quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:
The engine room has an automatic fire suppression system, either Halon or FM200 that is adequately sized for the area. (Even though they were on generator.) If it discharged it would've shut the generator off and they'd have no AC power, so only DC lighting which may or may not have been bright.

Most likely fixed CO2 if it even had a fixed fire suppression system. And these systems are never "automatic." They must be manually released.

quote:

Originally posted by Balzé Halzé:

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:
The engine room has an automatic fire suppression system, either Halon or FM200 that is adequately sized for the area. (Even though they were on generator.) If it discharged it would've shut the generator off and they'd have no AC power, so only DC lighting which may or may not have been bright.

Most likely fixed CO2 if it had a fixed fire suppression system. And these systems are never "automatic." They must be manually released.

An inspected passenger vessel under 100 Gross tons is required to have a fixed automatic fire
suppression system in the machinery space (which this boat was).

I've run a lot of commercial boats this size over the years and many of them from this era. On this size and this era, it would be automatic discharge and I've never seen a CO2 system on this size ,you have to remember this is a 75' boat, wooden, without fire proof bulkheads, and not a ship. Also USCG certified to carry passengers in this size needs automatic discharge for the machinery space. CO2 tanks to cover the size of the engine room would take up too much room and be too heavy. Halon was extremely popular in this time period and was/is automatic discharge, so is FM200 which everyone is what every is going to/went to if the Halon system is no longer re-certifiable. Both are very effective and more effective than plain CO 2 in this size engine room which probably doesn't have automatic dampers to close off airflow (given it's age). Bottle size for Bottle size. I don't know the measurements of the engine room, but a 40 lb bottle that's approximately the size of a smaller scuba tank of Halon or FM200 would be a common size for this size boat's engine room.

On this size or even under 100' (a lot of times even larger on yachts) with non fire-proof bulkheads, every system I have seen in this size is automatic (the automatic systems also have manual releases). They have an end on the bottle that melts at a certain temperature and they automatically discharge, It's usually around 165-180F. They will also have a relay box that shuts off the machinery (engines and generator(s)) when it discharges and close dampers if equipped.

46 CFR Subchapter T - SMALL PASSENGER VESSELS (UNDER 100 GROSS TONS)

See #7

"APPROVAL GUIDANCE & INFORMATION: U.S. Coast Guard regulations require the installation of U.S. Coast Guard approved fixed gaseous extinguishing systems on certain U.S. registered inspected vessels and permit the substitution of an approved system for one of the required approved portable fire extinguisher on pleasure craft.

5) Systems must be intended for installation in spaces that are normally unoccupied, and that personnel can leave within 10 seconds after the system is actuated.

7) The primary system actuator must be automatic if the agent cylinder is installed in the protected space.

10) System must be intended for the protection against Class B hazards (flammable liquids) in machinery and bilge spaces, and Class C hazards (non-shock hazard when applied to energized electrical equipment).

11) Systems intended for installation in small passenger vessel (46 CFR Subchapters T and K) must have manual (mechanical) back-up actuators, audible alarms, and automatic engine and ventilation shutdown upon system discharge. The engine shutdown feature must have a mechanism to quickly restart the engine(s).

15) Systems must be self-contained, i.e. not require an external source of power such as the boat’s electrical system for activation."

https://www.dco.uscg.mil/CG-ENG-4/FESys/

I suppose a small, unmanned engine room, an automatic system might make sense. I'm in the mindset of ship size engine rooms.

I'd still be surprised if they used Halon on a vessel like that though. But as the saying goes, that's more your wheelhouse.

quote:

Originally posted by Balzé Halzé:
I suppose a small, unmanned engine room, an automatic system might make sense. I'm in the mindset of ship size engine rooms.

I'd still be surprised if they used Halon on a vessel like that though. But as the saying goes, that's more your wheelhouse.

Halon was the choice of the day in 1981, Just about every boat under 100' of this era you'd see Halon. It was outlawed about 10 years ago, but grandfathered in so the system can stay provided it's inspected on a normal basis (yearly for inspected USCG) and the bottle is in the normal pressure range. If not, you have to switch to a currently approved gas/system, currently FM 200 is extremely popular.

