Review piece from The Wall Street Journal, and by coincidence relating to something I mentioned recently in another thread.

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The Real Lessons Of the Cuban Missile Crisis

Newly uncovered Soviet sources show that the 1962 confrontation could easily have spiraled into nuclear war— a useful warning as we face a new arms race today.

BY SERHII PLOKHY

The world is at the start of a new, undeclared nuclear arms race. In August 2019, the U.S. and Russia officially abandoned the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987, leaving the door open to the development of new missiles. China has 300 nuclear weapons and is expected to double its arsenal in the next decade. Last month, the U.K. raised the cap on its nuclear stockpile by more than 40%, the first projected increase since the end of the Cold War.

With Cold War-era arms control agreements gone, we are facing the first uncontrolled arms race since the 1960s. The nuclear competition of that era culminated in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, arguably the most dangerous moment not only of the Cold War but in world history. If we want to avoid a repetition of that crisis, it’s high time to relearn its lessons— which look different today than they once did, in the light of newly uncovered Soviet sources.

The Cuban missile crisis was triggered by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to redress the disparity in nuclear arms between the USSR and the U.S. President John F. Kennedy had won election in 1960 by arguing that there was a “missile gap” between the two countries that favored the Soviets, but in fact the situation was the opposite. The Soviets had very few strategic ballistic missiles capable of reaching the American mainland, while by 1962 the Americans had plenty of bombers and missiles that could reach Soviet territory.

When Cuban leader Fidel Castro, who survived a U.S.-backed invasion at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, begged the Soviets for military assistance, Khrushchev seized the opportunity to deploy medium-range nuclear missiles within striking range of the U.S. Dozens of missiles, warheads and tactical nuclear weapons had been placed in Cuba before an American U-2 spy plane detected them in mid-October 1962. The operational range of the missiles was 1,290 miles, enough to reach Washington, D.C.

The U.S. was caught by surprise, and Kennedy spent the week of October 15 brainstorming for a solution with a group of aides that became known as the Executive Committee. After considering several options, including airstrikes and a full-fledged invasion of Cuba, Kennedy decided to establish a naval blockade of the island. Faced with the Americans’ refusal to accept the Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba, Khrushchev backed down and on October 28 he agreed to remove the missiles. In exchange, the U.S. agreed not to invade Cuba.

Kennedy also agreed in secret to remove America’s nuclear armed missiles from Turkey.

Ever since, the dominant narrative of the crisis has been that Kennedy won thanks to decisiveness and good judgment, and Khrushchev lost. But American, Soviet and Cuban sources that have become available in the last few decades put that idea in question. From beginning to end, the American response to the crisis was “distorted by misinformation, miscalculation and misperception,” in the words of Kennedy’s defense secretary Robert McNamara. The Soviets’ ability to deliver missiles to Cuba undetected was one of the worst intelligence failures in American history, and Kennedy’s weeklong deliberation about an appropriate response gave the Soviets enough time to make the missiles combat-ready.

The miscalculations did not end there. Only after the end of the Cold War did McNamara learn that the Soviets had deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba as well as ballistic missiles. There were more than 40,000 Soviet troops on the island, not 10,000, as the Americans believed at the time. If Kennedy had ordered an attack on the missile sites from the air, or if Attorney General Robert Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had won support for their plan to invade Cuba, nuclear war would have become all but inevitable. McNamara retroactively estimated the probability at 99%.

Even as American leaders were deliberating, the situation on the ground came close to spiraling out of control. The memoirs of Soviet participants in the crisis show that at its height, Soviet commanders were considering the use of tactical nuclear weapons in self-defense. An American U-2 plane was shot down con- trary to orders from Moscow, and only sheer luck prevented the firing of a Soviet nuclear-armed torpedo at American ships in the Caribbean: A Soviet signalman got stuck with his equipment in the hatch of a submarine, preventing a senior officer from getting inside and ordering the strike.

