quote:

Originally posted by V-Tail:

quote:

Originally posted by RHINOWSO:

Jimmy, you don't know nothing about how a Navy ship works.

Zero. Zilch. Nada.

My kids know more than you do after watching the movie Battleship.

Then again, you are a shrimp boat cap'n expert - so just stick to that and Yachting.

RhinoDude, you are way off base here. You are nothing but an ex Navy officer, and you are arguing with a maven whose expertise on everything is well known. You need to show him some respect.

When will you learn?

That goes for you too, JAllen. You Navy officers don't know anything about this stuff, we have an actual rowboat captain to explain it all to us.

That picture pretty much sums up perfectly how Navy ships operate these days. At least in the Pacific fleet.

Where exactly do you think all of these electronics manufacturers TEST their new electronics before they sell them to the Navy??? To yachts, that have copius amounts of money to piss away on the latest and greatest toys. I've been playing with FLIR remote control night vision that displays on the bridge screen on yachts since around 2005.

The symantics of a Navy ship, operating in a commercial shipping lane, during peacetime and not exercising military operations, means nothing that it's a NAVY ship. It is just a ship. From what I know now and have seen, I want NOTHING to do with what goes on, on a Navy ship.

However, being that IT IS a Navy ship, and a destroyer of all things, makes the fact that they got run over in the first place that much worse. A destroyer is built to out maneuver other ships!!! How are they going to stop an incoming threat when they can't even stop from getting run over from the 600lb fat kid in school yelling that he's coming after them (they're constantly broadcasting AIS). They do have the latest radars and stuff, AND they can out maneuver ANY freighter. Stop on a dime, turn on a dime, etc.

I really don't believe that having more military personal die in NEEDLESS ship accidents due to a lack of training than all of the deaths the military has had in Afghanistan in 2017 is something to joke about. It is really in POOR taste.

Both of these accidents (regardless if it's a navy ship or not), should have been completely avoided, and the lack of training and mistakes made on all levels are so elementary that it is something you would never expect from any trained ship crew with more than a months experience on a ship (military or otherwise). It is downright criminal negligence, and the Navy thought so too.

Having been in the Navy 2-6 decades ago really means very little today. So many things have changed in all aspects. From Ship building, to operations, to electronics, etc.

It's no different than being a P51 Mustang pilot in WW 2 and trying to act like you know what you're talking about on an F22. Everything has advanced so far, the 2 aren't really even related.

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:

I really have no idea how a Navy ship operates.

No foolin’.

quote:

I'm a professional mariner that only knows How any ship SHOULD NAVIGATE. AND, quite frankly I don't really care how a Navy ship operates, so long as I steer clear of them.

Quite a few of us know how a ship should operate. That’s not the question. If standards were observed, this incident never happens. What we are trying to figure out is why standard procedures were not followed, which ones were failed, or were not followed and why.

What you have trained in and may be imminently qualified in serve you well. You have the luxury of being able to pick when you want to be at sea, within reason, only to go from one place to another, in mostly new equipment, with few, if any, crew to manage, feed, bathe, train. You have no need to concern yourself with weapons systems, underway replenishment, or the requirements of higher authority, among other operational concerns. The standards and procedures the Navy uses serve its needs well when they are understood, and observed. What we are trying to understand is what procedures were not followed in this incident and why. Maybe some require tweaking. Right now, the inquiry seems focused on training.

As you admittedly don’t know and don’t care about the Navy, maybe your involvement in these discussions will be limited.

Jim, there you go again, using logic and stuff.

It doesn't work. You keep forgetting, you are trying to reason with the maven.

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:

I really have no idea how a Navy ship operates.

No foolin’.

quote:

I'm a professional mariner that only knows How any ship SHOULD NAVIGATE. AND, quite frankly I don't really care how a Navy ship operates, so long as I steer clear of them.

Quite a few of us know how a ship should operate. That’s not the question. If standards were observed, this incident never happens. What we are trying to figure out is why standard procedures were not followed, which ones were failed, or were not followed and why.

What you have trained in and may be imminently qualified in serve you well. You have the luxury of being able to pick when you want to be at sea, within reason, only to go from one place to another, in mostly new equipment, with few, if any, crew to manage, feed, bathe, train. You have no need to concern yourself with weapons systems, underway replenishment, or the requirements of higher authority, among other operational concerns. The standards and procedures the Navy uses serve its needs well when they are understood, and observed. What we are trying to understand is what procedures were not followed in this incident and why. Maybe some require tweaking. Right now, the inquiry seems focused on training.

