quote:

Originally posted by BansheeOne:
- Incidentally, this year's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force of the NATO Response Force (about 5,000 ground troops, currently on five-day notice reduced from seven) is also led by France, so if they get activated in response to a Russian incursion into Ukraine, look for them to move to Romania, too.

- Other elements of the NATO Response Force to watch are last year's VJTF headed by Turkey, still on 30-day standby; and next year's headed by Germany, already on 45-day notice.

Keeping track - the VJTF was down to 48-hour readiness last weekend even before Putin recognized the Ukrainian rebel republics and deployed "peacekeepers" there, with the initial follow-on forces going from 30 to seven days, and the next echelon from 45 to 30.

Today, Germany indicated it may send additional troops to Lithuania on top of the ca. 350 already going; it's being suggested they may be air defense, which the country has wanted for some time. Norway, another partner in eFP Lithuania, is also going to reinforce the company team they're currently providing by a couple dozen soldiers. The nations involved in the Joint Expeditionary Force, led by the UK and including the Netherlands, Nordic and Baltic countries with a focus on maritime and amphibious operations, also announced that the force would shortly exercise across northern Europe.

That's all still scraps being gathered for some ad-hoc show of force. With Russian troops officially moving into Eastern Ukraine and announced to remain in Belarus after the end of current drills there, I expect the current multinational battalion groups on NATO's eastern flank to be upgraded to brigades by the end of next year. If there's any actual shooting in Ukraine, the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act saying that no "substantial" external troops should be regularly based in Eastern Europe certainly will be toast. France, Germany and Poland are already agreed on that.

Sticking to this thread because we should be very clear that all the movements in NATO are not about intervening in what is now officially war in Ukraine rather than preventing spillover onto allied territory. I'm actually surprised that despite NATO officially having activated Crisis Response Measures, the NRF hasn't yet [ETA: it has now while I was posting; my guess is still they're headed for Romania, though exercises in Norway had been previously scheduled].

The US is of course now deploying 7,000 out of the 8,500 troops previously put on alert to Europe. The bulk appears to be 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, which will likely draw pre-positioned equipment in Germany before moving on to Eastern Europe. Earlier, a battalion group of 800 was moved from Italy to the Baltic States, likely from 173rd Airborne Brigade; 300 have been reported to have arrived in Latvia. 20 Apache gunships were also ordered to the region from Germany and abother twelve from Greece, though the transfer appears to be hampered by weather conditions. Six F-35s from a contingent which arrived at Spangdahlem AFB last week were forward-deployed to Estonia, Lithuania and Romania.

Canada is also reinforcing the eFP battlegroup it leads in Latvia with up to 460 troops, including an artillery battery; looking at the similar German movement to Lithuania, this seems to be the general trend. Germany is also sending another company and light anti-air systems to the latter country and standing up an additional battlegroup in Slovakia, starting with 250 soldiers; Patriot missiles are to be deployed, too. A Type 124 air defense frigate is currently preparing to be stationed in the Baltic Sea, to be followed by a Type 130 corvette. Another German frigate will be deployed to the Mediterranean, and another three Eurofighters will join the three already in Romania, along with two A400M tanker aircraft.

Apart from the US, we're still talking three- to low four-digit numbers total for most partners here. An interesting conundrum is that in many European nations, a rather large share of their troops is already tied up in NATO contingency forces and thus not available for deployment unless that specific contingency is implemented. Looking at Germany, a total of 13,700 are earmarked for the 2022-24 NRF cycle alone. Another 3,000 are already deployed abroad; way down from the heyday of the Balkan and Afghanistan missions, but there's still a batch with Mali currently the biggest, also Lithuania, the naval contributions to NATO's four Standing Maritime Groups, etc.

Add national contingency missions like EvacOps as we saw in Kabul, domestic support for civilian authorities like logistical and administrative help during COVID, and the contemporary rather small all-volunteer forces get tight quickly. Though some Nordic countries have re-introduced conscription, I don't see that in Western Europe; if the US and UK didn't keep the draft to defend the Inner-German Border during the Cold War, probably neither will France or Germany go back to it for the Baltic States.

