'They'll be sailing a cargo boat full of rubber dog shit out of Hong Kong!'



.

Keep water out of boat
Keep people in boat
Don't hit anything

How hard is that?

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Originally posted by MikeinNC:

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Does this mean they're completely kicked out of the Navy, or just sent to some dead end menial job?

The CO and XO will get a letter in their records and will not advance due to those letters…it’s a career ender. If either has 20, it’s best to retire and be done with it.

The Chief of the Boat has over 20 and can retire, and probably will, because everywhere he could go-this will follow him and he won’t be in the command structure ever again.

And that’s the breaks…they were the command, and now they aren’t.

If the COB has more than 20 years, he can retire. Bubbleheads advance fairly quickly so it's possible he doesn't.

I suspect the COB and Exec can ride it out...the captain is probably screwed...

When my father was at Paris Island a few years back the DI came in one Saturday night drunk and was being an ass (sorry for being redundant) but picked up an M1 and was going to hit one of the recruits in the head with the butt of the rifle and they stopped and 'secured' him. Only solution was to immediately report it to an officer.... my father and another recruit spent a month in a lone barracks until the court marshal.... DI was busted down to private. Point of the story is 5 years later my father comes back from Korea and is up at Camp Lejune and sits down at a mess table and that 'busted DI' is sitting across from him with all his stripes back.

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Originally posted by 2000Z-71:
It's official, Bill Clinton has now gone down on everything.

Good gawd...

HA !!!

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Originally posted by ulsterman:
Submariners are jealous and are trying to keep up with the surface navy.

You guys are killin me. HA !!!

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Originally posted by MikeinNC:

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Does this mean they're completely kicked out of the Navy, or just sent to some dead end menial job?

The CO and XO will get a letter in their records and will not advance due to those letters…it’s a career ender. If either has 20, it’s best to retire and be done with it.

The Chief of the Boat has over 20 and can retire, and probably will, because everywhere he could go-this will follow him and he won’t be in the command structure ever again.

And that’s the breaks…they were the command, and now they aren’t.

If I new enough about it, which I don't, my instincts are suggesting that nuclear submarines under quality command are extremely capable of avoiding underwater mountains whether they're charted or not, so not being too forward, those fuckers royally fucked up. Unfuckingbelievable. I guess you could say all their woke training left them asleep at the wheel. If thee didn't care about a nuclear ship of war and the men serving on her, how could they possibly care about anything on their new oak desk shuffling papers sitting in front of the in their new "office" jobs. Good gawd.

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Originally posted by wrightd:

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Originally posted by MikeinNC:

quote:

Does this mean they're completely kicked out of the Navy, or just sent to some dead end menial job?

The CO and XO will get a letter in their records and will not advance due to those letters…it’s a career ender. If either has 20, it’s best to retire and be done with it.

The Chief of the Boat has over 20 and can retire, and probably will, because everywhere he could go-this will follow him and he won’t be in the command structure ever again.

And that’s the breaks…they were the command, and now they aren’t.

If I new enough about it, which I don't, my instincts are suggesting that nuclear submarines under quality command are extremely capable of avoiding underwater mountains whether they're charted or not, so not being too forward, those fuckers royally fucked up. Unfuckingbelievable. I guess you could say all their woke training left them asleep at the wheel. If thee didn't care about a nuclear ship of war and the men serving on her, how could they possibly care about anything on their new oak desk shuffling papers sitting in front of the in their new "office" jobs. Good gawd.

I’m not certain there is any way they could avoid an uncharted undersea mountain short of using active sonar in addition to their depth sounder (which is also active sonar).

Granted, my submarine experience ended in 1989, so there may be some new technology I am not aware of…but as a sonarman, I knew then there was no other way other than charts, dead reckoning, or position information from external sources to know ones position while submerged…and I suspect the same now.

My gut tells me there is more to this, and this story of hitting an uncharted seamount is just an excuse to “put this to bed.”

Well the report has been made public on this incident, enough details in the unclassified version to paint a pretty bad picture. Guess the seamanship issues aren't just limited to surface folk...

Gonna be hard to find parts for a Seawolf.

'Accumulation of Errors and Omissions' Led to Connecticut Crash, Navy Concludes

The Navy has released its investigation into the underwater crash of the submarine USS Connecticut, concluding that "an accumulation of errors and omissions" committed by a "weak team" led to the service's first major submarine mishap in decades.

