I read the entire transcript. It gets pretty rough towards the end and is especially hard when you get to the last few minutes that the ship is afloat. By rough reading, I'm talking about emotionally. As a mariner, it's actually terrifying, and I don't doubt that I may have nightmares tonight because of it. I hope some of you will take the time to read it though. It really puts you right on the bridge of that ship, and I swear that their conversations were just like hundreds that I've had on my ships with my crews in the past. Sobering stuff.

This is the direct link to the website to download the transcript. It is long, about 26 hours worth of conversations (edited down to about 10 hours), but it reads fast. The article is below.

Link to El Faro VDR Bridge Transcript

NTSB Releases El Faro VDR Bridge Audio Transcript; Opens Investigation Docket
December 13, 2016 by gCaptain

The 500-page transcript from the El Faro’s voyage data recorder bridge audio was released Tuesday along with four other factual reports added to the NTSB’s El Faro investigation docket as part of the agency’s ongoing investigation into the maritime tragedy.

The U.S.-flagged cargo ship El Faro sank Oct. 1, 2015 off Crooked Island, Bahamas during Hurricane Joaquin, resulting in the loss of all 33 crew members.

Entered into the docket were factual reports from the Electronic Data Group, Meteorology Group, Survival Factors Group, Engineering Group and the Voyage Data Recorder Audio Transcript Group, the NTSB said Tuesday.

NTSB Chairman Christopher Hart was joined by the agency’s Director of the Office of Research and Engineering, James Ritter, and Brian Curtis, Director of the Office of Marine Safety, in a press briefing in which they described the documents within the docket and provided highlights of the information contained within the docket.

According to the NTSB, the Engineering Group Factual Report contains information about the El Faro’s machinery system, a description and history of the vessel, maintenance histories for the plant, survey and inspection information, the vessel’s safety management system, and information about the training and experience of the El Faro’s engineering staff.

The Survival Factors Group Factual Report contains information about the U.S. Coast Guard’s search efforts, the El Faro’s survival equipment, crew preparedness, lifeboat standards and regulations, and information about distress transmissions.

The Electronic Data Group Factual Report provides a system overview and discussion of data recovered from the El Faro’s voyage data recorder and other onboard electronic systems. The ship’s voyage data recorder captured 26 hours of data in 11 parameters leading up to the sinking of the vessel. The 11 parameters were: Bridge Audio; Date; Time; VDR power supply status; Position and other GPS data; Heading; Course; Speed; Rate of Turn; Wind data; and Automatic Identification System data.

The Meteorology Group Factual Report provides information about what meteorological information was available to the El Faro’s crew.

The Voyage Data Recorder Audio Transcript Group Factual Report contains the transcript of the discernable and relevant bridge audio captured by the VDR. Members of the group included the NTSB, the U.S. Coast Guard and Tote Services – the owner of the El Faro.

The NTSB says it considers the information captured in the VDR’s bridge audio recording critical to determining the events leading up to the loss of the El Faro along with its 33 crew members. The NTSB characterized the bridge audio as “poor quality” and containing high levels of background noise; however, this is not considered unusual, the NTSB said.

There were six microphones positioned throughout the El Faro’s bridge, according to the NTSB. Extensive digital audio filtering was necessary to enhance the audio. The entire 26-hour recording was reviewed many times, with some statements reviewed more than 100 times by the VDR audio transcript group to ensure they understood what was being said in the recording. About 10 hours of audio was determined to be relevant to the investigation and therefore transcribed by the VDR audio transcript group. T

The transcript required more than 1,100 work hours to complete. The transcript report is more than 500 pages and is the longest transcript ever produced by the NTSB.

The following is a summary of the characterization of the bridge audio transcript provided by the NTSB:

The bridge audio recording began about 5:37 a.m., Sept. 30, 2015, roughly eight hours after the El Faro departed Jacksonville, Florida.

The first recorded conversation about the forecasted weather was captured the morning of Sept. 30, between the captain and chief mate, who agreed on a course diversion they believed would keep them sufficiently clear of the eye of Hurricane Joaquin. There were multiple conversations regarding weather and route planning throughout the day and evening of Sept. 30.

