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Is that idiot Biden gonna get us in a war with Russia or China?

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November 2, 2022 3:09 PM GMT+1 Last Updated 17 days ago

Nord Stream 1 operator says it found craters at damaged pipeline site

Reuters

MOSCOW, Nov 2 (Reuters) - The Swiss-based operator of Russia-led Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline said on Wednesday it had completed initial data gathering at location of the pipeline damage on line 1 in the Swedish exclusive economic zone and found "technogenic craters".

"According to preliminary results of the damage site inspection, technogenic craters with a depth of 3 to 5 meters were found on the seabed at a distance of about 248 metres from each other," it said.

[...]

"The section of the pipe between the craters is destroyed, the radius of pipe fragments dispersion is at least 250 metres. Experts continue to analyse the survey data," Nord Stream AG added.

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Sweden: Prosecutor confirms Nord Stream 2 sabotage

November 18, 2022

The Nord Stream 2 pipeline was damaged in a series of explosions in September, a prosecutor in Sweden said, adding explosives remains were found on the damaged pipeline.

A Swedish prosecutor said Friday that explosions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline were the result of sabotage.

In a statement, the Swedish Security Service said, "It is a case of serious sabotage," adding, "the extensive damage to the gas lines as a result of the detonations have been extensively documented."

[...]

What do we know so far?

The Swedish Security Service reports, "During analyzes carried out, residues of explosives have been identified on several of the foreign objects seized."

State prosecutor Mats Ljungqvist also said traces of explosives were found on several foreign objects.

Swedish authorities stopped short of assigning blame to any individuals or nation-state.

Last month, Denmark said a preliminary investigation showed the pipeline had been damaged by powerful explosions.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Friday that Russia intends to wait for a full damage assessment before determining whether to repair the pipeline.

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Source = Foxnews.com:Russian gas pipeline explodes near St. Petersburg, video shows
Russia officials say pipeline explosion caused by 'depressurization'
[There is some video at the link]

An explosion erupted in a gas pipeline outside St. Petersburg in Russia Saturday, according to a social media post by the governor of the Leningrad Region.

"Firefighters and rescuers extinguish a fire caused by a gas pipeline depressurization between Berngardovka and Kovalevo," Gov. Alexander Drozdenko said on Telegram. "There is no threat to the population and the spread of fire to residential areas."

The governor said the exact cause of the fireball that emerged in videos on social media was still being investigated. 

No suggestion of sabotage has been mentioned and Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations said the explosion was likely the result of "depressurization" in pipeline, which officials have further reduced to stop the fire, Russian media outlet RIA reported.


Explosion on pipeline in Leningrad, Russia outside of St. Petersburg. (Reuters )

Drozdenko said that emergency crew members allowed the gas to burn off and "are getting ready to start repairing the gas pipeline."

The governor also looked to assure local residents and said despite the alarming footage circling social media – including videos that showed a substantial fireball and burn site following the loud explosion – the surrounding forest areas were likely not in danger from the fire spreading. 

Drozdenko said the Vsevolozhsk thermal power plant has been "switched" to supply oil instead of gas to "ensure uninterrupted heat supply."

No casualties in the blast or ensuing fire have been reported, according to the local governor. 

Caitlin McFall is a Reporter at Fox News Digital covering Politics, U.S. and World news.

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Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022

Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Dr Jack Watling , Oleksandr V Danylyuk and Nick Reynolds

30 November 2022

This study of the early phases of the 2022 war sheds light on Ukraine's strengths and vulnerabilities, and the need for further Western support.

Executive Summary

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has provided an invaluable opportunity to assess the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) and the implications of a range of capabilities for modern warfare. Many publicly made judgements on these issues have lacked supporting data or insight into Ukrainian operational planning and decision-making. To ensure that those drawing lessons from the conflict do so from a solid foundation, this report seeks to outline key lessons, based on the operational data accumulated by the Ukrainian General Staff, from the fighting between February and July 2022. As the underlying source material for much of this report cannot yet be made public, this should be understood as testimony rather than as an academic study. Given the requirements for operational security, it is necessarily incomplete.

Russia planned to invade Ukraine over a 10-day period and thereafter occupy the country to enable annexation by August 2022. The Russian plan presupposed that speed, and the use of deception to keep Ukrainian forces away from Kyiv, could enable the rapid seizure of the capital. The Russian deception plan largely succeeded, and the Russians achieved a 12:1 force ratio advantage north of Kyiv. The very operational security that enabled the successful deception, however, also led Russian forces to be unprepared at the tactical level to execute the plan effectively. The Russian plan’s greatest deficiency was the lack of reversionary courses of action. As a result, when speed failed to produce the desired results, Russian forces found their positions steadily degraded as Ukraine mobilised. Despite these setbacks, Russia refocused on Donbas and, since Ukraine had largely expended its ammunition supply, proved successful in subsequent operations, slowed by the determination – rather than the capabilities – of Ukrainian troops. From April, the West became Ukraine’s strategic depth, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) only robbed Russia of the initiative once long-range fires brought Russian logistics under threat.

The tactical competence of the Russian military proved significantly inferior compared with the expectations of many observers based within and outside Ukraine and Russia. Nevertheless, Russian weapons systems proved largely effective, and those units with a higher level of experience demonstrated that the AFRF have considerable military potential, even if deficiencies in training and the context of how they were employed meant that the Russian military failed to meet that potential. Factoring in the idiosyncrasies of the Russian campaign, there are five key areas that should be monitored to judge whether the Russian military is making progress in resolving its structural and cultural deficiencies. These areas should be used to inform assessments of Russian combat power in the future.

1. The AFRF currently operate with a hierarchy of jointery in which the priorities of the land component are paramount, and the military as a whole is subordinate to the special services. This creates sub-optimal employment of other branches.

2. The AFRF force-generation model is flawed. It proposes the creation of amalgamated combined arms formations in wartime but lacks the strength of junior leadership to knit these units together.

3. There is a culture of reinforcing failure unless orders are changed at higher levels. This appears less evident in the Russian Aerospace Forces than in the Ground Forces and Navy.

4. The AFRF are culturally vulnerable to deception because they lack the ability to rapidly fuse information, are culturally averse to providing those who are executing orders with the context to exercise judgement, and incentivise a dishonest reporting culture.

5. The AFRF’s capabilities and formations are prone to fratricide. Electronic warfare (EW) systems and other capabilities rarely deconflict, while processes for identifying friend from foe and establishing control measures are inadequate. The result is that capabilities that should magnify one another’s effects must be employed sequentially.

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Originally posted by PASig:
I'm surprised that report did not also mention the fact that the Russians have basically zero concept of a Noncommissioned Officer Corps like all other Western militaries do and instead have Colonels and Generals doing the work that Sergeants and Sergeants-Major/Chiefs do in the other militaries.

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operate with a hierarchy of jointery in which the priorities of the land component are paramount, and the military as a whole is subordinate to the special services.

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Originally posted by corsair:
I can't figure out if I'm more bothered by him wearing his smock and boonie indoors or, his speech impediment?