It appears the investigation has been going on for a few years, but I'm curious if the recent damage to the U.S.S. Connecticut submarine from a collision with a seamount in any way influenced this.

Given how expensive these submarines are, presumably their now shortened expected operational life spans, and the risks to their mission, operational status, and to the lives of their crews, the potential sentencing penalties don't strike me as commensurate to the egriegous nature of the crime.

[note: hyperlinks found at linked website article]

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Former director of U.S. Navy’s steel supplier pleads guilty to falsifying strength tests

By Peter Talbot
UPDATED NOVEMBER 08, 2021 3:18 PM

The former director of the U.S. Navy’s leading supplier of cast high-yield steel pleaded guilty Monday to falsifying test results that measure the strength of steel used in Navy submarines.

Elaine Thomas, former director of metallurgy at Bradken Inc., pleaded guilty to major fraud in U.S. District Court. She faces up to 10 years in prison and a $1 million fine. She is to be sentenced Feb. 14.

Bradken’s foundry in Tacoma produces castings that prime contractors use to fabricate submarine hulls, according to a news release from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Washington. The Navy requires that the steel meets certain standards for strength to ensure it doesn’t fail in a collision or under other circumstances.

The Tacoma foundry produced castings for 30 years and was acquired by Bradken in 2008. According to the release, many castings failed lab tests and did not meet the Navy’s standards. Federal prosecutors say Thomas, as director of metallurgy, falsified the tests to hide the fact that the steel had failed the tests.

Thomas falsified results for over 240 productions of steel, according to the release, which represent a substantial percentage of the castings Bradken produced for the Navy.

Court filings indicate there is no evidence that Bradken’s management was aware of the fraud until May 2017, according to the release. At that time, a lab employee discovered that test cards had been altered and that other discrepancies existed in Bradken’s records. In June 2020, Bradken entered into a deferred prosecution agreement, accepting responsibility for the offense and agreeing to take remedial measures.

Bradken also entered into a civil settlement, paying more than $10.8 million to resolve allegations that the foundry produced and sold substandard steel components for installation on U.S. Navy submarines.

The Navy has taken extensive steps to ensure the safe operation of the affected submarines, according to the release. Those measures will result in increased costs and maintenance as the substandard parts are monitored.

This story was originally published November 8, 2021 1:05 PM.

OK. Part of this is on the NAVY for failure to check the strength. I suspect it was just another cozy relationship. Fat Leonard was bad enough, now something that could endanger lives of a sub crew.

It takes a special slime ball to lie and risk the lives of crews for money. Death might best, no cushy Fed. time or fine. Someone might try it again, set an example.

quote:

Originally posted by recoatlift:
It takes a special slime ball to lie and risk the lives of crews for money. Death might best, no cushy Fed. time or fine. Someone might try it again.

Agreed. I might be ok with this potential penalty range for unknowing incompetence and negligence.. but to knowingly falsify this data goes well beyond criminal negligence.

In the old days we had Navy QC inspectors on site IN supplier plants to observe and at times require additional testing. I personally knew this for primary and secondary reactor plant components which I was involved with back in the day. We also did extensive NDT and other testing of components after we took delivery.

Seem to recall that after the disasters that prompted subsafe requirements that similar measures were involved with piping and tubing makers. They had screwed up lying about their products claiming they met the requirements as seamless. The lack of resulting structural integrity caused the loss of life and platform.

Not my area of expertise but I wonder if HY100 steel weld inspections wouldn't have shown some indications of the lack of quality during submarine hull construction.

Selling shoddy steel to the US Navy for nuclear ship should be a death type penalty crime. Bad steel could put the whole country in jeopardy, esp. in a hostile encounter or in war.

quote:

Originally posted by bald1:
In the old days we had Navy QC inspectors on site IN supplier plants to observe and at times require additional testing. I personally knew this for primary and secondary reactor plant components which I was involved with back in the day. We also did extensive NDT and other testing of components after we took delivery.

Seem to recall that after the disasters that prompted subsafe requirements that similar measures were involved with piping and tubing makers. They had screwed up lying about their products claiming they met the requirements as seamless. The lack of resulting structural integrity caused the loss of life and platform.

Not my area of expertise but I wonder if HY100 steel weld inspections wouldn't have shown some indications of the lack of quality during submarine hull construction.

The article I read earlier didn’t specify what the components in question this foundry poured were, hull, power plant, or some other critical use. That article indicated the metallurgist thought the Navy requirement of -100° F was “stupid”. That suggests it was for a charpy v notch (CVN) toughness, from my work experience. If so then in process welding inspections wouldn’t necessarily catch the falsified condition.

For reference, the job I just retired from routinely qualified weld procedures from offshore drilling rigs and similar service requirements, with CVN’s at -40° F. This included pressure vessel grade steels and high tensile steel in the grade ranges similar to HY100. Doable, but we did have to pay attention to details. I would suspect that the foundry would/could meet requirements but doing so would be harder in terms of process control.

My foundry expertise is limited, but from the company website, they listed every required certification. This would indicate both internal and external quality audits and inspections. Also I presume the metallurgist wasn’t a department of one, others knew......

quote:

Originally posted by Modern Day Savage:
goes well beyond criminal negligence.