As you admittedly don’t know and don’t care about the Navy, maybe your involvement in these discussions will be limited.

The safety of the crew, ship and others (crew and ship). Should be the most immediate and is the most critical concern on any ship, Navy or otherwise.

The Navy's training on war related activities, might very well be good and fine. But that remains to be seen and is not an involvement in any of these accidents. Both ships DID do an excellent job at damage control.

When you have so many different levels of personal on several ships, making such egregious mistakes. The ENTIRE Navy system needs a complete overhaul in regards to training on the most important item. Safely navigating and running the ship from point A to point B, because that is what that ship is doing most of the time. When the mistakes stem from the Commander down to the lowest level of crewman, on several ships. The issue is the Navy culture and Navy training. There is a severe breakdown in the training. If it was just one ship, one incident, it could go either way.

The war time activities do not effect me, so they do not concern me. The needless loss of life and egregious effects of them running into other (non military) ships, and complete lack on competency do.

What if it was a cruise ship that hit one of the destroyers. Suppose one of the missles or guns lit off from the impact? If it was a cruise ship, full of people, that hit the destroyer, it's chances of sinking would be much higher, so would chances of injury, then it would have been a HUGE mess.

In the course of my business I run all kinds of boats, ships, and yachts. Mostly boats and yachts. But I do also run yachts with passengers with all sorts of medical conditions, ages, as well as crew from time to time. Well, I always have crew on board. Not all of the yachts I run are new or even close to new either. I recently delivered a 60' trawler from the 1980's from Greenport,NY all of the way to Stuart, FL. Fixing systems on a pretty daily basis.

This message has been edited. Last edited by: jimmy123x,

< Voltaire voice >

Pour encourager les autres.

< Voltaire voice >

Apparently, the US Navy decided to skip over selecting Jimmy123x as the new head of Surface Warfare.

Rich is a good guy, vastly experienced, and I hope he is able to rapidly institute change and needed training.


Vice Admiral Richard A. Brown
Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
Commander

Vice Adm. Richard A. Brown is a native of Lowell, Mass. He graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1985 with a Bachelor of Science in Mathematics. He holds a Master of Science in Operations Research from the Naval Post Graduate School and a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.
Brown’s sea tours include navigator and damage control assistant in USS Charles F. Adams (DDG 2); flag lieutenant for commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group 12; operations officer in USS O’Bannon (DD 987); operations officer in USS Leyte Gulf (CG 55); executive officer in USS Mahan (DDG 72); commanding officer, USS The Sullivans (DDG 68); commanding officer, USS Gettysburg (CG 64); and commander, Carrier Strike Group 11.

Every year he commanded a Navy ship, his crew earned the Battle Efficiency Award. In 2009, Gettysburg also earned the Arizona Memorial Trophy.

Ashore, he served as flag secretary for the supreme allied commander Atlantic/commander in chief, United States Joint Forces Command; branch head for surface commander and lieutenant commander assignments, Navy Personnel Command, PERS 410; Strategy and Policy Branch head for Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) N3N5IW; executive assistant to the assistant secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); commanding officer, Surface Warfare Officers School Command and commander, Naval Service Training Command. His most recent assignment was as commander, Navy Personnel Command and deputy chief of Naval Personnel.

Brown assumed the duties as commander, Naval Surface Forces/Naval Surface Force U.S. Pacific Fleet in January 2018.

His personal awards include the Legion of Merit (five awards), the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (two awards), Navy Commendation Medal (five awards) and Navy Achievement Medals (two awards).

quote:

Originally posted by feersum dreadnaught:
Apparently, the US Navy decided to skip over selecting Jimmy123x as the new head of Surface Warfare.

Too bad. They lost the opportunity to have a real expert.

quote:

Originally posted by V-Tail:

quote:

Originally posted by feersum dreadnaught:
Apparently, the US Navy decided to skip over selecting Jimmy123x as the new head of Surface Warfare.

Too bad. They lost the opportunity to have a real expert.

Looks like they chose someone well qualified for the position.

I didn't give them the opportunity! When you get to a certain point in your career, you know you're very successful when you pick and choose who you work for and what you do for them. I've been at that point for quite some time, and no position in the Navy would interest me. Far too much Bureaucratic BS to deal with.

"It is impossible for a man to learn what he thinks he already knows." -- Epictetus

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:
"It is impossible for a man to learn what he thinks he already knows." -- Epictetus

I've found it's much better to answer stupid comments, with equally stupid comments.