I needed to sit down when I read this.

quote:

Germany's reversal on Ukraine weapons policy 'response to Putin's aggression'

21m ago

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz addressed German lawmakers over a reversal in government policy on supplying Ukraine with weapons. Scholz added that €100 billion in defense spending would be included to the German budget.

As Russia's invasion of Ukraine continues into its fourth day, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz addressed the German Parliament, the Bundestag, on the government's decision to directly supply weapons to Ukrainian troops.

[...]

More defense spending

Scholz said that the German government would allocate €100 billion euros earmarked for the German armed forces, the Bundeswehr, in the 2022 budget. "From "From now on, more than 2% of our GDP will be invested in our defense," Scholz said.

"All of this costs a lot of money. For that, we will set up a special fund for the German armed forces," he added.

[...]

https://m.dw.com/en/germanys-r...ggression/a-60932652

For reference: This year's regular defense budget is 50 billion - up from 33 in 2014 when Russia first attacked Ukraine, but still just about 1.5 percent of the GDP, which has grown almost as fast. So the special funds of 100 billion is nice to address accumulated gaps and obsolescences from previous underfinancing since the end of the Cold War; but the commitment to finally meet and in fact exceed NATO's two-percent target on an annual basis, and even within the original 2024 timeframe (previously it was "well, maybe 2031"), is really the more important step.

After advocating for that through my entire "career" in defense politics, ca. 1997-2017, the better part of a decade of "it's about participation, not budget anyway", "we should look at all of our non-military contributions to global stability, too", "our neighbors don't actually want a Germany with a stronger military than theirs", "we couldn't sensibly spend so much money anyway", it's still hard to believe; and I'm automatically cautioning that the money does indeed need to be spent sensibly, accompanied by some serious structural and procedural reform.

Running an update on NATO troop disposition by country:

Estonia: The UK has increased the local Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup it leads there to the better part of two battalions, including two tank squadrons, artillery, and a half-dozen Apache attack helicopters; call it 1,700 total. Additionally, 300 Danish soldiers recently replaced the French contribution in the regular annual rotation between both countries. The French will probably not return, since they have taken over the lead of an equivalent battlegroup in Romania. NATO air policing is currently conducted by six American F-15s, four Belgian F-16s, four French Mirage 2000, and two each US and UK F-35s.

Latvia: Canada also doubled its contribution to the local eFP battlegroup it leads to about 900 troops, including artillery. I'm unclear about any reinforcements from the other contributors (mainly Italy, Spain and Poland); total should also be close to 2,000. Seperately, the US has deployed a battalion of up to 800 troops from 173rd Airborne Brigade out of Italy.

Lithuania: With the imminent deployment of Ozelot short-range air-defense systems and radars, the German contingent to the local eFP battlegroup will be close to 1,200, including artillery and a detached marine company based at the port of Klaipeda. The Dutch and Norwegian contributions have been increased to 350 and 200 respectively; there is also a Czech air defense unit of a little under 150.

Separately, a detachment of 500 from US 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division has reinforced the 400 from 1st ABCT, 1st ID who were already there on a regular European rotation. I understand that elements of NATO's VJTF rapid reaction force have also been deployed for a total of 4,000 allied troops in the country, which sits across the critical Suwalki Gap between Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. A dozen American Apaches deployed from Greece are probably also based here. Air policing currently conducted by four each Danish and Polish F-16s and two US F-35s.

Poland: The bulk of about 14,000 US troops deployed to Europe has or will probably be going here after drawing pre-positioned equipment in Germany, including the early arrivals from 82nd Airborne Division and the remainder of 1st ABCT, 3rd ID; also another 20 Apaches moved from Germany. They reinforce the local eFP battlegroup of about 1,200 American and 150 each British and Romanian troops.

The UK also sent 350 Royal Marines and 100 personnel operating their brand-new Sky Sabre air defense system in addition to 100 engineers who were already in-country before the current crisis. Eight American F-15s also deployed; additionally, German Eurofighters are flying CAPs out of Rostock near the Polish border.

