I recently watched a fascinating documentary on the tragedy of the USS Indianapolis. I was truly shocked that the prosecution used the Japanese captain of the sub that sank the Indy as material for their case.

The documentary left me with more questions than answers.

#1. Was the captain made into a scapegoat?

#2. If you think the answer to question one is true why do you think so?

#3. What specific failures led to the sinking of the USS Indianapolis? Was it in your opinion avoidable or inevitable?

I understand it is incredibly difficult to answer these questions with 100% confidence and certainty but I appreciate all input on this subject.

I recently discovered a family member of mine passed away on the Indianapolis so it has really driven me to learn anything and everything I can regarding this fascinating chapter of American history.

I'm about to start reading the book, so I'll have an opinion soon.

I recently listened to the audiobook on our way back from summer vacation. IMO he was. There were quite a few reasons outlined in the book, but IMO while he bore some of the responsibility, the people on shore were far more negligent than he was, denying him an escort, failing to report the ship being overdue, letting it's location get lost in the shuffle, etc. None of those people were prosecuted, and as such McVeigh did not deserve to be.

One of the biggest factors from the book that impacted me was McVeigh's leadership in the water after the sinking. He exercised command leadership, kept the men in his group calm and organized, and likely saved lives as a result. When compared with groups of men in the water led by other officers (and there are some pretty horrific stories in the book), the level of discipline maintained by the Captain was a step above.

The men who were actually there rejected his guilt as well, and it was the surviving sailors of the Indianapolis (along with a school kid and the skipper of the Submarine Indianapolis) that helped lead the charge for his exoneration.

Originally posted by 92fstech:

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The men who were actually there rejected his guilt as well, and it was the surviving sailors of the Indianapolis (along with a school kid and the skipper of the Submarine Indianapolis) that helped lead the charge for his exoneration.

This was something that stuck out to me when watching the documentary. One man interviewed said the letters from those who lost loved ones ultimately led to his suicide. The interviews I saw all supported their skipper.

When the guy who torpedoes you says that zig zagging wouldn't have made a bit of difference, then I'm not sure how you can convict a man for not zig zagging when information that would lead him to zig zag was withheld from him.

He got screwed.

IMO, he got the big salami!

Yes he was railroaded!

Poor guy couldn't live with it, offed himself over it.

Shame on the Navy for that.

Yes, he was scapegoated. The fact that a warship of the importance of the Indianapolis and its mission had gone overdue and not missed is one of the biggest FUBARs of WWII.

But Halsey got nothing but a wrist slap for sailing TF 38 into Typhoon Cobra. 779 killed, 3 ships sunk, 2 dozen ships with minor to serious damage.

Yes he was railroaded, no question.

When a court of inquiry recommended court martial, Nimitz overturned it and issued a letter of reprimand, but Ernest King overturned Nimitz and ordered the court martial.

This alone should settle any doubt: About 380 ships of the U.S. Navy were lost in combat in World War II, McVay was the only captain to be court-martialed for the loss of his ship.

Of course he was. Scapegoat so that poor planning from above was shielded.

Ernest King was a massive egotistical asshole. It was his way or else. Interesting read about him and his battles with the Army in the Pacific. If you got on his wrong side for anything you were fucked.

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Originally posted by stickman428:

#1. Was the captain made into a scapegoat?

Absolutely; this has pretty much been established as historic fact.

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#2. If you think the answer to question one is true why do you think so?

The US Navy screwed up, bigtime. In order to save face, they made CAPT McVay into a scapegoat to cover their own screw-ups. They never notified McVay that there was a known Japanese submarine in his area. They never noticed he was overdue. IIRC, one junior officer DID notice the Indy was overdue, and on his own initiative, ordered some ships to go search for her. However, the base admiral was notified and he countermanded this order. Instead of, you know, asking around if anybody had a spare heavy cruiser laying about, he did absolutely nothing (while men drowned, died of exposure, and were ripped apart by sharks). The same people who were responsible for not knowing Indy was overdue ended up on the prosecution team for the court-martial. This is nothing unusual, to be honest. They did the same thing with the 9/11 commission - took the very people most responsible for the screw-up and put them on the panel (so they could not be questioned).

