Thirty years ago.

https://theaviationgeekclub.co...its-at-low-altitude/

That was a very bad week at Fairchild, as four days earlier an airman killed four people at the base hospital.

https://www.spokesman.com/stor...irchild-and-spokane/

Famous story, very sad. One of the crewmembers was taking his final flight for the Air Force, with his family and friends watching.

Pilot was a loose cannon and grossly irresponsible. Many others flat out refused to fly with him. He was hot dogging, and killed himself and the other 3 crew. Ironically, every other member of that crew was responsible for reining in his bad flying habits and attitude (they were above him in the squadron/Group/Wing leadership, IIRC). They all died as a direct result of NOT doing their jobs and stopping him months before the accident.

Pilot flew the plane in violation of regs and laws of physics. It is still sickening to watch that video.

USAF said they learned their lesson, but years later ANOTHER 'hotshot' Pilot did the SAME THING with a C-17 in Alaska. The load master was not on that flight, as he refused to fly with the pilot.

It’s interesting to think about what the failure to control the pilot’s prior dangerous behaviors says about supervision and leadership.

Although a single incident does not make a culture, it can illustrate what occurs in cultures. Despite the common conception that the armed forces operate in a rigid hierarchical manner, people are people and very often people don’t do what’s best for even themselves, much less for their organizations.

I don’t operate in an environment that is in any way close to as critical (and dangerous) as military aviation, but just recently I found it a little difficult to admonish someone about an issue because of the relationship I had developed with him. Some supervisors obviously cope by adopting a “take no prisoners” practice toward any failing, no matter how minor. Many others, however, allow too many things to slide until they can’t be ignored any longer and perhaps it’s too late—sometimes with disastrous results as in this incident. Finding an appropriate balance is key, but not always that easy.

I was in the 325th for 2 1/2 years.
20+ years prior to this incident.

Bob

Yes I’ve heard about this, tragic, could have easily been worse with more fatalities on the ground.

Forgive me for armchair QB’ing, the pilot was known to be a loose cannon. There were the handful that refused to fly with him, then the right seater, went supposedly as a ‘safety’ pilot of sorts. Doing so, he should have been at an extreme state of alertness every second.

That alertness would peak with the high AOB, higher ‘G’ turns low to the ground. Once that VSI was zero, then ANYTHING negative, it should have been GAME OVER(knock it off, whatever). With the high AOB, one would/should intuitively realize, the VSI about to go negative. The easy & safe way to do those turns is to only accept a slightly climbing VSI. Of course, this all has to be commensurate with the aircraft platform in question. A B-52 can’t maneuver like an F-18. A 90 AOB isn’t going to work for very long in a B-52.

Everything is easier in hindsight. A lot of heads rolled over this accident.

quote:

That alertness would peak with the high AOB, higher ‘G’ turns low to the ground. Once that VSI was zero, then ANYTHING negative, it should have been GAME OVER(knock it off, whatever). With the high AOB, one would/should intuitively realize, the VSI about to go negative. The easy & safe way to do those turns is to only accept a slightly climbing VSI. Of course, this all has to be commensurate with the aircraft platform in question. A B-52 can’t maneuver like an F-18. A 90 AOB isn’t going to work for very long in a B-52.

Translation, please, for the few of us who aren’t pilots.

Once the vertical speed(VSI) went anything less than positive. One could say zero, but that would be about impossible to hold in that high angle-of-bank,AOB, in a B-52.

I got out of the Navy 1 year before this accident, 8.5 years flying. One can normally mention a few words, I’ve also nursed the stick when required, flying with another.

One has to wonder if he did this on purpose - all of his "bosses' were there to watch over him that day actually in the plane (may have had a grudge against some/all of them, possibly over previous counseling); "retaliation of not being promoted"; "Holland had dead-ended his career"; "only months left until retirement" and given his reputation and word-of-mouth from other pilots, no chance that any airline would pick him up as a pilot (flying career pretty much over); he knows "many squadron pilots and crew members refused to fly with him"; "in the days before the event, however, he seemed to have lost his mind". He knew the limitations of his aircraft yet ignored them.

