The Pentagon is investigating what it has called a “critical compromise” of communications across 17 Air Force facilities by one of its engineers, according to a search warrant obtained by Forbes. The document also details evidence of a possible breach of FBI communications by the same employee, who worked at the Arnold Air Force Base in Tennessee.
The government had been tipped off by a base contractor that the 48-year-old engineer had taken government radio technologies home, effectively stealing them for his own use, according to the warrant, which alleged the amount of pilfered equipment was worth nearly $90,000.
When law enforcement raided his home, they found he had “unauthorized administrator access” to radio communications tech used by the Air Education and Training Command (AETC), “affecting 17 DoD installations,” according to the warrant. The AETC is one of nine “major commands,” defined by the Pentagon as “interrelated and complementary, providing offensive, defensive, and support elements” to Air Force HQ.
While the government didn’t detail the breadth or nature of the information taken, these new allegations come just three months after another major breach of Pentagon security. In that incident, it was alleged Air National Guard employee Jack Teixera leaked sensitive information related to the war in Ukraine on social platform Discord. Teixera pleaded not guilty in June, while the DoD made plans to improve its security measures to prevent similar breaches.
Because the engineer has not been charged, Forbes is withholding publication of his name. He did not respond to requests for comment. Neither the Department of Defense nor the Air Force had responded to requests for comment. The Justice Department declined to comment.
During the raid, investigators also discovered an open computer screen showing the suspect was running a Motorola radio programming software, “which contained the entire Arnold Air Force Base (AAFB) communications system,” according to the warrant.
They also claimed to have found evidence the suspect had possible access to communications of the FBI and various Tennessee state agencies, though authorities did not provide more information on what data he had obtained.
The FBI hadn’t provided comment at the time of publication, though the search warrant revealed it was working with the Air Force on the investigation.
According to the warrant, “witnesses and co-workers” told investigators that the suspect “sold radios and radio equipment, worked odd hours, was arrogant, frequently lied, displayed inappropriate workplace behavior and sexual harassment, had financial problems, and possessed [Arnold Air Force Base land mobile radio] equipment.” A colleague had twice reported him because of “insider threat indicators” and unauthorized possession of Air Force equipment, investigators said.
According to his LinkedIn page, the suspect has a long history in cybersecurity as well as radio communications. He claims to have carried out numerous tests of the Arnold Air Force Base’s security, improved protection of radio communications on the site and had knowledge of the encryption used on government data.
A document detailing the forensics on technologies seized from his home revealed that he had a USB containing “administrative passwords and electronic system keys” for the AETC radio network. Also retrieved from flash drives were “local law enforcement radio programming files,” On another USB drive were “Motorola radio programming files,” which, when opened, presented a warning banner noting they were U.S. government property. Meanwhile, installer files recovered in the search came with a "CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED" pop-up when opened.
Reported twice, looks like his chain of command needs some disciplinary action if this is true. One complaint should have been enough to investigate and find what was going on. With the recent incidents, you would think that the higher ups would start some internal investigations to see what else is being missed.
According to the warrant, “witnesses and co-workers” told investigators that the suspect “sold radios and radio equipment, worked odd hours, was arrogant, frequently lied, displayed inappropriate workplace behavior and sexual harassment, had financial problems
Reads like a modern day FBI supervisor's job description.
_________________________ "Sometimes I wonder whether the world is being run by smart people who are putting us on or by imbeciles who really mean it." Mark Twain
Times have changed. During the Cold War I was assigned to SAC. Since this brought me into close access to nukes, I was subject to what then then known as the "Human Reliability Program". Which is now called the Personnel Reliability Program. Semantics. If there was even a hint of misconduct of any sort, you were relieved of duty and reassigned. Often to Civil Engineering, which was referred to as weeds and seeds. Which meant you cut grass. Or you were discharged. It seems now there is little oversight on those who have access to critical systems and information. Who is minding the store, USAF?
End of Earth: 2 Miles Upper Peninsula: 4 Miles
Posts: 16554 | Location: Marquette MI | Registered: July 08, 2014
"Human Reliability Program". Which is now called the Personnel Reliability Program. Semantics.
Been there, got that t-shirt.
Likewise. An E-5 I was stationed with in navy nuke weapons program got stupid, along with a “social disease”, and was discharged as unreliable. Times have indeed changed.
Three separates incidents where leadership failed to act and see through any disciplinary measures after Texiera was caught Basically, his bosses kept the problems in-house, put their heads in the sand hoping nothing would come of and failed to implement or, follow better security guidelines nor, provide close oversight.
What a fuck-up
Posts: 15191 | Location: Wine Country | Registered: September 20, 2000
"Human Reliability Program". Which is now called the Personnel Reliability Program. Semantics.
Been there, got that t-shirt.
Was it because the term “human” was offensive to non-human personnel???
It’s interesting to me, it took a contractor to report the person unless the person was the contractor’s employee but I didn’t read it to be that way.
"It did not really matter what we expected from life, but rather what life expected from us. We needed to stop asking about the meaning of life, and instead to think of ourselves as those who were being questioned by life – daily and hourly. Our answer must consist not in talk and meditation, but in right action and in right conduct. Life ultimately means taking the responsibility to find the right answer to its problems and to fulfill the tasks which it constantly sets for each individual." Viktor Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, 1946.
Posts: 20258 | Location: The Free State of Arizona - Ditat Deus | Registered: March 24, 2011
Originally posted by corsair: Three separates incidents where leadership failed to act and see through any disciplinary measures after Texiera was caught Basically, his bosses kept the problems in-house, put their heads in the sand hoping nothing would come of and failed to implement or, follow better security guidelines nor, provide close oversight.
What a fuck-up ]
That’s a cascading series of failures by a number of individuals. It’s not as if maintaining classified information security is an ancillary job for each of them; it’s their main fucking job.
"It did not really matter what we expected from life, but rather what life expected from us. We needed to stop asking about the meaning of life, and instead to think of ourselves as those who were being questioned by life – daily and hourly. Our answer must consist not in talk and meditation, but in right action and in right conduct. Life ultimately means taking the responsibility to find the right answer to its problems and to fulfill the tasks which it constantly sets for each individual." Viktor Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, 1946.
Posts: 20258 | Location: The Free State of Arizona - Ditat Deus | Registered: March 24, 2011
Basically, his bosses kept the problems in-house, put their heads in the sand hoping nothing would come of and failed to implement or, follow better security guidelines nor, provide close oversight.