Hopefully they are digging in to see whether foreign influences were at work.

I can think of several countries that would be glad of us having defective subs.

Tie one of those failed castings to her and drop her into the ocean.

quote:

Originally posted by BGULL:

quote:

Originally posted by bald1:
In the old days we had Navy QC inspectors on site IN supplier plants to observe and at times require additional testing. I personally knew this for primary and secondary reactor plant components which I was involved with back in the day. We also did extensive NDT and other testing of components after we took delivery.

Seem to recall that after the disasters that prompted subsafe requirements that similar measures were involved with piping and tubing makers. They had screwed up lying about their products claiming they met the requirements as seamless. The lack of resulting structural integrity caused the loss of life and platform.

Not my area of expertise but I wonder if HY100 steel weld inspections wouldn't have shown some indications of the lack of quality during submarine hull construction.

The article I read earlier didn’t specify what the components in question this foundry poured were, hull, power plant, or some other critical use. That article indicated the metallurgist thought the Navy requirement of -100° F was “stupid”. That suggests it was for a charpy v notch (CVN) toughness, from my work experience. If so then in process welding inspections wouldn’t necessarily catch the falsified condition.

For reference, the job I just retired from routinely qualified weld procedures from offshore drilling rigs and similar service requirements, with CVN’s at -40° F. This included pressure vessel grade steels and high tensile steel in the grade ranges similar to HY100. Doable, but we did have to pay attention to details. I would suspect that the foundry would/could meet requirements but doing so would be harder in terms of process control.

My foundry expertise is limited, but from the company website, they listed every required certification. This would indicate both internal and external quality audits and inspections. Also I presume the metallurgist wasn’t a department of one, others knew......

I've seen many Charpys fail at -40, in my days making bolting materials for nuclear plant construction (ASME BPV Code Section III). I can imagine the failure rate at -100 is very high. Heat treat, quench, & temper must be perfect as well as certified chemical analysis of the steel. This was all about cutting corners for cost in my view. She wasn't alone in this, I'd bet.

quote:

Originally posted by Modern Day Savage:
It appears the investigation has been going on for a few years, but I'm curious if the recent damage to the U.S.S. Connecticut submarine from a collision with a seamount in any way influenced this.

Unlikely.
If anything, this most recent collision and the more dramatic San Francisco-accident, shows the strength and durability of US sub construction. Both subs suffered bow dome removal and ballast tank damage yet, they were still able to sail (albeit on the surface, bring your Dramamine ) for several days to Guam.

quote:

Given how expensive these submarines are, presumably their now shortened expected operational life spans, and the risks to their mission, operational status, and to the lives of their crews, the potential sentencing penalties don't strike me as commensurate to the egriegous nature of the crime.

Subs are good for 40 years, not sure what info you're reading about shortened lifespans. The new Columbia-class, like the Ohio's they're replacing, is expected to have a service life of 42-years. The improvements will include an updated reactors that will not require a core replacement, this should give each sub another 2-3 additional patrols over the Ohio-class they're replacing.

quote:

Originally posted by joel9507:

quote:

Originally posted by Modern Day Savage:
goes well beyond criminal negligence.

Hopefully they are digging in to see whether foreign influences were at work.

I can think of several countries that would be glad of us having defective subs.

I wasn't going to go there, assuming that investigators would've looked into that.. but, yeah, I considered that possibility too.

quote:

Originally posted by corsair:
...

quote:

Given how expensive these submarines are, presumably their now shortened expected operational life spans, and the risks to their mission, operational status, and to the lives of their crews, the potential sentencing penalties don't strike me as commensurate to the egriegous nature of the crime.

Subs are good for 40 years, not sure what info you're reading about shortened lifespans. The new Columbia-class, like the Ohio's they're replacing, is expected to have a service life of 42-years. The improvements will include an updated reactors that will not require a core replacement, this should give each sub another 2-3 additional patrols over the Ohio-class they're replacing.

Notice that I italicized the word "presumably" in my previous comment, in order to emphasize my presumption. The article indicates that there will be increased maintenance inspections and the associated increased costs that come with those, but I am assuming that sub par steel that fails to meet contract specifications will have a shortened life span.

Depending on how extensively the deficient steel was used in construction and whether the steel is used in a structural application or not, I suppose it's possible that once it reaches it's (shortened) life span, just the deficient steel component(s) might be eventually replaced during preventative maintenance, while still leaving the overall submarines capable of continued service.

I see what you did - presuming is always a tricky one for issues we don't have the full story on. No doubt inspections have increased, this also puts the USN under further scrutiny regarding its maintenance and material sourcing practices. They're already getting a full spotlight regarding its differed maintenance schedules, shipyard disasters & accidents, lack of investment in its own shipyards and readiness.

Navy leadership and lack of Congressional oversight to call the Navy out regarding its over-emphasis on shinny/high-speed ships while ignoring the necessary infrastructure to support such ships like dry-docks, tenders, salvage vessels and most importantly, failing to create a sustainable relationship with the US shipbuilding industry.

Some good commentary on the issue.

Do we need rope weavers and gallows builders or do we just go with guillotines?