quote:

Originally posted by kkina:
New footage from CNN really makes the casual observer wonder how a helicopter could plow right into a landing airliner.

That’s the video to makes think the last jog in the path of the Blackhawk was after the crash. That last data point said the Blackhawk was going 74kts at 200’, the second to last data point said it was going about 100kts at 300’. I don’t see the Blackhawk making any change in altitude or course at all in that video.

As for how the Blackhawk didn’t see the CRJ based on that video, the camera catches things the human eye cannot. As an extreme example of this, it’s why night vision goggles were invented. In this case, you can see the difference in the background sky between the two videos. In the first video, the sky looks like it’s a half hour past sunset, while the sky looks like nighttime in the second video. Obviously, the camera in the first video is capturing more light.

I have no idea what any of the pilots could see. I asked earlier how much of the CRJ’s landing lights the Blackhawk pilots may have been able to see with the CRJ turned about 70 degrees away from the Blackhawk, but no one responded. It’s interesting how much light from the CRJ’s landing lights are reflected off the Potomac. Not only that, but there’s definite spot of light moving on the Potomac out in front of the Blackhawk. Maybe the pilots were looking down?

Hopefully, there are recordings of the in the cockpit communications of the Blackhawk crew.

According to the NTSB, based on information from the CRJ’s data and voice recorders:

“The minute before the collision, the flight crew received an automatic traffic advisory stating "traffic, traffic." A few seconds before the crash, the crew had a verbal reaction and data showed the airplane beginning to increase its pitch.“ Link

More detailed report:

“Data in the control tower, though, showed the Black Hawk helicopter at 200 feet at the time.”

Timeline of events

Brice Banning, NTSB investigator in charge, gave a timeline down to the second of the chain of events before impact.
8:15 PM: The aircraft left 37,000 feet for an initial descent.
8:39:10 PM: Potomac Approach cleared the crew for the Mount Vernon visual runway one approach.
8:43:06 PM: The crew made initial contact with the DCA tower. The tower controller asked if the crew could switch to runway 33.
8:45:27 PM: The autopilot was disconnected.
8:46:01 PM: A radio transmission from the tower was audible, informing PAT 25 (the Black Hawk) that traffic just south of the Wilson Bridge was a CRJ at 1,200 feet circling to runway 33.
8:46:29 PM: The crew received a 1,000-foot automated callout.
8:46:47 PM: DCA Tower cleared other jet traffic on runway 1 for departure with no delay.
8:47:29 PM: The crew received a 500-foot automated callout.
8:47:39 PM: A radio transmission from the tower was audible, asking PAT 25 if the CRJ was in sight. One second later, the crew received an automated traffic advisory stating "traffic traffic."
8:47:42 PM: A radio transmission from the tower was audible, directing PAT 25 to pass behind the CRJ.
8:47:58 PM: The crew had a verbal reaction, and FDR data showed the airplane beginning to increase its pitch.
8:47:59 PM: Sounds of impact were audible, followed by the end of the recording.

This message has been edited. Last edited by: trapper189,

quote:

Originally posted by kkina:
New footage from CNN really makes the casual observer wonder how a helicopter could plow right into a landing airliner.

[FLASH_VIDEO]<iframe frameborder="315" height="560" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/1q57bulcrWM" title="American Eagle Flight 5342 crash - New video obtained by CNN" width="560"></iframe>[/FLASH_VIDEO]

If you look in the upper right corner of the video, you can see the lights from the MGM Hotel sitting up on a hill. The lights from the MGM Hotel obscured the CRJ7 from the view of the Helo crew.

They either lost the CRJ7 for a precious few seconds in the lights or they misidentified it as another aircraft that was over the Woodrow Wilson bridge at the same time.

quote:

Originally posted by techguy:
I have a question, may be stupid. Don’t airplanes and military helicopters have some type of radar system that would alert them to other aircraft in the area?

No.
Those things do exist (air to air interceptors for example), but would not be present on either aircraft involved in this crash.