Slovakia: A new NATO battlegroup is being stood up under lead of the neighboring Czechs who will provide about 600 troops. Also 700 Germans, most of which will however operate three Patriot missile squadrons jointly with 200 Dutch; a German infantry company is already in-country for the ground element. Other contributions will be 400 Americans and 100 each Polish and Slovenians.

Hungary has been reluctant about basing NATO troops due to PM Viktor Orban's close relationship with Putin (he had just returned from a visit to Moscow literally on the eve of the attack on Ukraine, when his defense minister still claimed Russia was just joing on a peacekeeping mission in the separatist areas). However, they recently cleared the way to station them at least in the Western part of the country, and are listed as hosts for the new battlegroups in recent NATO decisions. Currently a detachment of 200 from US 2nd Cavalry Regiment out of Germany is deployed here.

Romania: As noted, France had already decided to take the lead of a local NATO battlegroup even before recent decisions. Currently, about 900 troops of US 2nd Cavalry Regiment from Germany and most of this year's French-led VJTF are deployed here. NATO air policing conducted by eight American F-15s, eight Italian and six German Eurofighters respectively, and two US F-35s, supported by American KC-135 tankers deployed to Greece and two German A400M tankers.

Bulgaria like Hungary had long been reluctant about NATO troops due to traditional close relations with Russia, until the latter told them they shouldn't host them. The coming battlegroup will reportedly include 150 British troops, and talks are ongoing with Italy. Spain has deployed four Eurofighters for air policing, which will be joined by two Dutch F-35s next month.

Most of that is a continuation of the "as many allies as possible to have skin in any place" approach; I'd rather have NATO begin to clean up the hodgepodge in favor of combat-effective units with as few partners as possible in each country. Concentrate the British effort on Estonia rather than parceling company-sized elements out to Poland and Bulgaria; the Czechs in Lithuania should really go to Slovakia now that their country is taking the lead there, rather than the German company cross-deployed instead of further reinforcing the battlegroup we're leading up north. If the Italians go to Bulgaria, they should pull out of Latvia. And so on.

Also taking the opportunity to list some early decisions on the German defense posture after the recent unexpected opening of the money faucet. Though as always I'll caution that the budget needs to be fully authorized before it can be spent; after the initial big bang, the usual political haggling has already set in, with some in the ruling coalition complaining they were taken by surprise when Chancellor Olaf Scholz made the announcement, the conservative opposition making it clear they expect something in return if they help enshrining the special funds of 100 billion Euro in the constitution, etc.

- The very first decision was reverting the selection for replacing the aging Tornado fighter-bombers in the nuclear delivery and electronic warfare role with F-18 Super Hornets and EA-18G Growlers to a mix of 35 F-35s and 15 Eurofighters in a yet-to-be-developed ECR variant, total worth about 15 billion Euro. While the former will probably speed up things as unlike the Super Hornet, the F-35 is already certified for delivery of the current B61 bomb variant under NATO's nuclear participation scheme, industry still needs to show they can deliver on the latter.

- The second batch of the Puma infantry fighting vehicle, originally planned to be ordered this year but postponed for budget reasons, is back on. This means the last four of nine mechanized infantry battalions still equipped with the tired old Marder IFV will get their replacements, too.

- The vendor for the fire support variant of the Boxer wheeled APC, intended to replace the Wiesel airborne weapons carrier in the heavy companies of Jäger battalions has been selected, and the number of vehicles to be ordered has reportedly been increased. This may indicate that plans to build up the German contingent of the joint French-German Brigade into a full brigade of its own - possibly a medium formation like US Stryker brigades - are going ahead. Of course that will also need warm bodies for manning, but unsurprisingly the Ukraine war has led to increased interest to enlist among those both with and without prior service; so there may be hope of reaching the 2031 overall force target of 203,000 yet.