The captain departed the bridge at about 8 p.m. Sept. 30, and returned at about 4:10 a.m. Oct 1. At about 4:37 a.m. the chief mate received a phone call from the chief engineer regarding the vessel’s list and engine oil levels. This appears to be the first recorded conversation about these issues. The information was related to the captain. The alternate chief engineer is heard stating at about 5:12 a.m. that he’s never seen the ship with such a list.

At about 5:43 a.m. the captain takes a phone call and indicates there is a problem in the number three hold of the ship and sends the chief mate to investigate. They discuss suspected flooding over UHF radio, which appears to be the first recorded conversation about a flooding condition on the ship.

The captain indicates at about 6:13 a.m. that the ship lost propulsion. Numerous conversations are heard throughout the remainder of the recording about the ship’s flooding condition, attempts to rectify the ship’s list and attempts to regain propulsion.

The second mate began formatting a GMDSS distress message at about 6:32 a.m. as directed by the captain. At 7:07 a.m. the captain notified Tote Service’s designated shoreside representative of the critical situation and that he was preparing to send an electronic distress signal. The captain instructed the second mate to send the distress message at about 7:13 a.m. The captain gave the command to sound the ship’s general alarm at about 7:27 a.m. and about two minutes later the second mate exclaimed there were containers in the water and the captain gave the command to sound the abandon ship alarm. About four minutes later the captain relayed over the UHF radio to put the life rafts in the water.

The bridge audio recording ended at about 7:40 a.m. Oct. 1, 2015, with the captain and one of the helmsmen still present on the bridge.

The full bridge audio transcript and other factual reports are available online in the docket at http://go.usa.gov/x8p9j

Here’s a link directly to the bridge audio transcript: LINK

WARNING: The VDR bridge audio transcript contains details from the final moments before the El Faro sank. It may be difficult or inappropriate for some readers.

The National Transportation Safety Board stresses that the public docket contains only factual information collected by NTSB investigators. It does not provide analysis, findings, recommendations or probable cause determinations, and as such, no conclusions about how or why an accident occurred should be drawn from the docket. Providing the docket affords the public the opportunity to see what information has been gathered about the accident. Any analysis, findings, recommendations, or probable cause determinations related to the accident will be issued by the NTSB at a later date.

El Faro: Event Summary

On Thursday, October 1, 2015, about 07:15 a.m. eastern daylight time, the US Coast Guard received distress alerts from the 737-foot-long roll-on/roll-off cargo ship El Faro. The US flagged ship, owned by Sea Star Line, LLC, and operated by TOTE Services (TOTE), was 36 nautical miles northeast of Acklins and Crooked Islands, Bahamas, and close to the eye of Hurricane Joaquin. The ship was en route from Jacksonville, Florida, to San Juan, Puerto Rico, with a cargo of containers and vehicles. Just minutes before the distress alerts, the El Faro master had called TOTE’s designated person ashore and reported that the ship was experiencing some flooding. He said the crew had controlled the ingress of water but the ship was listing 15 degrees and had lost propulsion. The Coast Guard and TOTE were unable to reestablish communication with the ship. Twenty- eight US crewmembers and five Polish workers were on board.

Link

An incredible tragedy, and certainly one you understand more deeply than probably anyone else here. I wish I had words to help things get better . . . .

I'm not a mariner and that was a rough read, especially the end. What a crazy and scary situation.

That was definitely a tough read.

With the technology available today how in the world did they end up in the eye of a hurricane?

Balze' thanks for posting this. Its the final chapter in the story.

I, like you, have read and listened to my fair share of these. I know how it reads. I will skip it.

May the Good Lord have mercy on their souls.

RIP

Wow, that was intense.

I am a mariner, involved in a thread on this on another board, and got several things from it.

1. IMO they should have never, ever taken that route, they could've followed the Florida coast and been in calm water and not even in the Hurricane's path, this was what brought the ship down. This would've added about 160 miles to the trip. They thought they could beat the hurricane....

