I walked through that airplane every time it came to Destin starting at least 15 years ago up to its last visit last year. Collings Foundation has owned it for a long time, as stated above.
Must admit that last year was really going to see the B-25 as my dad flew them some in as WW II. It didn't show due to a maintenance issue.

No one, and I mean no one, takes better care of their warbirds than Collings. I have first hand experience with assisting in the maintenance of Betty Jane, as well as their B-25. I have rear seat time in their TP-51C and TF-51D, and right seat time in the Collings B-25. All magnificently restored, and safety is paramount - not $$$.

quote:

Originally posted by aileron:
No one, and I mean no one, takes better care of their warbirds than Collings. I have first hand experience with assisting in the maintenance of Betty Jane, as well as their B-25. I have rear seat time in their TP-51C and TF-51D, and right seat time in the Collings B-25. All magnificently restored, and safety is paramount - not $$$.

A friend of mine was flying the B-25 with them for a while.....

quote:

Originally posted by aileron:
No one, and I mean no one, takes better care of their warbirds than Collings. I have first hand experience with assisting in the maintenance of Betty Jane, as well as their B-25. I have rear seat time in their TP-51C and TF-51D, and right seat time in the Collings B-25. All magnificently restored, and safety is paramount - not $$$.

While I am no airplane mechanic or pilot, I toured their B 17, B24 about 6 years ago and noticed everything was meticulous. From the control cables, to wiring runs and everything I looked at.

The problem is, it's a 75 year old plane. With 75 year old engines. The engines have a lot of castings such as cylinders that are 75 years old. Also a lot of 75 year old technology on the engines, that was finnicky when it was new and even more finnicky now. The nature of the beast.

While the B17 was really tight for me to get through (being 6'3) I really wanted to fly on it and for some reason didn't spend the $400-450 they wanted for a ticket/flight that day. Every year since I've been out of town or just missed it when they were in town and honestly have been kicking myself ever since. The B24 really didn't interest me nearly as much even though it's much roomier inside...…..I fly on a T6-Texan occasionally and have flown on a lot of other interesting vintage stuff when I was younger like a steersman bi-plane......

The NTSB opened the docket on this crash; you won't find the report, but you'll find considerable documentation.

No real surprise here; the Collings Foundation was flying under the radar with the same abysmal maintenance that they've been known for over the past 20+ years, and ended up with two dead engines, airspeed limitations, thrust limitations, and no altitude: they ran out of airspeed, altitude, and ideas, about the same time.

Some talk was made of the crew being the most experienced B17 pilots left; the captain was also the director of maintenance for the Collings Foundation, and ultimately responsible not only for determining that the airplane was airworthy and safety to fly on the day he piloted it, but for it's operating condition (safety wire cutting through and grounding out magneto p-leads, worn out overgapped spark plugs, etc.

Same old shit. Leopard doesn't change its spots.

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=100356

quote:

Originally posted by sns3guppy:
The NTSB opened the docket on this crash; you won't find the report, but you'll find considerable documentation.

No real surprise here; the Collings Foundation was flying under the radar with the same abysmal maintenance that they've been known for over the past 20+ years, and ended up with two dead engines, airspeed limitations, thrust limitations, and no altitude: they ran out of airspeed, altitude, and ideas, about the same time.

Some talk was made of the crew being the most experienced B17 pilots left; the captain was also the director of maintenance for the Collings Foundation, and ultimately responsible not only for determining that the airplane was airworthy and safety to fly on the day he piloted it, but for it's operating condition (safety wire cutting through and grounding out magneto p-leads, worn out overgapped spark plugs, etc.

Same old shit. Leopard doesn't change its spots.

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=100356

Agreed about the leopard.

I provided a quote for some B24 major repairs a few years ago (more than a couple). The response from them was essentially and in the kindest words I can find, "insulting".

Quality maintenance by quality mechanics has not been what they are known for. Cutting corners to make ends meet, is. It's never going to pencil to keep these things operating profitably, and the amount of cost-cutting that is safe and feasible is difficult to guess at. As usual, this was a snowball event that could have been stopped at numerous points along the way. A culture of acceptance, probably due to the amazing fact that these aircraft and the history they represent, is amazing. The end of an era is coming swiftly. Expect these flights to come to an end.

The captain on that flight had a previous pilot certificate revocation and medical certificate suspension for failing to report a second DUI. Circa 2011, he doubled his flight time reported to the FAA on his medical form, over a one year period, and showed very large increases in flight time over the two years prior to the mishap. Given that he held a commercial without an instrument rating and only one type, and his habit of falsifying his flight time, it appears his experience level was considerably overreported.

They had difficulty starting the No. 3 and No. 4 engines on the mishap flight. No passenger was briefed, even on how to operate the seat belt, and some weren't able to lock their seat belts or tighten them. No egress instructions were given. In fact, no briefing of any kind, was given. Seats were on the floor.

I spent a few hours reviewing the docket. There are several threads on this site reflecting a desire to fly on board Collings Foundation aircraft, including their A-4 and F-4. I'd strongly suggest that anyone considering doing so, reconsider.