The court-martial was a bad joke, and should have NEVER taken place. Putting the Japanese sub skipper on the witness stand was further proof they were out to screw him. CAPT McVay's guilt was a foregone conclusion the moment they declared he would face a court-martial.

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#3. What specific failures led to the sinking of the USS Indianapolis? Was it in your opinion avoidable or inevitable?

The sinking was never inevitable.

Anybody who has read even a single book by a submarine skipper, be it American, Brit, Japanese, German, Russian, whatever, will realize very quickly how slow subs of that era were underwater. They relied on torpedoes traveling in a straight line, to a point determined in advance by guesswork and rudimentary mechanical computers. Mis-estimating the target ship's speed by a single knot can cause the torps to miss. Missing the course by a couple degrees can cause a miss. Estimating the ship's length wrong can result in a miss. Even IF the sub's torpedo fire control team gets everything right, torps could wander off course, fail to explode on contact, travel too deep and pass harmlessly under the target, or even (in at least TWO confirmed US cases) circle around and strike the subs that fired the torps (USS Tullibee and USS Tang were both sunk by their own circle-running torpedoes - there may have been even more, if the whole crew was lost. Only a single USS Tullibee crewman survived and was able to tell what happened to his boat).

Indy was traveling in a straight line at a constant speed. Really, the Indy could not have done much to make it easier for the Japanese submarine. She was not traveling near her top speed of 30 knots or so - CAPT McVay pushed her hard to reach Pearl with the atom bomb components, setting a record that apparently stands to this day. He pushed her further to reach Tinian Island to deliver the bomb components, and on her last trip, CAPT McVay was taking it easy on his engines in case they were damaged by the hard usage. IIRC, he was traveling at 17 knots.

Now, many people make a huge deal about the fact that CAPT McVay was never told about the known Japanese sub in his area. To me, this is irrelevant. Sure, had he been told, he MAY have been more cautious. However, the entire Pacific, from Japan to Alaska to California to the Panama Canal to China was a war zone, and ANY ship commander should have taken precautions to protect against submarine attack. Therefore, it is reasonable and necessary to ask WHY he was not zig-zagging. I have spent many hours going over this in my head (I would ponder it while out in the wilderness hiking when I had nothing else to do). I have also read at least 3 books specifically about the Indy, and many more about the Pacific war in general. When CAPT McVay went to bed, the Indy was in such heavy fog that he could barely see the bow of his own ship. Under these conditions, it would have been pointless to zig-zag. That fog would make Indy effectively invisible and immune from attack (Japan did not have radar fire control for its subs). BUT, the Japanese skipper saw Indy from about 3 miles away, and was able to race ahead to place his sub into attack position.

This is vital, as it means at SOME point the weather cleared up. All the while, CAPT McVay slept (and I have no problem with this - the dude had to sleep SOME time, and what better time than when his ship was in absolutely no danger protected by the fog?). This makes me ask, what was the bridge crew thinking when the weather cleared up? They HAD to notice. Did CAPT McVay order them to wake him up in case the weather cleared up? Did he order them to start zig-zagging if the weather cleared up? Even if he left no orders, it should have been standard practice for the bridge watch to wake him up if there was ANY doubt about orders. Was CAPT McVay a tyrant and the crew afraid to 'bother' him? It doesn't seem likely, based on the crew's near-universal support for him, but I don't know for certain. The bridge watch had to have at least some experienced hands that would realized that the clear weather posed a threat to the ship. Yet, apparently, nobody did anything. Maybe they did wake up CAPT McVay, and he told them to continue on. I don't know.