2. The cargo was not storm lashed, nor did they have any storm lashings to secure it. (major issue regarding stability)

3. The cargo broke free in hold 3, which prevented the crew from investigating why it was flooding. They think it broke the fire main off but who knows.

4. The ship was ill maintained with several items needed fixing that never were.

5. They didn't do real safety drills, just half assed ones and the crew weren't even sure if their survival suits even fit them.

6. They had polish workers on board doing pipe fitting and all sort of maintenance on one of the turbines.

7. Not sure why the lube oil pump kept sucking air, even with the listing and hurricane seas it should've kept prime and oil. This is why the turbine shut down, causing them to lose power/propulsion, and ultimately probably roll over.

Scary scary situation. All lives were lost.

Jimmy, I pretty much agree with all of that.

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:

7. Not sure why the lube oil pump kept sucking air, even with the listing and hurricane seas it should've kept prime and oil. This is why the turbine shut down, causing them to lose power/propulsion, and ultimately probably roll over.

On this last point, though, consider that the vessel's main propulsion system consisted of a 30,000-horsepower, General Electric cross-compound, geared steam turbine set. The ship was under contract to be built in 1973 and at that time, ABS rules required the lubricating oil system of the main engine to be “so arranged that it would function satisfactorily when the vessel is permanently inclined to an angle of 15 degrees athwartship and 5 degrees fore and aft.” We know from the VDR that the vessel was listing at at least 15 degrees and most likely more and getting worse.

The main engine loss lube oil pressure due to the extreme list which ultimately sealed the fate of the ship and its crew.

I can see how reading that would rattle you some Balze! I'm no mariner, but I guess the best take on this is that this should be a reminder to err on the side of safety. Could have made all the difference here, it appears!

Any idea if they had a chance to get into lifeboats? Or do you think it just got to a point where it just went straight down?

^^ And to add to that. If they even got into a life raft, would it even do any good in a hurricane? Even in one of these completely enclosed ones:

quote:

Originally posted by RAMIUS:
Any idea if they had a chance to get into lifeboats? Or do you think it just got to a point where it just went straight down?

The Captain ordered abandon ship about nine minutes before the recording ended. Not much time. And lifeboats weren't going to happen in that situation. Liferafts were their best options. Personally, I would've done everything I could just to get into the water with my immersion suit.

I likely would've died in the engine room though doing anything I could to get propulsion back.

Saw a news article about this yesterday with some excerpts, and skimmed through the whole transcript in your link.

Eerie to read the helmsman saying hours before the storm hit that he had laid out his immersion suit and life jacket already.

A little after 23:00, about 8 hours before they went down, the third mate was phoning the captain in his quarters to warn him that their course would put them 22 miles from the center in 100-125 kt winds by 04:00. The captain told him they'd be south of it by then and the "winds won't be an issue." He seemed unconvinced: "I trust what he's saying– it's just being twenty miles away from hundred knot winds– this doesn't even sound right."

I can only imagine how awful it was to watch your fears and doubts be confirmed over a matter of hours as that wind and sea bore down on you, one thing after another going wrong.

The lifeboats would be near impossible to launch in hurricane force winds and waves and would be banging against the ship, they found 1 lifeboat half submerged after the ship went down and really beat up. Life raft would be their best bet and they'd at least had a chance, maybe 50/50 odds. If you look at the pics posted, the bags on the bottom fill up with seawater to keep it from drifting too fast from wind and to keep it from tipping over. But, you have to jump say 50' from the ship to the water (perhaps higher) then swim to the liferaft in a gumby suit which is pretty hard to swim in and get to the liferaft and get in. I just did a training class and we did all this, getting into the liferaft by yourself in a survival suit was a major feat in and of itself, with 2 people helping from in the water, still somewhat difficult. Jumping in the water in their survival suit would have given them somewhat of a chance, but a low one. Problem is, you'd have to launch it,

quote:

Originally posted by Sigmanic:
I can see how reading that would rattle you some Balze! I'm no mariner, but I guess the best take on this is that this should be a reminder to err on the side of safety. Could have made all the difference here, it appears!

