Retired generals raise telling questions about the current commandant’s radical new ideas.

Deference to senior command is a hard-wired tradition in elite military organizations, and nowhere is that tradition more honored than in the U.S. Marine Corps. But what happens if a policy coming from the top of the chain of command is insufficiently tested or intrinsically flawed? Where is it written that a subordinate or former commander can set aside deference and demand a second look?

For more than two years many of the Marine Corps’ finest former leaders have struggled with this dilemma as they quietly discussed a series of fundamental changes ordered, and in some cases already implemented, by Gen. David Berger, the current commandant. Among Marines there are serious questions about the wisdom and long-term risk of dramatic reductions in force structure, weapon systems and manpower levels in units that would take steady casualties in most combat scenarios. And it is unclear to just about everyone with experience in military planning what formal review and coordination was required before Gen. Berger unilaterally announced a policy that would alter so many time-honored contributions of the Marine Corps.

The unique and irreplaceable mission of the Marine Corps is to provide a homogeneous, all-encompassing “force in readiness” that can go anywhere and fight anyone on any level short of nuclear war. The corps has fought many political battles to preserve that mission but never from within—until now.

Among other decisions, Gen. Berger’s “Force Structure 2030” plan includes these provisions:



• Elimination of three infantry battalions from the current 24, a 14% reduction in frontline combat strength.

• Reduction of each remaining battalion by 200 Marines, taking an additional 4,200 infantry Marines from the frontline combat capabilities.

• Elimination of two reserve-component infantry battalions of the present eight, a 25% reduction of combat strength.

• Elimination of 16 cannon artillery battalions, a 76% reduction, to be replaced by 14 rocket artillery battalions, for use in “successful naval campaigns.”

• Elimination of all the tanks in the Marine Corps, even from the reserves.

• Elimination of three of the current 17 medium tilt-rotor squadrons, three of the eight heavy-lift helicopter squadrons, and “at least” two of the seven light attack helicopter squadrons, which were termed “unsuitable for maritime challenges.”

After several unsuccessful attempts by retired senior officers to engage in a quiet dialogue with Gen. Berger, the gloves have now come off. The traditional deference has been replaced by a sense of duty to the Marine Corps and its vital role in our national security. Recently, 22 retired four-star Marine generals signed a nonpublic letter of concern to Gen. Berger, and many others have stated their support of the letter. A daily working group that includes 17 retired generals has been formed to communicate concerns to national leaders. One highly respected retired three-star general estimated to me that “the proportion of retired general officers who are gravely concerned about the direction of the Corps in the last two and a half years would be above 90 percent.”

There is not much time to stop the potential damage to our national security. Questions should be raised. The law does not give the commandant of the Marine Corps carte blanche to make significant changes in force structure. Title 10 provides that the commandant perform his duties “subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Navy,” and that the Navy secretary “has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Navy including. . . . organizing,” but “subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.” And the president retains ultimate authority as commander in chief.

The risk involved in a restructuring of this scale should have required full consideration and debate in such Pentagon offices as the Defense Resources Board, then a formal approval by the defense secretary before being sent to the White House for further review, and then extensive oversight hearings in Congress.
Few of our most serious members of Congress would have simply nodded and funded a program with almost irreversible long-term consequences. Gen. Berger’s announcement came during the Covid restrictions, when much of Congress had gone remote, and serious examination and oversight was extremely difficult. Added to that was the chaos that existed in the Pentagon during the 2020 campaign year and the inevitable postelection turbulence.

New ideas, even if they are bad ideas, have a way of gaining media attention. Predictably, some commentators have dismissed the concerns of the Marine Corps retired community as coming from a bunch of graybeards whose minds are still focused on yesterday’s wars. Such comments do no justice to the long tradition of combat innovation that has always marked the Marine Corps, from amphibious doctrine to helicopter usage to the techniques of close-air support.

If Gen. Berger’s new ideas were well thought out and tested, we would be seeing 90% of retired generals enthusiastically supporting them instead of expressing concern. But the realities of brutal combat and the wide array of global challenges the Marine Corps faces daily argue strongly against a doctrinal experiment that might look good in a computerized war game at Quantico.

Twenty-two four-star generals deserve to be listened to. For the good of the country, let’s hope they will be.

Mr. Webb was a Marine infantry officer in Vietnam, Navy secretary (1987-88) and a U.S. senator from Virginia (2007-13). He is the Distinguished Fellow at Notre Dame’s International Security Center.

