quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:

quote:

Originally posted by RHINOWSO:
I think part of the problem might also be that the Navy has been doing the manning crunch for the past 5+ years across the boards. I don't know how undermanned a DDG might be, but reduced manning was something that the surface Navy was being pushed into. Even VFAs were getting cut pretty deep. More with less, you know the drill.

Because the less people you have, the less people who make it to retirement, the less retirement money you have to pay out... of course it's all under the guise of business analysis, efficiencies, etc, but that is the bottom line IMO.

The Little Crappy Ship was meant to embody that, were everyone onboard was cross trained, had 15 jobs, and wow, that thing can't do shit.

I read at some length the report of the fiasco with the patrol boats in the Persian Gulf. Among the things that struck me was the overwhelming bureaucracy, organization with instructions, requirements, limitations, for personnel, maintenance, operations, etc. I don't see how anyone could stay up to date as people came and went, quarters came and went, reporting requirements zooming by.

Two things emerged. The boats weren't operational, engines, communications, navigation and the crews couldn't run them, plan or execute ops, even if all the reports and documentation were up to date.

Something is wrong here.

THOSE boats ran out of fuel in the Persian Gulf, then drifted into Iranian waters. There was no other reason in that situation.

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:


THOSE boats ran out of fuel in the Persian Gulf, then drifted into Iranian waters. There was no other reason in that situation.

You need to read some more on that.

From Military.com:

Contributing Factors

Because of unit upheaval and reorganization in previous years, Coastal Riverine Squadron 3 and its parent unit, Coastal Riverine Group 1, found themselves undermanned and overtasked. The crews of the two command boats had missed key skills training periods due to operational commitments, the investigating officer found, and were lacking navigation training as well as training needed to prepare them to operate in the Middle East during their deployment.

Poor communication meant that the then-commander of Task Force 56, Capt. Kyle Moses, didn't realize the units were inadequately prepared for deployment, the investigator found. On top of that, the investigation determined, the task force fostered a "can't say no" command climate, meaning that lower-ranking troops fell in line rather than raising important concerns.

Neither Moses, nor the commander of Task Force 56.7 in Bahrain, nor the Kuwait detachment officer-in-charge, understood the poor condition of the riverine command boats, neither of which was fully operational, the investigation found. Neither task force had a sense of ownership of the boats, officials said.

This lack of leadership and training was considered by investigator to be an extenuating factor in the conduct of the riverine boat crews, which made a series of bad choices starting with "blindly" deviating from course at the outset.

The two boat captains did not understand proper procedure for addressing an engine failure underway. They failed to keep their weapons manned while dead in the water to guard against a surprise attack. Both captains failed to exercise self-defense when the Iranians demonstrated hostile intent, the investigation found, due to a lack of understanding of how to do so. The lead boat captain surrendered both boats to the Iranian authorities, the probe found. While the military code of conduct acknowledges that troops may be captured, it forbids surrender if they have the means to resist.

And while detained, the crews showed some confusion about what they were permitted to say. The investigator found some volunteered pieces of information apart from name, rank and serial number, including the top speed of the riverine boats and the fact that the parent command owned a third boat. The sailors' comment about telling their command the boats couldn't make the journey demonstrated lack of trust in their chain of command to the detaining forces, the investigator said, and could have been used for propaganda purposes.

----------------------------------

Almost all of us started in the Navy hearing "proper prior planning prevents piss poor performance." This op showed less planning, in hostile waters, than they might have done to take the boats from San Diego out to San Clemente, or maybe Catalina for a picnic.

Command atmosphere was poor, candor in discussing shortcomings was apparently not appreciated. Otherwise, somebody needed to stick up their hand and say "my boat is broke," "my radio doesn't work," or we need a map. Jeepers!

I don't recall that running out of fuel caused the engine stoppage. I thought there was engine failure.

interesting historical article at Naval Institute (from 1972)

bit of a hard read, but note the section

(1) Overtaking Situation Burdened Vessel: 0-68-Degree Collision Angle :

(a) The overtaking vessel must not close the overtaken vessel closer than a distance equal to one Pull Rudder Advance at the present speed plus the specified clearing distance.


and

(1) Collision Angle 0-68 Degrees—Privileged (From two points abaft abeam to port to a position two points abaft the beam to Starboard). As Privileged Vessel, you must not allow the Burdened Vessel to approach closer than a distance equal to one Full Rudder Advance at the present speed, but never less than 500 yards. The one maneuver open to you is to turn away from danger, in this case turning to starboard. A turn to starboard should be made in all situations except in the case of a vessel overtaking on the starboard quarter, in which a turn to starboard would result in collision with the overtaking vessel, therefore the turn must be to the left.