I believe the Captain was ultimately at fault here for making the decision to take the ship on the route that he did, but it was even more egregious in my opinion to wait as long as he did to send the mayday signal in order to give "professional courtesy" (a term he said more than once in that recording) to the office by getting in touch with them first.

Having said that, I was humbled by his actions at the end of that recording. I believe he's a good man who made some poor decisions.

Now consider the article below. It's very easy for me to believe that his past experience being fired from Crowley for standing up to them did indeed influence his decisions here.

El Faro Captain Was Fired By Crowley In Row Over Safety
December 14, 2016 by John Konrad

A Newly released transcipt of audio recording the El Faro’s last moments show a calm and collected Captain remaining on the bridge of his ship to help a crewmate stricken by fear and possible injury. An action above and beyond the call of duty, and with total disregard for his own life… action that, had the El Faro been an US Navy ship, would have qualified Davidson for a medal for physical courage. But the Navy also recognizes another type of bravery once exhibited by Captain Davidson; moral courage.

The widow of the captain of the El Faro described her husband as a cautious and experienced mariner who did not cut corners. A commitment to safety that required moral courage and had once caused his career to spiral down from Master to Junior Safety Officer – Third Mate.

“He wanted things done correctly, you know, by the book. Everything he did was by the book,” Theresa Davidson said of her husband, Michael Davidson, in a newly released transcript of testimony she gave to investigators back in January.

Mrs. Davidson discussed her husband’s years of service aboard Polar Tankers in Alaska, his professional achievements – including First Class pilot certificates for the infamously dangerous waters surrounding Valdez Alaska – and his commitment to the safety of his ship and crew. A commitment that once got him fired.

After working as Chief Mate aboard Tankers in Alaska Captain Davidson went to work for Crowley Maritime. Davidson did well there and was given command of his first ship but his dreams ended when got in an argument with managers over safety concerns.

“He left the Crowley ships because there was an incident where they were asking him to do something that was unsafe on the ship as captain.” Said Mrs. Davidson. “They wanted him to take the ship from one port to another port when he was told by, that the steering wasn’t safe. And he said I’m not going to do that. Then he ordered two tugs to move the ship”

Details on what happened next are scant because NTSB and USCG investigators failed to ask Mrs. Davidson for specific details. We do not know if Crowley had other complaints against the Captain… but we do know that he was fired from Crowley. We also know that in his opinion the decision to order those tugboats, a decision he made for safety reasons, was a domino that set his career in free fall.

“When he came back from vacation they weren’t too happy with the (tugboat) bill” said Mrs. Davidson. “(Crowley) told him he was no longer employed. So that’s why he took the third mate job with TOTE. That’s why he ended up over there.”

Had TOTE warned him not to make the same mistake again? Did the consequences of that act alter his perspective as Captain? We don’t know. But those short snippets of testimony provide the only clue gCaptain has uncovered about why Davidson delayed transmitting Mayday – a message his 2nd Mate had prepared 41 minutes before it was sent – until after he talked with the company’s designated person ashore.

Captain Davison is the only Master in recent memory who – as far as the evidence can tell – died at his post, on the bridge of his ship, for the sole reason of ensuring that the last remaining crew member under his direct command had a chance of survival. facts clearly show that Captain Davidson acted with Physical Courage on the morning of October 1st, 2015.

The facts also suggest Davidson acted with Moral Courage years before as Master aboard a Crowley ship. But, to be clear, we do not know what effect, if any, the consequences of that act had on the decisions he made aboard the El Faro. Nor do I want to suggest that Crowley is at fault. I only ask, as a United States Merchant Mariner, that the NTSB and USCG do more than ask the cursory questions they have released so far. We, as mariners, ask that the NTSB act in a more detailed and professional in there questioning approach and follow-up.

Link

quote:

Originally posted by S600MBUSA:
Saw a news article about this yesterday with some excerpts, and skimmed through the whole transcript in your link.