This message has been edited. Last edited by: sns3guppy,

I thought I read that the FAA had revoked the Collings Foundation's permit to operate passenger fights?

This message has been edited. Last edited by: 4859,

blancolirio lays it all out, including photos of the mags that were badly maintained, not installed properly and out of spec/miss adjusted.




Link to original video: https://youtu.be/1HNsQuLrOqg

Sorry to read this.
Flying isn't cheap or easy. If you can't do it right, you shouldn't be doing it.

So it sounds like they destroyed a priceless historical artifact and killed innocent (and unknowing) passengers out of negligence.

This really torques me off.

I never heard about Collings' shoddy maintenance. They will likely get their butts sued off from this.

When I read about the two DUI's and falsification of flight logs, I have a reasonable idea of what that kind of person he was. Not someone I would ever have hired when I had mechanical repair businesses in the past. Good mechanics do not do that stuff, and they do not cut corners.

I'm not a mechanic or pilot, but when I visited these planes in Cape May NJ a few weeks prior to the crash, I was less than impressed watching these guys work on them.

quote:

Originally posted by c1steve:
When I read about the two DUI's and falsification of flight logs, I have a reasonable idea of what that kind of person he was. Not someone I would ever have hired when I had mechanical repair businesses in the past. Good mechanics do not do that stuff, and they do not cut corners.

I spent about five hours reviewing the docket yesterday. I don't recall anything about flight logs falsified, but the pilots reported times were certainly not accurate. When the pilot reported his times, they increased almost six thousand hours in one year, effectively doubling his previously reported total experience. Last year, he claimed a 2,000 hour increase. Most guys flying long haul freight don't fly that much, or close to it, even doing up to 14 hours at a time (or more). A 74 year old guy giving occasional half-hour rides? Not any remote possibility.

In addition, he had only one type rating, for the B-17, and no instrument rating. He didn't necessarily need anything else to fly the B-17, but it doesn't appear that his flying background was very extensive, and unless it was all ag flying, it's unlikely he got remotely close to the hours he claimed, without an instrument rating. There just aren't that many jobs out there that hire pilots who aren't instrument rated. The copilot on the mishap flight had 26,000 hours and multiple types, and was retired, but had no B-17 type rating. He flew right seat occasionally, as a volunteer, for fun.

The overgapped spark plugs were simply worn out; the organization was trying to stretch parts as far as they could on the little budget they had. It doesn't matter what the budget is: in aviation, it's either within tolerance, or it's not. Using worn out parts is unacceptable. Moreover, they listed all the engines as overhauled or rebuilt within the last few hours, yet the accessories were excessively worn, such as cams in both magnetos, with corrosion evident in cylinders and in the magnetos. Mags were grounding out while in operation, and the p-leads on one mag were held in place with a single loop of safety wire.

An associate of mine was killed in a PB4Y (B24) nearly 20 years ago; he'd flown the B24 and B17 with Collings for several years prior to his death, and the maintenance was no better then. The same will be true of all the Collings Foundation's aircraft.

Just as critical, the captain made the choice to fly this aircraft, knowing it's issues. They made multiple start attempts on the #4 engine prior to the mishap flight; it wouldn't start, and they took time to "blow out" the magneto, even though that had nothing to do with the problem (I've never "blown out" magnetos on a radial engine airplane...and have flown singles through four engine bombers, since I was a kid...but I fly properly maintained aircraft, as a rule).

It's not uncommon to have starting troubles with radials, but all witnesses, including all passengers, reported particular difficulty with the No. 4 engine.

The crew did not perform an engine run-up, which is very necessary when it comes to flying radial engine airplanes; full propeller low RPM checks, and it takes time to warm the entire engine. Carburetor heat is a big issue with radials, and magneto checks are very important. It's clear from the pieces of the investigation that no runup was done (specifically stated by each survivor); the pilot taxied to the runway and took off. Had he done the run-up, given the condition of the magnetos, they'd have never been able to take off, because I'm quite sure he knew the engine would be popping and banging far too much.

There was evidence of detonation in both engines, and given the wear on the corroded magneto cams, and insufficient points gap as a result, one engine produced very weak spark, the other had enough, but was grounding out, so intermittantly, no spark. It failed shortly after takeoff (No. 4). There was also mag condenser leakage beyond tolerance, worn spark plugs, and ignition leads that did not deliver, as well as evidence of arcing at the lead "cigarette" contacts.

I've had 72 engine failures over my career to date, I believe; many of those are radials, which are prone to a lot more potential problems than most other kinds of engines. Some partial power failures, many shutdowns, but also other issues associated with them, and precautionary shutdowns. Point is, engine failures on round engines aren't unheard of, or even that uncommon, but some of the issues here were so glaring that they pilot (who was director of maintenance) skipped basic, critical procedures (engine runup), and overlooked known issues, in order to rush a flight into the air. The power loss occurred just after takeoff.