Once the Japanese sub was in position (aided by Indy's unchanging and entirely predictable course), the attack was relatively easy. Still, of 6 torps fired, only 2 hit. Now, they usually fired a spread at different angles, like a big fan. This helped insure a hit in case the fire control team mis-calculated the ship's length, speed, and/or course. So, of a 6-fish spread, some were guaranteed to miss. But, two were enough. Japan had the 'Long Lance' torpedoes - the most deadly and reliable torps of any combatant of the entire war. US heavy cruisers, especially those built in the pre-war years like Indy, were notoriously bad at absorbing torpedo damage. These so-called 'Treaty Cruisers' were limited to a maximum tonnage of 10,000 tons (Japan and Germany cheated and made bigger ships; the US was pretty much honest). As a result, there were many compromises that made these ships poor weapons in a real war. Several US Treaty Cruisers were sunk early in the war with heavy loss of life. Even a single torp could have sunk her, had it hit in the right place.

Now, I read a VERY interesting section in the book "Out of the Depths" by Edgar Harrell. Harrell was a Marine who (obviously) survived the sinking. He also supported CAPT McVay and his actions. Yet, he stated that the Indy was NOT at Condition Z; full water-tight integrity. He said the crew could pass through the entire ship at ease. At Condition Z, every water-tight door is shut and locked, except for when somebody is using it. It's apparently a pain in the butt, as to get through the ship you would have to constantly open and close hatches. However, the open hatches ruined Indy's already weak water-tight integrity, and allowed water to quickly flood the entire ship. This is probably why the ship sank in 15 minutes, and why the radio room did not get a good SOS call out. From what I recall, they did transmit an SOS, and it was received. However, it was never repeated, which lead the receiving station to assume it was a Japanese trick (they all assumed that in the time a heavy cruiser sank, the ship would get off several SOS calls; not just the one). Now, I am not certain what the rules or procedures were pertaining to Condition Z. It could have been normal to have the hatches open, even in a war zone. I honestly don't know, so I cannot judge whether CAPT McVay violated orders or procedures. I also don't know if he DID order the hatches shut, but the crew ignored these orders. Too many things are unknowable at this point.

As for the Japanese skipper saying 'it didn't matter whether Indy was zigging or not,' that is utter BS. I believe the Japanese skipper only said that to save CAPT McVay's reputation. For example, I recently read "Wahoo" by Medal of Honor recipient Richard O'Kane. In that one book alone, he recounted SEVERAL instances where a ship, early in an attack approach by the sub or at the last minute, zigged away or made an unexpected turn. This either screwed up the attack or caused torpedoes already in the water to miss. In one documentary, the skipper of the USS Indianapolis nuclear attack sub stated that zigging was useless. He had a chart explaining how a spread of 6 torps would result in at least 1-2 hits if the ship took evasive action. Now, I think HE was lying to protect CAPT McVay, as well. While it is true that a ship spotting incoming torps may not be able to do ANYTHING to avoid a hit or two (10-20 seconds before impact), he knew darn well that a zig earlier could have taken Indy MILES away from the sub leaving the Japanese sub no chance to attack. In clear weather, the Japanese sub could not surface without being seen and attacked, and it could only travel 5-6 knots max speed underwater. Even at Indy's 'slow' speed of 17 knots, Indy would have left the Japanese sub far behind without any chance to attack.

So, zig-zagging COULD HAVE made a difference. This is why it was standard practice in all navies in both World Wars. It worked. It was not perfect, of course, as target ships sometimes zigged TOWARDS the sub, making an attack easier (IIRC, this happened to the Japanese carrier Shinano - she zigged right towards the US sub which then could attack and sink her). There are no cut-and-dried answers to Indy's fate - but I will defend to the death that zig-zagging COULD HAVE saved Indy. Those who say it could not have are either trying to ignore history to clear CAPT McVay's name or just don't know what they are talking about. I think some people, in an attempt to clear CAPT McVay, go too far and lie or mis-represent the facts on his behalf. I believe the US Navy commander of the modern USS Indy did this. As an historian, I cannot and will not do so.


That all being said, I DO believe Capt McVay was responsible for the loss of his ship. His ship was NOT zig-zagging in a war zone on a clear night. Furthermore, his ship was not at Condition Z. Now, before I get flamed, let me explain that it is historical precedence that a Captain is solely responsible for the safety of his ship. The fact that he was asleep when the torps hit is irrelevant. He should have left orders to either wake him or start zigging if the weather cleared. If he DID do so, and the bridge crew ignored him, he is still responsible since it was HIS bridge crew and HIS ship.