Eerie to read the helmsman saying hours before the storm hit that he had laid out his immersion suit and life jacket already.

A little after 23:00, about 8 hours before they went down, the third mate was phoning the captain in his quarters to warn him that their course would put them 22 miles from the center in 100-125 kt winds by 04:00. The captain told him they'd be south of it by then and the "winds won't be an issue." He seemed unconvinced: "I trust what he's saying– it's just being twenty miles away from hundred knot winds– this doesn't even sound right."

I can only imagine how awful it was to watch your fears and doubts be confirmed over a matter of hours as that wind and sea bore down on you, one thing after another going wrong.

I caught that as well. Tough read. Had to be a horrifying experience.

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:
Problem is, you'd have to launch it,

The liferafts should've launched automatically after the ship sank. But then try finding and getting into a liferaft in those sea conditions...

It really is a nightmare scenario.

quote:

Originally posted by Balzé Halzé:

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:
Problem is, you'd have to launch it,

The liferafts should've launched automatically after the ship sank. But then try finding and getting into a liferaft in those sea conditions...

It really is a nightmare scenario.

Yeah, I was referring to the crew tieing the painter off to the El Faro and launching them, themselves prior to the El Faro sinking, then jumping in the water and boarding them, then cutting the painter and going. The LEE side of the ship probably wasn't too bad wind-wise, but still very rough water, but again 9 minutes is hardly any time to don immersion suits, and even get to the life rafts to self deploy them rather than waiting on the hydro static release to do it. It also is mentioned in the NTSB transcription that the crew, they put lashings on them earlier in the voyage?

quote:

Originally posted by jimmy123x:
I am a mariner, involved in a thread on this on another board, and got several things from it.

1. IMO they should have never, ever taken that route, they could've followed the Florida coast and been in calm water and not even in the Hurricane's path, this was what brought the ship down. This would've added about 160 miles to the trip. They thought they could beat the hurricane....

2. The cargo was not storm lashed, nor did they have any storm lashings to secure it. (major issue regarding stability)

3. The cargo broke free in hold 3, which prevented the crew from investigating why it was flooding. They think it broke the fire main off but who knows.

4. The ship was ill maintained with several items needed fixing that never were.

5. They didn't do real safety drills, just half assed ones and the crew weren't even sure if their survival suits even fit them.

6. They had polish workers on board doing pipe fitting and all sort of maintenance on one of the turbines.

7. Not sure why the lube oil pump kept sucking air, even with the listing and hurricane seas it should've kept prime and oil. This is why the turbine shut down, causing them to lose power/propulsion, and ultimately probably roll over.

Scary scary situation. All lives were lost.

Want to clarify a couple of these points actually.

#4. Saying the ship was ill maintained is not fair. There's no evidence of that. It's an old ship for sure, but anyone who's been out to sea knows that there are always outstanding issues with every ship. Some things get fixed; others don't. The issue here would be the age of the ship and not necessarily the maintenance.

#5. Again, where is the evidence that they didn't do real safety drills? It's no secret in our industry that drills get tedious and people get complacent, but that is hardly unique to the El Faro and in no way means they didn't do "real safety drills." And the statement in the audio about guys not knowing if they fit into their Gumby suits sounded to me to be mostly in jest. And after all, they were operating primarily in warm waters.

#6. The riding gang of polish workers were not doing any work at all to the turbines. They were all pipefitters reinstalling winches, cables, and certain sea water piping systems.

Now, something I learned from reading the technical reports of the ship, the emergency fire pump was located inside the #3 cargo hold. Consequently, the sea chest to the emergency fire pump was also located in this hold. It does make sense that cargo may have broken free and damaged this piping system. With the sea chest right there, I can understand how that hold flooded so severely and with absolutely no way to secure it. I'm confused though why there wasn't a bilge alarm in that space to immediately warn of any possible flooding, especially if there is a sea chest located within the space. But then again maybe there was. The final report is still yet to be released.

I read this, and then stood up with my shawl on, and read out loud from Hymns, Ancient and Modern 'Eternal Father, strong to save'.

Amen

tac