The heavily redacted report paints the picture of a ship led by officers who failed to learn from their mistakes and did not hold the crew to high standards. Investigators observed that "in the absence of external oversight or evaluation," the ship's leaders "failed to maintain day-to-day standards."

While on deployment in the Pacific Ocean, the Connecticut struck an unidentified seamount or underwater mountain on Oct. 2, 2021. The submarine sailed to Guam and eventually returned to its homeport of Bremerton, Washington, on Dec. 21.

Read Next: Marine Corps Considers Abandoning Parris Island Amid Rising Extreme Weather Threats

The report, submitted to Navy leaders Oct. 29 and finalized by Navy leadership on April 11, recommended nonjudicial punishments for six people: the boat's commanding officer, Cmdr. Cameron Aljilani; his second on command, Lt. Cmdr. Patrick Cashin; both of the ship's navigators; the officer of the deck ;and the junior navigator at the time of the incident. The recommended charge for all the sailors was dereliction of duty, and improper hazarding of a vessel for everyone but Cashin and the junior navigator.

Investigators suggested that "the administrative chain of command initiate detachment for cause" for all of the sailors except the junior navigator.

The ship's senior most enlisted sailor, Chief of the Boat Cory I. Rodgers, was recommended for administrative counseling.

All of the other sailors' names were redacted in the report on privacy grounds.

In the months leading up to the submarine's deployment, investigators noted that crew issues were already showing. In July 2020, the squadron that oversees all three of the Navy's advanced Seawolf-class submarines wrote Aljilani a formal "letter of performance" for "inadequate supervisory oversight, ineffective accountability practices, and superficial self-assessment.".

Then, in February 2021, Aljilani's bosses wrote him a "letter of instruction" that told him to "address the command's overall performance, lack of improvement, and reluctance to accept feedback."

Amid these troubles, the submarine hit a pier in April while mooring at Naval Base Point Loma in San Diego. The submarine did additional safety training before leaving San Diego to try and get at the failures that led to the incident, but a later investigation "revealed degraded standards in navigation, planning, poor seamanship, and ineffective command and control."

Despite this track record, the squadron decided the mooring incident "represented an anomalous performance and not systematic failure." Still, on May 25, 2021, the squadron again formally counseled the boat's commander as well as the executive officer, navigator and assistant navigator over the incident.

Two days later, on May 27, the Connecticut deployed -- ahead of schedule, according to the released report.

Much of what the submarine was doing leading up to the grounding is redacted, with the Navy citing national security reasons. The original report was classified at the Secret level -- the middle level out of three in the classification system -- and not to be shared with any foreign nationals.

The report does explain that, about a day before the crash, on Oct. 1, the sub's leadership began making plans for a "humanitarian evacuation transit" toward Okinawa. Typically, these evacuations are to offload crew who have family matters like childbirth to attend to.

The new, temporary route took the submarine over poorly surveyed areas of the ocean, something Aljilani and his navigator were aware of, according to investigators.

"[Aljilani] incorrectly believed MATT data was available and in use in the area where Connecticut was transiting," the report explained.

MATT data are classified, digital maps specifically designed for submarines. "Where MATT coverage exists, MATT is the recommended and preferred navigation product ... for subsurface navigation," the report explained. Plus, the assistant navigator knew about but didn't use a feature on the ship's digital chart system to highlight surveyed and non-surveyed areas.

"The [commanding officer] did not conduct a detailed review of the route," the report said, noting that the "temporary route passed through surveyed and unsurveyed areas on the chart."

As the ship began to take this new route, issues with the ship's depth-sensing sonar cropped up, as well. The unredacted portions of the report reveal that there were at least three separate instances during which the sailors on the bridge didn't have accurate measurements of the Connecticut's actual depth. In each of those instances, the junior sailor in charge of those readings failed to take appropriate action, investigators added.

Eventually, the team on the bridge began to note a series of discrepancies between the depth data they had from instruments and the information from the navigation charts prepared for the temporary route.

In some of the last unredacted entries before the collision, the report said that "[Aljilani] was unaware of the ship's proximity to the navigation hazard" and that "the [officer of the deck] stated he was concerned with the shallower-than-expected soundings but that he did not assess a need to take aggressive action."

"The [officer of the deck] did not consider ordering a lower speed."