LINK: https://www.wsj.com/articles/m..._opin_pos_5#cxrecs_s

The way I see it, the USMC is trying to go back to what was their core specialty: NAVAL INFANTRY. Not trying to be a second US Army which in many ways is what they've become in the past 30 years or more.

The Marines got rid of their tanks in 2020, saying they were too large and heavy to transport to remote islands. New weapon systems that can kill tanks at much greater distances will replace tanks as anti-tank weapons.

They are also eliminating bridging units, and re-organizing the Law Enforcement battalions.

I disagree with eliminating the armor units especially since they used them so effectively in the Pacific Theater during WW2.

I understand that they want to go lighter so an Abrams might not be the most effective in that sense but maybe go to a lighter tank like the Army is supposedly fielding/testing.

Change is often hard to accept.

Preparing to fight the next war, from the POV of the last war, it becomes apparent how both are vastly different, and how unprepared one is for that reality.

The U.S. Military once was born on horseback.

New weapons, systems, tactics and doctrines are necessary for effective and winning battles and wars.

Sometimes, less is more.

Rule #1. Putting payload in space. For every pound of payload, X amount greater weight than the payload, in fuel, is required to put that payload in space. Fuel is X amount more payload. Figure it out.

Same goes for personnel.
Every troop is "payload". Every troop you add requires X number of troops to support that added troop. (Logistics)

That's just the tip of the iceberg.


Not all change is going to be the "right thing", sometimes due to bad decisions, politics, agenda, and sometimes due to the inability to precisely predict the future. So, there will be some good and some bad in the change. Hope there is more in the "right" column, than in the left, when the change is complete.

^^^^^^^^^
And to add to that, after every major war, the Corps has attempted some “transformation” and downsizing.

At least this time, they at least seem to have a plan. And the plan at least makes some sense.

The infantry battalions are presently being reshaped into the mold of US Army Ranger battalions with a Naval Infantry mission. West Coast infantry units are closing the gap on the ability for infantry units to do most of what battalion recon has always specialized in. Your basic oh three double dumb dumb is being tasked with a more “tactical” expectation that merely being a grunt.

While some of the changes are bad, this article almost reads like spilled milk of people steeped in tradition and fearful of change.

I saw some big changes in the USAF, with aircraft going from F-4s all the way to F-22, and after some experience with the F-35.
Parallel to that were several changes of command structure and various iterations of the type of maintenance and organizational structures employed Along the way, I learned to let "nostalgia" go and embrace the new things, finding the best way to exploit them, and lobby for changes of things that did not work as they matured.

When I look back on it, and all the years post military, it is amazing how much was crammed into that time, like living half a dozen lifetimes and careers in that space. (all of that experience served (serves) me well, and I am richer for it.

The Corps will change. My hope is it is for the very good in the long term.

Ironic, that I was so resistant to change in my earlier days.

I don't have the context, but looking over Mr. Webb's article what struck me most is what sounds like a reduction in numbers of troops.

Did I read that correctly? In this plan, are there to be fewer fighting Marines? If so, that's a horribad idea.

The rest of it, to a military historian who is not a veteran, sounds like they are trying to make the Marines lighter and more easily mobile for their traditional role.

That might make sense if (hypothetically speaking here, given the current Administration) there were enough Army troops so that the Marines didn't need to get put into ground situations for long periods.

If you want the Marines to take (and hold) places alongside the Army, they need the stuff and the organization to do that.

quote:

Originally posted by mrapteam666:
The Marines got rid of their tanks in 2020, saying they were too large and heavy to transport to remote islands. New weapon systems that can kill tanks at much greater distances will replace tanks as anti-tank weapons.
.

At some point, The Corps (and especially a lone Grunt) is going to miss having that "Ass"!
A Tank is a great asset anywhere.

It's a nice feeling to be able to say- "I really don't feel like getting that 'close' in this 'close quarters combat' game... Let's blow 'em up with that big, bulletproof thing!"

I’m reading less troops, less artillery tubes, no tanks.

I don’t think history will show that to be smart. Not an infantryman but I can’t think of any soldier ever wishing they had less artillery and tank support. We have a whole fleet of amphibious warships capable of delivering heavy shit to a fight. Do we get rid of them too?

Change is always hard. It’s not always right though either.

quote:

Originally posted by joel9507:
I don't have the context, but looking over Mr. Webb's article what struck me most is what sounds like a reduction in numbers of troops.

Did I read that correctly? In this plan, are there to be fewer fighting Marines? If so, that's a horribad idea.