this language is similar to what Balze reported about overtaking conditions

https://www.usni.org/magazines...1b&mc_eid=211e40ec33

I believe in this scenario DDG 62 was the Privileged platform and Crystal was the Burdened platform

quote:

Originally posted by JALLEN:

quote:

Originally posted by sdy:
more significant info from the USNI News article that was identified earlier

https://news.usni.org/2017/06/...ss-call-reached-help

The crew of the guided-missile destroyer that was struck by a merchant ship on Friday off the coast of Japan fought to save the ship for an hour before the first calls went out for help, Japanese investigators now believe.
According to the current operational theory of Japanese investigators, the deadly collision between USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) and the Philippine-flagged merchant ship ACX Crystal knocked out the destroyer’s communications for an hour, while the four-times-larger merchant ship was unaware of what it hit until it doubled back and found the damaged warship, two sources familiar with the ongoing Japanese investigation told USNI News on Wednesday.

Investigators now think Crystal was transiting to Tokyo on autopilot with an inattentive or asleep crew when the merchant vessel struck a glancing blow on the destroyer’s starboard side at about 1:30 AM local time on Friday.

When the crew of Crystal realized they had hit something, the ship performed a U-turn in the shipping lane and sped back to the initial site of the collision at 18 knots, discovered Fitzgerald, and radioed a distress call to authorities at about 2:30 AM

That is the scenario that seemed most plausible to me, given the track info we had, but I still can't imagine what the crew of the Fitz was doing, or not doing.

I think the Crystal bridge was manned, they just did a course correction 15 minutes prior. If NOBODY was paying attention to radar and AIS or lookouts or well anything, on the destroyer, how do we even know their nav lights were on? Destroyers are very hard to pick out at night, and a stern light on the destroyer (if it was overtaking situation would be the only light you see) is not that overly visible due to placement , exhaust, etc. It could also be that the destroyer turned into their path at the last minute if it was doing that zig zag pattern.

However, without the destroyers actual path AND voice recording data from the destroyer bridge. Who the heck knows what really went on. We certainly know the Fitz crew was not paying attention. Could the crystal crew not been paying attention, yes.....too many variables at this point.

quote:

However, without the destroyers actual path AND voice recording data from the destroyer bridge. Who the heck knows what really went on.

hard to argue that

we are just describing possible scenarios given what is known

that isn't a wasteful exercise. it makes everyone think a lot and when the truth becomes clear, it is much more understandable if you have been doing some brainstorming on the limited info

quote:

Originally posted by sdy:
interesting historical article at Naval Institute (from 1972)

bit of a hard read, but note the section

(1) Overtaking Situation Burdened Vessel: 0-68-Degree Collision Angle :

(a) The overtaking vessel must not close the overtaken vessel closer than a distance equal to one Pull Rudder Advance at the present speed plus the specified clearing distance.


and

(1) Collision Angle 0-68 Degrees—Privileged (From two points abaft abeam to port to a position two points abaft the beam to Starboard). As Privileged Vessel, you must not allow the Burdened Vessel to approach closer than a distance equal to one Full Rudder Advance at the present speed, but never less than 500 yards. The one maneuver open to you is to turn away from danger, in this case turning to starboard. A turn to starboard should be made in all situations except in the case of a vessel overtaking on the starboard quarter, in which a turn to starboard would result in collision with the overtaking vessel, therefore the turn must be to the left.


this language is similar to what Balze reported about overtaking conditions

https://www.usni.org/magazines...1b&mc_eid=211e40ec33

I believe in this scenario DDG 62 was the Privileged platform and Crystal was the Burdened platform

Slight edit... should read one FULL Rudder advance.

The mystery here is what the destroyer was doing during the last ten minutes before the collision.

The fact that the Captain was in his cabin when the ship was hit suggests to me that they weren't doing anything. There would be several minutes minimum from the time the ships were too close together before impact.

Based on this Washington Post article, the closing of the hatch is an investigation of of its own.

- were there still survivors when the hatch was closed?
- was a sailor making repeated trips to the survivors and back?
- who gave the order to close the hatch?
- was it necessary to save the ship?

https://www.washingtonpost.com...m_term=.74650bd06acb

As sad as it is, when I was on board we had to make the mental choice of closing the hatch on possible survivors if necessary. Save a few or the boat. One choice I am glad I never had to make and I am sure those sailors are dealing with from then until their grave.