I’m subbing for a 4th grade class today and this was on the board when I walked in:

^^ An entire forum?

dis·pu·ta·tious
/ˌdispyəˈtāSHəs/

adjective: disputatious

fond of or causing heated arguments.
"a congenial hangout for disputatious academics"

This guy does an excellent analysis on several aspects of this crash. His radar screen is a little confusing at first but then becomes very clear.
That area is an incredibly complex place to fly anything, even in the daytime. At night wearing night vision with lots of lights and distractions in the background and 90db+ cockpit noise, a recipe for disaster.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3PtOdR_VCc

Also note the hours for each pilot (in command and instructor) that have been mentioned, 500 and 1000.

Those are the minimum required for each of their duties that night. They are also vaguely described and clearly rounded numbers.
Here's a link to the actual manufacturer's requirements and a quick scroll through the first ten pages will give you the idea of the requirements.
Then, to make that trip into one of the most complex and consequential flight environments on the planet, the first experience in their position(?) for both pilot and instructor at night?

https://www.lockheedmartin.com...rse-Descriptions.pdf

quote:

Originally posted by sigmonkey:

It's not as simple as it looks from the recliner...

Truth! Along with what someone earlier said it could have been any of us.

I've called distant opposite direction traffic in sight on downwind to 24R at LAX pre-dawn, only to realize a minute later I was seeing Venus not an aircraft light!

Humans are creatures of habit, and we expect the most likely thing to keep happening. We also make errors which are not due to incompetence or malice - they are just an error.

As check-airman at my airline I was involved in training and re-training after undesirable situations occurred. Highly trained, professional, competent people are still imperfect. Things happen fast, the environment is far too busy.

quote:

We also make errors which are not due to incompetence or malice - they are just an error.

As check-airman at my airline I was involved in training and re-training after undesirable situations occurred. Highly trained, professional, competent people are still imperfect. Things happen fast, the environment is far too busy.

Perhaps changes will be made to the crowded airspace around Washington. I hope so.

The amount of head-down time in the modern airliner is ridiculous. The non-flying pilot spends a ton of time pushing keys on the FMS system through the entire flight. This crew set up for an ILS to runway 1 and were then given a visual to 33. Loading the new runway into the FMS is mandatory to get the correct airspeeds and flaps configuration loaded in. Primary nav is the FMS, not the ground based ILS.

The pilot flying is mostly looking at instruments and the runway, with less time available to scan for traffic and less excess brain capacity to process the non-stop radio chatter. If the non-flying pilot is getting saturated with re-programming the FMS, his external awareness is diminished.

I know, old man ranting about newfangled technology.

In the old days, we'd have the ILS selected in the NAV radio with the frequency for a possible different runway in the standby. If given a runway change all we had to do was press one button to swap freqs and flip a page in the approach chart book.

All this modern tech is great but it is also a big distraction from old fashioned aviating.

quote:

Originally posted by chellim1:

Perhaps changes will be made to the crowded airspace around Washington. I hope so.

I hope so too. I've operated at every major airport in this country, Canada, and Mexico. Nothing comes close to the intensity of DCA.

quote:

Originally posted by chellim1:

Perhaps changes will be made to the crowded airspace around Washington. I hope so.

I'm guessing the FAA has tried. Secret Service says "Don't fly over the White House." Choppers (military, medevac, park police, TV news, etc) say "We need the low altitude corridor." Congress screams "Land more airliners at DCA, we're too lazy to drive out to IAD." DOT tells FAA to "Make it work."

quote:

Originally posted by Phantom229:

quote:

You say you are a controller. Ok fine.

You say you were a controller. Ok fine. Let me ask you then if you were approving pilot applied visual separation and they told you twice that they had the aircraft in sight, how did you ensure separation? Cause this DCA issued a control instruction to pass behind the traffic but the PAT pilot not only climbed into but turned into the traffic. How was he suppose to turn the helicopter other than telling him to turn? Is there some magical remote control that I don’t know about?

Ok....

Mr. Phantom,

Q: What is the very first line item on the ATC OJT -25 training form?

A: ENSURES SEPARATION

Q: What is the 2nd item?

A: PROVIDES SAFETY ALERTS

The controller failed on both accounts.

