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Originally posted by Broadside:
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Originally posted by corsair:
Those ships are floating monuments to the disfunction inside the Navy. Among many things, those ships set the navy backwards by at least 10-years.
Can you expand on this for us non-Navy types?
It's an endless list of bad things but, here's some:
- There was no specific mission focus when it was conceived. All ships prior have an outline of what it's main mission and secondary missions are. LCS had no concept of operations developed, thus the mission modules which were supposed to make it versatile, actually resulted in the ship being good at nothing. The anti-mine module never came about after 10+ years and billions spent on research. The anti-submarine module is useless as both ships use noisy water-jets instead of props and the internal machinery isn't silenced for listening in the water. The anti-surface module is limited to a pop-gun (57mm) for a canon and a couple 30mm guns. The Hellfire anti-surface missile has a range of 5-6miles, not even over-the-horizon. The Naval Strike Missile has a range of 100miles but, the ships don't have a decent fire-control radar to take advantage of that range. The only anti-air capability is the last ditch SeaRAM system.
- The LCS was supposed to incorporate modern machinery, methodology and enough computers to monitor all systems which theoretically should reduce the number of watch standards being manned, hence a smaller crew. The reality is these smaller crews were left with doing twice the work normally asked as sailors not only had to do their own rating but, somebody else's as well. The Navy thought that utilizing Blue & Gold crews like submariners they could keep crews fresh and on constant rotation, the reality is they ended up with burnt-out crews. The navy has had to increase the ships complement while continuously evaluating the workload each sailor is burdened with. All sailors know that Navy ships require redundant crews because battle damage will eliminate some members and you'll not only need the additional hands to replace your losses but, also to help with damage control. 7 of the first 8-ships all suffered mechanical failures, half of them were because of sailor error.
- The ships are made of aluminum, built to commercial standards not to surface combatant standards. No paint is applied, which gives the ships their rough appearance. Rumor has it that an admiral liked the cost savings of not having to paint the ships and thought the raw aluminum look made it look like a stealth fighter's matte finish
yeah, no shit. Never mind the soot marks from the side exhausts, very ship-shape. Aluminum as we saw during the Falklands, burns quite hot when heated..like when an anti-ship missile detonates or, fuel is ignited. Without any hardening or, reinforced framing, the LCS' aren't structurally any different than luxury yachts or, fishing boats. One of the ships, on the way to its new homeport, prior to commissioning, cracked its hull after bouncing inside the Panama Canal.
- Both ships are limited in range, as they can barely make 4,000 miles without the need for a fill-up. In other words, they can barely cross the Atlantic in a single push, navy ships don't run dry or, even get to half-way so, they need to have an oiler to pull-up along side constantly. Meanwhile, being built at the same time, the Coast Guard's similarly sized National Security Cutter, can make 12,000 miles with its internal tanks full.
- The first deployment for the LCS came...nearly 8-years after the first ship was commissioned. Lengthy issues with machinery, tech on the fritz, repeated hull inspections, lack of weapons or, mission limitations, continued to push the LCS to red-headed step-child status and the Navy having to create a separate command structure for it. The first four ships are test beds, the next 6 are for training, which leaves the remaining for deployment, which has been very limited to date. No other class of ships have had so many hulls, over such a long period of time, dedicated to non-deployment/non-combat status.