quote:

Originally posted by RHINOWSO:
Yeah, fast and loose with a nearly $2BN warship is no way to go through life.

Congratulations, Commander Kill Joy, you done ruinated the whole point of joining the Navy.

quote:

Originally posted by Rey HRH:

quote:

Originally posted by corsair:

quote:

Originally posted by Rey HRH:

It could have been just luck of the draw as far the watch rotation is concerned. If you're qualified as OOD, then you're qualified as OOD. It does seem the punishment meted takes into account some mitigating factors that the prosecutor even brought up.

I'm expecting the skipper to pay the full price.

I don't want to see anyone's career ruined but there has to be consequences when sailors die.

Just because you're qualified doesn't make you competent. It should be however, as we've seen this JO froze during the moment of truth. Failed to call the CO and allowed all hell to break loose. The other two JO's in CIC were also equally useless with their own inaction. As one commentary posted elsewhere: It's as if, the parents left one of the kids to watch the other children, and when something bad happened, they all conspired to not say anything when the parents show up responding to the loud noise. Not a single LPO or, CPO stepped-in to do something.

There's a lot of training problems, much of it likely points back to the school house, personal manning, and over-bearing amount of admin bureaucracy vs training. The decision makers that led to this are long gone unfortunately, a few more stars should be added to the fire.

Except are you coming at this from a military point of view?

To qualify for a watch station, you have a qual card that lists the specific items that must be signed off by the individual instructors training you. For some stations, there's even a final board/test. You're either qualified or not. If someone is signed off as qualified, they are.

Besides which, there are other members in the team who are also qualified for their stations. So, it's not like the OOD was just by herself. This allows for integrating newly qualified people into watch teams. They're still qualified but they have also more experienced people on the team.

We know how it SHOULD be done. However, there's clearly a culture of rot in which sailors/officers aren't very good at their jobs. Not to mention the term 'gun decking' is a relevant term. Who's training and over-seeing the trainers?
This ship also didn't have a quartermaster for 2-years leading up to this, while not a pivot-point to this incident, does point to a larger issue with manning which leads to detailers and the CO. Squeaky wheel gets the grease, how squeaky was this CO to PERS and his higher-ups?

quote:

Originally posted by Rey HRH:

quote:

Originally posted by corsair:

quote:

Originally posted by Rey HRH:

It could have been just luck of the draw as far the watch rotation is concerned. If you're qualified as OOD, then you're qualified as OOD. It does seem the punishment meted takes into account some mitigating factors that the prosecutor even brought up.

I'm expecting the skipper to pay the full price.

I don't want to see anyone's career ruined but there has to be consequences when sailors die.

Just because you're qualified doesn't make you competent. It should be however, as we've seen this JO froze during the moment of truth. Failed to call the CO and allowed all hell to break loose. The other two JO's in CIC were also equally useless with their own inaction. As one commentary posted elsewhere: It's as if, the parents left one of the kids to watch the other children, and when something bad happened, they all conspired to not say anything when the parents show up responding to the loud noise. Not a single LPO or, CPO stepped-in to do something.

There's a lot of training problems, much of it likely points back to the school house, personal manning, and over-bearing amount of admin bureaucracy vs training. The decision makers that led to this are long gone unfortunately, a few more stars should be added to the fire.

Except are you coming at this from a military point of view?

To qualify for a watch station, you have a qual card that lists the specific items that must be signed off by the individual instructors training you. For some stations, there's even a final board/test. You're either qualified or not. If someone is signed off as qualified, they are.

Besides which, there are other members in the team who are also qualified for their stations. So, it's not like the OOD was just by herself. This allows for integrating newly qualified people into watch teams. They're still qualified but they have also more experienced people on the team.

If the instructor isn’t properly trained and qualified then what good is the qualification? There are serious issues in the entire culture from the top down.

Worst nightmare for the Navy. I thought for sure they would offer a plea deal to avoid this. I guess that could still happen.\

https://www.washingtontimes.co...tm_content=newsalert

USS Fitzgerald commander says Navy staged public smear campaign in deadly collision
Critics say top brass were well aware of operational readiness problems long before crashes

The Navy commander facing court-martial for a deadly collision last year in the Pacific that sparked major questions about the Navy’s leadership and readiness of the fleet is not going down without a fight.