Bringing the Soviet and Cuban sides of the story into focus also dramatically changes the chronology of the crisis. Contrary to the widespread belief fostered by Robert Kennedy’s memoir “Thirteen Days,” the crisis did not come to an end on October 28; it lasted another 23 days. In mid-November, the Executive Committee was still holding regular meetings to discuss how to respond if an American plane were shot down over Cuba, since Fidel Castro had renewed his orders to fire at American reconnaissance planes. Even after the Soviets agreed to remove their missiles from Cuba, they refused to remove bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons until November 20, effectively ending the crisis.

The main lesson to be drawn from this more detailed story is that history cannot be reduced to the agony of decision-making in the White House. A nuclear crisis has many participants, all acting in a fog of mutual suspicions and misunderstandings, to say nothing of the simple lack of timely, reliable information. Political leaders can lose control over troops on the ground, leaving it to chance to decide the outcome of a complex and dangerous situation. If the Cuban missile crisis didn’t turn into a nuclear war it was partly thanks to pure luck.

After the crisis ended, Kennedy and Khrushchev were sufficiently terrified of the possibility of a nuclear exchange to start arms control talks, leading to a partial ban on nuclear testing in 1963—Kennedy’s last contribution to international politics. The arms control process helped to stabilize the Cold War and eventually end it.

We cannot wait for another nuclear confrontation on the same scale as the Cuban missile crisis to renew our commitment to the principles of nuclear arms control. Today’s communication technology makes nuclear command and control systems more reliable than they were in 1962, but advances in cyberwarfare put that security in doubt. And some of today’s nuclear-armed states are much more unpredictable than the Cold War superpowers. No one knows what to expect from North Korea in a nuclear crisis, or from Iran if it manages to become a nuclear power.

The only way to put limitations on the new nuclear arms race is to return to negotiations not only on strategic nuclear weapons but also on tactical, medium- and intermediate-range nuclear weapons of the kind delivered to Cuba in 1962.

Mr. Plokhy is a professor of history at Harvard University. This essay is adapted from his new book, “Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis,” which will be published this week by W.W. Norton.

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Thanks good read. Today though I’m not sure there is a fear of nuclear war in the same way as 50s and 60s. This extends not just to rogue states like Iran or North Korea, but also to Russia and USA. Low Yield weapons, hypersonic delivery that is not detected until things go “boom” - yeah I’d say we are marching towards some pretty big risk. As outlined in the article, ends up being the folks in the field and they won’t always get it right. We got lucky back then, hope we can say the same in the future.

A friend sat "IN" a fully loaded B-58, during the CMC. He also crashed an SR-71, the cockpit now resides in the Seattle Museum of Flight.

The "official" story of the SR-71 crash is bogus. It reads a tire blowout. But the ACTUAL story is that Lockheed wanted the test pilot (my friend) to takeoff with the computers "OFF!" A/C crashed!!

They didn't want a repeat of that test!!!!

I remember the duck & cover drills in elementary school back then.
We had no real idea how serious it could have been as 9 year olds.

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Those of us who were older were terrified. The rich families were building fallout shelters so they could somehow survive. The scenario of the movie, "On the beach" seemed a real possibility. The Cuban missile crisis was a lot scarier than 9/11.

I was in basic training at Ft.Gordon Ga. That week we were in bayonet and hand to hand fighting. Of course our training cadre were always yelling at us that we were dumb a duds all day, but tha next day it was different.They worked with us,showing how to hold the rifle etc.,and telling us to pay attention,”you don’t know were you’ll be tomorrow”.That night we had to gather behind our day room were a TV was set,and around 7:00 Pres Kennedy came on telling about the missiles.

If you're interested in this bit of history, it would be worth your while to see if you could dig up a copy of "Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis".

Excellent book that looks at a couple of key decisions using three different approaches. We had it in a grad school course back in the early '80s on organizational behavior (which it was also an exceptional text for) but as a military historian, the detail it went into was of immense interest to me. The various missteps and miscommunications and the effects of time lag due to diffusion of information/commands were eye-opening.

My reading of it is far enough in the past for me that I do not recall for sure, but I have no recollection of the analysis being slanted by any desire to use the crisis to argue for disarmament.