The rest of it, to a military historian who is not a veteran, sounds like they are trying to make the Marines lighter and more easily mobile for their traditional role.

That might make sense if (hypothetically speaking here, given the current Administration) there were enough Army troops so that the Marines didn't need to get put into ground situations for long periods.

If you want the Marines to take (and hold) places alongside the Army, they need the stuff and the organization to do that.

As for the RIF- Reduction in Force
It happens after every war, more so during certain administrations. Clinton era cutbacks, the Corps went from 220,000-240,000 Marines down to 180,000. IIRC, they wanted to go even lower to +/- 140,000. The thought process is that since we're not fighting RIGHT NOW, we don't need that many people.

(Thanks Slick Willie, I was one of those that was cut. Yes, I could have stayed in the Corps, but my options were C130 Mechanic, or Admin... Well, THAT wasn't happening, especially coming from the 0300 field!)

Now it's not only a RIF, but a Transitioning / Restructuring as well. Changing the way the Corps is going to fight THE NEXT WAR.
Institutionally, the Corps and the Army were always fighting the last war.
The Corps is looking at another "Island Hopping Campaign" out in the South Pacific.

One of the Thought Process of the way Marines looked at combat is- 30 Day Battle.
Marines are prepared to go in, fight and hold or expand for 30 days. Then Big Army comes in. Marines resupply, regroup then move on for the next 30 days.

quote:

Originally posted by pedropcola:
I’m reading less troops, less artillery tubes, no tanks.

I don’t think history will show that to be smart. Not an infantryman but I can’t think of any soldier ever wishing they had less artillery and tank support. We have a whole fleet of amphibious warships capable of delivering heavy shit to a fight. Do we get rid of them too?

Change is always hard. It’s not always right though either.

Are Marines supposed to be Army soldiers?

Or are they just getting back to what has been their specialty: light seaborne infantry?

i thought i read also somewhere the deletions would 'pay for' significantly augmented drone warfare capability which is proving so important in the Ukraine conflict

going to ZERO on armor is a mistake though IMO.

maybe a 'lighter' series of tank (smaller than the M1) ??

---------------------------

Diverting funds from one institution (The Marine Corps) allows an administration to fund other institutions (ie: Social Programs). We cannot lose sight of the fact that while equipment costs are quite high, most funding for our services is spent on PERSONNEL. I believe this administration has priorities above national defense and those are their ultimate concern.

After watching Russian infantry getting schwacked by a Javelin in Easter Ukraine recently as they took cover besides a tank upon initial contact with Ukrainian militia, you can get too comfortable with them.

Tanks do come with their own set of ­baggage, especially for a light force. They’re hard to get on and off the ship and ashore in contested environments. The Army has modernized its tanks ahead of the Marine Corps. The most updated version is the M1A2 Sepv3 Abrams tank. That tank weighs 66 tons as a basic package and can come in at more than 80 tons with certain active protection systems equipment necessary for the modern battlefield. The upgraded Abrams runs over the weight limit for the Navy’s ­ship-to-shore connector, or SSC.

The existing Navy landing craft air cushion, or LCAC, could carry a single tank, without upgrades, ashore at that weight limit. The LCAC maximum speed is 40 knots with a full load, while the SSC can run at 35 knots or faster. Another option for transporting tanks is the landing craft utility class 1700. This vessel would be able to carry two M1A1 tanks. Though the LCU 1700 would still be difficult for early-stage forcible entry as it runs at a speed of 11 knots.

That translates into the Marines only being able to carry one M1A1 (older model, no protection system) at a time on the LCAC or SSC and two tanks on an LCU but at very slow speeds. The carrying capacity further limits tank upgrades for Marine armor to keep pace with modern anti-armor threats.
But the options have to be weighed when looking at forcible entry operations as compared to expeditionary advanced base operations, which could provide more opportunities for follow-on equipment delivery that could take advantage of the LCU capacity.

They cost a lot in acquisition, maintenance, fuel and logistics when compared with other platforms.
Speaking at the International ­Armoured Vehicles Conference on Feb. 10, Lt. Gen. Eric Smith, deputy commandant for Combat Development and Integration, argued that early ­experiments already are proving a smaller, more effective force for ­anti-armor than bringing tanks to the fight. They were seeing armor kills using lightweight mounted fires from the joint light tactical vehicle at ranges of 15 times to 20 times the distance a tank was previously achieving.

“We can kill armor formations at ­longer ranges using additional and ­other resources without incurring a 74-ton challenge trying to get that to a shore, or to get it from the United States into the fight,” Smith said. “You simply can’t be there in time.”

