrate fire response efforts.

“Instead, Commander, Expeditionary Strike Group THREE (ESG-3), the ship’s operational commander who has no assigned role or responsibility in response to a shipboard fire during a maintenance availability, stepped into a command and control vacuum to align the various ship, installation, and external organizations by employing a make-shift emergency response organizational structure.”

After an evaluation of what it would cost to repair the ship, the Navy decided to instead scrap Bonhomme Richard.

In April, the ship was towed from Pier 2, through the Panama Canal to Texas, where International Shipbreaking LTD., took possession of the remains of the ship for $3.66 million.

Miami Connection

In 2012, the Navy lost Los Angeles-class submarine USS Miami (SSN-755) to arson while the ship was undergoing an availability at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Maine when a shipyard worker set a fire aboard the boat.

The subsequent fire resulted in an uncontrolled blaze that cut the life of the submarine short after the Navy determined it would take $750 million to repair.

As a result of the fire, Naval Sea Systems Command crafted a new set of procedures to prevent fires when ships were in maintenance – NAVSEA Technical Publication, Industrial Ship Safety Manual for Fire Prevention and Response, known as the 8010 manual.

“In response to this fire, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF) convened a Fire Review Panel to determine how MIAMI could be lost in a shipyard environment despite readily available fire prevention programs and resources,” according to the Bonhomme Richard fire investigation.
“The critical takeaway from the Miami investigation, as stated in the USFF endorsement was that ‘accept[ing] a reduced margin to fire safety when a ship enters an industrial environment’ was a key driver to the policies and procedures that developed to prevent a similar outcome.”

While the 8010 manual set up procedures to prevent another fire like the one that destroyed Miami, investigators found that the Navy did not follow the rules outlined in the document.

“In the last 5 years, policy changes and corrective actions to address fire safety were inconsistently implemented or failed to be implemented across the Navy maintenance organization… training, implementation, and compliance with the 8010 Manual in private shipyards was not representative of maintenance on nuclear vessels being executed in the public yards. Additionally, there was a lack of procedural compliance and effective oversight within the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Navy Installations Command, and Naval Surface Force Pacific Fleet,” Conn wrote.

Investigators found that most sailors aboard Bonhomme Richard were not familiar with the updates to the 8010 manual.

“These personnel had a general unfamiliarity with the content of the 8010 Manual and commented that their training had not prepared them to combat a fire of the magnitude having occurred aboard Bonhomme Richard,” according to the report.

In a subsequent opinion, Conn said, “[t]he considerable similarities between the fire on USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) and the USS Miami (SSN-755) fire of eight years prior are not the result of the wrong lessons being identified in 2012, it is the result of failing to rigorously implement the policy changes designed to preclude recurrence.”

The military brass should be answering a question or two also.
How could a warship like this not have systems in place to prevent a fire from getting out of control and destroying it?
Imagine what a little enemy fire could do.

“The training and readiness of the ship’s crew were deficient. They were unprepared to respond.”

Yeah, but they were up to speed on LGBTQ BLM and CRT issues, so there’s that…

quote:

Originally posted by 220-9er:
The military brass should be answering a question or two also.
How could a warship like this not have systems in place to prevent a fire from getting out of control and destroying it?
Imagine what a little enemy fire could do.

you ever been in the shipyards when the ship is completely shut down to include all firemain/water pressure?

A ship in this condition is VERY vulnerable to fire and flooding.

Your question might be akin to asking, "how can a fire station burn down while it is under construction?"

quote:

Originally posted by Sigmund:
The link has many photos and diagrams.

https://news.usni.org/2021/10/...-investigation-finds

Here's a great companion video from the Sub Brief channel on YouTube: https://youtu.be/5JOmICbcTrY

This is a stunning and remarkable series of failures. Anybody, with any familiarity of the Navy will be crestfallen, pissed and outraged at the incredible number of bad decisions. Do yourself a favor and click on the link Sigmund posted, as there's a series of excellent graphics and a full-layout of all 36 people named and singled-out for their roll in this, to include FIVE Admirals, including retired(!) and Civilians in this loss.