Disappointing. Unfortunately, the data thus far is no surprise.

quote:

Originally posted by sns3guppy:
Just as critical, the captain made the choice to fly this aircraft, knowing it's issues.

And what about the pilot passing up the first opportunity to land it on the intersecting runway?
Monday morning quarterbacking I realize, but he seemingly missed a chance that would likely have saved the day.

I don't know what the captain's reasoning was. Lowering landing gear and moving secondary controls such as flaps, isn't the same as actuating them in modern aircraft. Given the point of failure and return, he may not have been in position to make runway 33, and he certainly would have expected to be able to return to land on rwy 6. Had both engines 3 and 4 feathered, very likely he would have made it wihtout difficulty.

Engine 4 was feathered, but survivors remarked on surging and a grinding sound from engine 3; post-crash teardown of the engine found the propeller on the low pitch stops, meaning it wasn't feathered. The propeller displayed rotational damage. It was turning. I think the captain attempted to use engine 3 for the return, but with a prop on the low pitch stop, the drag would have been enormous, were the engine not making power.

Multi-engine pilots understand that in a light twin, loss of one engine doesn't take 50% of the performance, but can take up to 80%...because the remaining engine is also countering drag. With the loss of one engine on a four engine WWII era bomber, the airplane can be manageable if the failed engine is feathered. If it's not feathered, with three others turning, those other three may not be enough. In this case, with two engines turning, one feathered, and one not, the captain was in a situation for which training is not given, nor is performance predicted, and the performance would have been considerably worse than he anticipated. In hindsight, viewing the mishap, it was certainly worse than he anticipated, and when he did get on the ground, a thousand feet short of the runway, the tailwheel lock was sheared, and the aircraft turned under asymmetric thrust and headed for the deice pad, where it crashed.

The captain was in a catch 22 situation; with the massive drag increase of one unfeathered propeller, and an intermittant, surging engine, he needed as much power as he could get from the remaining two, but was up against an airspeed problem in which he would be forced to retard power on the good engines to maintain directional control. Under circumstances with two caged (shut down and feathered) engines on the right, he could have managed with rudder; with the inboard right No. 3 engine producing drag unfeathered, he would have had insufficient rudder. If you go to the docket and look at the witness videos submitted, you'll see the B17 touching down with a lot of bank and the left wing coming up. The captain is trying to keep it under control and it's trying to roll on him. There's no reverse thrust and the brakes on that airplane are weak, and fade quickly, and at higher speeds, needs the tailwheel lock on landing (which it didn't have due to the sheared lock pin).

There may be a number of reasons that he didn't take the shorter runway 33, but among them is likely that he wasn't ready to make that landing yet, and that he anticipated more performance than he had.

Not necessarily relevant here but the B17 had a design flaw with the location and shape of the handle for the landing gear and the flaps. Pilots on approach sometimes retracted the flaps instead of lowering the gear and lost a lot of lift unexpectedly. Redesign of the handles for a more obviously different feel was the solution, and a good lesson on user interfaces and ergonomics.

These old planes were designed fast and with very little of what is now standard thinking about controls and instruments.

I am certainly no aviation expert, but I spent lots of time on the SAC ramp where I had little to do but watch the Maintence crews at work. The time and effort to to keep a B52 /KC135 flight ready was amazing to me. It was 24/7/365. And when I was watching, the aircraft were already 20+ years old.
I would guess the time, expense and expertise to keep a B17 aloft would be a daunting challenge.
It appears that the loss of life and of an iconic aircraft was due to the grossest of incompetence.

The documentation for aircraft of that era is sparse; the maintenance, pilot, navigation, load, and other manuals and documents are thin and fairly limited in scope. The aircraft were intended for short term use. Today, 76 years after that airplane hit the bricks, parts are scarce and operators have nowhere near the military budget, and don't fix things by removing entire major components and shipping them off.

I used to overhaul the hamilton standard hydromatic propellers used on that airplane, at night, over a 55 gallon drum, using a bucket with avgas from the airplane wing, for solvent.

The tech is low. It's not that complicated, and the aircraft are not that hard to maintain. They use standard practices and techniques, and materials. They're expensive.

The reliability of an R-1820 engine is very different than most turbojets, however. They drip and leak oil incessantly, and if you want to see a radial engine pilot get nervous, go a few hours without something happening. The suspense is a killer.

The NTSB Final Report is out. No surprises.

https://u7061146.ct.sendgrid.n...B-2FLUglEDEnmwS8Q-3D

The NTSB put most of it on the pilot, who was also the director of maintenance. Every aspect of the event screams "no."

Improper procedures; Collings Foundation procedures were faulty, but they didn't follow their own procedures. The SMS program was useless, run by a part time volunteer. The maintenance was shit. Airspeed far too low. Gear lowered downwind; stupid pilot tricks that guaranteed the crash. Little or no briefing of passengers. The Collings Foundation waiver across the board, yanked, no more rides, static displays only.

They muffed it up for everyone, with scrutiny and changes coming for all other operators of historical aircraft, that give rides. Collings was always like this; nothing new, and like I said, no surprises at all.