It wouldn't surprise me. He was probably unhinged.

I feel sorry for the two back seaters - they could do nothing but watch their fate unfold. The co-pilot, his squadron CO, might have been able to take over at some point - we'll never know. Very sad for all of the families.

quote:

Originally posted by arfmel:

Translation, please, for the few of us who aren’t pilots.

At a high angle of bank (AOB) all the wing lift is going sideways, not upward. There is no way to maintain a very steep bank angle and also maintain altitude. So if the turn is started with a slight climb, which is a positive rate showing on the Vertical Speed Indicator, the airplane is initially slightly nose up and climbing. Then as the turn progresses, the wing is not providing lift away from the ground so the nose will start to come down. At this point the vertical speed is negative, meaning the aircraft is descending.

Since the wing in this situation was still at nearly a 90 degree bank angle, the wing could not help stop the airplane from dropping towards the ground.

As the VSI started to go from positive to negative, the pilot should have rolled wings level so that the aircraft could be kept from diving towards the ground.

As an aside, it appears this pilot stalled the left wing. Without getting too far into the aerodynamic weeds, the wing on the inside of a turn is moving more slowly than the wing to the outside of the turn. In this crash it was the left wing on the inside. Just like making a tight turn in a car, the outside wheels are moving faster than the inside wheels. When the wing gets too slow it stops making lift.

So as the aircraft slowed down in the turn, the left wing would want to drop even more. If the pilot tries to use aileron to increase the lift on the left wing it worsens the problem due to the very low speed. As the nose drops the airplane is yawing to the left, further slowing that wing. The result is what we see in the video, the airplane continuing to roll to a steeper bank angle and the nose sliding down to point more at the ground.

quote:

Pilot was a loose cannon and grossly irresponsible. Many others flat out refused to fly with him. He was hot dogging, and killed himself and the other 3 crew. Ironically, every other member of that crew was responsible for reining in his bad flying habits and attitude (they were above him in the squadron/Group/Wing leadership, IIRC). They all died as a direct result of NOT doing their jobs and stopping him months before the accident.

To clarify, those mid-level officers were hamstrung by their superiors, who for whatever reason conferred political immunity over Bud Holland. They all chose to put themselves in harm's way to avoid assigning the duty to their subordinates, thus saving their lives. Those men were heroes.

This incident is required study materials as part of the pilot decision making programs offered. I’ve had it through the Wings program run by the FAA as well as CAP aircrew training

Interesting factoid, a photograph taken at the exact moment of 90° bank shows something ejecting from the plane a moment before the fireball erupts. It's commonly believed this is the co-pilot's ejector seat almost making it but being engulfed in the flames. However, the object is just the escape hatch blowing away. The official report does not indicate whether the co-pilot actually cleared the airframe or not.

This message has been edited. Last edited by: kkina,

Looks like a guy who was certain (in his mind) that he should have been selected for fighters and was bitter for his entire career.

Thank you for the translation and explanations.

My father was a B-17 pilot in WWII. He was never short on opinions, but censored himself when talking poorly about others individually. Right after this crash occurred, I was watching the network news with him. He went silent, then got up and walked out of the room.

.

TheFlightChannel did a great sim-video...

Watched the video, learned that the steep turn was part of a ‘go around’ with the other aircraft still on the runway. In my mind that’s even more of a fail in airmanship.

His version of a go around was at 250’ above the ground, very high angle of bank. And again, done in a B-52.

The idea would be to be back on final at some point, stabilized, for the planned ‘roll & go’. That is NEVER going to happen with the tight turn at 250’AGL. Midway in the turn the right seater should have done more than speak up.

There was mention of control inputs, after the aircraft was stalled.

That Guam crash next in line was tragic also, 2008 I think.

Does anyone have any information regarding the 1981 (approx) ceash of a B-52 in Otero County, Colorado?