Bad decisions, indecisions and some ego that followed the loss of the Bonny Dick starting with this gem:

quote:

The first hint of trouble on July 12, 2020, came just after morning colors. Just after 8:00 a.m., a junior sailor walked through the upper vehicle deck as she headed out to a vending machine after her watch. She noticed a “hazy, white fog” in the lower vehicle deck around 8:10 a.m. But she didn’t report it, the investigation found, noting that “because she did not smell smoke, (the sailor) continued to her berthing

I can only imagine the arguments and near-fights that were occurring pier-side while the ship is burning:

quote:

On that first day, BHR’s fire teams of sailors didn’t integrate with FedFire crews. Ships around the waterfront began sending teams of sailors to help fight the fire, but the effort “was unorganized” initially before a coordinated watchbill was established. For five days, the ship and FedFire worked from separate command posts on Pier 2, without clear indications to others as to who was in charge of the firefighting mission.

After San Diego Fire’s initial response and fire attack, fire crews did not reenter the ship after it was evacuated. SDFD officials said they would support from the pier but not reenter the ship, citing their manual that reads: “‘[a]ctivities that pose a significant risk to firefighters shall only be taken when there is potential to save lives.'”

But it prompted frustration and disagreements with FedFire and the Navy over the city department’s safety policies, investigators noted. After discussing it with the Expeditionary Strike Group 3 commander, the FedFire chief said he told the SDFD chiefs to leave “if they were not going to provide meaningful assistance to fight the fire.”

The noticeable departure of SDFD crews and vehicles was followed by that of other localities who had responded to the mutual aid call in the large-scale, regional fire response, further dampening the mood on the waterfront amid the growing emergency in front of them.

This ship, was a disaster waiting to happen, the command triad both the former and the present, was entirely deficient:

quote:

Between 26 March 2019 and 24 March 2020, BONHOMME RICHARD conducted 25 training evolutions for DCTT. , BONHOMME RICHARD DCTT Coordinator, participated in 9 of 25 training events. Records do not show CHENG participating in any of these 25 evolutions. Records show the BONHOMME RICHARD XO was designated as the DCTT Leader; but he did not participate in any of the 7 DCTT training events occurring after he reported aboard 12 November 2019. …
518. Use of AFFF in response to a fire had not been drilled for over a year and were neither drilled nor simulated after AFFF stations 3 and 4 were brought to an increased state of readiness in April 2020 to support fuel onload. …
520. BONHOMME RICHARD IETs failed 11 consecutive RE-03 fire drills from 28 December 2019 – 22 February 2020, with no indication of additional remediation drills being scheduled or executed. …
524. The BONHOMME RICHARD CHENG stated that he did not receive any reports on training effectiveness nor did he receive any training critiques. Training critiques were routed from duty sections straight to the XO and CO. [Encl 219]
525. The BONHOMME RICHARD CO and XO were not aware of any specific issues with IET drills nor that BONHOMME RICHARD IETs failed 11 consecutive RE-03 fire drills between 28 December 2019 and 22 February 2020. …
535. Several BONHOMME RICHARD Sailors reported they had not participated in egress or EBD training since they had checked onboard, with some asserting they had never received EEBD training.

This is perhaps the most remarkable and stunning case of poor leadership:

quote:

“Although the CO, XO, CMC, [Chief Engineer], and DCA were all present on the pier prior to the explosion,” the investigator continued, “they failed to establish command and control of the situation and did not lead action to integrate fire response efforts. “Instead, Commander, Expeditionary Strike Group THREE (ESG-3), the ship’s operational commander who has no assigned role or responsibility in response to a shipboard fire during a maintenance availability, stepped into a command and control vacuum to align the various ship, installation, and external organizations by employing a make-shift emergency response organizational structure.”

The term gundecking will be used quite liberally regarding this case.

quote:

Originally posted by 220-9er:
How could a warship like this not have systems in place to prevent a fire from getting out of control and destroying it?

You didn't read the report huh? Clearly training from the lowest sailor all teh way up to FIVE admirals have been implicated.
The foam firefighting system could've been activated 10+ different times over the course of the first two hours. While it may not have put out the fire, it could've slowed it down.