The defense team for Cmdr. Bryce Benson, who commanded the USS Fitzgerald when it collided with Philippine-flagged shipping vessel off Japan last June, killing seven sailors, is digging in against charges of negligent homicide and other violations of military law and is accusing the Navy of prejudicing the case against its client.

Cmdr. Benson’s decision to plead not guilty and to sharply contest the charges, amid claims that top service brass are seeking to try the case in the court of public opinion, will likely bring more bad news for the sea service, which is already reeling from the fallout of a string of deadly and embarrassing missteps last year. The looming courtroom fight also may provide fuel for simmering frustrations among the Navy’s rank and file with the direction of the service’s leadership under Adm. John Richardson, chief of naval operations.

In a surprisingly confrontational one-page public statement released last week, Lt. Cmdr. Justin Henderson, the head of Cmdr. Benson’s legal team, said the Navy’s leadership has participated in a public smear campaign against his client.

The Navy’s top brass “have repeatedly used public forums to assign guilt, foreclose legitimate defenses and cast unwarranted aspersions” on Cmdr. Benson’s reputation as a Navy officer, Cmdr. Henderson wrote.

“Rather than achieving accountability, the Navy’s strategy harms the very system of justice that is designed to protect sailors,” he said of comments made by service leaders, including Adm. Richardson and Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Bill Moran.

“Subverting this [legal] process through extratribunal statements only undermines fundamental fairness and erodes public confidence in the entire military justice system,” he added.

Although prosecutors have yet to file formal charges against Cmdr. Benson, including a possible charge of negligent homicide, the Navy officer will plead not guilty once the charges are officially filed, Cmdr Henderson told The Washington Times on Monday.

Navy brass rarely, if ever, mentioned Cmdr. Benson or other officers accused of negligence and command misconduct by name during media briefings on the service’s efforts to address training and operational shortfalls in the Pacific. But the implications from comments of top Navy leaders over who was responsible for the incidents involving the USS Fitzgerald and the USS McCain were made clear in no uncertain terms.

A 7th Fleet statement in August announcing that the commander was being relieved read in part, “The collision was avoidable and both ships demonstrated poor seamanship. Within the Fitzgerald, flawed … teamwork and inadequate leadership contributed to the collision that claimed the lives of seven Fitzgerald sailors, injured three more and damaged both ships.”

A Navy investigation later found Cmdr. Benson was sleeping when the bow of a Philippines-flagged container ship collided with the side of his ship. He suffered what has been described as a “traumatic brain injury” from the impact and was left clinging to the side of the ship for 15 minutes before the crew rescued him.

Two months after the incident with the Fitzgerald, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS McCain collided with an oil tanker off the coast of Singapore, resulting in the deaths of 10 sailors.

The pair of accidents, the two deadliest noncombat incidents at sea for the Navy in years, prompted a worldwide 48-hour stand-down of all Navy operations.

Wide-ranging review

Vice Adm. Thomas Rowden, who headed the 7th Fleet’s command in the Pacific, was forced into early retirement in January. A number of senior officers and sailors were fired or faced disciplinary charges under Commander Task Force 70, the unit within the Navy’s 7th Fleet where the McCain and Fitzgerald were assigned.

But top officials at the Navy Yard went further. Adm. Richardson called for a pair of wide-ranging Navy reviews initiated in the wake of the Fitzgerald and McCain incidents. One focused explicitly on the Pacific’s 7th Fleet and another was conducted servicewide. Both reviews found several failings in Navy crew preparedness and ability to carry out the most basic seagoing activities during service operations.

It was the initiation of the Pacific-wide and servicewide reviews that irked current and former Navy officers and sailors, already exasperated by leadership’s handling of the situation, sources told The Washington Times.

The reviews ordered by Adm. Richardson — particularly the one focusing on the 7th Fleet — were criticized as unnecessary and a way of undermining the fleet’s leadership because the fleet’s operational chain of command already had issued disciplinary actions and dismissals.

“There is a difference between the operators and the administrators,” a Navy source said. “And the [chief of naval operations] is not part of the operational chain of command” of the 7th Fleet.

Critics said the reviews were disingenuous because top Navy officials were well aware of operational readiness problems long before the crashes.

Shortly after the stand-down order was issued, Tom Callender, who once was in charge of capabilities for the office of the deputy undersecretary of the Navy, reached out to former colleagues in uniform to get a read on the situation. The majority of the officers and sailors with whom he spoke said the deadly collisions were no surprise, he told The Times.