CO2 is used on ships because it's effective and extremely cheap. I had an FM 200 40lb bottle that way low, it had to be shipped to MD to be filled from FL (only place in US they claimed did it) as hazardous material and shipped back as hazardous material, and the bill was over $3k.

Given this boats layout, I doubt there was any way to visually inspect the engine room without lifting one of the weatherproof deck hatches. All of the crew boats I've run under 100' are the same way, have to lift a deck hatch to see into the engine room.

Far different than the 160-176' Megayachts I've been on where the engineer has an office right outside of the engine room with large glass windows that look into the engine room.

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:

quote:

Originally posted by Balzé Halzé:
I suppose a small, unmanned engine room, an automatic system might make sense. I'm in the mindset of ship size engine rooms.

I'd still be surprised if they used Halon on a vessel like that though. But as the saying goes, that's more your wheelhouse.

Halon was the choice of the day in 1981, Just about every boat under 100' of this era you'd see Halon. It was outlawed about 10 years ago, but grandfathered in so the system can stay provided it's inspected on a normal basis (yearly for inspected USCG) and the bottle is in the normal pressure range. If not, you have to switch to a currently approved gas/system, currently FM 200 is extremely popular.

I'm very familiar with Halon and its history, not so much its use on smaller vessels though.

We use FM 200 in our ship's galley.

In the engine room spaces, paint locker, and Emergency generator room, we use a system called Sapphire. Supposedly it's safer for personnel as it won't necessarily kill you outright like halon or CO2 will if you are caught in the space when the fire suppression system is activated.

Please educate me. I had several hundred logged sport dives in the 80's and 90's but only ever used compressed atmospheric air. There are various gas mixes used by technical divers but I don't know much about them. Could there have been compressed gas on board that might accelerate the flames once the fire was raging?

quote:

Originally posted by Balzé Halzé:


In the engine room spaces, paint locker, and Emergency generator room, we use a system called Sapphire. Supposedly it's safer for personnel as it won't necessarily kill you outright like halon or CO2 will if you are caught in the space when the fire suppression system is activated.

Sapphire uses Novec 1230 as its agent, which is a direct replacement for Halon 1301. Novec 1230 is toxic, and requires twice the fluid volume for equivalent Halon. It's chief benefit, as advertised (and the reason it was designed: it doesn't deplete ozone and thus isn't subject to the restrictions that forced Halon out of the market. In short, it was developed because it doesn't contribute to global warming.

Halon, in contact with flame, produces phosgene gas, which is very toxic. Halon by itself isn't nearly as dangerous, but in the case of a fire, one has to weigh the threat of the fire against the measures taken to fight it. If one remains in the space and doesn't stop the fire, then the chance of fatality is closer to 100%. If one remains without supplemental oxygen, one's time is limited, regardless of the firefighting means.

It's said presently that the deaths on the boat were due to smoke inhalation, not due to heat, which is common when trapped in a space. Smoke from synthetic materials and hydrocarbons, everthing from formica to pressboard to spar varnish, produces very toxic combustion byproducts, and in contact with mucus membranes, hydrochloric acid. That burning you feel in your eyes and nose when exposed to smoke? That's it. In large quantities and high concentrations, it's not just the intake of toxic vapor, but the interaction with the smoke in the lungs that burns and does tissue damage chemically.

As for what's flammable...everything on the wooden boat. Including the paint and varnish; everything on there combusts and rapidly propagates a flame. More importantly, when heated, it all produces a flammable, potentially exlosive atmosphere. Fire doubles in size every sixty seconds in a structure, variable by oxygen availability and venting; a space that heats and produces the correct atmosphere can quickly become explosive once vented, and it doesn't take a lot of traditional aerosols or hollywood explosive components to do it.

quote:

Originally posted by HayesGreener:
Please educate me. I had several hundred logged sport dives in the 80's and 90's but only ever used compressed atmospheric air. There are various gas mixes used by technical divers but I don't know much about them. Could there have been compressed gas on board that might accelerate the flames once the fire was raging?