Yes, the pilot said he would apply visual; that's fine. However, when one observes (visually -- > out the window ,or on the RACD) that it looks like the pilot aint gonna miss the traffic, you have to attempt to issue instructions -- > turn/climb/descend/etc to de-conflict the aircraft. The poor chap did not do that.

Now, if the controller recognized the impending merge AND issued instructions to de-conflict, then he did everything in his power to prevent the collision.

Sadly, the controller did not do this.

He was busy, very busy. Thus, he lost situational awareness and this happened. Again, I am not here to beat up on the poor guy, however, a fact is a fact.

The controller failed to de-conflict the situation to the best of his ability.

A traffic alert to Bluestreak, a traffic alert to PAT was warranted. It was not done, period.

We can go round and round about this, and I see that we will disagree. I am willing to bet that when the dust settles, the controller is going to share some of the blame. Yes, the PAT pilot will take the lion's share of the blame, but, the findings will state that the controller did not do everything he could to try and de-conflict the two aircraft.

I am in agreement with every controller (current/retired) that I have talked to personally on this issue. It sucks and it hurts to see this happen. Controllers are entrusted with the safety of the flying public and are expected to do this to the maximum of their ability AND without fail.

Again, if the controller recognized the conflict and attempted to remedy it, he would be in the clear.

You will not agree on this, but, the NTSB will.

Mr. Phantom, I wish you well in your career and hope that you understand that I don't have any animosity towards you. It's just that you and I are not looking at this from the same perspective. I was indoctrinated under different standards and expectations.

I've flown into National and it was during the day. What I saw looking out the window was just a big city and with all the turns and such on the approach I was never able to spot the runways at that airport. With all the light polution in the DC area I have not one clue as to how the pilots managed to find that airport at night. BTW when I flew in there it was called the National Airport and even in those days there was a lot of talk in DC about closing the airport because it was just so difficult to fly into and out of. Frankly I think it should be closed down to all Commercial traffic and Jets. Allow it to be used for smaller Propeller driven Private aviation and limit it to that. DC actually has an excellent subway system and I'm pretty certain that there is likely a direct line from Dulles to a central terminal near the center of DC.

quote:

Originally posted by triggertreat:
NTSB confirms there were 5 controllers in DCA tower

From the comments-There were 5 people, but only 3 were actively controlling traffic. Two of the five were "supervisors with one being trained and one in a trainer role. (Anyone ever trained someone? Your focus is not solely on your job. Training is distracting) Breaking that down further one of the 3 active controllers was ground control and only two were focused on the sky; one primary and one assistant (guessing less experienced). So, basically, there was ONE controller in charge of all air traffic at one of the most congested airports in the country. ONE...let that sink in! Stating there were five controllers in the tower is disingenuous.

The tower was the locus of lamentable tragedy. A harried air traffic controller, juggling two jobs at the same time, noticed the looming disaster — but inexplicably failed to direct the helicopter and the plane to separate, offering instead something sounding more like an unhurried suggestion. The controller was handling both helicopters and planes —normally separate jobs— because their supervisor unaccountably let another controller go home early.

The F.A.A.’s preliminary report found tower staffing was “not normal for the time of day and volume of traffic.” Presumably, the FAA meant the tower was understaffed, since who would complain about overstaffing?

In the background of these instantaneous errors lies a fractured FAA having a slow-motion existential crisis. A class-action lawsuit continues grinding away in discovery, exposing the agency’s tragic 2014 decision to scrap merit-based testing when hiring air traffic controllers. Instead the FAA relied on a “biographical statement” that scored, you guessed it, totally irrelevant factors like skin color and ethnic background.

Reams of headlines over the last couple years have reported growing numbers of close calls at airports and an expanding crisis over staffing levels — a manpower crisis that festered even while the agency essentially refused to hire better-qualified white applicants, holding those jobs open for less-qualified minority applicants.

As bad as that sounds, it gets worse. The FAA’s critical staffing issues started —I am not making this up— with its mass layoffs in 2021 of controllers who refused to take the jabs. The agency has never recovered from that horrible mistake. It remains currently 3,000 controllers under normal staffing levels.