“There were warnings,” said Mr. Callender, now a senior defense fellow at the conservative Heritage Foundation. He said the warnings went unnoticed or unheeded by senior Navy brass.

The decision-makers at headquarters in Washington “were so far removed from the waterfront that they were not as aware of what the problem really was,” he said.

A pair of reports by the Government Accountability Office in 2015 and 2017 outlined numerous shortfalls in Navy readiness around the globe. Navy leaders saw a lack of basic seamanship skills, a result of minimal or insufficient training, as an acceptable trade-off to field a smaller fleet against a growing number of threats. Navy leaders attempted to squeeze every dollar into operations and expanding the fleet, which left little time or funding for training.

As a result of inadequate training, Navy crews were ill-prepared to handle the rigors of the unrelenting operational tempo of the Pacific.

“When the GAO says we are outside the readiness model,” the conditions were set for situations like the McCain and Fitzgerald to take place, a Navy official told The Times.

Good. Fight it. I have done a ton of research on these collisions and am convinced that, even if the immediate fault lies with the captain, the systemic fault lies with the highest brass that is sacrificing readiness and training on the altar of more ships, and bullshit requirements.

I am convinced that the systemic failure evident here lands on the CNO. Tell the politicians "yes" to the operational tempo, tell the budget people "yes" to the increased fleet, and disasters like the LCS, and blame the operator when things go to hell.

We did this repeatedly during the early stages of WWII also. We would send a guy out, give him a major responsibility, limit his command authority, short him on equipment, manpower and logistics, relieve him publicly and brutally when he failed and then give his successor everything he asked for and more to make sure he succeeded.

The upper echelons of the Navy are seriously diseased, and there is a need for a cleansing fire.

quote:

Originally posted by ArtieS:
Good. Fight it. I have done a ton of research on these collisions and am convinced that, even if the immediate fault lies with the captain, the systemic fault lies with the highest brass that is sacrificing readiness and training on the altar of more ships, and bullshit requirements.

I am convinced that the systemic failure evident here lands on the CNO. Tell the politicians "yes" to the operational tempo, tell the budget people "yes" to the increased fleet, and disasters like the LCS, and blame the operator when things go to hell.

We did this repeatedly during the early stages of WWII also. We would send a guy out, give him a major responsibility, limit his command authority, short him on equipment, manpower and logistics, relieve him publicly and brutally when he failed and then give his successor everything he asked for and more to make sure he succeeded.

The upper echelons of the Navy are seriously diseased, and there is a need for a cleansing fire.

I agree that a lack of training contributed the most to the accidents.

quote:

Originally posted by ArtieS:
Good. Fight it. I have done a ton of research on these collisions and am convinced that, even if the immediate fault lies with the captain, the systemic fault lies with the highest brass that is sacrificing readiness and training on the altar of more ships, and bullshit requirements.

We had the mantra for the last 10 years of my Air Force career of "Do More With Less."

I was shocked when one leader (can't remember who) said that at some point, "we would have to Do Less With Less." You can only increase the work load/operational tempo so much before something gives. People's energy is limited, but leadership doesn't seem to acknowledge that.

There may be a collision between the historic virtually absolute responsibility of the Captain of the ship for everything that happens with the realities of modern technology, organization, and politics.

When systems were simpler, not much training was necessary, or possible. How much training is there in manning the yardarms, letting out sails, taking them in? Those old cannon were pretty simple, and fire control was unknown. There were no promotion tests. Communications were line of sight, no satellites or cellphones or internet. Engine rooms were pretty simple too! Ships need to be a lot bigger now, just to haul around all the BuPers, BuNav, BuWep, etc. manuals. Crewman did not transfer in and out as frequently in those days.

That culture of total responsibility is eroded by all the external requirements imposed on a Captain by all the commanders in his chain of command, supply requirements, etc. It is very likely impossible to accomplish all the mandated training, maintenance, inspections, meet the schedules, with full crews, let alone reduced manning levels.

Still, when you salute and say “aye, aye, sir!” it’s your responsibility to perform as required. There needs to be a way to say, “Nope, can’t happen. Too dangerous.”

quote:

Still, when you salute and say “aye, aye, sir!” it’s your responsibility to perform as required. There needs to be a way to say, “Nope, can’t happen. Too dangerous.”