100% O2 is used in rebreathers and as a deco gas for dives requiring decompression. The bottles used in rebreathers are small and often when O2 is used as a deco gas for open circuit dives it's in an aluminum 40 which is 40 CUFT of gas. You may also have some nitrox mixes but that would often be 30%, 32%, or 36% O2. Some will also use 50% or 80% O2 for deco.

For deeper dives, you get into trimix which adds Helium to the mix.

I don't think O2 was a factor here. I just don't see enough of it laying around to be a factor on this boat. The only O2 on the boat may have been emergency medical O2. Ever dive charted I have been on in the US has a medical O2 kit but again if they are not going far offshore I dudt they had any sizable tanks.

quote:

Originally posted by Balzé Halzé:

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:

quote:

Originally posted by Balzé Halzé:
I suppose a small, unmanned engine room, an automatic system might make sense. I'm in the mindset of ship size engine rooms.

I'd still be surprised if they used Halon on a vessel like that though. But as the saying goes, that's more your wheelhouse.

Halon was the choice of the day in 1981, Just about every boat under 100' of this era you'd see Halon. It was outlawed about 10 years ago, but grandfathered in so the system can stay provided it's inspected on a normal basis (yearly for inspected USCG) and the bottle is in the normal pressure range. If not, you have to switch to a currently approved gas/system, currently FM 200 is extremely popular.

I'm very familiar with Halon and its history, not so much its use on smaller vessels though.

We use FM 200 in our ship's galley.

In the engine room spaces, paint locker, and Emergency generator room, we use a system called Sapphire. Supposedly it's safer for personnel as it won't necessarily kill you outright like halon or CO2 will if you are caught in the space when the fire suppression system is activated.

I mainly deal with yachts under 100', mixed in with some commercial boats 50-100' and the occasional over 100' yacht. On almost all of them 30' and above, the machinery space has an automatic fire suppression system. When it was last re-certified, who knows. Some owners do it every year like you're supposed to, but a lot of owners don't. All of the ones I manage, maintain, and run are current. Almost all of them used to be Halon, until FM200 (Seafire or Fireboy brands rule the market). But aside from the machinery space, none of them have any automatic fire suppression in other areas or living spaces or the galley. Although under 80' most yachters rarely cook on board in the galley. Also the USCG requirement for portables on recreational boats is pretty weak. On a 60-70' yacht it is 3- 10lb BC portables. Classed yachts (ABS, RINA etc.) usually aren't until you get to 120' and over, have better requirements. But even that is a joke sometimes. I worked on a classed 176' MY, where the crew was lall trained in fire fighting (STCW) we had a complete fire suit with oxygen bottle, fire hoses with seawater, but the pants for the fire suit were size 30" waist, the majority of the crew couldn't fit into it!!!!


I would imagine this dive boat has very little O2 on it, and I highly doubt anyone was using a re-breather in the type of diving this boat specialized in. This was mostly straight recreational diving, perhaps some were using Nitrox. My guess is if they had an O2 bottle on board, it would be in the lazarette (stern) and very small, where the dive compressor was which didn't appear to catch fire. I also don't think the dive tanks had anything to do with it, as it takes quite a bit of heat for them to melt the valves and blow out, and by that time the wood boat was so fully ablaze it wouldn't matter. The fire had plenty of oxygen (air), plenty of heat, and plenty of fuel (wood and other combustibles). The portable fire extinguishers the boat had were most likely unreachable and insufficient for the fire by the time the crew were aware of the fire.

By it's design, the stateroom is a death trap in regards to this boat catching fire. Both in having so many people crammed into such a small area instead of having multiple staterooms/bulkheads/doors/exits and where the exits were located, both inside of the house. But on a 75' boat everything is a sacrifice and space is a premium. The fact that it was certified to sleep 46 people in a single stateroom was extremely surprising to me. I don't even know how the stateroom got enough oxygen down there with that 46 people sleeping in such a small space via the staircases. There were no windows that opened that I could see.