I also DO believe the court-martial was a GROSS miscarriage of justice. As somebody else stated, Adm King was a giant Douchebag, and I think he was protecting HIS reputation by screwing CAPT McVay (it was 'his' Navy, after all, that made these mistakes). I think the Japanese skipper knew this, and lied to protect CAPT McVay (what were they going to do - charge a member of a defeated combatant nation for perjury?). I think the people who WERE responsible were the ones casting the heaviest stones. I believe the bureaucracy of the Navy did everything possible to protect itself; and if a single US Navy Captain suffered, what did they care?

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Originally posted by Blackmore:
But Halsey got nothing but a wrist slap for sailing TF 38 into Typhoon Cobra. 779 killed, 3 ships sunk, 2 dozen ships with minor to serious damage.

True. BUT, Halsey was irreplaceable - CAPT McVay was not.

Nimitz considered reprimanding and/or replacing Halsey, but there really wasn't anybody who could fill Halsey's shoes. He and Adm Spruance traded off command of the one large carrier force (that is why it was called Task Force 58 under Fifth Fleet when Spruance was in command, but the same force of ships was called Task Force 38 under Third Fleet with Halsey in command). It was such a huge responsibility, that the two commanders risked burn-out from extended ops. Neither could have sustained command more than several months before they would break down and make really bad decisions (and one must consider Halsey's responsibilities; he was under tremendous strain, which may have led to his error of judgment with the typhoon).

This was the largest single command in the US Navy; arguably even more important than Adm King as chief of the Navy. Halsey and Spruance were the ONLY 2 commanders Nimitz would/could trust with such a command. Sure, Halsey screwed up (with the typhoon AND at the Battle off Samar), but Halsey also had huge public support. Reprimanding Halsey at this late stage of the war would have been counter-productive, and may have cost even more lives by placing an inexperienced commander in his place. Halsey was impulsive and unpredictable, but he WAS a good commander. And even the best commanders make mistakes. And the higher the level of command, the higher the potential for truly epic mistakes, like the typhoon. . .

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Now, I read a VERY interesting section in the book "Out of the Depths" by Edgar Harrell. Harrell was a Marine who (obviously) survived the sinking. He also supported CAPT McVay and his actions. Yet, he stated that the Indy was NOT at Condition Z; full water-tight integrity. He said the crew could pass through the entire ship at ease. At Condition Z, every water-tight door is shut and locked, except for when somebody is using it. It's apparently a pain in the butt, as to get through the ship you would have to constantly open and close hatches. However, the open hatches ruined Indy's already weak water-tight integrity, and allowed water to quickly flood the entire ship. This is probably why the ship sank in 15 minutes, and why the radio room did not get a good SOS call out. From what I recall, they did transmit an SOS, and it was received. However, it was never repeated, which lead the receiving station to assume it was a Japanese trick (they all assumed that in the time a heavy cruiser sank, the ship would get off several SOS calls; not just the one). Now, I am not certain what the rules or procedures were pertaining to Condition Z. It could have been normal to have the hatches open, even in a war zone. I honestly don't know, so I cannot judge whether CAPT McVay violated orders or procedures. I also don't know if he DID order the hatches shut, but the crew ignored these orders. Too many things are unknowable at this point.

IIRC, the book I read said that Indy's outdated and poorly designed ventilation system made it insufferably hot below decks if the hatches were not left open to allow air to move through the ship, and as such they were regularly left open unless conditions specifically dictated the condition Z be set. On a related note, this was also the reason that many of the crew were sleeping out on deck at the time of the attack, which probably greatly reduced the loss of life in the initial explosion.

The book also stated that internal communications went down on the ship after the torpedo hit, so there was no way for the Captain to issue orders in a timely manner. Even the #1 and #2 radio rooms couldn't communicate with each other, and runners had to be sent, who had to work their way around fire and other damage to the ship. Centralized command pretty much broke down without communications, and the crew was left to take action on their own initiative. I can't say for sure, but I imagine this had a significant impact on damage control, and possibly critical actions like getting the watertight doors shut throughout the ship.