I agree. And to be clear, I am not exonerating the Captain, or the chain of command on the ship. At a minimum, they are required, in peacetime, to return the ship and its crew safely back to port at conclusion of a routine patrol mission. The transiting of a busy shipping lane is a routine, if complex matter. A helicopter crash is not a routine matter. Death happens at sea; but these deaths should not have happened.

My point is that the entire chain of command needs to feel the pain of this, all the way up to the head boy. If that does not happen, necessary changes, including the one you suggest will never happen, sailors will continue to die and the immediate command levels will bear the criminal and career costs of decisions beyond their control.

quote:

Originally posted by BamaJeepster:

“There is a difference between the operators and the administrators,” a Navy source said. “And the [chief of naval operations] is not part of the operational chain of command” of the 7th Fleet.

The CNO is the top naval officer, right? I understand that he may not be in the immediate chain of command for minute to minute decisions during action but I would think that as the overall man in charge he could choose to insert himself wherever he wants. He may get relieved for making a bad decision but until that happens isn't his the ultimate word?

I guess I'm a little confused...

Mark


Edited: I guess I should have done a little more digging. This surprises me but this was most informative: JCS

quote:

Originally posted by mark_a:

quote:

Originally posted by BamaJeepster:

“There is a difference between the operators and the administrators,” a Navy source said. “And the [chief of naval operations] is not part of the operational chain of command” of the 7th Fleet.

The CNO is the top naval officer, right? I understand that he may not be in the immediate chain of command for minute to minute decisions during action but I would think that as the overall man in charge he could choose to insert himself wherever he wants. He may get relieved for making a bad decision but until that happens isn't his the ultimate word?

I guess I'm a little confused...

Mark

Yes, but as he’s not in the operational chain of command, he can’t say “make this ship go there”, as that is the operational commanders realm. Sure, he can exert influence to get something done more than likely, but it’s irregular.

Much like Colin Powell was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in Desert Storm - an Admin role in the chain of command, but Schwarzkopf was CENTCOM, so he was in charge of the operational aspects of the war. Even though overall Powell was the highest ranking person in the Army and military.

As said, the CNO is an administrative position, not a direct command position. However, the CNO is responsible for the operations and direction of the Navy as a service. It is the job of the CNO to notify national command authority that the Navy is stretched beyond what it can do with the ships and manning available, and make appropriate changes.

That may mean reducing operational tempo, moving ships from a less busy theater to the Pacific, or pushing back against the requests of NCA and the other Joint Chiefs. The CNO is a member of the JCS which advises the President and National Security Council on all military matters, and the individual who sets Naval priorities. If the NCA is requesting missions that the Navy can't fulfill with its existing TO&E, then the CNO is the guy who has to push back. That may be a CLM (Career Limiting Move) but CNO is the top dog, and that comes with the territory.

The bit quoted by sdy indicates that the Navy is trying to contain these fatal accidents to the operational chain of command. My argument is that they are not solely operational failings, they are also administrative failings. If the Navy is stretched, then eliminate some of the bullshit training (EO, etc.) and focus on Ops and Maintenance. There is some evidence that the radar system on Fitz wasn't operating properly when the collision occurred. You can't fix a radar if you are in EO training.

Maybe some paperwork needs to be set aside, maybe training needs to be organized it tiers such that operational training, maintenance training and activities, and warfighting are prioritized over other things. I'm picking on EO, but it's just an example of the bureaucratic overburden that reduces time for more critical activities.

When something has to give to meet mission requirements, its the job of the CNO to make those changes. Organizations only change when pain is applied. Let's hold command accountable for their failings, but lets also apply some pain at the highest levels.

We are not at war in the Pacific. This is not like sending the damaged Yorktown to Midway which was a calculated risk.

This message has been edited. Last edited by: ArtieS,

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:

Still, when you salute and say “aye, aye, sir!” it’s your responsibility to perform as required. There needs to be a way to say, “Nope, can’t happen. Too dangerous.”

The problem is, in both of these collisions they failed at the most BASIC tasks of navigating. Maintaining a proper watch, following traffic patterns, not crossing a shipping channel, not understand which direction the other vessel was heading and turning into it. Understanding Modern technology had very little to do with these accidents. Really, all they had to do was look out of the bridge window to see what was going on.

Odd coincidence that this thread is still alive. I have recently changed jobs and moved to VA, where I am intimately involved in many aspects of naval surface force Atlantic training, qualification, and certification. Training has one again definitely become a first and foremost topic in the USN.
I would tell you more, but... you know.