- The plan to rebuild conventional warfare capabilities after the 2014 Ukraine crisis ushered in the end of the expeditionary age previously was to have a mechanized brigade fully deployable with organic capabilities from a cold start by 2023, a division by 2027, and a corps by 2031. The 2027 target has now been brought forward to 2025, which will need an accelerated increase of capabilities downgraded when the wave of the future was chasing sandal warriors around sandy places - particularly artillery and mobile air defense.

- Per reports from today, Germany is investigating acquisition of the Israeli Arrow 3 missile defense system, including three "Super Green Pine" radars which could also cover neighboring countries from the Baltic States to Romania (though they would need their own launch sites). Since it would be off the shelf, it could allegedly be operational by 2025, though the process is at a very early stage and media reports are typically confused; they mentioned "Iron Dome", which is of course an entirely different system.

Overall by the pre-election memo on necessary modernization issues the 100 billion number is reportedly based upon, some other projects which can be expected to be addressed include:

- 20 billion alone to rebuild ammunition stocks to Cold War levels.

- Five billion for a new transport helicopter to replace the clapped-out fleet of CH-53Gs from the 70s; a selection between the CH-47F and CH-53K has been running for years, put on hold, restarted, suspended again as too expensive, etc.

- Three billion for Digitization of Land-Based Operations, not least cross-sectional introduction of encrypted radios so far used mostly by special forces. The standard hand-held set remains the SEM 52, which was considered an outdated piece of junk when I was in 30 years ago.

- Two billion for new warships.

- 600 million for upgrading the Patriot missile system.

- A total of 34 billion for various multinational projects: next-generation main battle tanks, fighter jets and UAVs in cooperation with France, new frigates and landing platforms with the Netherlands, improved submarines with Norway, a new artillery and ammunition system with the UK, the TWISTER system against hypersonic missiles, strategic airlift capabilities, a "combat cloud", etc.

quote:

Originally posted by BansheeOne:
- Three billion for Digitization of Land-Based Operations, not least cross-sectional introduction of encrypted radios so far used mostly by special forces. The standard hand-held set remains the SEM 52, which was considered an outdated piece of junk when I was in 30 years ago.

One of the major takeaways from the Russian debacle in Ukraine should be to highlight the vulnerability of older communication systems to interference and interception, and underline the importance of robust, encrypted radio communication capabilities.

Russia's outdated communications technology has clearly been shown as one of several primary shortcomings of their military.

Thank you Banshee. Your explanations and data were very interesting.

This message has been edited. Last edited by: BB61,

Banshee, what’s going on with the Bundeswehr rifle debacle?

Have they figured out who is building the new assault rifle to replace the H&K G36 now that Haenel is out?

Haenel appealed the decision. They already lost one appeal to the government trade regulation office, but are still pursuing another appeal through the court system. The courts' ruling is expected next Wednesday, April 6th.

Source: https://www.lahrer-zeitung.de/...7d-083a2144f63c.html


If Haenel's appeals fail, the plan is for the Bundeswehr rifle contract to be awarded to the HK 416A8.

Frankly, a new service rifle is about the least important modernization issue. It would be nice to have, but the "scandal" over the G36 which led to the replacement decision was mostly in the political realm rather than based upon field experience, and boiled down to "don't use an assault rifle in the LMG role which wasn't specified for it". Troops continue to trust it, and if you ask infantry types, they'd rather have modern carrier vests for everyone rather than most being stuck with belt-and-suspender pouch systems from the 90s. In the end you're replacing one piston 5.56 mm rifle with another, and while a personal weapon is an important item to the individual soldier, its overall effect on the battlefield pales in comparison to other systems.

There are long-standing bigger items, like the lack of artillery and air defense. There are a total of just twelve self-propelled howitzer and four MLRS batteries left (including reserve), just about enough to support a single division in high-intensity combat. All the mobile air defense remaining is a dozen Ozelot vehicles firing Stinger, broadly akin to the American Avenger system, and transfered to the air force in the last reform at that. Despite a 50 percent increase of the defense budget since 2014, there are the effects of decades of penny-pinching on mundane items which however really keep an armed force rolling to revert, from winter clothing to spares to ammunition. Example: the stock of AMRAAM air-to-air missiles was not getting checked for extended use since they were going to be replaced by the new Meteor anyway; except introduction of the latter was also delayed for cost reasons, so at one point there were just ca. 20 AMRAAMs not deadlined. That would have been a short war.