I am in no way, shape, or form qualified for that position. But nor would I want it. I love what I do and am fortunate I'm very skilled and qualified at what I enjoy and it comes naturally. It has however, squashed my want to go boating on my time off. But that's ok. I'd rather enjoy OPM (Other People's Money).

So no Chinese hacking?

quote:

Originally posted by Fenris:
So no Chinese hacking?

I highly doubt it.

However, the new "state of the art" yacht I'm running has a system from a company in Germany. I have seen them log in remotely (via internet) and change all sorts of stuff to fix bugs, turn stuff on, turn stuff off, even zoom the chartplotter out, while I was underway. They basically bricked 2 of my 4 Nav screens one time. When they log in, the screen goes to some windows log in screen. But literally if someone hacked the boat, it's quite possible they could get everything up and running. The electronic engine controls are separate, but in some aspect tied into the system. It might be possible to literally put the engines in gear and create all sorts of damage if the main engine keys are left in remote in the engine room (which a lot of people do, I don't). Although I'm not positive. 2- 1950 HP diesels in a 93' yacht could do ALL kinds of damage in a marina that has $1 billion in yachts in it. The yacht is way over-complicated. You need an ipad to put up the blinds, or turn the stereo on and change channels, or other very normal stuff. The only thing that have actual switches as well as being on the ipad are light switches and air condition thermostats.

Pretty scathing commentary about the state of leadership within the Surface Warfare Community by one of the leading Navy bloggers

An Obstinate Organization

quote:

As the former COs of FITZ and MCCAIN get ready for their ordeal, there are a few things we should keep in mind.

They were not the ones who created the conditions that addressed manning shortfalls by cross-decking Sailors neither trained nor qualified for the watches they would stand.

They were not the ones that created the conditions where ships could not get the depot level maintenance they needed, so already short-manned ship’s company would complete that required maintenance out of hide – not doing their primary jobs or getting enough rest.

They were not the ones who so “optimally” manned their ships to the point there was little white-space in the calendar for the COs to fully train and drill their crews.

They were not the ones who were more than happy to deploy ships that demanded 80-100 hr work weeks for weeks and months on end and expected nothing bad would happen on their watch.

They were not the ones who created a culture where self-abuse was a virtue; where professional development and mastery of your craft was seen as an obstacle to ambition.

…and yet, they will be the ones at Courts Martial. They were in command. That comes with the package.

Is it too much to ask for real change as opposed to that sad, slow, and slightly pathetic regression to the mean waiting for all the outcry to fade in the ambient noise past the news-cycle escarpment?

We can do better.

quote:

Originally posted by corsair:
Pretty scathing commentary about the state of leadership within the Surface Warfare Community by one of the leading Navy bloggers

An Obstinate Organization

quote:

As the former COs of FITZ and MCCAIN get ready for their ordeal, there are a few things we should keep in mind.

They were not the ones who created the conditions that addressed manning shortfalls by cross-decking Sailors neither trained nor qualified for the watches they would stand.

They were not the ones that created the conditions where ships could not get the depot level maintenance they needed, so already short-manned ship’s company would complete that required maintenance out of hide – not doing their primary jobs or getting enough rest.

They were not the ones who so “optimally” manned their ships to the point there was little white-space in the calendar for the COs to fully train and drill their crews.

They were not the ones who were more than happy to deploy ships that demanded 80-100 hr work weeks for weeks and months on end and expected nothing bad would happen on their watch.

They were not the ones who created a culture where self-abuse was a virtue; where professional development and mastery of your craft was seen as an obstacle to ambition.

…and yet, they will be the ones at Courts Martial. They were in command. That comes with the package.

Is it too much to ask for real change as opposed to that sad, slow, and slightly pathetic regression to the mean waiting for all the outcry to fade in the ambient noise past the news-cycle escarpment?

We can do better.

they're being thrown under the bus for a situation that they didn't create, that they could not fix (in time), and would have gotten fired if they said anything or made waves to try to fix.

quote:

Originally posted by f2:

quote:

Originally posted by corsair:
Pretty scathing commentary about the state of leadership within the Surface Warfare Community by one of the leading Navy bloggers

An Obstinate Organization

quote:

As the former COs of FITZ and MCCAIN get ready for their ordeal, there are a few things we should keep in mind.

They were not the ones who created the conditions that addressed manning shortfalls by cross-decking Sailors neither trained nor qualified for the watches they would stand.

They were not the ones that created the conditions where ships could not get the depot level maintenance they needed, so already short-manned ship’s company would complete that required maintenance out of hide – not doing their primary jobs or getting enough rest.

They were not the ones who so “optimally” manned their ships to the point there was little white-space in the calendar for the COs to fully train and drill their crews.