CSG-4 has a Facebook Page


Mission
Who Are We?
• We are a team of experienced Sailors, Marines, government civilians and reservists, who mentor, train and assess Atlantic Fleet combat forces to forward deploy in support and defense of national interests.

• We are experts who shape the readiness of Atlantic Fleet Carrier Strike Groups (CSG), Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG), Amphibious Readiness Groups (ARG) and Independent Deploying ships through live, at sea and synthetic training, as well as, academic instruction.

• We recommend readiness certification to US Fleet Forces Command / CTF 80 and the Commanding General, Second Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF).

• We are the Immediate Supervisor In Command (ISIC) and has Administrative Control (ADCON) over Tactical Training Group Atlantic (TTGL) and Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Atlantic (EWTGL).

What Do We Do?
• Mentor, Train and Assess Atlantic Fleet combat forces to forward deploy (External)

• Encourage the personal and professional development of our Sailors, Marines and civilians within the command.

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN: It is very likely impossible to accomplish all the mandated training, maintenance, inspections, meet the schedules, with full crews, let alone reduced manning levels.

There was a study that was done at the US Army War College about this very thing. The synopsis of the study was that, the professors of study found that it is “literally impossible” for Army officers to meet all the requirements imposed on them, but that it is also unacceptable for them to fail to meet the requirements. They routinely square this impossible circle by lying – about what they’ve done, who they’ve trained, and to what standard.

Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession

One could do a study on SWO's and likely come to the same conclusion.

quote:

Originally posted by corsair:

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN: It is very likely impossible to accomplish all the mandated training, maintenance, inspections, meet the schedules, with full crews, let alone reduced manning levels.

There was a study that was done at the US Army War College about this very thing. The synopsis of the study was that, the professors of study found that it is “literally impossible” for Army officers to meet all the requirements imposed on them, but that it is also unacceptable for them to fail to meet the requirements. They routinely square this impossible circle by lying – about what they’ve done, who they’ve trained, and to what standard.

Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession

One could do a study on SWO's and likely come to the same conclusion.

Gun decking, I believe the term is.

this report is about the McCain

truly hard to comprehend how bad things were (are ?)

https://news.usni.org/2018/05/...ion-charge-collision

Senior Enlisted USS McCain Sailor Pleads Guilty to Dereliction Charge in Collision

quote:

Originally posted by CaptainMike:.... I have recently changed jobs and moved to VA, where I am intimately involved in many aspects of naval surface force Atlantic training, qualification, and certification. ...

Thank you, Sir. For what you are doing.
See my CUT.

'nuff said.

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:

Still, when you salute and say “aye, aye, sir!” it’s your responsibility to perform as required. There needs to be a way to say, “Nope, can’t happen. Too dangerous.”

But, anybody who DOES say "I/we cannot do that mission" is likely to see his/her career end VERY abruptly, since they didn't have that 'can-do spirit.' They would be replaced with career-obsessed lackeys that only care about getting promoted, and the people left behind will suffer.

quote:

Originally posted by sdy:
this report is about the McCain

truly hard to comprehend how bad things were (are ?)

https://news.usni.org/2018/05/...ion-charge-collision

You would think something simple like a big light on the controlling console should show which station had control - like a TV studio camera shows which camera is live at any given time.

Fly the plane or drive the ship seem like things that should be a clear focus - but I know nothing about driving ships.

It is just sad on Memorial Day to have to remember the needless loss of patriots over such a basic lack of understanding between control stations. Steering (by rudder), it seems to me, should be able to be done without confusion.

In reading the article it also seems that keeping the starboard engine at 20 knots while reducing the port thrust accentuated the port turn. But, maybe I do not understand the dynamics.

It is sad but the investigation seems to be yielding some clear facts about what happened.

In an emergency, why couldn't a single button be pushed to consolidate control?

I remember something from when I was about 11 years old. We were barreling down the road toward the main gate to Edwards, AFB. My mom was driving our new car that had this newfangled cruise control she decided to try.

My dad did not tell my mom how to turn it off. In a panic, my mom asked if I knew how to turn it off and I started making suggestions. The gate was getting closer and finally, mom tapped the brake. Problem solved and all control was immediately returned to her.

Shouldn't returning manual control to a single ship station be as intuitive?

Shouldn't it be automatic like a tap, rack and roll for ship drivers? Based on the article, control seemed to confuse people.