It is easy for a paper pusher to say they could have waited to seal the hatch, but they were not there dealing with water pouring in on them.

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
That has to be the most gut-wrenching decision ANYONE would ever have to make. That scene in Crimson Tide when Mr. Hunter had to order Mr. Hellerman to close the hatch was just heartbreaking. I can't even imagine......

RIP Sailors.

quote:

Originally posted by Ronin1069:
Based on this Washington Post article, the closing of the hatch is an investigation of of its own.

- were there still survivors when the hatch was closed?
- was a sailor making repeated trips to the survivors and back?
- who gave the order to close the hatch?
- was it necessary to save the ship?

https://www.washingtonpost.com...m_term=.74650bd06acb

I haven't read the article but wouldn't base anything on a new paper story.

You absolutely close the hatch if it protects the boat. Doesn't matter if your mother is in there.

quote:

Originally posted by petr:
As sad as it is, when I was on board we had to make the mental choice of closing the hatch on possible survivors if necessary. Save a few or the boat. One choice I am glad I never had to make and I am sure those sailors are dealing with from then until their grave.

It is easy for a paper pusher to say they could have waited to seal the hatch, but they were not there dealing with water pouring in on them.

As a Repair Locker Officer, I knew there was a chance I might need to make that call, just as there was the was possibility to send a soul outside the ship to take readings and samples after a nuclear attack (ie - sending someone to his/her death).

Whoever actually sealed that hatch did it well after the person in charge made the order and probably second guessed the decision for many, many moments before actually performing the action.

Does anyone know how many crew is on watch and in the navigational room/com room at night during this shift on a destroyer? The article state the ship runs with a crew of 300, so I would think they'd have plenty of crew to stand watch.

The Crystal most likely only has a crew of 24-36 for the entire ship, and generally only 2 people would be on watch and running the ship at night......

quote:

Originally posted by erj_pilot:
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
That has to be the most gut-wrenching decision ANYONE would ever have to make. That scene in Crimson Tide when Mr. Hunter had to order Mr. Hellerman to close the hatch was just heartbreaking. I can't even imagine......

RIP Sailors.

When it comes time to dog a hatch, there is no time to sit and hash it out with the powers that be. Usually the person making that decision is the closest repair locker leader. I was in charge of Repair 2 on the last ship I was on (I was an E6) and I will say that the decision is not gut wrenching. If it's time-it gets dogged...it's that simple.

Dog the hatch or die. Heart-wrenching happens later.

quote:

Originally posted by MikeinNC:

quote:

Originally posted by erj_pilot:
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
That has to be the most gut-wrenching decision ANYONE would ever have to make. That scene in Crimson Tide when Mr. Hunter had to order Mr. Hellerman to close the hatch was just heartbreaking. I can't even imagine......

RIP Sailors.

When it comes time to dog a hatch, there is no time to sit and hash it out with the powers that be. Usually the person making that decision is the closest repair locker leader. I was in charge of Repair 2 on the last ship I was on (I was an E6) and I will say that the decision is not gut wrenching. If it's time-it gets dogged...it's that simple.

Dog the hatch or die. Heart-wrenching happens later.

Thanks for putting that perspective out there for the crowd.

quote:

Originally posted by Ronin1069:
Based on this Washington Post article, the closing of the hatch is an investigation of of its own.

- were there still survivors when the hatch was closed?
- was a sailor making repeated trips to the survivors and back?
- who gave the order to close the hatch?
- was it necessary to save the ship?

https://www.washingtonpost.com...m_term=.74650bd06acb

WAPO is only good when you are out of TP.

But of course they are gonna investigate everything. People died, the Navy investigates when someone does damage to a piece of equipment or someone gets a minor injury.

I could have told everyone there would be an investigation that covered any / all DC actions as soon as the ship collided with the Crystal.

Does this thread need to be locked? If we're going to get into conspiracy theories, there must be nothing left to say.

quote:

Originally posted by parabellum:
Does this thread need to be locked? If we're going to get into conspiracy theories, there must be nothing left to say.

I don't see any conspiracy theories. Just describing the mental decision to lock down the hatches knowing there might be a human in that compartment that's dieing. But it's to save the lives of many many others on board.

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:
I don't see any conspiracy theories.

Who asked you?