It's going to be interesting how fast the deficits can be corrected. Just before the invasion of Ukraine there was an unsolicited offer for an all-inclusive package worth 42 billion by Rheinmetall with all the armored vehicles, air defense systems, light and heavy transport vehicles, CH-53K (as local partner of Lockheed Martin) and ammunition you need. Lead time allegedly 6-12 months for the latter, 12-18 for wheeled vehicles, 24 for tracked if they go from single to three production shifts. I suspect this is the basis for the 2027 target of a fully equipped deployable mechanized division being moved forward to 2025. Anything that comes afterwards will involve systems currently under development with multinational partners, which were never expected to enter service before 2030 and probably can't be accelerated much even if you throw lots of money at them.

This message has been edited. Last edited by: BansheeOne,

Wow

Is this all on Merkel?

It’s insane how Germany’s military readiness and strength was allowed to wither away like that.

This is on every German government since 1993 when we first dropped under the two-percent share of GDP for defense spending, because everyone wanted to reap that peace dividend and pay the one-trillion Mark cost of German reunification. So the last three chancellors, with the involvement of any political party but the left and right fringe, since the latter were never part of a national government coalition. The current administration would have continued that - in fact they were planning to reduce spending again - if they hadn't been hit over the head with a hypersonic clue stick even before they had really settled down after their election.

The nadir was reached under Merkel, but also the turnaround after the first Ukraine crisis in 2014. In fact I think Germany had the fastest-growing defense budget in NATO during the last seven years, from 33 to 50 billion Euros; it's just that we were still working our way up to what it would need to sustain adequate forces year-on-year (the two-percent target currently translates to somewhere beyond 60 billion), before even addressing the deficits accumulated over the previous quarter-century. Hence the pre-election memo quoting the necessary back investment at 100 billion, which got turned into official policy overnight when Ukraine hit (again).

Admittedly we could only react so massively to this and various other crises in the last two decades (subprime/Euro, refugees, Corona, what have you) because of a very conservative fiscal policy including a constitutionally mandated balanced budget in normal times. Once you pull some of those stops out, the spigots open really good. In the case of defense though I would have preferred maintaining a level that wouldn't have made such a drastic response necessary. But of course everyone thinks their particular pet issue is more important than others, and it probably needed Ukraine for such a fundamental change to the German popular reluctance towards military issues from the last decades.

Banshee:

Thanks as always for all the updates pertaining to Germany. You mentioned you were in the Bundeswehr 30 years ago this time? I think we were both in our countries respective military at the exact same timeframe and I was over there in your country.

Was in the US Army's 3rd Inf Division: 4th Bn, 3rd Air Defense Artillery at Larson Barracks in Kitzingen (the locals called it "Flak Kaserne") from late 1991 to late 1995. We went to Putlos Bundeswehr Training Area in Oldenburg in Holstein (near Denmark) once a year for live-fire of our Stinger missiles and Bradleys.

German partnership unit was PzFlakBtl 12 in Hardheim:

I was a bit of a military vagabond because I couldn't decide on a career track. Got drafted into a field artillery battalion in Schwalmstadt, Hesse in July 1992, but only so I could be paid according to the West German payscale as I was immediately detached for basic training as a medic in Halle/Saale, Saxony-Anhalt in the first West-East German recruit swap; back then it felt a little like being deployed abroad directly upon enlistment. Then my previous application as an officer candidate in military police got through, and I got to do basic training all over again in Celle, Lower Saxony. Of course then I found I wasn't cut for this and got to serve out the remainder of my regular twelve months of conscription as a medic at the MP battalion's HQ company in Hannover. Then four years later I went back for a voluntary reserve spell with Operative Information in Mayen, Rhineland-Palatinate; the irony being I liked it so much that I probably would have stayed in if I had started out there. As it is, I got to grace five bases with my attendance over a total service time of less than 13 months.