They were not the ones who were more than happy to deploy ships that demanded 80-100 hr work weeks for weeks and months on end and expected nothing bad would happen on their watch.

They were not the ones who created a culture where self-abuse was a virtue; where professional development and mastery of your craft was seen as an obstacle to ambition.

…and yet, they will be the ones at Courts Martial. They were in command. That comes with the package.

Is it too much to ask for real change as opposed to that sad, slow, and slightly pathetic regression to the mean waiting for all the outcry to fade in the ambient noise past the news-cycle escarpment?

We can do better.

they're being thrown under the bus for a situation that they didn't create, that they could not fix (in time), and would have gotten fired if they said anything or made waves to try to fix.

Better to quit, than to kill people.

Your #1 job as Captain of the ship is the safety of the crew, the ship, and passangers, in that order. If you feel you cannot fulfill those 3 things, than it's best to quit. I have turned down many jobs over the years due to safety concerns.

At the very least there should have been some emails from the CO to his superior stating the issues he's facing and what is needed to operate the ship properly. There is a major issue in the Navy at least in the Pacific fleet. When you have major issues spread across multiple ships, the issue isn't with that particular ship it's with the entire organization. But where the issue's and lack of training start and stop, I do not know.

quote:

Originally posted by f2:

quote:

Originally posted by corsair:
Pretty scathing commentary about the state of leadership within the Surface Warfare Community by one of the leading Navy bloggers

An Obstinate Organization

quote:

As the former COs of FITZ and MCCAIN get ready for their ordeal, there are a few things we should keep in mind.

They were not the ones who created the conditions that addressed manning shortfalls by cross-decking Sailors neither trained nor qualified for the watches they would stand.

They were not the ones that created the conditions where ships could not get the depot level maintenance they needed, so already short-manned ship’s company would complete that required maintenance out of hide – not doing their primary jobs or getting enough rest.

They were not the ones who so “optimally” manned their ships to the point there was little white-space in the calendar for the COs to fully train and drill their crews.

They were not the ones who were more than happy to deploy ships that demanded 80-100 hr work weeks for weeks and months on end and expected nothing bad would happen on their watch.

They were not the ones who created a culture where self-abuse was a virtue; where professional development and mastery of your craft was seen as an obstacle to ambition.

…and yet, they will be the ones at Courts Martial. They were in command. That comes with the package.

Is it too much to ask for real change as opposed to that sad, slow, and slightly pathetic regression to the mean waiting for all the outcry to fade in the ambient noise past the news-cycle escarpment?

We can do better.

they're being thrown under the bus for a situation that they didn't create, that they could not fix (in time), and would have gotten fired if they said anything or made waves to try to fix.

The rest of that blog is fairly grim reading.

It is hard to imagine that new Ensigns are sent to ships having never been on a bridge before.

~50 years ago, OCS was 18 weeks, and included a fair amount of time on the YPs out on Narragansett Bay in the last phase. Now according to the article, OCS is 12 weeks, and hints that YPs are only at the Academy.

The Navy budget is bigger than ever while more and more money is pissed away on other than fighting at sea.

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:
Here is a description paraphrasing the report on the Fitzgerald’s situation.

quote:

In a report released on 1 November[6] the Navy describes Fitzgerald's course in the half-hour prior to the collision as running 190T (nearly due south), with a speed of 20 knots (37 km/h; 23 mph). At about 01:17 Fitzgerald's OOD (Officer of the Deck, responsible for the ship's course and maneuvering) misjudged the course of ACX Crystal. At 01:25 the OOD noticed ACX Crystal getting closer, and ordered a turn to 240T (that is, to turn to the right and pass behind ACX Crystal), but then rescinded the order. Instead he "ordered an increase to full speed and a rapid turn to the left (port)" (to pass ahead of ACX Crystal), but "these orders were not carried out." At 01:29 the "Bosun Mate of the Watch, a more senior supervisor on the bridge, took over the helm and executed the orders."[7] The Navy has not said what those orders were, nor what transpired on the bridge following the collision at 01:30. Among other failings the Navy says "physical look out duties" were not performed on the starboard (right) side, where ACX Crystal and two other ships were approaching.

This suggests that they knew, and made mistakes. My question is why not call the Captain and let him sort it out? That is ALWAYS the right thing to do in the situation, and probably required by Captain’s Night Orders or whatever they call them, standing orders.

Let's get back on track with the discussion. "these orders were not carried out." That just shouted at me. How can an order given in the Navy under those circumstances not be carried out. And isn't there someone plotting courses in the bridge? I think so; I'm a bilge rat in the engineroom so I don't get to see that.