The other thing to keep in mind is that with almost all commercial boats, the first criteria is that they are designed to make the most money that they can, which means building them to the very edges of the USCG (or other flag state) rules. Maximum passenger or cargo carrying capacity, building them to the smallest Gross Registered Tonnage or Gross Tonnage through design to fit into the smallest set of safety gear and crew requirements etc.

For example the Conception came in at 99 Gross Registered Tons. If it came in at 100 GRTs, it would fall under a completely different set of USCG rules that would require crew to have more experience, more training, and more pay. There would be additional safety gear requirements as well as other things. GRT's is a formula dating way back to how much cargo a vessel could haul. Something as minor as a door to the stateroom, or 2 staterooms or a simple change of a few inches more in the stateroom or another room, would push it over. There may not have been anything that would've changed this situation, but you don't know.

An article/update on the Conception. I quoted some vital paragraphs out of the entire article.



"Boat where 34 died was a 'fire trap' despite passing inspections experts say. it's far from alone"

Now, as investigators search for the cause of the fire that killed everyone in the bunk room — one crew member and all 33 passengers — questions are mounting about the design of the Conception and its emergency escape routes.
By various accounts, both the design of the boat and the layout of its sleeping quarters met federal standards and both are widely popular among California operators of overnight dive and fishing excursion vessels.

But just because it passed muster with the Coast Guard does not mean the Conception was as safe as it could be, according to some naval design and safety experts who have raised concerns about the placement of the escape routes from the bunk room.
John McDevitt, a former assistant fire chief from Pennsylvania who is an accredited marine surveyor and the chair of a National Fire Protection Association committee on commercial and pleasure boat fire protection, called the Conception “a compliant fire trap.”
“What bothers me is that the vessel was inspected by a Coast Guardsman within the last 12 months,” said McDevitt, who thinks the design of emergency exits was problematic. “This boat has been checked by the Coast Guard for 40 years almost.”

The fact that no passengers below deck escaped has focused attention on the bunk room’s exits. The stairs in the sleeping quarters led to the galley. The escape hatch over bunks in the rear of the room opened up into a dining area adjacent to the galley and just a few feet from the open-air dive deck.
Officials have said fire blocked both exits.
“I definitely have concerns about the ability of those passengers being able to evacuate during a fire,” NTSB Commissioner Jennifer Homendy, who is leading the board’s investigation, told The Times this week.
Homendy said she was “taken aback” by the size and location of the emergency hatch when she toured the Conception’s sister ship the Vision, which has a nearly identical design.

“You have to climb up a ladder and across the top bunk and then push a wooden door up,” she said. “It was a tight space. … It surprised me how small it was and how difficult it was to access.”

The vessel appears to meet current federal regulations, which require boats such as the Conception to have “at least two means of escape,” including stairways and emergency hatches.
“The two required means of escape must be widely separated and, if possible, at opposite ends of the space to minimize the possibility of one incident blocking both escapes,” the regulation states, noting also that exits must be “sufficient for rapid evacuation in an emergency.”
It’s not clear if passengers ever had a chance to try to escape. Santa Barbara County Sheriff Bill Brown, who is also the coroner, said smoke inhalation is the likely cause of death.
Still, McDevitt, the marine surveyor who also is a Coast Guard-certified captain, said that the design of the boat was flawed. He questioned why both egress points — the stairwell and the hatch — deposited passengers into the galley and adjacent dining area.
“When you put two exits into the same common area, you are not providing two means of egress — it’s still only one,” he said. “You are exiting into the galley and common area.”


Paul Kamen, a forensic naval architect and mechanical engineer based in Berkeley, said he thought the size of the roughly 2-feet-square escape hatch was adequate, but he also questioned placing both points of exit in the galley and nearby dining area.
“The common areas for fire to start are the galley or the engine room, so there’s always one (other) escape route. Whatever one is on fire, you go out the other way,” he said. “The problem here is both escape routes went through the galley, and you lost that redundancy when the galley is engulfed in flames.”


https://www.msn.com/en-us/news...X898?ocid=spartandhp

According to reports, it is now a joint FBI/Coast Guard investigation.