I was in the Navy, stationed at the Fleet Operations Control Center (FACCPAC) in Hawaii when this took place. The Pac fleet wasn't directly involved in the conflict, but since one of our main missions was to know where every Russian sub was at any given time things got very hectic. We all thought we where going to full out Nuclear war. 18 hour shifts. Scary time for a 20 year old. Kennedy showed some balls, and Khrushchev thankfully backed down. I've no doubt we'll be faced with a similar situation soon down the line. I'd feel better with Trump at the helm, as I think Biden would be the one to back down.

Nuclear weapons are the Sword of Damocles hanging over the world. As new generations forget the fear of the Cold War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, it's only a matter of time before the politics of brinksmanship creates another nuclear crisis. Best case is another relatively bloodless crisis like the CMC. Worst case - well, we don't really want to imagine that. Even if all nations agreed to eliminate nuclear weapons, there's no putting the genie back in the bottle. Somewhere, sometime, a power hungry leader will recall the ultimate trump card in geopolitical poker and the game will begin anew.

quote:

The U.S. was caught by surprise, and Kennedy spent the week of October 15 brainstorming for a solution...

I've read two accounts that claim we knew about them temp sites and the hard sites being built a long, long, loong time before the "crisis".

Older guys I worked with 25 years ago in eastern Indiana told me about B-52's lining the interstates outside of Wright Patterson Air Force Base. Kennedy was needlessly reckless and almost caused a war, yet has been continuously praised for his actions.

Growing up in the 80's the media put fear into kids that nuclear war was inevitable under Reagan. So many movies, TV shows, and mini series about nuclear war. Of course, Reagan won the cold war and the Soviet Union collapsed.

It is the lack of credible nuclear opponent like the Soviets that has led to the modern complacency. And you know what? I'll bet all those old weapons are bordering on non-functional, especially the Russian ones. Imagine a black comedy where a limited nuclear exchange results in nothing but duds and the leaders of both countries have to call "time-out" and contemplate a "do-over".

quote:

Older guys I worked with 25 years ago in eastern Indiana told me about B-52's lining the interstates outside of Wright Patterson Air Force Base. Kennedy was needlessly reckless and almost caused a war, yet has been continuously praised for his actions.

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Depends on your account. Kennedy was smart and deliberate. When he went on television he instilled a sense of confidence. You ought to listen to the tapes of Kennedy meeting with the military who wanted a full scale invasion etc. Soviet leadership was reckless and misjudged the United States. I think if you lived during that time you would have a different opinion.

It’s interesting to think about the history of the Cold War period and the things that almost happened, most of which were directly due to both the paranoia and the aggressive ambitions of the Soviet Union. Both of those factors were poorly understood by most people in the US and rest of the West at the time, and are of course as understandable and as relevant to most people today as the factors leading to the battle of Cannae.

As for some crazy group or even nation like North Korea’s managing to detonate a nuke or nukes on US soil, the reaction to that is literally unimaginable to me. Unimaginable because I literally have no idea what it might entail, and not just the effects of the attack itself, but how the US would react. I can only believe that if people whine about the measures that were taken in country in response to the 9/11 atrocities and the COVID-19 pandemic, those reactions would seem like the FOE’s decision to the raise the prices at its pancake breakfast fund raiser.

And that doesn’t even begin to consider the blind panics that would follow such an event due to virtually everyone’s ignorance of the actual direct effects of such an attack, but due to their legitimate fears as well. What would happen if 95 percent of the population of every coastal city in the country decided that they needed to flee inland to escape the possibility of another nuke’s being detonated on a container ship in the local harbor?

None of that is of course worthy of worry because that’s all any individual could do—worry—but I do find it interesting to wonder how different the world would be today if some things had been only slightly different 60 years ago.

quote:

Originally posted by sigfreund:

What would happen if 95 percent of the population of every coastal city in the country decided that they needed to flee inland

I remember the CMC but, living in the Midwest, didn't really have a sense of how serious it was until some close relatives in Savannah packed up and headed inland. It all became very real and scary.

Able Archer 1983 was another close call apparently.