When was the last time the Marine Corps was "light seaborne infantry" in your opinion?

It certainly hasn't been for a long time using any realistic definition. Tanks, artillery, aviation, infantry. What is next? No aviation, Navy can take care of it? Light seaborne infantry sounds a lot like Marines in the crows nest and not much more. Certainly not conducting any of the operations they became known for. Not saying they need to but certainly want to point out that "light seaborne infantry" isn't storming Iwo Jima. Not winning at least.

This Commandant killed the Corps.

The entire being for the Corps was the MAGTAF.

It's gone.

Tanks? Yes they are heavy. But I have NEVER met a grunt that didn't want a tank. We got so many requests for support in AFG we couldn't field them all.

Grunt platoon from Charlie Company going on patrol?

"Hey, can we get a tank section?"

A USMC Abrams weighs just under 65 tons, 1/4 tank of fuel and no SL-3 gear ( I ran a bunch over the scales at Camp Bastion, we had to be under 130K to get on a C17). Put it at 67 fully loaded.

This was the biggest gripe from the MEU commander. A platoon of tanks took up a lot of weight on ship.

There is a reason the USMC didn't upgrade to the V3. I don't agree with it, but it was a reason.

The Army and the Marines use tanks completely differently. This goes back to WWII.

Army trains tank on tank, old school European battlefields. Armor defeats armor. In the USMC armor was there for the grunt. Infantry support.

This doctrine came from the island campaigns of WWII. In Europe Army tanks fought tanks. In the pacific USMC tanks supported infantry.

We kept that doctrine until this shitbag Commandant threw it in the trash.

Now let's talk parts. The Army has set a date of 2025 for M1A1 sustainment. Gone. That meant the USMC had to upgrade or die out.

A buddy of mine was in an elevator with some Army Colonel at a meeting a few years ago. He asked what the USMC intends to do. He told my buddy he was pulling all his engineers that were working on obsolescence for the M1A1 to the V3. My buddy had no answer.

If the USMC kept the M1A1 platform parts sustainment alone would have killed them. Once the Army pulled the plug on the A1 it was over.

The Army's V3 has a MLC (military load classification) of 80 tons. It does not weight 80 tons.

It runs 68, 69.

Shit. I forgot what I was talking about. I love tanks, and I love USMC tanks.

And I hate this Commandant.

FYI, everything I know I learned from my Haynes tank manual



I'm pretty sure I'm the only kid on the block that has a functioning gunners/commanders handle test set in my garage.

This message has been edited. Last edited by: mbinky,

quote:

Originally posted by mbinky:
Army trains tank on tank, old school European battlefields. Armor defeats armor. In the USMC armor was there for the grunt. Infantry support.

This doctrine came from the island campaigns of WWII. In Europe Army tanks fought tanks. In the pacific USMC tanks supported infantry.

Kinda, sorta, not really.

During WW2, the Army's medium tanks like the M3 Lee and M4 Shermans were sometimes used to destroy enemy tanks, but that wasn't their primary purpose. Rather, their primary purpose was to support the infantry and exploit breakthroughs. Much like how the USMC utilized them in the Pacific. USMC tanks also similarly engaged Japanese tanks on occasion, although much less commonly than the Army's because the Japanese fielded very few tanks. Therefore they were able to focus more on their primary role of infantry support.

During WW2, it was the Army's tank destroyers like the M10, M36, and M18 that had the primary role of, well, destroying enemy tanks.

It wasn't until after WW2 that the US military nixed the bifurcated concept of infantry support tanks and tank-killing tank destroyers and went with the universal Main Battle Tank concept instead, with tank-vs-tank being added as one of their tanks' primary roles.

quote:

Originally posted by RogueJSK:
It wasn't until after WW2 that the US military nixed the bifurcated concept of infantry support tanks and tank-killing tank destroyers and went with the universal Main Battle Tank concept instead, with tank-vs-tank becoming one of their tanks' primary roles.

Remember that we don’t fight the last war…

Ukraine is illustrating quite handily the negatives of armor, infantry supported or not.

The tactics that worked in Fallujah or AFG would get a lot of tanks eliminated nowadays, and we need to adapt. Removing that logistical burden frees up resources for things that can move, shoot, and SURVIVE.

quote:

Originally posted by reloader-1:
Remember that we don’t fight the last war…

Very true.

And what can take and hold ground?

Armor.

If I had to write a paper on how NOT to capture land mass...

I'd show everyone the Russian advance.