I can't believe the order was simply dropped given the Order-repeat back order protocol. If the senior enlisted took over because the order was wrong, how come it took 4 minutes for him to execute?

And I don't mind the court martials. it's right and proper.

quote:

Originally posted by Rey HRH:
Let's get back on track with the discussion. "these orders were not carried out." That just shouted at me. How can an order given in the Navy under those circumstances not be carried out. And isn't there someone plotting courses in the bridge? I think so; I'm a bilge rat in the engineroom so I don't get to see that.

I can't believe the order was simply dropped given the Order-repeat back order protocol. If the senior enlisted took over because the order was wrong, how come it took 4 minutes for him to execute?

And I don't mind the court martials. it's right and proper.

Here is the sequence of events in the report...Like you, I don't see an explanation for the orders failing to be carried out at 0127. The Bosun Mate took over the helm 2 minutes later. What was going on? Did the helmsman get confused or did he just flat out refuse to follow the orders?

quote:

Originally posted by Rey HRH:

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:
Here is a description paraphrasing the report on the Fitzgerald’s situation.

quote:

In a report released on 1 November[6] the Navy describes Fitzgerald's course in the half-hour prior to the collision as running 190T (nearly due south), with a speed of 20 knots (37 km/h; 23 mph). At about 01:17 Fitzgerald's OOD (Officer of the Deck, responsible for the ship's course and maneuvering) misjudged the course of ACX Crystal. At 01:25 the OOD noticed ACX Crystal getting closer, and ordered a turn to 240T (that is, to turn to the right and pass behind ACX Crystal), but then rescinded the order. Instead he "ordered an increase to full speed and a rapid turn to the left (port)" (to pass ahead of ACX Crystal), but "these orders were not carried out." At 01:29 the "Bosun Mate of the Watch, a more senior supervisor on the bridge, took over the helm and executed the orders."[7] The Navy has not said what those orders were, nor what transpired on the bridge following the collision at 01:30. Among other failings the Navy says "physical look out duties" were not performed on the starboard (right) side, where ACX Crystal and two other ships were approaching.

This suggests that they knew, and made mistakes. My question is why not call the Captain and let him sort it out? That is ALWAYS the right thing to do in the situation, and probably required by Captain’s Night Orders or whatever they call them, standing orders.

Let's get back on track with the discussion. "these orders were not carried out." That just shouted at me. How can an order given in the Navy under those circumstances not be carried out. And isn't there someone plotting courses in the bridge? I think so; I'm a bilge rat in the engineroom so I don't get to see that.

I can't believe the order was simply dropped given the Order-repeat back order protocol. If the senior enlisted took over because the order was wrong, how come it took 4 minutes for him to execute?

And I don't mind the court martials. it's right and proper.

Let’s not confuse the orders.

The Captain has standing orders, updated daily for the OOD, while the Captain is off the bridge. I call these Captain’s Night Orders. They are written, kept in a folder or notebook, and initialed by each OOD at the start of his watch. They will cover things like notifying the Captain under stated conditions, what expectations are for the next hours, steaming conditions for the night, coirse, speed, any manuevers, hazards to navigation. The Captain wants to be notified if any ship is going to come within stated distances. The OOD must contact him, or her, and report. I heard of a JOOD making the call, and both officers getting a royal reaming because it is for the OOD to call, not the JOOD. Sometimes the Captain is down in the wardroom watching the movie. No matter. You must track him down and give him the report.

I can’t wait to find out why this was not done on Fitzgerald.

The Boatswains Mate of the Watch took over to execute a helm order. Why this became necessary, we can’t say. That is a verbal command from whoever has the conn, usually the OOD, to the helsman at the wheel, to turn, change speed, etc. “Right standard rudder!” Helm replies, “Right standard rudder, aye aye, sir!” Or “All ahead one third,” which is acknowledged and repeated back by the lee helmsman who has the engine controls. These helm commands are noted in the log by the Quartermaster who is keeping the log, at the time. Maybe there was a discussion going on, uncertainty, such that the helmsman did not respond. 4 minutes is a long time. The atmosphere on the bridge of a well run ship ordinarily precludes such confusion. If the OOD has “lost it” I guess anything can happen. That young man is in a heap of trouble now, and not many good explanations. The log only notes commands, not a transcript of discussions.

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:
The log only notes commands, not a transcript of discussions.

We may have discussed this in the previous thread, but wouldn't there be a voyage data recorder with audio of the bridge conversations?