A training exercise considered 'too real' by the USSR during a sensitive time for their government:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Able_Archer_83

On a separate note -- the increased hostilities between India and China are concerning.

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My uncle was CO on the USS Cromwell (DE-1014) at the time. They were on a port visit in NYC and sortied for interdiction ops. My dad remembers driving my uncle back to the ship, and that my uncle could not tell him what the emergency was all about...

During Cuban Missile crisis my dad was an E-5 Optical specialist on the Yosemite out of Guantanamo. He spent part of it on a Destroyer working on the gunnery optics. According to him lots of stuff zipping around underwater and above the water and was in a word, “Scary”. Participated in some blockade work too while out. Think everything they had went to sea. We got lucky, but lucky because of good sailors and soldiers on both sides that had the discipline to not pull the trigger. He and the other enlisted thought they were toast.

My cousin was Navy UDT during the crisis . He told me that they swam ashore with the orders to locate Castro and be prepared to take him out when the order came . He said that he was in the crosshairs but the order never came .

quote:

Originally posted by ZSMICHAEL:

quote:

Older guys I worked with 25 years ago in eastern Indiana told me about B-52's lining the interstates outside of Wright Patterson Air Force Base. Kennedy was needlessly reckless and almost caused a war, yet has been continuously praised for his actions.

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Depends on your account. Kennedy was smart and deliberate. When he went on television he instilled a sense of confidence. You ought to listen to the tapes of Kennedy meeting with the military who wanted a full scale invasion etc. Soviet leadership was reckless and misjudged the United States. I think if you lived during that time you would have a different opinion.

Well, Kennedy provoked the Cuban Missile Crisis. He had NO legal authority at all to institute a naval blockade of Cuba. That was an ACT OF WAR, as understood by the world's major powers. Why did he over-react? Because the Soviets were placing missiles in Cuba. This was, as the narrative teaches, a grave threat to the peace-loving people of the US and the world. The ONLY reason for such missiles so close to US soil was to launch a surprise attack to decapitate the US leadership. Kennedy had no choice but to react strongly to the emplacement of these missiles. Or, so we have been told.

What few people realize or acknowledge is that, DURING THE SAME TIME FRAME, the US had these same types of missiles stationed in Turkey; a similar distance from Moscow. Of course, OUR missiles were there to prevent an aggressive Soviet Union from nuking us first. Our motives were pure and blameless. Again, that's what we have been told.

As Americans, I believe we are naturally biased. Everything (or most) we did was for the greater good, and US motives were pure and honorable. Those dirty commies, on the other hand, were deceitful and bent on world domination. Everything they did was for nefarious purposes. Now, this is often true, but not universally so. I do realize, of course, that the USSR WAS the 'evil empire' as President Reagan called them. However, an honest review of history must show the US also had blood on our hands.

Kennedy was a fool to push the Soviets against a wall and force them to either accept open conflict or back down in humiliation. The fact that it turned out ok does NOT justify his actions. I am utterly amazed we ever survived this Crisis, and I believe it was only divine intervention that prevented us all from being nuked.

Had the US invaded Cuba, the Sovs WOULD HAVE attacked the landing beaches with atomic weapons (they had FROG battlefield rockets armed with live nukes, and the Soviet ground commander had release authority). Now, I respect Kennedy from standing up to the military, which REALLY wanted to invade. But, the Crisis was a crisis of Kennedy's own making. He had no right or moral authority to demand the Soviet missiles be removed from Cuba (ESPECIALLY when we had our missiles in Turkey; something the history books tend to ignore). He gambled with ALL our lives. Basically, he provoked a crisis in the first place and then took credit for getting us through this same crisis. That is not something to admire - it was nuclear brinkmanship with the fate of the world in the balance. I cannot admire him for that.

We got lucky.

A very long article but worth reading. Did Kennedy have authority to impose the quarantine? Does the fact that we had Jupiter missiles in Turkey justify Russia's actions?

I'll never forget Kennedy's tv address informing the nation of the crisis, especially this one line: "the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth." And btw I thought he looked and sounded scared, not confident.


https://colinatoxford.wordpres...uban-missile-crisis/