The Putlos/Todendorf range still exists, and the attendant base today houses the Luftwaffe's Air Defense Group 61, doing SHORAD and C-RAM under a joint command with the Dutch; it's their Ozelots and radars currently deploying to Lithuania. Army air defense as noted is completely gone, and will urgently have to be rebuilt. There was actually a suggestion to refurbish 50 of the good old Gepard SPAAGs which remain in industry stocks, and either put them back in German service or deliver them to Ukraine; otherwise Romania has taken over most of the fleet with Stinger launchers added to the 35 mm guns, and has deployed some to the US-led eFP battlegroup in Poland, running air defense for 2nd Cavalry Regiment there. The Bundeswehr is more likely to get the Oerlikon Skyranger system on a Boxer chassis though. Rheinmetall recently presented a variant combining a 30 mm gun with missiles and a high-energy laser for anti-drone work. Will be interesting to see how that works out.

At this point it looks like there are no additional allied deployments beyond the planned buildup of new NATO battlegroups in the Southeast. After Slovakia gave their battalion's worth of S-300 surface-to-air missiles to Ukraine, the US moved another Patriot battery there on top of the Dutch and two German ones which are part of the local NATO presence; otherwise I'm mostly seeing aircraft detachments cycling through. The UK replaced their Apache flight in Estonia with a couple AgustaWestland Wildcat utility helicopters, and sent six Typhoon fighters to Romania relieving their previous eight Italian and six German counterparts; they also seem to count eight more deployed to Cyprus into their Southern Air Policing effort. The Dutch also replaced the previous Spanish F-18s in Bulgaria with four F-35s as planned.

quote:

Originally posted by BansheeOne:
It would be nice to have, but the "scandal" over the G36 which led to the replacement decision was mostly in the political realm rather than based upon field experience, and boiled down to "don't use an assault rifle in the LMG role which wasn't specified for it". Troops continue to trust it, and if you ask infantry types, they'd rather have modern carrier vests for everyone rather than most being stuck with belt-and-suspender pouch systems from the 90s.

Meanwhile some decisions are being made for German procurement even before this year's budget and the special funds of 100 billion have passed parliament (and unsurprisingly, some insecurity remains about the whole thing as everyone hasn't just given up on the usual games to sharpen their respective political profile). Among the first was the important mundane; 2.36 billion are to be spent on equipping every swinging dick (and pair of tits) with the planned next-generation battle raffle including body armor/load bearing systems, helmets, backpacks and clothing over the next four years. By previous plans, about a quarter of the forces would have been equipped within that timeframe. The Bundestag's budget committee actually authorized that retroactively, so political sensibilities have not yet overriden the current sense of urgency.

The selection for the future heavy transport helicopter is reported to be finally made on 26/27 April. There is a lot of current advertizing by the Lockheed/Rheinmetall team that the CH-53K can be delivered out of the ongoing production for the USMC from 2025, that it already has a certified air refueling system per German requirements while the CH-47F would first have to be fitted with the one from the G variant, and that it can auto-fold to the footprint of the current CH-53G. Not sure if that is preparing for the choice expected to go their way or a last-minute attempt to revert a decision for the Chinook due to considerations of NATO fleet synergy effects, like with the F-35. The just-established Boeing/Airbus team is rather quiet by comparison.

In other industrial advertizing, the surface-to-air variant of the IRIS-T air-to-air missile has long been suggested to complement Patriot in the Luftwaffe, initially as a low-cost secondary missile to PAC-3 within the future MEADS system, which however seems to have died from procrastination. With recent events, IRIS-T SLM appears slated for procurement anyway as the government asked domestic industry for anything that could be brought into service quickly, if necessary by redirecting orders from foreign governments. Diehl Defence and Hensoldt have now announced that a configuration developed for a "Mediterranean" customer could be delivered from the third quarter of this year if the decision is made, possibly supplemented by elements of the shorter-ranged SLS system variant already in Swedish service.