Thus, it is unsurprising that in its last survey in 2023, Pete Buttigieg’s DOT reported that 77% of critical air traffic control facilities were understaffed. The truth is probably closer to all of them.

https://www.coffeeandcovid.com...iday-january-31-2025

quote:

and I'm pretty certain that there is likely a direct line from Dulles to a central terminal near the center of DC

One can take the Silver Line directly from the Capitol South station to Dulles Airport. However, those entitled congress critters would have to ride with all of us scum-sucking low-life commoners.

You know they have their own parking lot at DCA?

quote:

Originally posted by chellim1:

quote:

Originally posted by triggertreat:
NTSB confirms there were 5 controllers in DCA tower

From the comments-There were 5 people, but only 3 were actively controlling traffic. Two of the five were "supervisors with one being trained and one in a trainer role. (Anyone ever trained someone? Your focus is not solely on your job. Training is distracting) Breaking that down further one of the 3 active controllers was ground control and only two were focused on the sky; one primary and one assistant (guessing less experienced). So, basically, there was ONE controller in charge of all air traffic at one of the most congested airports in the country. ONE...let that sink in! Stating there were five controllers in the tower is disingenuous.

The tower was the locus of lamentable tragedy. A harried air traffic controller, juggling two jobs at the same time, noticed the looming disaster — but inexplicably failed to direct the helicopter and the plane to separate, offering instead something sounding more like an unhurried suggestion. The controller was handling both helicopters and planes —normally separate jobs— because their supervisor unaccountably let another controller go home early.

The F.A.A.’s preliminary report found tower staffing was “not normal for the time of day and volume of traffic.” Presumably, the FAA meant the tower was understaffed, since who would complain about overstaffing?

In the background of these instantaneous errors lies a fractured FAA having a slow-motion existential crisis. A class-action lawsuit continues grinding away in discovery, exposing the agency’s tragic 2014 decision to scrap merit-based testing when hiring air traffic controllers. Instead the FAA relied on a “biographical statement” that scored, you guessed it, totally irrelevant factors like skin color and ethnic background.

Reams of headlines over the last couple years have reported growing numbers of close calls at airports and an expanding crisis over staffing levels — a manpower crisis that festered even while the agency essentially refused to hire better-qualified white applicants, holding those jobs open for less-qualified minority applicants.

As bad as that sounds, it gets worse. The FAA’s critical staffing issues started —I am not making this up— with its mass layoffs in 2021 of controllers who refused to take the jabs. The agency has never recovered from that horrible mistake. It remains currently 3,000 controllers under normal staffing levels.

Thus, it is unsurprising that in its last survey in 2023, Pete Buttigieg’s DOT reported that 77% of critical air traffic control facilities were understaffed. The truth is probably closer to all of them.

https://www.coffeeandcovid.com...iday-january-31-2025

This is incredible! Incredibly bad!

Questions for the controllers: ATC is only responsible to separate participating aircraft, correct? When the military crew asked for and accepted visual separation didn't they remove themselves from "participating"?

As flight crew I've always assumed when taking visual separation (or a vfr departure) that nobody is watching out for me. ATC has zero responsibility for me, and they may well be far too busy to peripherally monitor me.

quote:

Originally posted by Fly-Sig:
Questions for the controllers: ATC is only responsible to separate participating aircraft, correct? When the military crew asked for and accepted visual separation didn't they remove themselves from "participating"?

As flight crew I've always assumed when taking visual separation (or a vfr departure) that nobody is watching out for me. ATC has zero responsibility for me, and they may well be far too busy to peripherally monitor me.

No, if you are on my frequency, I have a duty to separate. A pilot stating that they will maintain visual separation is a huge help, however, if I notice that your application of visual separation is leading to a loss of separation, then I have an obligation to attempt to de-conflict the situation. Just because a pilot says they will apply visual separation, does not mean I can just act like you are no longer my responsibility.
You stay separate from the other guy and I'll watch to make sure it happens.

Interestingly enough, 'center weenies' (Coloradohunter44) are not permitted to use visual separation in class A airspace. I wonder if the FAA will pull the plug on that for the 'window-lickers' --- > terminal controllers.

Biden's FAA pick - not the best and brightest

More Juan.... Some interesting comments about altimeters.