The last entry said that "the sonar supervisor identified a trace near the bow" but determined it was likely an animal.

After the grounding, which the report notes occurred in international waters on the afternoon of Oct. 2, the crew reported "severe degradation" from the sonar array and took steps to surface the submarine. Once on the surface, the boat struggled to stay fully afloat since it couldn't completely empty its ballast tanks.

Eventually, the submarine was ordered to Guam, where it arrived on Oct. 8, 2021. News of the collision was first reported by USNI News the day before.

Although the Navy's initial statements and the report both note that 11 sailors were injured by the collision, the report adds more detail, including that the two most serious cases were a scalp laceration and concussion symptoms, as well as a fractured shoulder suffered by the officer of the deck at the time of the crash.

"During the transit to Guam, Connecticut identified seven Sailors who would benefit from mental health treatment," the report said. "During his interview, the [ship's corpsman] stated that number grew to approximately 50 Sailors."

The report is very tight-lipped about the damage to the submarine, redacting the entire section outlining the damage, save for a line about cost estimates being unavailable. In other sections, investigators noted that the boat's "bow dome" -- the front of the submarine that protects the sensitive sonar dome -- detached during the voyage to Guam, and divers found rocks in two of the submarine's main ballast tanks once it arrived.

The conclusions explain that while "no single action or inaction caused this mishap ... it was preventable."

"It resulted from an accumulation of errors and omissions in navigation planning, watchteam execution, and risk management," investigators added.

Specifically, the report observes that the failure to properly plan the route the day of the collision played a significant role in the mishap.

"The navigation review team, including the CO [commanding officer], failed to identify and properly mark at least ten charted hazards to navigation in the vicinity of the grounding," it said.

In addition to the navigation review team, investigators faulted the watch team at the time of the collision for not recognizing the area was hazardous and taking more actions to ensure the ship's safety. Although the report acknowledged the submarine was having issues with one of its depth-measuring sonars, investigators concluded that, even if it had been working properly, "it would not have prevented this grounding."

The blame, according to investigators, lay with several members of the Connecticut's leadership and the watch team that day.

Aljilani "failed to evaluate and mitigate risk, and he abdicated his responsibility to conduct an effective review of the voyage plan for the day of the grounding." Cashin, his second in command, "did not question the ship's voyage plan or identify watchteam errors."

The ship's two navigators were both faulted for directly contributing to the grounding. The lead navigator -- an officer -- should have reviewed the new route. Meanwhile, the assistant navigator -- a senior enlisted sailor -- "most egregiously [told a junior sailor on watch that day] to remove a 'stay out' area around a navigation hazard along the planned track."

According to a letter on the report written by the commander of the Navy's Pacific Fleet, Adm. Samuel Paparo, and dated April 11, 2022, the punishments for all six sailors blamed in the report have been carried out -- though the requests to push them from the Navy are all pending.

The letter states that the recommendation for Rodgers is complete but added that he has a pending request to be removed from the Navy, apparently suggesting that the master chief is being punished beyond what investigators recommended.

The report also suggests that the Navy look into how it trains and certifies submarine leadership, adding that "although the Connecticut [leaders] were fully qualified for their assignments, this was a particularly weak team."

A statement from the Navy on the release of these documents noted that there were a total of 28 corrective actions -- "of which 14 actions are complete, 13 actions are in progress, and 1 action is enduring."

"In implementing these significant improvements, the Navy will become a more effective fighting force," the statement added.

Sounds like the Squadron leadership should be deemed milquetoast at best and also subject to disciplinary action.

I'm just a dumb surface sailor, but you NEVER lay down a line on a chart which doesn't meet adequate UKC (Under Keel Clearance) requirements. Sometimes entering/leaving port that may only be 2-3 feet, but in coastal waters it is generally 30 feet and open ocean 60 feet or more. I would think that for submarines the required margins would be much greater because their positional accuracy is significantly less while submerged.
Major screw up by everyone involved.

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Originally posted by parabellum:
Diverstity, inclusiveness, gay pride, rainbow flags, 246 genders and whitey is evil.

That's our Navy

I did NROTC and served briefly...all during the Reagan years and his "800 ship" build up. I doubt I would recognize the new navy if I ever went to sea again.

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Originally posted by MikeinNC:

quote:

Does this mean they're completely kicked out of the Navy, or just sent to some dead end menial job?