Apropos of Mediterranean, the sale of the Arrow 3 missile defense system to Germany has reportedly been okayed by both Israel and the US which contributed some of the tech, though the actual decision to procure has not been made yet. Meanwhile on the Army side the plan seems to be rebuilding mobile air defense within the artillery battalions, which are to be increased from four to nine (so probably one for each of the five mechanized, the mountain and the future medium brigade planned to be built up from the German contingent of the French-German Brigade, plus two divisional ones).

Also, a minor element that has been in the making for some time: The Bundeswehr will re-establish a dedicated long range reconnaissance company of 210 personnel, expected to be operational by 2025 due to selection and training standards. During the Cold War, there was one such company in each of the three army corps; from 1996, they were transformed into one instruction and one special forces reconnaissance company under the KSK. The latter was eventually turned into another full-on commando company, the former disbanded in 2015 - in typical fashion just before the value of the capability in the reorientation towards national and alliance defense was rediscovered. Currently, only one platoon remains in each of the two airborne regiments, which will form the base for the new company.

quote:

Originally posted by BansheeOne:
Well they mentioned there was an eight-year runup (so probably from 2019 to 2027) in which Russia had already taken all of Ukraine and the Baltic States (apparently without NATO putting up a fight over the latter despite the aforementioned tripwire forces there*). Both sides also invested in new technologies like lasers and quantum computing. So it can be assumed the Russian forces improved both in quantity and quality over today.

* A possible scenario would of course be that Russia launched hard-to-counter hybrid warfare involving the substantial Russian minority in two of the three states, and/or the dreaded cold-start attack - their 76th Air Assault Division is based just 20 miles from the Estonian border in Pskov, and the Suwalki Gap between their heavily militarized exclave of Kaliningrad and friendly Belarus is only 40 across - and NATO was averse to risking escalation to nuclear war over three small hard-to-retake countries.

.


How many tank Battalions left in the Bundeswehr?

Seven, including one semi-active. Previously there were just four active and two semi-active, but in 2016 PzBtl 414 was fully activated with the inclusion of a Dutch company; this represents the last heavy armor of the Netherlands which had planned to give up the capability entirely before the original Ukraine conflict in 2014, and now are leasing 18 Leopard 2s from the German fleet. As part of Dutch-German military integration, the entire battalion is operatively subordinated to NLD 43rd Mechanized Brigade, which in turn comes under GER 1st Panzer Division.

In 2019 an additional battalion was activated with PzBtl 363, drawing on the active parts of (Mountain) PzBtl 8 from Mountain Brigade 25 which remains on semi-active status. Right now the various battalion types are still spread around the brigades somewhat randomly due to political basing considerations, as the thought was that packages would be formed for expeditionary warfare anyway. The future five mechanized brigades are supposed to have one tank, two mechanized infantry (on Puma IFV) and one Jäger (on Boxer wheeled APC) battalion each, plus 414 in NLD 43rd and 8 in Mountain Brigade 25.

Equipment is currently a mix of Leopard 2 A6, A6M (improved mine protection) and A7V; for VJTF 2023, the Israeli Trophy active protection system is being added to some of the latter. The fleet is planned to be brought to a common standard until 2026, before it will hopefully be replaced by the joint French-German Main Ground Combat System from 2035 or so - unless it falls apart like so many multinational defense procurement projects.

quote:

Originally posted by BansheeOne:
(Mountain) PzBtl 8 from Mountain Brigade 25

Ya'll have tanks that can climb mountains?!

Dang.

Teutonic engineering really is next level.


()

The use a dozen goats to drive the treads. Six to a side.

They are pretty badass unless you yell at them, and the tank falls over.

It's the source of endless jokes of course ...

Back when in the 80s, this was established as the divisional tank battalion of 1st Mountain Division (hence the single-digit number 8, common to all of those formation's divisional units) - which by then actually only had a single mountain brigade besides two mechanized ones, as the Alps on the border with Austria were considered of secondary importance in potential defense against Warsaw Pact troops. But branch traditions must be kept, so in good endless military compound German you got a Gebirgsdivision with a Gebirgsartillerieregiment, a Gebirgspanzerbataillon, a Gebirgspionierbataillon, etc.