It appears that they are looking for any criminal conduct. Several sites say that the most likely charges would be seaman's manslaughter. This would be important if it can be found that they didn't have someone on duty and awake during the night.

According to Wikipedia, this charge only requires simple negligence rather than a specific state of mind.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...getText=The%20Seaman's%20Manslaughter%20Statute%2C%20codified,jurisdiction%20of%20the%20United%20States.

Between this and the news about the design of the boats, I suspect most companies will either beef up staffing and/or suspend operations until modifications can be made. Some operations will probably go out of business if they don't have the capital to make the updates.

So does the law state that an anchored dive boat operation have a crewmember on night watch? If the law does not state that, would it be considered non criminal negligence?

Appears that it is required:

https://www.govinfo.gov/conten...7-chapI-subchapT.pdf

Coast Guard issued a Marine Safety Information Bulletin on the incident.

Of the things, they mention they specifically talk about lithium-ion batteries and extension cords.

Coast Guard

when I dove from that boat I don't recall any night watchmen, I slept above the main deck near the same place as the crew but outside. I was up most of the night and I didnt see anyone just hanging around watching the boat in general.

One think I hated about that boat was the generator running 24 hours a day. Just no relief from the noise.

quote:

Originally posted by XLT:
when I dove from that boat I don't recall any night watchmen, I slept above the main deck near the same place as the crew but outside. I was up most of the night and I didnt see anyone just hanging around watching the boat in general.

One think I hated about that boat was the generator running 24 hours a day. Just no relief from the noise.

On all the modern yachts that I run (+/- the size of the Conception), you barely and I mean barely, hear the generator running 10' from it's exhaust outside, and you don't hear it running anywhere inside the boat. You need a generator running on a boat that size for a lot of the ships systems (battery charger, possibly steering pump), refrigerators, air conditioners, cooking, etc. etc. There's no way around running the generator, unless you're tied up to a marina with shore power. The old yachts, the generators were noisy too.

Honestly, working on a dive boat like this is a pretty bottom of the barrel job in the Merchant Marine industry as well as charter fishing boats (pay and etc.), and chances are they didn't do an anchor watch, which would generally be someone awake, watching the electronics, and doing periodic bilge and engine room checks.


Where did the crew sleep? In the wheel house on the flybridge?

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:

quote:

Originally posted by XLT:
when I dove from that boat I don't recall any night watchmen, I slept above the main deck near the same place as the crew but outside. I was up most of the night and I didnt see anyone just hanging around watching the boat in general.

One think I hated about that boat was the generator running 24 hours a day. Just no relief from the noise.

On all the modern yachts that I run (+/- the size of the Conception), you barely and I mean barely, hear the generator running 10' from it's exhaust outside, and you don't hear it running anywhere inside the boat. You need a generator running on a boat that size for a lot of the ships systems (battery charger, possibly steering pump), refrigerators, air conditioners, cooking, etc. etc. There's no way around running the generator, unless you're tied up to a marina with shore power. The old yachts, the generators were noisy too.

Honestly, working on a dive boat like this is a pretty bottom of the barrel job in the Merchant Marine industry as well as charter fishing boats (pay and etc.), and chances are they didn't do an anchor watch, which would generally be someone awake, watching the electronics, and doing periodic bilge and engine room checks.


Where did the crew sleep? In the wheel house on the flybridge?

Their sleeping quarters is near the wheel house atop of the boat, I slept on the bench cushion seating they had up there like a observation aea. deck.

Here's the NTSB preliminary report it was released today.

https://www.ntsb.gov/investiga...liminary-report.aspx

Looks like the whole crew was asleep not watching.

I hope the liability is now 100% on the operator and the suit to limit damages is denied.


https://www.buzzfeednews.com/a...liminary-report-ntsb

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:
Here's the NTSB preliminary report it was released today.

https://www.ntsb.gov/investiga...liminary-report.aspx

That is a whole lot of words saying nothing they didn't know 24 hours afterward.