The CO and XO will get a letter in their records and will not advance due to those letters…it’s a career ender. If either has 20, it’s best to retire and be done with it.

The Chief of the Boat has over 20 and can retire, and probably will, because everywhere he could go-this will follow him and he won’t be in the command structure ever again.

And that’s the breaks…they were the command, and now they aren’t.

I think it depends. Captain Ilg XO of the Enterprise became CO of the USS Wabash Oiler which had its top side scrape a bridge going into Oregon during the Rose Parade activities. He went on to become CO of the Enterprise and grounded the carrier on a sandbar soon after a two year overhaul in the in the shipyard. Apparently bent a shaft which was heart breaking as the Enterprise had a bent shaft coming into overhaul and was fixed. That shaft always vibrated underway especially at high speeds. He went on to become an Admiral so his mishaps didn't seem to faze his career.

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Originally posted by Rey HRH:

quote:

Originally posted by MikeinNC:

quote:

Does this mean they're completely kicked out of the Navy, or just sent to some dead end menial job?

The CO and XO will get a letter in their records and will not advance due to those letters…it’s a career ender. If either has 20, it’s best to retire and be done with it.

The Chief of the Boat has over 20 and can retire, and probably will, because everywhere he could go-this will follow him and he won’t be in the command structure ever again.

And that’s the breaks…they were the command, and now they aren’t.

I think it depends. Captain Ilg XO of the Enterprise became CO of the USS Wabash Oiler which had its top side scrape a bridge going into Oregon during the Rose Parade activities. He went on to become CO of the Enterprise and grounded the carrier on a sandbar soon after a two year overhaul in the in the shipyard. Apparently bent a shaft which was heart breaking as the Enterprise had a bent shaft coming into overhaul and was fixed. That shaft always vibrated underway especially at high speeds. He went on to become an Admiral so his mishaps didn't seem to faze his career.

I know that the Enterprise grounding incident in SF Bay was blamed on a problem in engineering that resulted in uneven screw turns on the starboard shafts that caused them to be out of sync with the port shafts (The Big E had 4 shafts) causing the ship to veer out of a very narrow channel in SF bay. The CP's career survived. The CHENG... probably not so much.

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Originally posted by P226collector:

I know that the Enterprise grounding incident in SF Bay was blamed on a problem in engineering that resulted in uneven screw turns on the starboard shafts that caused them to be out of sync with the port shafts (The Big E had 4 shafts) causing the ship to veer out of a very narrow channel in SF bay. The CP's career survived. The CHENG... probably not so much.

That's no different than the submarine. And chances are the submarine captain wasn't on the bridge while coming out of port, the captain is expected to be on the bridge.

I worked in the Big E engine room, starboard aft but was off the boat before they came out of overhaul. The engine room just follows the signal sent from the bridge. I stood both upper and engine room watch underway and I never heard of us having to sync with the other engine rooms. IIRC, we could even lock one shaft while the others were turning. Any syncing or coordination would have to be controlled from the bridge along with the rudders.

I don't know if it's just a sea story but I heard the captain made the available crew go topside on one side to see if that would shift the boat off the sandbar. It was a funny mental picture either way.

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I don't know if it's just a sea story but I heard the captain made the available crew go topside on one side to see if that would shift the boat off the sandbar. It was a funny mental picture either way.

It's true. I was there.

Bird farm CO's are all aviators though, at least they used to be, and nobody expects them to be able to drive a ship worth a damn. I was on an AOR which was a deep draft supply ship they used to give to O-6 aviators for a tour to practice ship driving prior to selection as carrier CO. We allided (HARD) with piers in both Italy and Greece. Good times.

This message has been edited. Last edited by: CaptainMike,

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Originally posted by CaptainMike:
Bird farm CO's are all aviators though, at least they used to be, and nobody expects them to be able to drive a ship worth a damn. I was on an AOR which was a deep draft supply ship they used to give to O-6 aviators for a tour to practice ship driving prior to selection as carrier CO. We allied (HARD) with piers in both Italy and Greece. Good times.

Still correct. Carriers are apart of NAVAIR, ergo all carrier CO's are aviators that have gone to nuke school and have commanded a deep-draft ship prior. Aviator career path at O-6 level is you can either command a carrier, command an air wing or, command a base/school.

'Ship's leaders'? WTH? In OUR navy they are called 'officers' - I realise that this might be hard for some folks to comprehend, but.......