They were really bog-standard units, and the tank battalion would have supported the mountain brigade in flatter terrain where it was much more likely to fight. Same as today, really; in truth most of the German "light" infantry troops have long been quasi-mechanized as the Bundeswehr was expected to meet the armored red hordes on a highly cultivated battlefield that might quickly turn nuclear, with few major wooded and mountainous areas to defend. Post-Cold War, the mountain troops were expected to deploy to areas with general difficult terrain, from the Arctic to desert environments like the current mission in Mali.

In the current brigade, one line battalion is mounted on Boxer wheeled APCs and two on BV 206 all-terrain vehicles. They do retain a pack animal unit providing the traditional mules and Haflingers though, and each battalion has a dedicated alpine platoon trained in climbing, skiing, etc. There's actually a recent new focus on horse-mounted patrols in restricted terrain, so not everything that's old is gone.

(Cue flashy video.)

To finish the German rearmament arc: after some partisan games, the government coalition and the Conservatives agreed on the 100 billion special funds. Yesterday parliament voted to authorize it 593:80, and 567:96 for putting it into the constitution with that specific purpose. It has also been clarified that this will not come on top of the regular defense budget being raised to two percent of the GDP, but to reach that target quickly over the average of the next five years. Which is not what was generally understood from the original announcement; but just six months ago everyone in the community would have been ecstatic merely at the two-percent target being reached this year rather than, maybe, in 2031, so hardly anyone's complaining. Intended distribution:

- 40.9 billion for air systems: F-35 for the nuclear delivery role, a yet-to-be-developed Eurofighter electronic warfare variant to replace the rest of the Tornado fighter-bomber fleet, some booster money for the French-German 6th generation Future Combat Air System project, P-8 maritime patrol aircraft (and apparently twelve instead of the originally planned five) to replace the current P-3C, 60 CH-47F to replace the 50-year-old CH-53G, a lot more H145M light utility helicopters, arming the Heron TP drones, a gamut of ground-based air defense against anything from drones to ballistic missiles, the TWISTER European space-based early warning system, space surveillance, radars and comms.

- 20.7 billion for Command, Control, Communications and Computers in various projects: Digitalization of Land-Based Operations (DLBO), a Tactical Wide Area Network (TAWAN), extending SATCOMBw, a German Mission Network for deployments abroad including naval, a data center network, more PRC-117G encrypted radios off the shelf.

- 19.3 billion for naval systems: four F126 general-purpose frigates, five more K130 corvettes, two of the U212 submarine's CD variant jointly developed with Norway, multi-purpose combat boats for the naval infantry, new RHIBs, IDAS sub-to-air missile, Future Naval Strike Missile, SONIX underwater detection system.

- 16.6 billion for land systems: more booster money for the French-German Main Ground Combat System project to replace the Leopard 2, Leclerc and possibly Italian Ariete main battle tanks, upgrading all Puma infantry fighting vehicles to the standard of those to be deployed with NATO's speartip force, replacement for remaining Marders (possibly 100 more Puma and 290 Boxer wheeled IFVs), Boxer fire support vehicle to replace the Wiesel weapons carrier in the heavy companies of light infantry battalions, successor for remaining Fuchs APCs (more Boxers, or something else?), successors for Wiesel and the Wolf 4x4 in their airborne role jointly with the Netherlands, and for the BV 206 all-terrain veicle of the mountain troops jointly with the Brits, Dutch and Swedes, new mobile field hospitals.

- Two billion for new clothing and personal equipment (already underway): more night vision goggles, noise-cancelling headphones, helmets (Galvion Batlskin Viper), modular body armor and load-bearing system (MOBAST) and all-climate battle dress sets, ballistic underwear and backpacks (Snigel 110 liters), new boots.

- Half a billion for AI research and development, particularly for navigation under NAVWAR conditions (degraded electronic aids) and surveillance of big areas.

The restocking of ammunition that has been quoted at 20 billion is reportedly to be paid from the regular budget, as will be further development of FCAS and MGCS with France beyond the sums allocated from the special funds.